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This dissertation examines the construction, instrumentalization, and institutionalization 
of a West German victimhood narrative between 1945 and 1970, namely a homogenized master 
narrative of the “flight and expulsion” of some ten to twelve million ethnic Germans from 
Central and Eastern Europe during and immediately after the Second World War. I argue that 
expellee groups, historians, and politicians cemented a victimhood narrative and idealized past 
that emphasized German suffering and Soviet barbarity in museums, literature, and the media in 
order to underpin arguments for social, material, and political claims. In this manner, the 
expellee organizations fashioned a central concept of “flight and expulsion” and colonized public 
debates for decades, leaving a lasting impact on how contemporary Germany remembers the war 
and the integration of millions of refugees. By examining the trajectory of the expulsion 
narrative, I seek to show the layering of memory, how it was used over time, and the defining 
impact that this victimhood discourse has had on German public memory and academic 
interpretation of the phenomenon. My work investigates the origins and evolution of a discourse 
that continues to inform German historical consciousness, thereby providing fresh insights into 
the relationship between memory politics, the production and narration of history, and political 
interest group advocacy. 
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After many years of exhaustive work, writing this part of the dissertation proved 
welcome and satisfying, as it allowed me to recall the many friends, family, and colleagues that 
have supported me along the way. Without their unwavering support, I would not be the person 
and scholar I am today, and so I am forever indebted to them. 
 I have had the good fortune to receive generous research support from a number of 
institutions and entities. The History Department of the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill provided support to conduct research, as did the DAAD with a Graduate Research Grant that 
permitted eight months of fruitful research in German archives. The Berlin Program for 
Advanced German and European Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin also enabled me to 
extend my stay in Germany for ten months. A very special thanks goes to the Berlin Program’s 
tireless Karin Goihl, and her ceaseless support in all matters ranging from navigating university 
bureaucracy to tips that made the Berlin experience even more special.  
A number of dedicated archival staffs provided invaluable advice and greatly increased 
my effectiveness, so that I did not drown in file folders. While I found nearly all the archives I 
visited staffed with helpful personnel, I want to extend particular gratitude to several individuals 
who went above and beyond to help me. Michael Hansmann and Thilo Pries of the Archiv für 
Christlich-Demokratsiche Politik in Sankt Augustin provided tremendous insight into the 
archival holdings, and supplied me with books and various literature that proved valuable to my 
work. Christine Czaja, who diligently works to preserve the memory of her father Herbert Czaja, 
kindly granted access to his personal papers and materials that still remained within the 30 year 
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retention period. Damian Spielvogel of the Landsmannschaft Schlesien opened all doors of his 
organization’s house, including access to the coffee pot, and provided intriguing insight into the 
inner workings of the expellee association. His candidness and generosity surprised me, and left 
me with a more nuanced perspective. Lastly, Ingrid Sauer and Helmut Demattio of the 
Sudetendeutsches Archiv at the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv not only helped me bypass 
archival bureaucracy so that I could conduct speedy research trips to Munich, they shared 
insights that mere finding aids could never have revealed.  
This dissertation relied upon and benefited from the input and suggestions from a very 
large transatlantic community. I would like to thank Mark Stoneman of the German Historical 
Institute, who led the GHI’s invaluable summer archival tour that prepared me for my time in 
Germany and allowed me to present my project to peers. I still think fondly of those wonderful 
summer days in Speyer, Cologne, Koblenz, and Munich, which were surprisingly productive 
despite the ongoing 2014 World Cup. I am also indebted to Richard Wetzell and the participants 
of the GHI Transatlantic Doctoral Seminar, whose helpful suggestions and critical feedback 
came at a crucial time of the writing process. The engaging colloquia and workshops of the 
Berlin Program also offered a stimulating forum to discuss research and make connections with 
fellow scholars, many of whom became friends. 
A number of conferences, workshops, and colloquia in Germany furthermore offered 
opportunities to present my research just as I undertook the daunting and terrifying task of 
turning mountains of notes and sources into the semblance of an argument. I am especially 
grateful to Paul Nolte, who not only hosted my stay at the Freie Universität Berlin but also 
opened the door to his colloquium. Ralph Jessen of the Universität zu Köln likewise kindly 
allowed me to present my research.  A very fruitful conference at the Deutsches Rundfunk 
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Archiv in Frankfurt likewise leaves me indebted to its organizers, specifically Maren Röger, 
Stephan Scholz, Hans-Ulrich Wagner, and Alina Tiews. Thanks also to Martin Schulze Wessel 
and K. Erik Franzen of the Collegium Carolinum, the Sudetendeutschen Akadamie der 
Wissenschaften und Künste, and Elisabeth Fendl of the Institut für Volkskunde der Deutschen 
des östlichen Europa for making possible the presentation of aspects of my research. Last but not 
least: My heartfelt gratitude to the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung in Potsdam, which 
provided various forums to present my work. The ZZF has become intimately bound to Chapel 
Hill, on professional and personal levels, and I hope that I continue to profit from this 
transatlantic network of scholars and friends.  
Two of those ZZF friends who made and continue to make my time in Germany 
productive as well as immensely enjoyable are Stefanie Eisenhuth and Hanno Hochmuth. They 
have opened their homes to my wife and I during our trips to Berlin, and are emblematic of how 
scholarship and friendship come together. In Cologne I must also thank Jochen Molitor, not 
solely for his scholarly input, but consistently excellent conversations and passionate debates 
over a variety of subjects touching on every conceivable subject, including esoteric music, John 
Ford Westerns, the breathtaking variety of American dialects, FC Köln and their mascot Hennes 
VIII, and the myth or reality of German efficiency.  
I reached out to and forged many of these relationships during my time in Germany, but 
the most important community from the start of my graduate studies—and likely for the rest of 
my life—is the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. UNC boasts many fine scholars, but 
especially in European history a high concentration of renowned experts have settled in the 
charming town in North Carolina’s Piedmont. Numerous sophisticated seminars, such as the 
North Carolina German Studies Seminar and Workshop Series, provide UNC graduate students 
viii 
 
an engaging forum to present work and discuss the latest research of colleagues and visiting 
presenters. I particularly thank Karen Hagemann and her always helpful professional advice that 
has helped me ultimately become a better scholar. During my studies at UNC, I was honored to 
attend courses and work for some of the most respected scholars in the field. However, I 
especially would like to express my sincere gratitude to my dissertation committee, who not only 
read this lengthy tome, but sought to help me improve it. Klaus Larres and Jay Smith provided 
critical advice for how to turn this project into a book. Chad Bryant and Christopher Browning 
generously read early drafts, offering words of much appreciated encouragement but also critical 
suggestions that sharpened the argumentation and pushed the content to engage with wider 
scholarly debates.   
Above all, I owe the most to Konrad Jarausch, who profoundly shaped this dissertation, 
and my development as a historian. His renown and mountain of scholarship often left me 
intimidated, but the exceptional standard he sets has always pushed my own expectations further. 
With utmost patience for my seemingly glacial writing speed, trenchant advice on writing or how 
to advance the career, willingness to provide creative freedom, and delightful wit, I cannot think 
of a better adviser. His unconditional support and consistent dedication to each and every one of 
his advisees is astounding, and his advising style has provided a fine model worthy of emulation.  
Just as formidable as its faculty, the close-knit graduate community at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill has often left me in awe and nurturing a profound sense of 
imposter syndrome. Simply put: I am honored to have worked and forged lifelong friendships 
with so many impressive and kind people. Though bound to each Tar Heel that toiled in 
Hamilton Hall, a few require special recognition: Alex Ruble, Lars Stiglich, Lorn Hillaker, 
Caroline Nielsen, Philipp Stelzel, Freiderike Brühöfener, Dan Giblin, Stephen Riegg, John 
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Robertson, and Trevor Erlacher made graduate school one of the most rewarding and memorable 
experiences. As one of the remaining “elder statesmen” who had to unfortunately witness many 
of his friends and colleagues move on from Chapel Hill, I was grateful for the camaraderie of the 
Kruzhok and its founding members Dakota Irwin, Michał Skalski, and Max Lazar. 
One UNC graduate and now ambitious historian working in Berlin and bicycling through 
the Brandenburg countryside must receive particular thanks, not only because he more than any 
other person discussed my research with me and profoundly shaped this text, but because he 
became truly one of my best friends: Scott Krause. Scott has managed to perfectly combine the 
seemingly polar opposite Swabian earnestness and Californian chill into a dependable yet 
exciting friendship. Whether giving rides from eastern Poland to Frankfurt or organizing 
Brandenburg Safaris to idyllic lakes or abandoned sites of Germany’s past in his unfathomably 
colorful VW Harlequin, being friends with Scott has been an unforgettable adventure. 
Lastly, after all of the thanks to the academic community, one must acknowledge the 
people outside of this network who nevertheless provided the most important support that 
sustained me. My closest and dear friends Christopher Wieland, Scott Westhoff, Thomas 
Scheier, and Marco Cavarzere are like brothers, and like family have lent emotional support that 
kept me grounded in a world outside of dusty file folders. Academia is filled with uncertainties, 
yet it is reassuring to know that their unconditional friendship is a constant in my life. 
This dissertation is dedicated to my actual family on this and that side of the Atlantic, and 
who shaped my life in countless ways. I could not ask for a more loving family, and I hope to 
always make them proud. My brother Thomas and sister-in-law Jordyn are about the best 
siblings one could wish for, and I remain thankful that we share such strong bonds despite 
frequent time and distance apart due to our careers. The generosity and enthusiasm of Regina and 
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Helmut always make my wife and I excited for our visits to Sigmaringen, where we revel in the 
hours of conversation during grilling or walks along the Danube.  
A special thanks goes to my parents, John and Gisela. As a retired school teacher, my 
father shared his passion for learning with me, and the frequent trips to history museums, Roman 
aqueducts, or medieval castles around Bonn remain some of my strongest memories and explain 
my fascination with history. Inconceivably, my father read every page of this dissertation. 
Besides flattering me, his enthusiastic feedback and poignant questions proved invaluable for 
gauging the responses of lay readers, and helped improve large portions of this text. From my 
mother I received my commitment, drive, and stubbornness, traits that proved instrumental 
during long hours of work. She is a continuous source of praise and compliments that boosts 
egos and lifts spirits, something that every son needs hear occasionally, especially during the 
grind of graduate school.  My parents have done so much for my brother and I, that it cannot be 
adequately expressed. We are fortunate that they always gave selflessly in order to make our 
lives easier, and their ceaseless support has made us into the people we are today. Now that I am 
a father, I only hope that I can partially match their example of what it means to be a parent.  
I also wish to express my eternal gratitude to my grandparents, Margot and Norbert, two 
exceptional people who have profoundly shaped my life and will be forever looming figures in it. 
They have showered their grandsons with unending adoration and support, and their 66 years of 
marriage and remarkable reconstruction of livelihoods after 1945 set a powerful example of love, 
commitment, and how to overcome all adversity. As expellees themselves, however, Oma and 
Opa also deeply shaped this study in a number of ways. Since I was a child, they shared nostalgic 
stories of idyllic childhoods and harrowing accounts of unimaginable horror. This personal 
connection led me to this project, and I continuously brushed up against my family history in my 
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sources. Yet their lives of rupture and loss, shared by millions of Europeans during the 20th 
century, engendered an understanding for the human and emotional dimensions of these events. 
While attempting to remain as objective and critical in its assessments, this dissertation—so it is 
hoped—has tried to remain sensitive to the fact that it deals with loss and suffering. While it is 
perhaps not the dissertation that they expected, I hope that in a small way that I have articulated 
what my grandparents and millions of refugees endured, and recorded for posterity their 
experiences without overlooking the historical processes that unleashed this misery. 
While this study is dedicated to my entire family, I want to devote the last and most 
important lines to the two most important people in my life: My loving wife Jenna, and my 
precious son Johnathan. Johnny filled his parents with unspeakably deep awe, joy, and pride. 
Fatherhood suddenly left academic accolades standing in the shadows, and all scholarly 
achievements pale in comparison to the smirk and giggle of our beautiful son. For his part, 
Johnathan seems less interested in my dissertation, though he flipped through it a few times 
before throwing it to the floor. Despite his understandable disinterest in such a somber topic, it 
remains dedicated to him and the hope that he has a bright and peaceful future. May he always 
have a home filled with love, where his mother and father encourage and support him, spark his 
imagination, and stimulate his intellect. 
Lastly, to my wonderful wife Jenna. Jenna encouraged me to undertake this journey so 
many years ago, and has made countless sacrifices so that I could pursue my passion. She has 
never doubted my abilities, nor ceased to be act as my most trusted source of advice and 
consolation in moments of self-doubt or setback. Jenna is the most caring and devoted friend one 
could ask for, even during seemingly endless bouts of writing and work that interrupted our life 
together. It has not always been easy, and often it has seemed as if everything revolved around 
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me, my research, and this seemingly unending project. Jenna’s part in this journey should not 
remain overlooked or unappreciated, as too frequently the burdens and stress fell upon her. A 
dissertation is not the achievement of a single person; this dissertation required the endurance 
and understanding of someone often far more patient, giving, and stronger than I, whose own 
professional accomplishments deserve awe and admiration. Words are not enough to express my 
devotion, respect, and unending gratitude. For all that you do as an unequaled wife and mother, 
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All my life I have grown up with my grandmother’s stories of her traumatic experiences 
during her family’s flight from the Soviet Army during the winter of 1944/45. Born in 
Braunsberg, East Prussia (today Braniewo, Poland), she along with ten to twelve million 
Germans either fled the advances of the Red Army during the final months of the Second World 
War or were expelled from their ancestral homelands after the conflict’s resolution. In the 
immediate postwar years, nearly one in five citizens of West Germany were born in territories 
beyond Germany’s prewar borders, so that many Germans are intimately familiar with the 
horrific memories of their elders, which constitute a central component of German cultural 
memory of the Nazi period and World War II. 
Yet while I have internalized the oft-repeated memories of my grandmother, my training 
as a historian and interest in German memory politics made me aware of the instability and 
malleability of recollections, as well as the selective and often problematic ways in which 
Germany came to terms with its past. One episode in particular changed my entire perspective on 
memories of Flucht und Vertreibung, or “flight and expulsion,” and inspired this dissertation. On 
Christmas Eve in 2012, with my grandfather in the hospital after having suffered a serious 
stroke, I tried to draw my distraught grandmother into the family conversation by asking about 
her childhood memories of the holiday. Quickly she regaled the family with stories of imposing 
relatives, wintry pine forests, sumptuous feasts, and revered family traditions.  
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After some time, her recollections inevitably turned to 1944, the last Christmas at home, 
celebrated amidst a tense atmosphere as questions about the future hung in the air. The mighty 
Soviet Army stood at the borders of East Prussia preparing a massive operation that would see 
enemy troops cross the borders of the Third Reich. On January 12, 1945 the Eastern Front 
erupted in artillery fire, as the Soviet Army launched an attack against the entire German line 
running through Eastern Europe, driving in little more than two weeks to the Oder River and 
within 70 km of Berlin. Spelling the final phase of a conflict that had raged since 1939, the 
unstoppable Soviet offensive also had another consequence: Millions of German civilians 
plunged into a panicked westward flight.  
My grandmother was one of them. Her recollections in 2012 were familiar: Hasty 
packing, the terrified march across the frozen Vistula Lagoon that represented the last hope for 
an escape, and the terrifying scenes my then 14 year old grandmother witnessed. Although I 
noted that her memories followed a stable, unchanged script that recounted this episode of her 
life, her narrative suddenly had a new component that stunned me. In every version of the story I 
had heard, my grandmother’s aunt decided that the trek was too arduous and so turned home. 
Reaching her house, she found Russian soldiers had ransacked it and destroyed anything they 
could not carry with them. She also suffered unspeakable horrors at the hands of the drunken 
soldiers. Now, in 2012, almost as an aside, my grandmother revealed that it had been German 
soldiers that had pillaged and looted the family home. 
This significant difference in the family narrative, which neither my mother nor my aunt 
had heard, took nearly seven decades to emerge. My grandmother had not witnessed the events 
in Braunsberg after its fall and surrender, and only learned of them in a letter her aunt sent the 
family in 1946 in which she explicitly condemned the German soldiers’ behavior, and which my 
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grandmother now fished out of a box of keepsakes. Yet that portion angrily documenting the 
excesses of the German military against the civilian population inexplicably vanished from my 
grandmother’s narrative, which contained other disclosures: Recollections of her uncle’s POW 
forced laborers who were well-treated and friendly, until one of them was “sent home” when he 
threatened his master with a pitchfork; corrupt and incompetent Nazis and heroic Wehrmacht 
soldiers aiding civilians; memories of passing the Stutthof Concentration Camp, though the 
prisoners make no appearance; her father delaying flight as the city burned, because as a 
blacksmith he could make decent money repairing damaged trek wagons of fleeing civilians.  
Through my readings and engagement with primary sources, I realized that large parts of 
this combination of family “blank spots” and tropes mirrored depictions of this history in films, 
literature, and historical accounts. Indeed, I theorized, my grandmother’s memory and personal 
narrative of her life were significantly molded by them. The political and cultural landscape in 
postwar Germany profoundly influenced how the phenomenon was discussed, remembered, and 
represented. Though the Soviet Army committed atrocities against civilians and many Germans 
knew this firsthand, these experiences fused with lingering National Socialist racial worldviews 
and the anticommunist politics of the Cold War, thereby encouraging popular depictions of the 
events of 1944/45 that emphasized Soviet savagery and German anguish while relativizing or 
obfuscating issues such as German war guilt.  
My grandmother had not consciously lied; her memory merely conformed to and 
reflected how postwar West Germany publicly discussed its recent history. Thus, in order for my 
grandmother to make sense of her family’s plight, it was filtered through a collective memory 
that held that it had to be Russians who inflicted suffering, while most Germans acted honorably 
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and bravely. The Nazi dictatorship and the acknowledgement of concentration camps and slave 
labor receded into the background, if not disappearing entirely.  
Suddenly, I knew what I wanted to write my dissertation about: I wanted to find out what 
actors or sources my grandmother was exposed to, and shaped how she and other Germans 
contemplated “flight and expulsion.” I sought to investigate how master narratives of the events 
were created and who streamlined them, how these were circulated, what uses they served, and 
how they were cemented in West German cultural memory. My dissertation, in other words, 
explores the construction, instrumentalization, and institutionalization of the master narrative of 
the largest forced migration of peoples in European history between 1944 and 1970 in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and its layering over time. 
My study will demonstrate that the mental images and historical memories that Germans 
associated with “flight and expulsion” were significantly shaped by narratives that were a multi-
layered construction of the expellees themselves and their leaders and associations, as well as 
historians, politicians, and the media. This construction was based above all on Nazi press 
reporting and propaganda attesting to Russian atrocities and savagery, which provided some of 
the most dominant mental images that were expounded upon after 1945.  
In the immediate postwar period, journalists covering the expulsions as they unfolded 
also introduced tropes and interpretations that added a crucial layer to the master narrative. 
Expellees themselves also contributed to this process. As they fled or faced expulsion, they 
shared their experiences and reiterated rumors in public and semi-public conversations with one 
another and non-expellees. Already in the immediate postwar period, therefore, reality and 
interpretation fused into an inextricable blend of experiences, rumor, fear, yearning, and ideology 
that reverberate into the 21st century. 
5 
 
Yet another layer was added through a concerted streamlining of the plurality of voices 
and diversity of experiences reflected in eyewitness testimony, historians, expellee leaders, and 
members of the media constructed stylized narratives with recurring motifs of German misery 
and Soviet barbarity, ignoring conflicting accounts. Decontextualized from the history of the 
Third Reich, expellee associations and their supporters in government, academia, and the media 
embedded these narratives within historical studies, museums, memorials, and literature.1 Thus, 
by the 1950s, the “typical” fates of expellees had cemented themselves within German cultural 
memory and a central concept of “flight and expulsion” emerged, providing a deep well to draw 
from to this day.  
This dissertation will furthermore argue that expellee associations and their supporters 
constructed this “sympathy narrative” in order to instrumentalize it as the underpinning for 
social, material, and political claims. The immediate postwar years saw these groups successfully 
leverage their plight in order to arouse sympathy domestically and abroad to alleviate the 
consequences of the expulsions through material aid and accelerate integration of their 
constituents.2 Largely apolitical, the earliest descriptions of “flight and expulsion” during the 
1940s emphasized refugee suffering and appealed to audiences to intervene in the humanitarian 
crisis and convince particularly German society to open their doors to the millions of displaced.  
                                                 
1 Mathias Beer, “Im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Das Groβforschungsprojekt ‘Dokumentation der 
Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa,’” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 46 (July 1998): pp. 345-389. 
See also the contributions in Stephan Scholz, Maren Röger, and Bill Niven, eds., Die Erinnerung an Flucht und 
Vertreibung. Ein Handbuch der Medien und Praktken (München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2015). 
2 The pinnacle of this activism culminated in the “equalization of burdens” law of 1952. See Michael Hughes, 
Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat: West Germany and the Reconstruction of Social Justice (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1999). 
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However, by the 1950s, the Cold War provided new rhetorical strategies, and the memory 
of “flight and expulsion” found new potent uses by incorporating an unmistakable 
anticommunist tenor that dovetailed with the dominant victimhood framework of the early 
Federal Republic.3 Thus, expellee organizations by the early 1950s effectively embedded the 
expulsions into the geopolitical issues of the day, and deployed particularly emotional portrayals 
of their experiences that emphasized communist barbarity in order to leverage German suffering 
for the purposes of Heimatpolitik, the politics of getting the homeland back.4 Particularly the 
various documentations engaged in an explicit framing of the expulsions that permitted the 
cultivation of an expellee victimhood narrative. 
Lastly, this dissertation investigates the institutionalization of “flight and expulsion” in 
two phases. At the height of their power, expellees successfully enshrined their victimhood 
narrative in memorials, schools, museums, and literature. During the 1950s, expellees sought and 
largely successfully colonized public discourse. Starting in the 1960s, however cultural, 
demographic, and political developments forced them onto the defensive, leaving their narrative 
anachronistic. Expellee associations therefore attempted to conserve a nostalgic homeland for 
posterity, as well as attempt to imbed their argument in an emerging human rights discourse.5  
By examining the trajectory of the expulsion narrative from its initial construction and 
instrumentalization through its turn toward nostalgia and institutionalization in various cultural 
                                                 
3 Robert Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001); and Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of 
Amnesty and Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
4 On the political influence of the organizations in the 1950s, see Matthias Stickler, „Ostdeutsch heiβt 
Gesamtdeutsch.“ Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der deutschen 
Vertriebenverbände 1949-1972 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2004) 




forums, I seek to show the layering of memory, how it was used over time, and the defining 
impact that this “victim discourse” has had on German public memory and academic 
interpretation of the phenomenon. My cultural history investigates the origins and evolution of a 
discourse that continues to inform German historical consciousness, thereby providing fresh 
insights into the relationship between memory politics, the production and narration of history, 
and political interest group advocacy.  
 
Historiography 
My project engages with several distinct historiographies. Although not an 
Ereignisgeschichte, my intervention nevertheless contends with the “history of the events” 
tangentially. The multivolume Dokumentation der Vertreibung (“Documentation of the 
Expulsions”), published in the 1950s and early 1960s, was not only the first history of “flight and 
expulsion,” but a foundational text that historians in later decades drew from.6 A product of the 
Cold War, scholars working with this resource invariably work with a constructed narrative, and 
often refrain from rigorously interrogating the biases and political agendas that shaped the 
selection of eyewitness reports. The testimonies on which the Dokumentation is based therefore 
remain largely unmined. In order to recreate the plurality of experiences and argue for the 
postwar culling of conflicting narratives, my dissertation examines these reports and indicts the 
subsequent production of history that influenced the cultural memory of “flight and expulsion.” 
                                                 
6 For a critical examination of the Schieder volumes, see Mathias Beer, “Im Spannungsfeld von Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte. Das Großforschungsprojekt ‘Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa,’” 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 46, no. 3 (1998): 345–89. 
8 
 
Secondly, my dissertation engages with the Verbandsgeschichte (“organizational 
history”) of the expellee associations.7 Predominantly political histories that ultimately argue for 
a very brief ascendency during the 1950s before a rapid decline, these works overlook the 
relative success of this pressure group in colonizing discussions of “flight and expulsion,” 
imbedding it within a Cold War context, and circulating their politicized histories not merely 
domestically but abroad. This raises not only questions about their supposed marginal status, but 
also places “flight and expulsion” in a transatlantic context, when so often it is relegated to 
specialized literature on the expulsions. My intervention argues that the “German East” was 
crucial to the geopolitical calculus of the Federal Republic until the late 1960s, in large part to 
the successful leveraging of victimhood narratives of the expellee associations, and needs to be 
more earnestly included in histories of postwar East and West Germany. 
Lastly, my dissertation is in conversation with the numerous works examining the 
collective memory of “flight and expulsion.”8 Although historians have laid important 
groundwork, their scope is generally limited to narrow time periods or focused on specific actors, 
so that one doesn’t get an adequate sense of the relationship of their case studies and German 
collective memory. For instance, while Anna Jakubowska covers a long time period from 1957 
to 2004, her attention on the Bund der Vertriebenen (BDV) restricts the study to an organization 
                                                 
7 Matthias Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heisst Gesamtdeutsch”: Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische 
Zielsetzungen der deutschen Vertriebenenverbände : 1949-1972 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2004); Pertti Ahonen, After the 
Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Tobias Weger, 
“Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende?: sudetendeutsche Organisationen, 1945-1955 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2008); 
Michael Schwartz et al., Funktionäre mit Vergangenheit: das Gründungspräsidium des Bundesverbandes der 
Vertriebenen und das “Dritte Reich” (München: Oldenbourg, 2013). 
8 For an overview of the historiography, see Maren Röger, “Ereignis- und Erinnerungsgeschichte von ‘Flucht und 
Vertreibung’: Ein Literaturbericht,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 62, no. 1 (2014): 49–64. 
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with little resonance outside of the expellee community.9 Moreover, the examination of the 
BdV’s self-portrayal and depiction in Poland contributes a novel transnational perspective, but 
doesn’t grant meaningful insight into the BdV’s impact on public discourse. 
Robert Moeller’s original treatment of the “selective memory” of the Federal Republic, 
which emphasized expellee and POW suffering and raised it to a core element of 1950s political 
identity, proposes many salient points on the mentalities of postwar West Germany.10 
Nevertheless, his research reveals limitations. Specifically, the narrow concentration on a group 
of historians and sentimental movies, while fascinating, raise the question of whether Moeller 
overstates their cultural impact. What is needed is a larger empirical base of examples from the 
German press and literature, particularly the genre of pop literature that reached many millions.  
A collective of scholars recently attempted to make inroads into the identification of 
various media and practices related to “flight and expulsion.”11 While uncovering many useful 
source bases and types, there remain substantial lacunae because some of the contributions gave 
only a superficial or initial interpretation. Andrew Demshuk’s 2012 study makes a crucial 
intervention by arguing that expellee memory cannot be mistaken for expellee association 
memory politics, but the questions of the investigation attempt to understand how expellees 
personally came to terms with the loss of their homeland. The view “from below” therefore 
                                                 
9 Anna Jakubowska, Der Bund der Vertriebenen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Polen 1957-2004; Selbst- 
und Fremddarstellung eines Vertriebenenverbandes. (Marburg: Herder-Inst., 2012). 
10 Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003). 
11 Stephan Scholz, Maren Röger, and Bill Niven, eds., Die Erinnerung an Flucht und Vertreibung: Ein Handbuch 
der Medien und Praktiken (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2015). 
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neglects the activities “from above,” which had a more decisive influence on the West German 
discourse than individual citizens.12 
Hans Henning and Eva Hahn provided with their 2010 study a sweeping overview of the 
expulsion in German memory, covering the period from the end of the Third Reich to the 
present.  The breathtaking scope and many provocative insights cannot make up for an analysis 
that at times requires more nuance.  The authors’ overly critical castigation of West German 
special pleading assumes a stagnant victimhood discourse, and ignores earlier self-critical 
rhetoric.13 Moreover, the insinuation that East German cultural memory revealed greater and 
more progressive reflection in comparison to a West German selective reading of the past 
overlooks that the socialist state also politicized history. Before the West German selective 
remembering that privileged German suffering and obscured German war guilt, or East German 
triumphalist narratives of overcoming revanchist forces that relativized expellee misery, 
discourses in both Germanys possessed remarkable similarities and took both refugee misery and 
the role of the Third Reich seriously. All this is to say that the political biases of the authors 
frequently color the interpretations of their sources. 
One last relevant work that must be mentioned is the 2007 comparative study of opposing 
West and East German interpretations of “flight and expulsion” by Christian Lotz. While 
addressing similar concerns as this dissertation, Lotz concentrates on the construction of histories 
that supported a revision or legitimization of the Oder-Neiße Line after 1948.14 The new border 
                                                 
12 Andrew Demshuk, The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945-1970, Reprint 
edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
13 Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern: Legenden, Mythos, Geschichte 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010).  
14 Christian Lotz, Die Deutung des Verlusts: Erinnerungspolitische Kontroversen im geteilten Deutschland um 
Flucht, Vertreibung und die Ostgebiete, 1948–1972 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007).  
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to Poland indeed constituted a primary agenda of memory politics during the 1950s in both 
German states. But Lotz’ focus results in a neglect of the early period. This article reveals an 
earlier instrumentalization of a discourse to aid integration of millions of expellees and underpin 
social and political claims.  
In general, the period before 1949 receives short shrift in the literature, thereby obscuring 
fundamental earlier developments that predated foreign policy struggles of the height of the Cold 
War in the 1950s. The tendency of seeing public discourse as stagnant, or rather focusing on its 
1950s iterations, overlooks a surprising evolution. My dissertation represents the first full-length 
study of how a master narrative of “flight and expulsion” formed, how it influenced public 
memory, and the purposes it served in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1945 and 1990. 
In short, I investigate the dynamism, layering, and evolution of a discourse beginning in the 
Third Reich and stretching into the late Cold War. 
 
Sources 
Outlining how a victimhood narrative formed and influenced public memory requires a 
wide array of sources relevant to a cultural history approach. In order to make the argument of a 
streamlining of experiences, my dissertation examined the raw collection of testimonies that 
postwar historians solicited, compiled, and used for their interpretations. Located in the 
Bundesarchiv-Bayreuth, few historians have taken the time to consult the Ost-Dok holdings, 
preferring instead the convenience of consulting the Dokumentation der Vertreibung. While 
certainly there is nothing in and of itself wrong with relying on these volumes, one must do so 
carefully and realize one is working with a collection compiled for specific political goals in a 
Cold War context. The roughly 18,000 accounts from Germans from across the German East 
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therefore provide a means for assessing just how “representative” the “typical” testimonies in the 
Dokumentation are. 
A second set of sources instrumental for this study were party records, and personal 
papers of politicians bequeathed these archives. These holdings provide a wealth of useful 
sources, as most parties maintained refugee subcommittees and amassed material ranging from 
posters to radio scripts, to traditional interparty communication or protocols. The personal 
papers, moreover, of leading expellees who simultaneously rose in the ranks of their party after 
1945 often provided invaluable backchannel communication. In other words, party files are an 
important tool for measuring responses to the expellees, and how and to what degree these 
figures exerted influence on public discourse. 
Governmental records offered a third crucial source base. Particularly the records of the 
expellee ministry, held in the Federal Archive of Koblenz, proved a font of helpful documents 
chronicling the engagement with federal officials with historians, the media, and expellee 
associations. On the latter, the Sudeten German Archive in Munich, a seldom used yet 
nevertheless impressively large collection of organization records and personal papers spanning 
back to the mid-1940s that one cannot ignore when investigating expellee factions, as the papers 
of most other associations from a similar time period are no longer extant. Lastly, contemporary 
media coverage as well as novels were vital for tracing public discourse, and how “flight and 
expulsion” were discussed. 
 
Organization 
The first two chapters, covering flight from the Red Army and the expulsions, act as 
background chapters, yet attempt to create a broad spectrum of voices. If one is to argue that 
there is a streamlining after 1945, one must identify which voices entered the historical record, 
13 
 
and which ones did not. Moreover, these chapters make a concerted effort to bring in 
contemporary voices describing the forced migrations, in order to illuminate the formation of 
narratives and layering of memory that future activists would build upon. This includes Nazi 
propaganda on Soviet barbarities and the plight of fleeing civilians, German reports and rumors, 
and Allied reactions as the events were still unfolding. The goal of the introductory chapters is to 
provide audiences with an understanding of the complex phases and contexts that, as I 
demonstrate in later chapters, postwar actors conflated into a homogenized, central concept of 
“flight and expulsion.” As such, I seek to create a panorama of voices and experiences, and 
unearth the foundations of German historical memory of the war and its consequences. 
The third and fourth chapter argue that between 1945 and 1949, discussions of “flight and 
expulsion” were leveraged as largely apolitical “sympathy narratives” that underpinned demands 
for material support. Chapter three examines how by 1949, expellees in West Germany forged a 
“community of fate” in the face of non-expellee apathy and bigotry. Chapter four evaluates the 
various efforts of expellees to circulate victimhood narratives abroad in order to convince the 
Anglo-Americans of the importance of helping overcome the refugee crisis through increases in 
humanitarian aid.  
Chapter five discusses how expellees instrumentalized their narrative in arguments for an 
equalization of burdens law and campaigns to sway the rest of Germany to accept expellees as 
equal citizens deserving of support. With the short-term goal of integration achieved, expellees 
turned to their ultimate aim: Revising the postwar order. Chapter six therefore concentrates on 
the construction of a historical interpretation of “flight and expulsion” that streamlined the 
memory of the forced migrations into a decontextualized narrative of German victimhood and 
Soviet barbarity that was in turn leveraged in order to get the lost homeland back. A constellation 
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of associations, politicians, and the media framed these migrations in a Cold War context and 
attempted to appeal to domestic and foreign audiences in order to back the geopolitical goal of 
reuniting Germany within the borders of 1937. While this lobbying ingratiated expellee Cold 
Warriors with German and American anticommunist lawmakers, their memory politics 
profoundly shaped how West Germans viewed the forced migrations. Chapter seven investigates 
what images, tropes, and arguments this lobbying had on media discussions, and argues that 
when Germans reflect on “flight and expulsion” today, they make use of concepts forged in the 
1950s, when expellee associations largely monopolized public discourse. 
The last chapter examines the cultural, political, and demographic changes of the 1960s 
and 1970s that led to the political decline of the expellee organizations. With the recognition of 
the Oder-Neisse Line by the Brandt government, the relevance of the expellee pressure group 
faded. This chapter looks at the varying strategies ranging between radicalization and 
internationalizing flight and expulsion by tying it to human rights and EU discourses in the 
1980s. The chapter ultimately assesses how expellees sought to institutionalize and preserve a 
nostalgic homeland in German historical memory in museums and literature, adding the last 





“THE RUSSIAN IS COMING!” EXPERIENCES AND MEMORIES OF  
FLIGHT, 1944-1945 
 
“The misery which is unfolding among the treks dragging themselves from east to west is 
indescribable,” Joseph Goebbels confided to his diary on January 23, 1945. “One would prefer to 
avert one’s eyes,” he continued, from the “tragic scenes” unfolding on the icy country roads, 
where hundreds of mothers could do nothing to keep their children from starving or freezing to 
death. “This mass exodus in the face of the Soviets will enter as a procession of suffering 
(Leidenszug) into the history of the German people.”1 Even Adolf Hitler was “touched to the 
utmost” by the plight of the population caught in the furious maelstrom of the massive Red Army 
offensive of January 12th, 1945.2 Two days later, Goebbels again noted the Führer’s ostensible 
dismay over the “unending suffering” contained within “deeply moving” reports trickling in.3 
What responsibility they bore for this humanitarian disaster unsurprisingly did not arise during 
the intimate tête-à-têtes. Yet in one way the Reich Propaganda Minister’s entry proved prescient: 
The flight of millions of panicked civilians during the final months of the Second World War, 
which initiated a forced migration of 10-12 million Germans over the next several years, would 
indeed enter German history as one of its most traumatic and calamitous chapters.  
                                                 
1 Elke Fröhlich, ed., Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. 15 (München: K.G. Saur Verlag, 1993), 190. 
2 Fröhlich, 15:196. 
3 Fröhlich, 15:219. 
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One of the core challenges of this dissertation is separating reality from myth, 
distinguishing between actual experiences and postwar legends. At stake is not a meticulous 
recounting of the actual events, but rather describing who wrote this notorious chapter and 
populated its pages with “heroes” and “villains,” victims and perpetrators. Because this study 
investigates the construction and leveraging of a decades-old victimhood narrative, one must first 
excavate its foundations. The majority of Germans operate with interpretations and images that 
find their roots in the Third Reich, and were successively built upon by expellees after 1945. The 
first chapters must therefore reconstruct the actual processes that unfolded between 1944 and 
1946, for without a firm grasp of what constitutes “flight” or “expulsion” and analysis of the 
complex phases of the forced migrations, postwar memory politics become incomprehensible.  
Beyond providing necessary background information, however, this chapter will make 
two main arguments. First, it seeks to chronicle civilians fleeing the Soviet advance, yet aspires 
to challenge the accepted narrative of “flight” that revolves around panicked headlong escapes, 
treks on icy roads, sinking ships, and bloodthirsty Red Army troops. All these tropes are rooted 
in a reality, but they stand as “typical” experiences that historians and journalists time and again 
reified. Largely, this reflects the fact that authors relied on the interpretations of German 
historians in the 1950s, who established these themes and wove them into an argument for 
German victimhood and a revision of postwar borders.4 The tendency of uncritically utilizing 
these tropes simultaneously reflects West German cultural memory, and how powerfully 
discourse shaped scholarship. This dissertation aims to therefore impart a description of the 
forced migrations that resurrects neglected voices, and complicates the narrative.  
                                                 
4 See Theodor Schieder, ed., Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung  aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neiße, 
3 vols. (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984). The Schieder Commission, and the drawbacks of their 
scholarship, will be assessed in later chapters.  
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Such an attempt must take care with studies of the 1950s, and avoid an overreliance on 
them. The testimonies of the Dokumentation der Vertreibung (“Documentation of the 
Expulsions”) are selections, compiled to support Cold War era arguments. Surprisingly, few 
historians have taken the time to turn to the archival materials and collection of testimonies upon 
which the Dokumentation based its interpretations. Through a careful use of published accounts 
and analysis of raw eyewitness testimonies, a more nuanced picture emerges. Furthermore, 
working against the grain creates a panorama of diverse experiences that calls into question the 
claims of representativeness of “typical” fates, which in turn makes the postwar streamlining of 
memories into a homogenized victimhood narrative more comprehensible. In other words: If one 
wants to deconstruct the cultural memory of “flight and expulsion,” one must begin with 
reconstructing the diversity of experiences. 
Secondly, this chapter argues that the Nazi regime and contemporaries helped lay the 
foundations of this cultural memory. Fleeing refugees witnessed wartime carnage and recounted 
their experiences to incredulous audiences, or circulated rumors that spread from mouth to 
mouth. Yet Nazi press and regime elites emerged as the first authors of an interpretation of 
“flight and expulsion,” constructing a narrative of fear to coax the population into fighting 
Bolshevism to the last bullet. By sensationalizing atrocities, the Third Reich stoked terror that 
explain why millions sought to flee the encroaching enemy to begin with. Yet once disaster 
engulfed the German East and the regime lacked the inclination or ability to alleviate the 
suffering of civilians, press reports elided implications of failed humanitarian considerations 
from the NSDAP, and instead framed the waves of refugees as fleeing an inexorable red wave.  
Before the war even ended, in other words, the Nazi regime laid a foundational layer of 
“flight and expulsion” with powerful resonance, which influenced postwar authors who then 
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built upon it. One cannot parse the themes and silences without assessing these earliest of 
iterations that carried into the Federal Republic after 1945. This chapter therefore examines not 
just what happened, but explains how reality and interpretation fused into an inextricable blend 
of experiences, rumor, fear, yearning, and ideology that reverberate into the 21st century. In order 
to untangle this nexus of history and memory, we must go back to the beginning to the events 
themselves, but also to how they were described and narrated as they unfolded.    
 
Enemy at the Gates: The German East Between Soviet Hammer and Nazi Anvil 
Though the reports purportedly astonished and distressed them, the chaotic flight of the 
population living in the German East should not have completely surprised the Nazi leadership. 
In fact, what transpired in January of 1945 was but a repetition on a much larger scale of crises in 
the fall of the previous year. The regime bore a direct responsibility for the disarray in two 
regards. First, the refusal to learn from the humanitarian crisis unleashed by Soviet offensives in 
the months before and unwillingness to provide active measures to contend with a foreseeable 
reprise explained the hectic and disorganized scenes in 1945. Secondly, the unceasing 
propaganda that circulated news of atrocities and warned of the Soviet menace partially 
explained why millions of civilians now desperately sought refuge in the Reich. Yet for many 
civilians in the German East, the events of 1944 also convinced them of the folly of fleeing in 
1945. In short: The responses in January 1945, and how events unfolded, can only be understood 
by examining earlier developments that often remain overlooked or forgotten.  
Because memories of “flight and expulsion” habitually begin their story in 1945, it is 
essential to explain that the calamity had its direct roots in the summer of the previous year. 
Three years to the day marking the German invasion of the USSR, the Soviet Union launched an 
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enormous offensive along the entire Eastern Front on June 22, 1944. Though Stalingrad dealt a 
psychological and military blow that turned the tide against the Third Reich, Bagration 
represented the greatest military disaster in German history: In less than two months, the Soviet 
military obliterated three army groups, killing or capturing between 300,000 and 600,000 as it 
relentlessly drove more than 300 kilometers before halting at the German border in early 
August.5 The operation delivered Nazi Germany a colossal setback, yet the disintegration of the 
Wehrmacht also carried grave consequences for the population of Central and Eastern Europe.  
When the Red Army began its assault in Poland and Belorussia in June 1944, it sparked a 
massive movement westward of decimated military units and anyone with reason to fear the 
enemy’s retribution. Germans working or living in occupied territories and Volksdeutsche, ethnic 
Germans and Eastern Europeans deemed by the Nazi regime as “racially German” and whose 
privileged status now could become their undoing, faced particular danger.6 Treks of non-
Germans, mainly Balts who lived under Soviet rule from 1939 to 1941 and now faced potential 
                                                 
5 Ian Kershaw, The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944-1945 (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2012), 425; Manfred Zeidler, Kriegsende im Osten: die Rote Armee und die Besetzung Deutschlands östlich 
von Oder und Neisse 1944/45 (München: Oldenbourg, 1996), 83–104; and Heinrich Schwendemann, “Strategie Der 
Selbstvernichtung. Die Wehrmachtsführung Im ‘Endkampf’ Um Das ‘Dritte Reich,’” in Die Wehrmacht: Mythos 
Und Realität, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (München: Oldenbourg, 1999). 
6 Indeed, some Volksdeutsche already begun their westward flight as early as 1943, when the long retreat of the 
Wehrmacht set in. Red Army incursions into Romania and Yugoslavia for instance threatened the Transylvanian 
Saxons and Yugoslav-Germans; by the autumn, around 250,000 fled or were extracted by German authorities. R.M. 
Douglas estimates that 160,000 followed the Wehrmacht’s retreat from Romania and Yugoslavia, and another 
100,000 ethnic Germans fled from Slovenia. Volksdeutsche in Hungary were less willing to depart, and only an 
estimated 50,000—one-tenth of the German population—voluntarily left before 1945. Douglas, Orderly and 
Humane, 63. On the ethnic Germans during the war, see Doris L. Bergen, “The Volksdeutsche of Eastern Europe 
and the Collapse of the Nazi Empire, 1944-1945,” in The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich 
and Its Legacy, ed. Alan E. Steinweis and Daniel E. Rogers (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 2003), 101–28.; 
and R.M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane. The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2012), 39-64.  
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reprisal for collaboration, opted for a hasty departure and hoped for refuge in the Reich as well.7 
These were joined, for the first time, by Reich citizens in the Memel Territory and East Prussia 
in early August, when the Soviet offensive reached the borders of Germany. Conceding that the 
enemy threatened to overrun the eastern portions of the Reich, at the end of July Hitler ordered a 
temporary evacuation of non-essential citizens, mainly women and children, along with as much 
livestock and goods as possible.8 Due to the deteriorating military situation, these hastily planned 
evacuations soon gave way to hurried flight. In early August, NSDAP offices issued directives to 
flee, yet these came so suddenly that “a great confusion” confounded families.9  Largely on foot 
and together with their forced workers and livestock, the refugees streamed into East Prussia, 
congregating mainly around Insterburg (Cheryakhovsky) and Labiau (Polessk). 
 The German East narrowly escaped catastrophe only because the Red Army halted their 
offensive. Yet despite a botched evacuation, the regime eschewed any desire to draw conclusions 
from this disaster or develop plans for future crises. The only precaution in case of future enemy 
incursions remained an ambiguous May 31st, 1944 directive issued by Martin Bormann 
delineating the authorities of various institutions and which prioritized the removal of 
                                                 
7 Andreas Kossert, Ostpreußen: Geschichte und Mythos (München: Pantheon Verlag, 2007)., 142; see also Theodor 
Schieder, ed., Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung  aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neiße, vol. 1 
(München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984), 3. 
8 This evacuation had all the hallmarks of future similar operations: They were belated, poorly organized, and less 
interested in the welfare of the population as opposed to securing crucial resources for continuing the war effort.  
9 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:3. The reporter complains that the livestock suffered from 
extreme thirst and heat during the two week stay in East Prussia. Yet others had even struggled to get their cattle to 
safety, having been forced to use trails through boggy terrain because the Wehrmacht had closed the roads for 
military operations, so that many animals “found a miserable death” on the journey. All in all, through the month of 
August, 10,000 refugees a day arrived in Insterburg and the surrounding villages, along with nearly 5,000 cattle. 
Günther Lass, Die Flucht, Ostpreußen 1944-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, 1964), 18. 
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agricultural and industrial goods, as well as slave and prison labor.10 This provision, however, 
created a labyrinth of competencies, where ultimately civilian evacuations rested solely in the 
hands of the NSDAP and the individual Gauleiter, or Nazi governors, of the region. No 
coordination or uniform policy existed at this level, however. By early August, the Gauleiter of 
Wartheland, West Prussia, Silesia, and Pomerania tentatively developed confidential instructions 
for limited withdrawals within their domains, yet in East Prussia Erich Koch resolutely rejected 
all proposals as defeatism.11 In fact, in mid-July Koch instituted a prohibition on free travel in 
East Prussia to “stop wild remigration,” fearing a descent into chaos and bedlam that would 
hamper military operations and adversely affect morale.12   
The regime had good reason to consider the population’s mood. For those living in the 
eastern territories of the Reich, the obvious signs that the conflict stood at their doorstep 
compounded anxieties. “[T]he entire summer one could…hear the cannon thunder or explosions 
in the east,” one expellee recalled.13 For the first time in the war, East Prussia suffered aerial 
                                                 
10 This memo was reiterated on July 19, 1944 by Bormann, presumably because the Soviet advance seriously raised 
the necessity of implementing an evacuation. Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen 
Erinnern: Legenden, Mythos, Geschichte (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2010)., 262-263.  
11 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:12E.. See also Schieder, 1:33; Schieder, 1:46; Schieder, 1:133. 
Multiple civil servants testify that their attempts to coordinate evacuation plans with higher authorities were blocked 
by Erich Koch’s office. In any case, extant directives naively called for an evacuation of the population to areas only 
a few hundred kilometers westward. The rapid January 1945 offensive overran these collection points in a matter of 
days or weeks.  
12 Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern, 261. An exception was made for the estimated 825,000 
mostly women and children who had been settled in the “air raid shelter of East Prussia,” thus far virtually 
untouched by Allied air-raids, and whom the regime began extracting in mid-July. See Schieder, Die Vertreibung 
(Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:5E.; Ian Kershaw, The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944-1945 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 426. Particularly the 170,000 Berliners now in danger of being caught up in the 
war needed to be rescued, as their experiences threatened to negatively affect the “mood barometer of the Reich 
capital.” Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern, 260.. Koch, however, used his connections with 
Hitler to oppose Goebbels, reducing the number to 55,000, thereby exemplifying the confusion and intransigence 
that prevailed among the regime elite. Kershaw, The End, 22.. 
13 Quoted in Lass, Die Flucht, Ostpreußen 1944-1945, 63. 
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bombardments, and individual planes and small squadrons strafed farmers in their fields or cars 
on the road.14 In the summer of 1944, the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) noted flagging morale 
particularly in the German East, where “a great proportion of the population” grappled with 
“anxious fears” over the military situation.15 Regime reports documented “deep depression” 
nearing “anxiety psychosis,” and “creeping panic.”16 In East Prussia, one report commented, 
widespread opinion doubted the ability of the Wehrmacht to keep the front intact.17 
The fear went beyond mere alarm over imminent combat descending upon the region. 
Anxiety turned to sheer terror because of who stood at the gates: The dreaded Soviet threat. 
Especially women harbored profound apprehensive: “If the Bolsheviks get in, we might as well 
all hang ourselves, with our children,” SD operatives overheard from one worried mother.18 
Distress over being caught up in the conflagration mixed with memories of the Tsarist incursion 
into East Prussia in 1914.19 These qualms were only amplified by Goebbels’ virulent anti-
Bolshevik propaganda intended to raise fighting spirits in the “Total War” effort; since 1943, 
assurances of German superiority over “sub-humans” gave way to fears of dehumanized, beast-
like hordes intent on eradicating Germany.20 Indeed, fears of retribution for a harsh occupation of 
                                                 
14 Bundesarchiv Bayreuth Ost-Dokumentation (BArch Ost-Dok) 1/19, 211. 
15 Heinz Boberach, ed., Meldungen aus dem Reich: die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS : 
1938-1945, vol. 17 (Herrsching: Pawlak Verlag, 1984), 6698–99. 
16 Quoted in Kershaw, The End, 18. 
17 Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, 17:6702. 
18 Quoted in Kershaw, The End, 18. 
19 The Russian invasion of East Prussia sparked the flight of 350,000 and led to the deaths of about 1,500 civilians 
and mass plundering, destruction of property, and deportations to Russia. Alastair Noble, Nazi Rule and the Soviet 
Offensive in Eastern Germany, 1944-1945: The Darkest Hour (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 20–22.  
20 On Nazi anti-Bolshevik propaganda, see Ernest K. Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, 1925-
1945 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1965); Jay W. Baird, The Mythical World of Nazi War 
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the Soviet Union and German war crimes—well known to the population—were widespread. 
Visions of war coming home with a vengeance abounded. 
Not convinced by slogans that predicted victory, a sizeable proportion of the population 
yearned for measures that would ensure their safety. Instead, authorities implemented drastic 
measures that rattled composures further. Starting in July of 1944, the Gauleiter mobilized 
nearly a half million mostly old men and women, forced workers, and POWs for three to four 
week work details digging a network of trenches and fortifications known as the Ostwall 
(Eastern Wall) in East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, and East Brandenburg.21 Instead of inspiring 
confidence in the face of an approaching menace, the draining and demoralizing labor came 
across as a “desperate and ultimately pointless effort.”22 The creation of the Volkssturm 
(“People’s Storm”)—a militia comprised of boys as young as 16 and men as old as 65—similarly 
demoralized the population. While perhaps some believed that herein lay a powerful force to 
defend hearth and home from the Bolshevik onslaught, SD mood reports discovered deep 
skepticism: The mobilization of youths and the elderly indicated an exhaustion of Germany’s 
forces, and signaled that the Reich was “pressed into a hopeless defense.”23 The coming months 
                                                 
Propaganda, 1939-1945 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974); David Welch, The Third Reich. 
Politics and Propaganda (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
21 See Kershaw, The End, 101–6.  
22 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:11E. Billed as an impregnable fortress that would rebuff the 
Soviet advance, many questioned the military value of the endeavor. Moreover, dragooned laborers resented the 
grueling work that took them from their homes and harvest, and complained of excesses and abuse by slovenly 
officials overseeing construction. Cynically, East Prussians referred to the fruitless digging as “Schippschipp-
Hurra” (scoop-scoop-hooray). Kossert, Ostpreußen, 143. The Party itself was keenly aware of the criticism 
regarding the Ostwall and lack of conviction that it served realistic military purposes. Kershaw, The End, 104.. 
Indeed, as the Soviet 1945 January offensive would demonstrate, the largely undermanned fortifications presented 
no threat to the enemy, who seamlessly overran them. 
23 Quoted in Kershaw, The End, 106–7. On the skepticism, see also Bernhard Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944: 
Was in Ostpreussen tatsächlich geschah (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1997), 142. The mayor of Insterburg (Cheryakhovsky) 
similarly recalled that many doubted Gauleiter Koch’s repeated claims that not just the Wehrmacht, but Volkssturm 
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would indeed see the Volkssturm function as mere cannon fodder. Yet as pointless as it seemed 
from a military standpoint, the radical measure spelled disaster for the German East: With even 
more men bound to the defense of the Reich, future evacuations would predominantly be the 
affairs of women, children, and the old. Lacking the skills to lead teams of horses and 
overburdened with the care of the young or elderly, many women therefore lacked the support 
that could have mitigated the deprivations of an arduous flight.   
Yet among the most unsettling elements of the summer of 1944 were the waves of 
evacuees, and the news they brought with them. The mayor of Löbau (Lubawa) noted that 
sounds of the front and reports of “murders, rapes, deportations, and plundering” spread by 
military units and civilians unsettled inhabitants.24 The regime also registered how reports of 
evacuees fomented profound anxiety.25 In Alt-Wartenburg (Barczewko), an official recalled how 
refugees filled the district and spread unrest by recounting their experiences. Soon locals called 
for evacuations, yet orders prevented departures that would provoke feelings of “defeatism” and 
cause panic.26 Accounts that “made the true state of the troops and situation apparent” trickled as 
far as West Prussia, and prompted appeals for concise evacuation plans, which NSDAP offices 
spurned.27 Prohibited from leaving or preparing for a departure on penalty of treason, onlookers 
must have wondered whether they too would soon be caught up in the conflagration.  
                                                 
as well, would “firmly claw themselves into the soil of the homeland and no enemy would be able to intrude upon 
the province.” Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:10.  
24 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:35.  
25 Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, 17:6702. 
26 BArch Ost-Dok 1/1a, 123.  
27 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:32.. The growing desires for withdrawal and staunch prohibition 
of flight during the summer of 1944 are recurring themes in postwar testimonies of former officials. The 
recollections of ranking civilian authorities—even accounting for instances of exaggerated self-importance—
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Unease within communities that they were on their own in an unraveling situation were 
widespread. Indeed, the hysterical fear is a familiar element of “flight and expulsion.” Yet the 
archival record also documents contrary emotions. Dispersed among the rural communities, the 
summer evacuees were reduced to laborers for the local population and regretted having left their 
homes in exchange for a life of humiliation. After the Soviet offensive ground to a halt and 
officials ordered the male population to return to their farms to bring in the harvest, many of their 
families eagerly accompanied them: The desire to return home outweighed concerns for personal 
safety.28 Testimonies also reveal that anger and disgruntlement prevailed over relief of having 
avoided a catastrophe. Farmers of the border region resented the costs of spontaneous evacuation 
and regretted fleeing: The Wehrmacht seized the majority of livestock, thus dealing a heavy 
blow to their livelihood. Judging from the archival testimonies, civilians felt immense anger 
toward the regime and criticized how the evacuations played out and disrupted their lives.29 
Certainly, some of this disgruntlement can be explained by the benefit of hindsight and 
the fact that the halted Soviet advance made evacuations unnecessary. But those who fled or 
witnessed the August scenes discerned an inadequate and poorly organized response from 
authorities.30 In particular, the “positively dreadful composure” of fleeing military officials who 
tore through the region did not engender confidence. In early August, Gauleiter Koch lamented 
                                                 
overwhelmingly corroborate that especially East and West Prussian Nazi officials unequivocally refused to entertain 
evacuation orders.  
28 Schieder, 1:3. 
29 Hans Henning and Eva Hahn argue that the course of the evacuations, the complaints in the documentary record, 
as well as the thefts among the refugees and the capricious appropriation of private property through the Wehrmacht 
indicate that the evacuations were a humanitarian disaster that call the entire logic of the enterprise into question. 
Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern, 268–72.  
30 Kershaw, 108. Dokumentation, 9E 
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to Martin Bormann that daily “complaints over the unheard of manner in which these soldiers are 
behaving” reached his desk. Audaciously, there were reports of soldiers intruding onto the 
properties of Reich Germans in order to demand luxury goods or even plunder.31  
The August evacuations therefore seemed premature and poorly carried out, marked by 
haste and corruption. The lack of concrete procedures coupled with the blatant desperation and 
radicalism of the regime raised profound doubts about the ability of authorities to master any 
future catastrophe. The summer evacuations left a bad taste in the mouths of many, which would 
have grave repercussions in the coming months: The brush with disaster spread as much anxiety 
as it did resolve to remain on the family property at all costs. From her family’s farm in Deutsch 
Thierau (Iwanzowo)—located directly on the Königsberg (Kaliningrad)-Elbing (Elbląg) 
Autobahn—one young woman “saw the misery of the flight” all summer long, as columns of 
refugees streamed west and sometimes stopped for shelter. They were a continuous reminder of 
what loss of property and the risk of a flight into the unknown entailed, and they cautioned their 
compatriots still fortunate enough to remain at home to avoid making a similar mistake: “Almost 
all of them said to us: ‘stay where you are; because once you are on the road, everything is over 
and done.’ At the time we had no idea that the same was in store for us.”32  
 
“The Russian is Here!” A Foretaste of Calamity 
The constellation of inadequate or prohibited planning, anxiety, and disillusionment bore 
disastrous ramifications on October 5, when the Soviet military launched a formidable offensive 
                                                 
31 Their ranks were ostensibly filled with “Eastern peoples (Ostvölker), including Russian “broads (Weiber)” whom 
the soldiers openly “pamper and indulge,” completely forgetting that they were now on Reich soil and setting a 
terrible example. Quoted in Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern, 260. 
32 BArch Ost-Dok 2/14, 12. 
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across the borders into the Memel Territory. Reaching the Baltic coast within five days, the 
attack cut the region and its roughly 100,000 inhabitants from the Reich. Ignoring earlier calls 
from the military to remove the civilian population, NSDAP officials issued evacuation orders 
only on October 7, though portions of the population, exhorted by retreating Wehrmacht soldiers, 
risked punishment by independently fleeing from the approaching enemy.33  
Resentment over the first evacuations or a false sense of security engendered by the 
averted August disaster nevertheless convinced many to stay put. A sizeable proportion—
particularly those who experienced the August evacuations—ignored the belated calls to depart, 
preferring to “guard their properties from the rabble prowling about.”34 The rural communities 
exhibited such resolute intransigence that authorities, after initially opposing evacuation, now 
threatened to treat all who stayed behind as traitors. Despite this, in Wensken (Wentzko Paschil), 
“many no longer honestly believed [the orders], since the first time we could have stayed.” Only 
two families out of the nearly 300 villagers decided to leave.35 Because mechanized vehicles are 
faster than horse-drawn wagons, the speed of the enemy left no time for families to reconsider 
their choices, and nearly a third of the population—around 30,000—fell into Soviet hands within 
the first hours of the offensive. Looting, mass rape, and murder were common fates.36 
Once communities recognized the seriousness of the situation, hasty flight was the sole 
yet perilous option. Those who could save themselves across the Memel River before the enemy 
cut off the route were fortunate; for those whose escape was blocked, salvation lay in reaching 
                                                 
33 Doku, 3. Dokumentation, 14 E; and Kershaw, 108. Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:14E; 
Schieder, 1:3; Kershaw, The End, 108. 
34 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:2. 
35 Schieder, 1:3. 
36 Noble, 130-132. The Memel Territory in the first October days remains a surprising desideratum.  
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the city of Memel (Klaipeda) or other ports with transport across the Curonian Lagoon to the 
Curonian Spit before Soviet forces arrived. A desperate race against time developed, yet soldiers 
and refugees clogged roads under artillery fire. The Wehrmacht variously closed routes or 
directed civilians onto side roads to free operations for their forces or ease their retreat.37 The 
rapid enemy advance cut off one avenue of escape after another, so that many treks zig-zagged 
the countryside looking for a way to safety.38 Fleeing on October 8 after initially stalling, Else 
Steinwender’s trek encountered hundreds of refugees collapsed in exhaustion or resignation 
among abandoned carts and mounds of household goods that littered the way.39 Finding all 
avenues of escape cut off by by nightfall, Steinwender’s family contemplated returning home, 
yet a burning Memel’s ominous red glow on the horizon behind them made this a terrifying 
proposition. Agonizing over the lack of options, the decision was seemingly made for them: 
“All of a sudden it was said: ‘The Russian is here.’ Rigid with fear I 
watched as German soldiers took cover…. [Our] neighbor fell to her 
knees and loudly prayed for God’s help, we thought we and our children 
were lost. As if by a miracle it suddenly became quiet, until…fleeing 
German columns appeared, whom we followed, having discarded all of 
our unnecessary possessions.”40 
 
                                                 
37 Louis H. ignored evacuation orders until on October 9 he noticed columns of Wehrmacht units driving away from 
the front past his farm, followed by small arms fire from the adjacent forest. Hastily his family and neighbors fled, 
but made it only one kilometer before the military police halted civilians for several hours to permit retreating 
Wehrmacht personnel the right of way. As the last units passed, leaving no line of defense between the treks and the 
Soviet advance, H. was fortunate enough to immediately follow; those too far back in the traffic jam were overrun. 
Lass, Die Flucht, Ostpreußen 1944-1945, 32. 
38 One particularly daring example is the report of Inspector K. His trek initially fled away from the city of Memel in 
the face of Soviet units, only to be cut off by the enemy’s advance further south. Portions of the trek returned the 
way they had come, until German military police stopped them at a bridge that Soviet forces moments before 
crossed. Realizing he was caught in a cauldron, K. navigated side-roads through artillery fire and throngs of helpless 
women and children who had given up hope. Essentially following the Russian advance, K. inconceivably managed 
to skirt through into Memel. Lass, 29. 
39 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:4. 
40 Schieder, 1:4. 
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Steinwender was fortunate, as most never made it further than a few miles from their 
homes before the enemy overran the majority of the treks. Steinwender’s family reached Mingen 
(Minija), a small town on the Curonian Lagoon, before German troops detonated the bridge 
across the Mingen River. Thousands of terror-stricken refugees, huddled on the eastern shore, 
waited in vain for a place on the single ferry; in desperation many plunged into the water but 
drowned trying to reach the other shore.41 All along the coast, a diverse fleet of anything that 
could float, including fishermen from Nidden (Nida), attempted to ferry as many people across 
the lagoon to safety before the Red Army arrived.42 Frantic refugees, moments before the arrival 
of enemy troops, reportedly attempted to swim the 15 kilometers, but most failed.43 
Else Steinwender and others fleeing into East Prussia undoubtedly shared their 
experiences with the alarmed population. Hopes that they would avoid a similar fate were dashed 
only days later. On October 16th, powerful Soviet armored units attempting to drive toward 
Königsberg (Kaliningrad) punched a 60 kilometer salient into German lines before dogged 
resistance stopped them by the end of the month. At first many initially failed to notice the 
danger, as the westerly winds obscured the sounds of combat. “But slowly it trickled in: 
something is going on at the border! For the first time the names of German villages appeared in 
the army reports.”44 In Insterburg (Cheryakhovsky), the “sky in the east was red from fires, the 
thunder of cannons got louder daily, the streets were clogged with refugees and cars, with 
                                                 
41 Schieder, 1:4. 
42 Lass, Die Flucht, Ostpreußen 1944-1945, 30. 
43 Kershaw, The End, 110. 
44 Quoted in Kossert, Ostpreußen, 143–44.. 
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livestock and horses…. Children and foals who had lost their mothers wandered the streets.”45 
The region descended into chaos, as news of encroaching tanks and reports of Soviet atrocities 
spread like wildfire, yet once again no escape seemed possible.46 
Wehrmacht commanders anticipated the offensive and arranged a partial evacuation near 
the border, bypassing the NSDAP.47 The majority of East Prussians, however, encountered 
indifference and callousness from officials. Following directives, Nazi functionaries arranged for 
the transportation of goods and industry while threatening severe punishment for any signs of 
defeatism, including fleeing.48 Facts on the ground and passionate pleading, however, managed 
in some instances to convince the NSDAP to change course. For example, in Angerapp (before 
1938 Darkehmen, after 1945 Ozyorsk) the growing throng of disconcerted women amassed on 
the market square confronted NSDAP representatives and moved them to coordinate with district 
leaders to arrange evacuation. After failing to reach the Gauleiter, officials independently 
initiated departures with trucks and trains they procured.49 In Insterburg, where thousands sat 
“utterly unnerved, helpless and full of worries” on their luggage, the mayor’s pleas for help from 
Nazi Party offices were initially countered with admonishments to “keep his head.” Only after 
                                                 
45 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:10–11. 
46 Schieder, 1:10.; and BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 159. 
47 Noble, Nazi Rule, 130. See also BArch Ost-Dok 1/5, 89-98.  
48 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:9–10.. Throughout the region, the Nazi Party issued orders to 
civil servants to coordinate with factories and firms to prepare for the removal of their wares and machinery in the 
case of an emergency to assigned evacuation points further west.  
49 Schieder, 1:5–6. When authorities in Königsberg found out, they intervened and demanded that several 
individuals be “gunned down (über den Haufen schiessen)” as punishment. Informed that only women and children 
were present, the Gauleiter’s office demanded that they be mobilized for the defense of the city. Ultimately, the 
NSDAP relented and approved a limited evacuation. 
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painting a bleak picture of what an airstrike on the overcrowded train station would mean did the 
Gauleiter dispatch trains that ferried many of the women and children out of the city.50  
Left largely to fend for themselves and with fighting dangerously close, more often than 
not local leaders simply ignored NSDAP directives and initiated improvised evacuations for the 
most vulnerable.51 Not waiting on permission, ordinary East Prussians frequently packed and 
prepared for an imminent departure secretly.52 Social status and NSDAP affiliation strongly 
came into play here. Affluent estate owners and notables found few problems negotiating the 
prohibition on unauthorized withdrawal, managing to save themselves and their valuables days 
or even weeks before.53 Those who owned automobiles had an advantage, capable of making a 
speedy getaway with some of their property.54 The poor without transport faced a journey on 
foot, unless they could appeal to the altruism of one of their neighbors or secure precious space 
on a retreating military transport.55   
                                                 
50 Schieder, 1:10–11. The mayor attempted to prepare evacuation plans in August 1944, but received a sharp 
dressing down and threats from the district president. One must naturally take into account attempts of self-
justification after 1945. Nevertheless, numerous other reports corroborate the intransigence of the Nazi Party 
regarding timely preparations for the civilian population.  
51 For instance, Albrechtswiesen (Popiollen before 1938, Budry or Popioły after 1945) the mayor arranged for the 
elderly and sick to be evacuated to Heilsberg (Lizbark Warmiński), though he could not organize the transport of 
mothers and children. BArch Ost-Dok 1/5, 13.  
52 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 594. In the village of Daginten, Soviet planes circling overhead and rumors of enemy 
paratroopers prompted the mayor to advise his community to clandestinely prepare for departure. Without ever 
receiving directives, virtually the entire town left during the night before the arrival of the enemy the next day. 
BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 85.  
53 In the district of Gumbinnen, for instance, the large estate owners managed to leave long before the arrival of the 
fighting and the last-minute evacuation order. Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944, 104. See also BArch Ost-Dok 
1/1a, 123. 
54 While the rest of the community negotiated the clogged roads in treks, affluent citizens of Frankenhof (before 
1936 Didsziddern, 1936-1938 Didschiddern, after 1945 dissolved) packed their cars and drove their families to the 
Reich. BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 121. 
55 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 33.  
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Postwar testimonies reflect unbridled anger at Nazi officials and their behavior because 
of these final hours before headlong departure. Despite often preventing timely departures and 
expressing confidence that no flight was necessary, the party “fat cats” (Bonzen) frequently 
exhibited unscrupulous and hypocritical self-preservation by absconding with their families and 
possessions while compatriots anxiously awaited official directives.56 In the district of Angerapp, 
NSDAP notables for example used threats of violence to commandeer trucks that administrators 
organized for women and children in order to transport luxury foods and alcohol to safety. 
Moreover, during the hasty preparations of the community, party officials suddenly disappeared, 
with one high-ranking functionary drinking himself into a stupor at an inn while hysterical 
refugees milled about the streets.57 The privileges of NSDAP membership or connections to the 
regime were powerful currency: In Gumbinnen (Gusev), one woman called upon her cousin, an 
officer, who arrived with a military escort and cars to aid the family’s departure.58  
An “organized” evacuation, it is clear from the primary sources, did not exist. By and 
large, the regime failed to provide guidance, and it was only the rapid Soviet advance and 
independent decisions to flee that created a fait accompli that broke NSDAP obstinacy. 
However, when Nazi officials finally issued evacuation directives, they did so at the last possible 
moment and only intensified the pandemonium. In Gumbinnen, authorities “in their stubbornness 
                                                 
56 The local party leader (Ortrsgruppenleiter) of Sodeiken assured villagers that they were in no danger and warned 
them not to leave independently, before mysteriously disappearing in the days before the town’s flight. BArch Ost-
Dok 1/19, 596. Similarly, in Puspern (before 1938 Tublauken, after 1945 Lomowo), the Ortsgruppenleiter refused 
to grant the community’s withdrawal, but then absconded during the evening. BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 473. 
Throughout the region, party offices were able to relocate their operations to other cities, which many staffers used 
as an opportunity to extradite their families and close friends. See BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 208-209; and Lass, Die 
Flucht, Ostpreußen 1944-1945, 51..  
57 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:5. 
58 BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 19. 
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and delusion” did not allow departures until October 20, even though airstrikes pummeled the 
city and ground forces reached the outskirts days before. Now under the motto of “everyone for 
himself,” the district leader finally relented, setting off a stampede to the train station: “Endless 
droves of refugees gathered with their luggage for the departure… [and] the wagons of the long 
train were completely packed with people and their possessions.”59 In Eysseln (Kubansksoe), 
after inhabitants spotted enemy tanks approaching the town, authorities suddenly ordered the 
community to leave within fifteen minutes.60 Mostly, however, people were left to their own 
devices: In the township of Frankenhof, a Nazi official in a nearby village on the verge of being 
overrun telephoned and advised that the community “do what they think is best.”61 In many cases 
civilians received no alerts at all, oblivious to the danger until the Red Army rolled into town.62 
Even if communities managed to hastily depart, many received no warning of the seriousness of 
the situation: Treks fleeing westward only realized the danger after retreating Wehrmacht 
overtook them and shouted that “Bolsheviks were on [their] heels.”63  
Not all recalled bedlam and terror. In communities on rail lines, trains managed to 
transport women and children to western provinces before further evacuation to Pomerania or 
Saxony without any incidents.64 Remarkably, one refugee recalled after the war vividly feeling 
                                                 
59 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 208. See also BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 211-216. 
60 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 111. Miraculously, the 1952 report claims that all of the families of the village managed to 
escape via Osterode to Saxony without any losses. 
61 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 121. 
62 In Maygunischken (Aksjonowo), Red Army forces overran the town before anyone was able to evacuate. BArch 
Ost-Dok 1/19, 93. In Reckeln (Schiguli), only a handful were able to “run away at the last minute” on October 21st, 
when Soviet forces suddenly appeared in the village. BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 483.  
63 Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), R55/601, 181. 
64 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 111; and BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 208.  
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that “[t]he ride through the Masurian countryside was nice despite the ardor.”65 The excitement 
filled some refugees, particularly children, with a sense of adventure.66 In her diary, a young girl 
confided on October 20, 1944 that the electric energy made her think of her elders’ stories from 
WWI: “[A] secret wish emerged within me to once also be able to speak of so many dangers, of 
such adventures. My wish has come true…I think back on the early morning hours when my 
brother Horst excitedly stormed into the house with the news: ‘Today is the day.’ I hear once 
again the loud crying of our neighbors. I once again see the pale face of my mother, I once again 
relive the exciting hours, the confusing chaos, the clatter and screaming.”67  
For the majority, however, speedy getaway entailed painful choices and the eschewal of 
even basic considerations. For one family, this was their second flight since giving up their home 
in the Memel Territory in August. The travails proved too much for the elderly father, who 
suddenly passed away; unable to arrange funeral services because the town descended into 
chaos, the family had no choice but to leave his body in a barn with the hope that German 
soldiers might bury him.68 The departure from the homeland not only took an immense 
emotional toll, but quickly emerged as a deadly enterprise once combat engulfed the fleeing 
masses. On October 20, for example, a deadly airstrike on the overcrowded train station 
interrupted the evacuation of Benkheim (Banie Mazurskie), and the disoriented inhabitants now 
dispersed on foot as Soviet and Wehrmacht forces engaged in combat in the village.69  
                                                 
65 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 594 
66 Werner Arndt, Ostpreussen, Westpreussen, Pommern, Schlesien, Sudetenland 1944/1945: die Bild-Dokumentation 
der Flucht und Vertreibung aus den deutschen Ostgebieten (Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas-Verl., 1981), 26–27. 
67 BArch Ost-Dok 2/6, 64. 
68 BArch Ost-Dok 2/12, 87. 
69 BArch Ost-Dok 1/5, 89-98. 
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Even if one managed to hit the road, the flight immediately descended into disarray. 
Artillery and enemy planes menaced columns of fleeing civilians, who were exposed to the 
danger because wagons, livestock, and the slave laborers of the East Prussian farmers clogged 
the thoroughfares.70 Trying to maintain avenues for their operations, the Wehrmacht relegated 
refugees to the right side of the road while military vehicles in retreat or rushing to the front 
claimed the left.71 Nevertheless, military vehicles barreling down narrow country lanes struck 
slow-moving or distracted civilians and livestock.72 Elsewhere, military police closed avenues 
altogether and halted or redirected frantic columns to side roads.73 Tank columns blocked by 
traffic jams threatened to drive through any and all hindrances, even at the cost of civilian life.74 
Compounding the misery of the refugees, officials pressed men directly from the treks into the 
Volkssturm and confiscated horses.75 Lacking horses and competent drivers, this effectively 
ended the flight for many then and there or hindered their flight in January 1945. 
Pandemonium sealed the fate of thousands, as treks broke apart in the confusion or were 
left stranded, eventually overtaken by Soviet forces swiftly penetrating into the East Prussian 
interior.76 Though a few managed to navigate side roads and skirt by the enemy advance, the 
                                                 
70 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 140. 
71 Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944, 115. 
72 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 584. 
73 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 619. 
74 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:6. 
75 On the Volkssturm, see BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 3, 45, 61, 125, 127, 135, and 147. On the confiscation of horses, see 
Lass, Die Flucht, Ostpreußen 1944-1945, 44; Lass, 62.; BArch Ost-Dok 1/1, 51; and BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 34.  
76 Of the Tannsee (before 1938 Kasenowsken, after 1945 Jelowoje) community, only two wagons reportedly made it 
to safety due to the belated evacuation and because the trek was deprived of many of its horses and men. BArch Ost-
Dok 1/19, 619. The Blecken (Judino) trek broke apart into three separate groups after quarrels on which route to take 
after finding the main avenue closed; only one escaped the enemy. BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 65.  
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archival sources reveal that the advancing Red Army overran the vast majority of treks.77 
However terrifying the experience of flight may have been up until this point, the first 
interactions with Soviet soldiers proved incredibly traumatic for exhausted and terrified refugees. 
Many units, concerned with military objectives, rapidly bypassed refugees without incident. One 
woman recounted how Soviet soldiers raced by with “mind-boggling” speed, shouting for the 
civilians to return home as they rushed to engage German forces.78 Other Red Army troopers 
refrained from any abuse, and merely seized valuables such as wristwatches in passing.79 
Violent excesses were just as common as unremarkable encounters, however. The 
account of Margot G. reflects the themes of other testimonies. Fleeing with her family and Polish 
slave workers, the escape ended when enemy soldiers materialized from the mist ahead of them: 
“They stopped us with raised rifles and forced us to dismount from our 
carriages. The lead wagon escaped in the fog—they shot after it. On it 
were my mother, mother-in-law, and both of my children. The Russians 
cursed us out. They wanted to exterminate (ausrotten) us Germans, and 
after they had taken the watches of the men, they surrounded my husband, 
took him several paces with them, and before I could notice what was 
happening he was killed with a shot through the temple.”80 
 
                                                 
77 The villagers of Habichtsau (before 1935 Wannagupchen, after 1945 Nowyj Mir) fled at the last possible moment 
on Oct 19, retreating west for three days parallel to the Soviet advance. Separated by a mere seven kilometers, both 
parties raced toward Insterburg, with the refugees managing to reach it before the enemy troops closed the approach. 
BArch Ost-Dok1 1/19, 239. The trek from Schweizertal (before 1938 Nestonkehmen, after 1945 Woronowo), 
having received no evacuation order and threatened with enemy encirclement, aimlessly drove between the lines. 
“Here on the other side of the [forest] the Russian tanks, which were advancing on Schulzenwalde (Dubrava) in 
parallel, hummed. The German planes dove down and attacked the Russians with cannons and bombs. The Russian 
planes attacked the trek multiple times with machinegun fire, but no losses were caused among us.” Despite this 
incredible fortune, treks of neighboring communities behind the Schweizertal group were overrun, though the author 
reports that no deaths were known to him. BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 583. 
78 BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 20. 
79 For a typical example, see BArch Ost-Dok 2/43a, 196. 
80 BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 49-50. G.’s recollections cannot possibly parse the intentions or motives of the soldiers. It is 
possible that her husband was simply arbitrarily shot, punished for resisting, or seen as a Nazi functionary because 
of his Polish slaves. In either case, this specific account is corroborated in BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 34. 
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Margot Grimm was fortunate that her former slave laborers—now liberated—disguised 
her in “rags” and identified her as Polish, so that no harm came to her. Red Army soldiers 
however frequently showed little hesitation to make use of their firearms. Near Gumbinnen, 
German farmers and French POWs on harvesting duty emerged from heavy fog to find their path 
blocked by Soviet soldiers; all were reportedly torn from their wagons and summarily executed. 
Elsewhere in the district, eye-witnesses claimed that Red Army soldiers “blindly fired into the 
stream of refugees.”81 Particularly women, elderly and adolescent, faced perilous circumstances 
when encountering the enemy. Recalling the immediate scenes after their trek was overtaken, 
one respondent recounted how the soldiers “ravaged terribly”: “Women of every age and girls of 
school age…were torn down from the vehicles and indiscriminately defiled, men and children 
were to some extent battered to death.”82 Resistance from the victims or intervention from their 
relatives were met with deadly force.  
In addition to eliminating perceived obstacles to their sexual assaults, German uniformed 
men found little mercy. Whether military or civil servants such as postmen, any symbols of the 
despised fascist aggressors and remotest suspicion of Nazi Party affiliation—real or imagined—
was enough to warrant immediate execution. One farmer from an overrun trek was reportedly 
bludgeoned to death by a soldier who had discovered a swastika on his hunting license.83 Given 
that the NSDAP celebrated its most impressive electoral successes in the eastern regions, a 
                                                 
81 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 411. 
82 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 214. 
83 BArch Ost-Dok 2/7, 29. 
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significant proportion of the population had real reason to fear retribution at the hands of an 
enemy that suffered terribly under German occupation.84  
One must consider the possibility that in some instances, Soviet soldiers perceived 
civilians as enemy combatants who fell victim to a merciless policy of shooting first and asking 
questions later. In either case, whether filled with rage for the 20-28 million Soviet dead or 
uncertainty and fear over encountering masses of people in a combat zone on enemy soil, the fate 
of civilians caught between two fronts in a war of annihilation frequently ended tragically. When 
it comes to Soviet behavior, as later chapters will demonstrate, postwar testimonies and literature 
often contain outlandish exaggerations and ubiquitous assertions of apocalyptic barbarism that 
spared no one. Parsing the evidence is challenging, as the memories and interpretation of 
wartime traumata are filtered through a lens influenced by Nazi propaganda and Cold War 
anticommunism. Emotional and sensational depictions provided the moral and political grist for 
the memory politics of the expellees within a Cold War context, even as they often stood in stark 
contrast to the historical record. Nevertheless, even accounting for colorful narrations, 
overwhelming evidence attests to violence indiscriminately and arbitrarily meted out on a 
massive scale. Nowhere is the simultaneous blurring of fact and fiction demonstrated more 
clearly than at the notorious massacre in the East Prussian hamlet of Nemmersdorf. 
 
 
                                                 
84 Kershaw, The End, 98. Cutting across confessional and social lines, the eastern regions of the Reich showed early 
enthusiastic support for Hitler, particularly in border regions where territorial losses after WWI fueled revanchist 
sentiments. Moreover, because these territories had been spared many of the wartime deprivations and damages until 




“Dreadful Rumors” in the East: Fear Narratives of a Collapsing Regime85 
Reflecting after the war, General Heinz Guderian proclaimed that “what happened in East 
Prussia was an indication to…the rest of Germany of their fate in the event of a Russian 
victory.”86 On the one hand, Guderian unwittingly reified widely disseminated Nazi propaganda 
that elevated atrocities into an exhortation to fight to the bitter end or else face extinction. The 
fear narratives of the Nazi regime spread terror that help explain why millions opted for 
headlong panicked flight. Guderian’s memoirs evince how wartime images became a foundation 
that were further expounded upon in the postwar period, transforming Nemmersdorf into a 
notorious lieux de memoire of “flight and expulsion” that profoundly influenced the German 
public’s cultural memory of the war and the Red Army.87 The events are therefore emblematic of 
the appropriation, distortion, and mobilization of history and memory.  
Yet on the other hand, beyond the symbol of Nemmersdorf are the actual events that 
unfolded there in October 1944, which Guderian not unjustifiably implied as representative of 
many refugee experiences. In order to comprehend the memory politics of the expellees, it is 
necessary to critically examine the historical events that so powerfully shaped the course of the 
flight, and subsequent interpretations established upon them.  
As elsewhere in East Prussia, the roughly 600 inhabitants of Nemmersdorf 
(Mayakovskoye) and surrounding hamlets received no evacuation orders despite the proximity of 
the enemy. An increasing number of treks from the front, growing din of battle, and enemy 
planes that started strafing the village in mid-October unsettled the population for days. Anxiety 
                                                 
85 Fröhlich, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, 1993, 15:292. 
86 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Da Capo, 1996), 376. 
87 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 1-36. 
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grew further once officials ordered inhabitants, including women, to dig defensive positions, all 
while German artillery stationed in the village pulled out and postal service halted. Many 
interpreted these developments as signs of imminent combat, and secretly prepared for departure; 
those with relatives in the Reich suddenly left, while affluent denizens departed despite a 
prohibition of unauthorized retreat.88 
On October 20, the district’s agricultural leader Fritz Feller was conducting routine 
business when his car was flagged down by several Volkssturm men hiding from Soviet tanks 
parked 500 meters down the road. Racing to Gumbinnen in order to demand an evacuation, the 
administrator found that the enemy cut the telephone lines there, prohibiting contact with higher 
officials. The district president, eschewing responsibility, told Feller to organize an evacuation 
on his own authority. Frantically driving throughout the neighboring towns, Feller spread word 
for communities to flee at 6 a.m. the next morning.89  
In Nemmersdorf, inhabitants made hasty preparations while refugees from further east 
continued to surge into town. The rapid change of events astonished many: While hastily rushing 
to purchase provisions, Maria Eschmann came upon her neighbor—a “bear of a man”—bitterly 
sobbing in the street, lamenting that the villagers “have been betrayed, the Russian is just nine 
kilometers from Nemmersdorf.”90 Toward evening, the situation become so dire that many 
resolved to leave before the appointed time, and throughout the night treks continuously departed 
the village as artillery and machinegun fire erupted in close proximity. 
                                                 
88 Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944, 109–10. 
89 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 417. This seems to hold true for the entire region, where starting on the 19th and 20th 
independent departures began. Only on October 21 did NSDAP offices in Königsberg issue an official order. See 
BArch Ost-Dok 1/1, 9.  
90 Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944, 110–11. 
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Eschmann recalled that the screaming of refugees on the road woke her in the early 
morning, a few hours before her family was to depart. Shortly thereafter, she discerned three 
shouts of “Urrah,” the Soviet battle cry preceding an attack. Hurriedly waking her family with 
the news that the enemy was coming, the Eschmanns rushed to their waiting wagons; only the 
father-in-law stayed behind, unwilling to abandon his property and preferring to die at home. 
Most neighbors who had not fled during the night now plunged into a headlong retreat. Families 
became separated in the pandemonium and erupting combat. The town’s paymaster and fleeing 
military trucks scooped up pregnant women and the elderly, while Elisabeth Deichmann’s 
invalid father exhorted his daughters to leave him and escape with bicycles.91 Escape proved 
difficult, however, as treks clogged the roads through Nemmersdorf the past two days; masses of 
refugees congregated on the bridge over the Angerapp River on the eastern side of town.  
Because it was the sole crossing point in the area, the bridge was as much a lifeline for 
fleeing families as a crucial military objective for Soviet forces. The critical race against time 
was over for many here because “traffic stalled completely and our trek couldn’t move forward 
further.”92 With the enemy nearby, many abandoned their wagons and possessions in order to 
continue on foot. Marianne S. recalled how suddenly disarray gave way to dismay: 
“We were horrified as the first Russians appeared on the slopes over the 
Angerapp River. At first they seemed to be waiting, but then they stalked 
closer, and before we knew it they stood before us. In passing they took 
watches and jewelry from refugees. All of a sudden a Russian tank with 
the first German captives appeared. Driving any further was unthinkable; 
the Poles steering our wagons immediately defected to the Russians.”93 
                                                 
91 Fisch, 112–13. The parents of Elisabeth Deichmann were fortunate to find room on a military horse-drawn 
carriage. 
92 BArch Ost-Dok 2/43a, 196. 
93 BArch Ost-Dok 2/43a, 196. For S. and her compatriots, the flight ended here. While deciding what to do, Soviet 
soldiers directed the refugees to return to their homes, only a few kilometers away. Unhindered, the refugees left on 




Carefully working their way up the refugee column toward the river, the caution of these 
advance units suggests that they anticipated resistance at this natural defensive position. The 
shouting of refugees and soldiers that Maria Eschmann heard likely emanated from the river, and 
signaled the start of an assault trying to capture the crossing point. Numerous testimonies 
recalled incredibly thick fog that concealed the area. Opening fire on what they reasonably could 
assume were Wehrmacht positions, the salvos ripped through the treks on the bridge, sending 
people clamoring into the adjoining fields. Enemy tanks crashed into the chaos of hysterical 
refugees and terrorized animals. Whether frantically pursuing military objectives and indifferent 
to civilian losses or unaware of the situation due to poor visibility, the results were deadly.94 
Upon entering and sweeping through the town, Soviet forces found numerous inhabitants 
and refugees who remained or were unable to escape. Contrary to the horror that Nemmersdorf 
stands for, the first hours seem to have been marked by relative calm. Apart from the town’s 
nurse, whom soldiers arbitrarily beat down and injured with a gunshot, ample evidence reveals 
that the startled townsfolk initially encountered an equable enemy more concerned with securing 
the village.95 Having sent his family away at the last moment and needing to return home for 
supplies before following them, Johannes Schewe ran into Red Army soldiers who did not 
                                                 
(Schreckensbilder) greeted them. “To both sides of the bridge one could see on the slopes raped women who had 
been murdered or, covered in blood, were laying in the last spasms.”  
94 Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944, 106. The number of dead are unknown, but nearly all eyewitness accounts 
recall seeing numerous dead civilians, though, as will become clear, many sources claimed these to be the victims of 
deliberate executions. 
95 BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 34. The nurse, Margarete Frommholz, survived the encounter and was found after German 
forces retook the town. After several weeks of convalescence, she was awarded the War Merit Cross with Swords 




prevent him from gathering his belongings and leaving Nemmersdorf.96 Similarly, Charlotte 
Müller recounted to Wehrmacht authorities days after the recapture of the town a tense yet 
ultimately innocuous first encounter as they attempted to flee an overrun Nemmersdorf: 
“Suddenly…Russian infantry appeared before us, behind which we also 
saw Russian tanks. The Soviets…fired several warning shots and stopped 
us. We and our luggage were searched, and we then received the order to 
return to our farm. The Soviet soldiers said to us: ‘You Hitler [i.e. are you 
a Nazi]?’ We said no, after which they let us go. I immediately went into 
the house and…burned the swastika flag and portrait of the Führer.”97 
 
Despite witnessing raped and murdered civilians, Marianne S. attested to Soviet soldiers 
in nearby Tutteln (Sytschjowo) protecting civilians by gathering them in a bunker during a German 
artillery bombardment. There she faced questions about her neighbors’ party allegiance and any 
possible hidden weapon caches and stores of alcohol, yet overall felt that she was “treated 
politely.” Indeed, despite nearly being raped by a soldier who ultimately could be “talked out of 
it,” S. “found [her] impression confirmed that they had orders not to harm us.”98 A 1949 report 
                                                 
96 Schewe’s report in the 1970s failed to mention atrocities he personally witnessed, despite widely known notorious 
tales of barbaric excesses. His experiences run contrary to many of the oft-cited accounts. Stopped by Soviet troops, 
Schewe was unable to understand their questions, and he was soon allowed to retrieve his bicycle and some food 
unhindered. Trying to depart, an officer with excellent German stopped Schewe at the edge of town and asked 
whether German soldiers were nearby. “I told him that I had seen none and that I was a civilian. Then he said that I 
should go, and I took my bike and beat it.” Cited in Fisch, 120–21. 
97 See the reproduced report in Bernhard Fisch, “Nemmersdorf 1944 – Ein Bisher Unbekanntes Zeitnahes Zeugnis. 
In: Zeitschrift Für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung,” Zeitschrift Für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung 56, no. 1 (2007): 110.. 
Müller’s family was forced into her farm’s yard, during which the mother was shot in the arm for moving too 
slowly, and forced to turn over valuables. After serving the soldiers food, they left and no longer bothered the 
family. During the next several days, the family encountered friendly and polite soldiers as well as hostile troops 
who threatened them with violence and raped Charlotte Müller on two occasions. Overall, it appears that uncertainty 
and the possibility of sudden outbursts of brutality marked these interactions. 
98 BArch Ost-Dok 2/43a, 197. The testimony suggests that the tense questioning focused on intelligence gathering, 
as she had to explain images of the Wehrmacht Soviet soldiers found in the town, and elucidate German ration 
cards. S.’s 1963 report, submitted as a response to allegations of atrocities in Nemmersdorf that she wanted to refute, 
corresponds to her testimony recorded in an October 25th, 1944 military police report. There she claimed that Soviet 
soldiers gathered civilians in their bunker “to prevent harm coming to them.” Red Army officers questioned civilians 
as to why they had not been evacuated, and demanded to know what they had been told to expect from Soviet 
forces. An officer furthermore assured them that no harm would come to them. Even her 1944 description of the 
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chronicles an even more remarkable encounter between a mother with two children attempting to 
flee along the Nemmersdorf road on foot. Unable to flag down a German tank that passed without 
stopping, the family was overtaken by an armored car that halted and took them on. Her relief 
turned to horror upon realizing that she mounted a Soviet vehicle. To her astonishment, a young 
officer assured in excellent German that she had no need to despair, indicating on a map where he 
would bring her. Upon arrival their arrival, he gave her directions to German lines, yet warned her 
not to take this interaction as a rule of thumb, lest she encounter less hospitable comrades of his.99 
Despite an abundance of evidence that the Red Army more or less peacefully secured 
Nemmersdorf, the initial restraint of the soldiers turned to deadly capriciousness over the course 
of the afternoon, as the only corroborated episode that resulted in half of the 26 massacre victims 
demonstrates. Surprised by the arrival of enemy forces, Gerda Meczulat’s family and some 
neighbors sought refuge in an air raid shelter. After several hours of silence, Gerda’s father 
ventured home to tend to the livestock and brew coffee. He soon returned, reporting that 
Nemmersdorf was “filled with Russians” who searched and questioned him, yet let him go 
unimpeded. This encouraged another member of the group to attempt to retrieve a blanket, but he 
quickly returned after soldiers plundering the refugees’ abandoned luggage turned him away. 
Because the “road was in a state of utter chaos,” the villagers resolved to remain in the bunker. 
Over the course of the day, the mood suddenly turned: 
“[T]he Russians then came into our ‘bunker’ and spent quite some time 
among us and rifled through our luggage. A sympathetic looking 
Russian—he seemed to be the leader of the troop—even played with the 
small children present. Much later, it was already evening, a higher 
                                                 
averted rape is revealing: After pushing her into a room, the soldier “backed off, probably because he felt like he 
was being observed.” Cited in Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944, 100–111. 
99 “You were fortunate to fall into my hands. Take care not to generalize this case, as you will surely suffer. I am an 
exception.” BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 127. 
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ranking officer appeared who had an extremely intense argument with this 
soldier before ordering us to exit the bunker. My father, who understood 
Russian, tried to explain that we as civilians had not done anything and he 
should let us go. With ‘Pascholl!’ [Move!] we were sent out into the open. 
My father thought we could go home. But as we emerged, solders stood 
on both sides of the exit with rifles ready. I fell…was yanked up and then 
felt nothing anymore in the commotion. When I came to, I heard children 
screaming and rifle shots. Then everything was still.”100 
 
Gerda Muczulat survived the coup de grâce, the lone survivor of the execution that claimed 
thirteen lives. The motives remain unclear, as are many of the details of what happened in 
Nemmersdorf and the surrounding areas. The evidence nevertheless suggests that during the course 
of the day, and before strategically withdrawing and surrendering the area to the Wehrmacht, 
Soviet soldiers increasingly engaged in violent behavior—possibly fueled by hours of alcohol 
consumption—that ended in scores of civilian dead through combat and outright murder.  
When Wehrmacht units entered Nemmersdorf on October 22, they encountered relieved 
civilians who “fell into each other’s arms and laughed and cried with joy.”101 They also witnessed 
scenes “so terrible that some of our recruits run out in panic and vomited.”102 Numerous witnesses 
                                                 
100 Quoted in Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944, 122–23.. Fisch argues that Meczulat’s account remained 
consistent throughout its numerous iterations over the course of decades, and was corroborated by reports of the 
Wehrmacht documenting the scene days after the execution. He concludes that Meczulat’s recollections of the 
bunker have a high degree of veracity and are among the few substantiated reports regarding the Nemmersdorf 
massacre. 
101 BArch Ost-Dok 2/43a, 198. The dramatic moment of liberation remained ingrained in the memory of Marianne 
S. years later. “After several hours it became quiet, yet we did not dare come out [of the bunker]. Suddenly above us 
a German voice resounded “out,” and I will never forget this feeling as we saw German soldiers before us. We fell 
into each other’s arms and laughed and cried with joy.” 
102 Günter K. Koschorrek, Blood Red Snow: The Memoirs of a German Soldier on the Eastern Front (London, 
2002), 293. The Oct. 22nd diary entry describes mutilated corpses, including an old man pierced with a pitchfork and 
left to hang on a barn door. Interviewed by Bernhard Fisch in 1996, former soldier Harry Thürk somewhat 
corroborates these statements with his recollection of an old man lying on the ground with a pitchfork piercing his 
chest. Thürk swore that he also witnessed a woman nailed to a barn door. His unit found two further dead women in 
their homes, as well as a blood-stained bed, and numerous dead civilians at the bridge. Fisch, Nemmersdorf, 132-33. 
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testified to having seen crucified and dismembered victims.103  As will be demonstrated, some 
horrors that entered into German collective memory, the majority of which first came to light years 
after 1944, must be attributed to propaganda and postwar embellishments, if not outright myths. 
Yet contemporary reactions of the soldiers, preserved in diary entries, reveal that Nemmersdorf on 
October 22nd, 1944 presented a scene that deeply unnerved witnesses.104  
The accounts from Nemmersdorf reached as far as Berlin, where the news catapulted Hitler 
into a fit of acrimonious rage.105 Joseph Goebbels registered the “horrible atrocities (furchtbare 
Greueltaten)” in his diary, immediately interpreting them as evidence of Soviet policy for a 
conquered Germany.106 “These atrocities are indeed dreadful,” he added after learning the details, 
yet also an opportunity. After months of exhortations to resist the Soviet onslaught threatening to 
                                                 
103 Karl Potrek, a member of the Königsberg Volkssturm deployed near Nemmersdorf, reported in 1953 that upon 
entering the town he saw four naked women crucified to the sides of a wagon, with another two nailed to a nearby 
barn door. In all, Potrek testified that he counted 71 women and children and one man “murdered bestially, except 
for a few who exhibited signs of execution.” A doctor confirmed that “all” women, including girls as young as eight, 
were raped. Overall, all remaining inhabitants were dead. BArch Ost-Dok 2/21, 716. Testifying on behalf of the 
defense before the Nuremburg Tribunals in 1948, Dr. Heinrich Amberger swore that his military unit “found the 
previously circulating rumors of the butchering (Niedermetzelung) of German civilians fully confirmed.” Amberger 
recalled that Soviet tanks had driven through the trek, “rolling flat” carts, animals, and civilians. None of the dead 
were killed through combat, Amberger reasoned, but were clearly “methodically murdered.” Furthermore, the 
witness recalled that “[i]n at least one case a man was nailed to a barn door,” though fellow comrades informed him 
that similar incidents occurred throughout the area. Like Potrek, Amberger reasoned that the entire population had 
been killed. BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 9-10. A similarly infamous Nemmersdorf legend involves the fate of an elderly 
man left behind due to an illness that had left him bedridden. Returning days later, the family him replaced with a 
“completely dismembered (zerstückelt), unrecognizable form.” Feller claimed 60 inhabitants of her town had been 
murdered. BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 35. These witnesses, despite contradicting evidence, remain among the most 
prominent and cited sources. As later chapters will show, their accounts are colored by Nazi propaganda and in turn 
had a tremendous influence on postwar collective memory of Nemmersdorf.   
104 See the reactions in Kershaw, The End, 113–14. 
105 Hitler’s secretary, Traudl Junge, alleged that the dictator reacted to the news with a characteristically histrionic 
paroxysm: “They’re not human beings any more, they’re animals from the steppes of Asia, and the war I am waging 
against them is a war for the dignity of European mankind. We have to be hard and fight with all the means at our 
disposal.” Traudl Junge, Until the Final Hour: Hitler’s Last Secretary (London, 2002), 145. 
106 “The population that remained they harassed, intimidated, raped women and then executed them, plundered, 
robbed, in short, acted in accordance with the policy that Stalin gave them along the way for their entry into German 
territory, namely to proceed without discretion.” Elke Fröhlich, ed., Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. 14 
(München: K.G. Saur Verlag, 1993), 108. 
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destroy Europe, the Propaganda Minister had an exemplary cautionary tale. “I will use them as an 
occasion for a massive press campaign, so that among the German people the last naive 
contemporaries can be convinced of what the German people can expect if Bolshevism does truly 
take possession of the Reich.”107 By taking hold of the narrative, Goebbels ensured that 
Nemmersdorf would long live on in the popular memory Germany. 
The regime’s keen interest in the small East Prussian village manifested itself in the 
dizzying constellation of actors on the scene in the days after the Wehrmacht’s recapture of 
Nemmersdorf. Regimental surgeons already examined the bodies of the victims, before troops laid 
them to rest in the presence of local party representatives. Officials of the Wehrmacht High 
Command, the military courts, and a special task force of the secret military police arrived three 
days after the massacre and ordered the exhumation of the victims, who were laid out on a nearby 
field. With dignitaries looking on, an “international” commission of doctors hailing from various 
Axis powers examined the bodies; remarkably, the personal physician of Heinrich Himmler, Karl 
Franz Gebhardt, arrived to assist the investigation into the cause of death. European journalists 
from allied or German-occupied countries descended to record the scene. German correspondents 
and Propaganda Ministry officials documented the grisly scene; a press unit photographed slain 
children and women, their torn down undergarments suggestive of their fate.108 
                                                 
107 Fröhlich, 14:110. Nazi propaganda had for quite some time made the case of what awaited Germany if it did not 
resist to the last full measure. Nazi press extensively covered the discovery of over 20,000 Polish nationals executed 
by the Soviet NKVD in Katyn. Yet Goebbels had also increasingly inundated the German people with reports of the 
Anglo-American dangers, for example. Just a week before Nemmersdorf, the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 
October 13 claimed that “American troops have without any reason set fire to and burned down the border town of 
Wallendorf…in front of the eyes of the inhabitants…so that the entire goods and chattels (Hab und Gut) burned 
down.” Cited in Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944, 143–44. Nemmersdorf, in other words, occurred at a time when 
the Propaganda Ministry initiated a more comprehensive “atrocity campaign” to cultivate a fighting spirit in the face 
of calamitous military setbacks on both the Eastern and Western Fronts.  
108 Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944, 151–54. 
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 “The Raging of the Soviet Beasts—Terrible Crimes in Nemmersdorf—On the Trail of the 
Murderous Firebrands in the Liberated East Prussian Locales,” the front page of the Nazi Party 
organ Völkischer Beobachter (VB) proclaimed on October 27, 1944, setting off a flurry of 
coverage throughout the Third Reich.109 The public learned that the German counteroffensive 
uncovered “grisly traces of Bolshevik terror,” describing in vivid detail the state of some twenty 
corpses, all of whom, it was repeatedly emphasized, were methodically killed from close range.110 
Worried over implications that authorities left victims in harm’s way, the paper adamantly ensured 
readers that the NSDAP implemented successful evacuations of most of the population.111 On an 
unfortunate few, “the Soviet beasts slaked their animalistic bloodlust.” Local, regional, and 
coordinated press echoed the flagship Nazi paper with shocking headlines: “Bolshevik Bloodlust 
Rages in East Prussian Border Area,” “Bestial Murderous Terror in East Prussia,” and “Beasts 
Raged in East Prussia” confronted the public with alarmist headlines on October 27th, 1944.112 
                                                 
109 “Das Wüten der Sowjetischen Bestien,” Völkischer Beobachter, October 27, 1944, 1. 
110 The emotionally charged catalogue of heinous crimes included the jarring description of a young woman who 
was raped and stabbed to death and found holding the hand of her murdered child. The article furthermore described 
how all women had been raped and subsequently murdered from close range. Several bodies, it was reported, clearly 
proved that the victims were “forced by the murderous beasts to kneel before they were shot in the nape of the 
neck.” The repeated allegations of all deaths occurring through execution, as opposed to combat, were ostensibly 
confirmed by Soviet POWs, who admitted that they had been given “free reign” to plunder, rape, and murder.  
111 It seemed crucial to communicate the foresight and care of the Party during the evacuations, even if this was not 
the case. Even Joseph Goebbels noted that on October 25th, 1944 that the evacuations had proven difficult, as they 
had come too late. The blame, the Nazi notable surmised, lay with Gauleiter Koch, who placed too much faith in the 
Wehrmacht’s abilities to stave off the enemy, so that now all measures that could have been planned were being 
carried out in a hasty manner. The following day, Goebbels once again bemoaned the flagging morale in East 
Prussia, which he attributed to the nonexistent evacuation plans which were now poorly executed. Fröhlich, Die 
Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, 1993, 14:100; Fröhlich, 14:108. 
112 Cited in Kershaw, The End, 115.; and “Bestien wüteten in Ostpreussen,” Braunschweiger Tageszeitung, October 
27, 1944, 1. The papers conformed to guidelines of the German News Agency (Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro; DNB), 
which had been directed by the Press Office of the Propaganda Ministry that “[t]he monstrous Soviet bloodlust must 
be denounced in the layout and headlines.” The directive advised the Nazi fourth estate that it “is especially 
desirable that the DNB report brings out the horrific Bolshevik crimes in East Prussia in a big and effective way and 
comments on them with extreme harshness.” Quoted in Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen: Stimmung 
und Haltung der deutschen Bevölkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1970), 521–22. 
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The following day, Kurt-Lothar Tank published a long, gripping narrative of the 
“unforgettable picture of inhumane horror” he witnessed in Nemmersdorf, now “a village of death, 
a village of silence.”113 Tank painted a gratuitously macabre picture of “26 gruesomely disfigured 
bodies of bludgeoned and shot elderly and children, of defiled and murdered girls” discovered by 
the shocked soldiers.114 Tank recounted the horrendous rape of “Charlotte W.”, one of the few 
survivors.115 The morbid descriptions of murdered women and children hammered home the 
message that all of the victims fell victim to merciless Soviet monsters acting on orders of their 
communist officers and the “Jew Ehrenburg”—a Soviet propagandist.116  More importantly, the 
article made clear that this fate awaited all Germans unless they resisted with their entire might. 
Presciently, Tank claimed that the “frightful days of Nemmersdorf will never be forgotten.” 
In the same edition, under the headline “Nailed Alive to the Wall—61 Victims of 
Bolshevik Murderous Terror,” the international doctors’ commission published their findings of 
                                                 
113 Kurt-Lothar Tank, “Die Mörder von Nemmersdorf,” Völkischer Beobachter, October 28, 1944, 1. 
114 The soldiers “who gazed with frightened faces…upon the bloody field” were, according to the author, seasoned 
veterans of the Warsaw uprising brutally put down by German forces, which cost the lives of some 150-200,000 
Polish civilians. The reporter surmised that “even the hellish scenes from Warsaw, which so bloodily remained vivid 
in their memories, paled in comparison.” 
115 “Charlotte W” is in fact Charlotte Müller, whose testimony to Wehrmacht secret military police, cited above, 
does not exactly correspond to the much more dramatic interpretation of Tank. 
116 Without wanting to engage in morbid voyeurism, an excerpt forcefully illuminates the undoubtedly chilling effect 
of the article on its public: “Most of them are disfigured, the hands and cheeks, brow and jaws in tatters, neck and 
chest covered in streams of blood; most of them have been killed with shots to the nape of the neck after 
unbelievable mistreatment….A 19 year old brunette girl…has evidently been defiled in the most brutal manner and 
then murdered. To her side lies a six month old infant in blue cotton clothing, the little head bloodily deformed 
through a pistol shot….In the gulch lay raped and murdered women next to their murdered children. The Bolsheviks 
even defiled and then murdered a pregnant woman. These are not the isolated acts of a sadistic horde—they are 
systematic mass murder such as only the Soviets know. They don’t think of demonstrating a deceptive program of 
sparing German civilians. No, they carry out the orders of the Jew Ehrenburg and the commander of the 33. 
Bolshevik Army! They arbitrarily kill German people, defile German women wherever they find them. The frightful 
days of Nemmersdorf will never be forgotten by the German soldier. He has thrown the murderers of German men 
and women out of Nemmersdorf, and he will drive them back further, for he knows what German civilians can 
expect if he takes but one step backward. The war has entered its most merciless stage. Here everything ends what 
one once before could find words for. The bestial bloody deed of Nemmersdorf will cost the Bolsheviks dearly.”  
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“bestial atrocities of the Soviet hordes” in Nemmersdorf and the surrounding villages.117 It was 
medically confirmed, the VB heralded, that Soviets had raped nearly all the women murdered 
virtually all victims with “close range shots.” Though no mention was made of crucifixions in 
Nemmersdorf—an unlikely oversight for the propaganda machinery intent on emphasizing 
Soviet brutality—one man in Alt-Wusterwitz (Dubrawa) was found with punctured hands, from 
which it could be deduced that he had been nailed alive to a wall by his Soviet tormentors.118 
Subsequent VB front pages brought further details of eyewitness accounts of how “Bolsheviks 
for the first time unveiled their brutish (viehisches) face on German soil.”119 The November 11th 
front page of the party paper featured a photograph of murdered children accompanied with a 
warning that this fate awaited the rest of Germany, if not all energies were brought to the fight 
against Bolshevism.120 By disseminating every last ghastly detail, the Nazi regime hoped to stir 
indignation far beyond the border regions of East Prussia.121 
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Intended audiences nevertheless met the morbid propaganda campaign with mixed 
feelings. While Nemmersdorf may have engendered a sense of purpose and provided postwar 
justifications for resistance to the last, the goal of fanning zealous self-sacrifice failed. The 
regime reluctantly noted that the press agitation backfired and sapped morale, with some circles 
rejecting the arguments of the regime entirely: Intelligence reports found that Germans detected 
an irresponsibility on the part of the authorities, who had not evacuated populations in time.122 
Particularly in areas far removed from the Eastern Front, SD informants registered ambivalence 
and outright disgust over the heavy-handed enumerations of brutalities. In fact, the shameless 
exploitation of German dead evoked for some the “atrocities that we have perpetrated on enemy 
soil, and even in Germany.”123 From the perspective of the regime, the propaganda initiative 
failed in its desired effects, dampening already flagging morale. Goebbels lamented with 
exasperation that “[t]he atrocity reports are no longer being bought,” remarking that “[e]specially 
the news about Nemmersdorf have only convinced a part of the population.”124  
One should be cautious to conclude from the critical reactions that the ensuing panic 
following the reporting of Nemmersdorf is nothing but a cherished “myth” uncritically reiterated 
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by postwar historians. For despite failing to move the German population to resolute defense, the 
press campaign spread terror especially among the inhabitants of the regions directly now 
directly threatened by the Red Army. Memories of 1914 already reverberated in the region: For 
East Prussians such as Ida K., who as a child fled Tsarist troops in 1915, people “knew what to 
expect of the Russian troops,” so that news of “horrific butchery” only reinforced expectations of 
imminent horror.125 Moreover, they did not need the litanies of horrors in the Völkischer 
Beobachter to imagine a dark future: Rumors and reports of the atrocities spread mouth to mouth 
like wildfire, unleashing hysteria among the treks fleeing west.126 Stories of “monstrous 
events…more horrific than any demonic or sadistically perverse fantasy could come up with” 
were on the lips of many in the German East.127 For those facing the inferno, the however 
distorted imaginings of unbounded barbarism rang true, and were certainly real enough to spark 
desperate retreats and waves of mass suicides to avoid falling into Soviet hands. 
To what degree one can prove or disprove Nemmersdorf is a somewhat fruitless venture, 
and beside the point.128 The point is that “naked horror” gripped many inhabitants of the German 
East. Justifiably or not, “after ‘Nemmersdorf’ nothing was like it was before,” meaning both the 
trajectory of the forced migration and the memory of it.129 Though inflected with hearsay and 
luridness, the massacre propelled fears to feverish heights. The October flight also had other, 
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more tangible lessons, however. Throughout the region, “pitiful wagons, from which completely 
silent little children’s heads curiously peered, were distressing and at the same time endlessly 
moving. The pots and cans tied to the braces clattered loudly.”130 Upon seeing the miserable 
columns, many must have pondered one fateful question: “Are we next?” The victims streaming 
through towns, the stories they brought with them, and the headlines in the papers undoubtedly 
inculcated widespread willingness to risk all for immediate safety, even in the dead of one of the 
coldest winters in a generation during an enemy offensive more ferocious than the last. 
 
 “Every man for himself!” Parsing “Flight” 
“There is no mercy—for no one, just as there was no mercy for us,” Marshall Ivan 
Chernyakhovsky’s order of the day from January 12th, 1945 impressed upon his troops. “It is 
unnecessary to demand of the soldiers of the Red Army that they show mercy. They burn with 
hatred and thirst for vengeance. The land of the fascists must be made into a desert like our land, 
which they laid to waste. The fascists must die, just as our soldiers died.”131 The Main Political 
Administration of the Red Army likewise reminded members of the Red Army that they were the 
sole masters once they set foot on German soil, and that they are “both the judge and the punisher 
for the torments of his fathers and mothers, for the destroyed cities and villages.” Whomever they 
encountered were “next of kin of the killers and oppressors.”132 
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As the Soviet military steeled itself for its mammoth attack, the furious artillery 
bombardment that preceded it signaled to the inhabitants of East Prussia that something ominous 
loomed on the horizon. “In the morning around seven o’clock a steady rolling and droning wakes 
me. The window panes are vibrating….This can only mean the end. Toward midday the rolling is 
as powerful as a landslide. Air blasts that one holds one’s breath for…. The people…try to console 
themselves with the belief that this can only be the effects of our new miracle weapon.”133 While 
Wehrmacht surgeon Hans von Lehndorff anxiously contemplated what the ferocious artillery 
portended, elsewhere that day, Karl Schippmann’s short letter to his wife noted that “everything 
is shaking here, me too. What happens now, I do not yet know.”134 In Berlin, meanwhile, Goebbels 
hoped that the “nerve-racking tension” of the latest Soviet offensive would only last a few 
days.135 His adjutant, Wilfred von Oven, observed that most of the Nazi leadership felt 
“confident,” and that few were “dismayed” by the reports trickling into the capital.136 
In 1944, the Soviet juggernaut halted at the gates of the Third Reich. January 1945 proved 
something else entirely: It was the final drive on Berlin to end the war and defeat the fascist foe. 
With German defenses depleted after the failed December Ardennes Offensive, in less than three 
weeks the Red Army drove more than 500 kilometers and only stopped once it reached the Oder 
River, the last natural barrier before the Nazi capital. The coda of the Third Reich’s death throes 
was staggeringly bloody: In the final phase of the war, 300-400,000 soldiers died each 
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month.137 Yet Nazi Germany’s swift collapse like a “house of cards” proved horrendously deadly 
and unalterable for the civilian population as well.138 Hans von Lehndorff’s allusion to a deadly 
“landslide” rolling from the East seemed a particularly apt metaphor.  
Postwar historical retrospections of “flight and expulsion” invariably commence their story 
on this fateful day: “It began on the 12th of January, 1945,” opened a gripping 1949 multi-part 
series Ostdeutsches Schicksal (“East German Fate”) chronicling the “collapse” and the “German 
tragedy.”139 The following year, the popular illustrated Der Stern printed haunting images of 
destroyed treks and dead horses, reminding readers that “exactly five years ago, as the Russian 
steamroller inexorably advanced…a fate (Schicksal) fulfilled itself, which in its deep tragedy 
remains unforgettable.”140 Decades on, “flight” remains closely associated with January 1945, 
where events appear as an inconceivable disaster that erupted without adequate forewarning, akin 
to a natural catastrophe such as an avalanche or earthquake.141 The events of the preceding summer 
and fall—apart from Nemmersdorf—feature as a brief footnote, if not overlooked entirely.  
Not only does January 1945 eclipse the experiences of refugees in the months before, the 
popular notion that virtually all inhabitants of the German East wanted to flee but were prevented 
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from finding refuge dictates typical “flight” narratives. Many indeed yearned to escape the 
looming danger. The brush with disaster in the fall, the enemy’s proximity, and months of 
propaganda and rumors of atrocities did produce a “silent” emigration from the German East in 
the months preceding January.142 Prohibitions on travel could be bypassed, particularly if one 
had relatives in the Reich. Alone 30% of the East Prussian population—nearly 600,000—sought 
refuge from a Soviet offensive that many foresaw.143 A number of prominent postwar historians 
such as Wolfgang Schieder, Lothar Gall, and Heinrich August Winkler were among those who 
escaped the deluge of 1945 in this manner.144 Unsurprisingly, NSDAP elites like Erich Koch also 
arranged for the safety of their families, and even transported valuables westward.145  
Retrospectives frequently cite compulsory measures that prevented a timely flight once 
the enemy launched its attack. The regime once again refused to learn from previous 
evacuations, and continued to stubbornly insist on merely ignoring the military threat.146 Official 
authority still lay with the NSDAP, which as in the fall by and large resolutely opposed orderly 
departures and threatened penalties for anyone who was found packing or preparing wagons. The 
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threat of “black lists” or even death for the “defeatist” act of fleeing was an effective deterrent.147 
Yet another deterrent for leaving was that by departing, families forfeited their ration cards and 
could not draw provisions on the road, and illegally slaughtering or hording foodstuffs to build 
up a supply were immensely difficult as well as dangerous.148 Other testimonies point to the 
physical inability to flee: The military confiscated horses and vehicles throughout the fall, 
leaving many families incapable of travelling.149 Some women refused to leave without their 
husbands and children who, activated in the Volkssturm, remained at home.150 Similarly, families 
with pregnancies or infants, the elderly, and sick convinced many to stay together.151 Moreover, 
the extreme wintry conditions, undoubtedly explain the high proportion who vowed to remain 
behind, preferring to “go to the dogs instead of freezing on country roads.”152  
All these represented very real concerns that explain why civilians did not take to the 
road. Yet despite a pervasive eagerness to leave, postwar narratives suggesting a universal 
yearning to flee ignore the surprisingly high proportion of testimonies that—even recorded after 
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wartime traumata—express no such desires to begin with. The majority of the ten million in the 
German East, however, remained for a variety of reasons.  
Unsurprisingly, little attention is placed on motivations rooted in regime loyalty: Some 
earnestly believed promises of miracle weapons and trusted assurances that the Soviets would be 
held.153 For others, the experiences of the 1944 evacuations reinforced the resolve to not undergo 
a similar travail again. Evacuees arriving in Danzig in October 1944, authorities reported, 
“levelled the most severe criticisms” against the NSDAP, which in their mind implemented a 
botched evacuation that endangered or inconvenienced them.154 Even with the enemy threat, 
therefore, numerous families “conferred and decided to stay” to safeguard their property.155 It 
was “good this way,” one expellee recalled even after the war and the accompanying hardships, 
as “we…were spared the strain of the evacuation.”156 The inclination to remain at home proved 
so strong that throughout December 1944, Insterburg’s mayor waged an unceasing and futile 
campaign to bar refugees evacuated in the fall from returning. Not even the threat of withholding 
ration cards helped, and the flustered civil servant needed to “ship off” some people who 
continued to return multiple times.157  
Moreover, despite widespread fear of the Red Army, many “did not want to believe the 
news of atrocities…or thought them to be strongly exaggerated.”158 A pastor in Lauenburg 
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recalled a sense of anxiety, but that pervasive conversations on the street over whether to stay 
typically ended optimistically: “It won’t get so bad.”159 Once the Soviet attack approached, one 
expellee noted in their diary, the population gave up “trying to escape… [and] the majority 
resolves to remain.” After all, “in 1814 the Russians were generally also human and behaved 
themselves, even with isolated excesses, as such.”160 In ethnically mixed regions such as 
Masuria, Pomerania, and Upper Silesia, Catholics especially decided to stay, strengthened in the 
belief that their generally better relations with Poles would prevent the most violent excesses.161 
Despite widespread stories of Soviet atrocities, a variety of motivations—optimism, the 
stability of the front throughout the fall, memories of overcrowded evacuation zones, and 
concerns for property and livestock—convinced many to risk remaining and find refuge in the 
familiarity of the homeland. Further belying images of a panicked last minute departure yearned 
for by the entire population, surreal scenes in the testimonies suggest a remarkable sense of 
normality for many. Refugees from East Prussia in Pomerania encountered “fantastical” sights: 
Uniformed waiters, set tables, and women dining in fine hats, even as the fighting neared.162 In 
Elbing, a student noted in her diary on January 23rd that not even the bombardment could 
interrupt her reading: “It was simply too cozy in the warm room, Christmas cookies before me, 
the warm glow of the lamp on the book. I savored!!!”163  
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Whether assuaged by rosy prognoses or resolved to tough it out, the unimaginable speed 
of the Red Army left entire communities unmoved or unaware of the danger, even as explosions 
could be heard and the first refugees appeared.164 Noblemen took advantage of the “glorious 
weather” to hunt, though fighting erupted only a few kilometers away.165 Hans von Lehndorff’s 
own father, bored with the drudgery of preparing his estate’s trek, took the time to enjoy forests 
uncommonly teaming with game.166 Indeed, “relatively peaceful living” continued: In many 
cities such as Elbing, street cars continued to run and theaters remained open up until the day 
Soviet forces threatened the city.167 One moviegoer, after weeks of trying to procure tickets to 
the sold out film Opfergang was disappointed when sirens cut the experience short. On her way 
home a tank passed her; she only realized that it had been the enemy after her neighbor informed 
her that elsewhere in the city Soviet armor was driving down the streets and shooting 
indiscriminately to both sides into houses.168  
As misplaced as the illusions of stability may have been, they complicate postwar tropes 
of a stubborn NSDAP refusing to allow people clamoring to leave. The sources do support such 
behavior. For example, the Gauleiter of Lower Silesia, Karl Hanke, did not issue evacuation 
decrees until January 19, a week into the offensive, though hundreds of thousands were already 
independently on the move.169 Hanke maintained, however, that the population was in no 
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danger.170 Elsewhere in the region, authorities opposed the measure: On January 19, the NSDAP 
district leader in Cosel (Koźle) informed officials that “everything is to remain as it is,” since the 
Soviets would not cross the Oder. Anyone who questioned the safety of the city would be shot, 
he added.171 It was not uncommon that evacuation orders nevertheless followed a mere hours 
after continuous threats or assurances that all was well.172 
Archival materials also substantiate familiar tropes of obstinate and cowardly 
functionaries in the crucial hours of the German East. When news of approaching forces 
circulated in Elbing, city notables together with party officials requisitioned trucks meant for 
evacuations, and fled to Danzig with many of their possessions.173 In Sensburg (Mrągowo), 
inhabitants finally could evacuate after days of waiting for permission from NSDAP authorities, 
who suddenly drove off.174 Inhabitants throughout the German East noted with fury and disbelief 
that Nazi representatives had “long fled into the hills,” leaving their compatriots in the lurch.175 
In Frauenburg (Frombork), party elites fled while shouting one last maxim: “Germany must live, 
even if we must die!!!”176 When they did not flee, authorities continued to prevent flight, 
threatening draconian measures for all who disobeyed.177 Crisis frequently brought out 
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fanaticism: Throwing himself into the “final struggle,” the NSDAP district leader of Allenstein 
(Olsztyn) attempted to blow the gas, water, and electrical works, but civil servants dissuaded him 
by arguing that the measure would only spread even more panic.178 Nazi figures generally added 
to the pandemonium: Throughout the German East, deputies roamed the streets mustering boys 
as young as thirteen or fourteen for the desperate defense. Only rarely, as a report from Leba 
(Łeba), did refugees recall “party comrades who stepped up with us to the last procession.”179  
As in the previous summer and fall, yet now on a far larger scale, evacuation or 
disorderly flight only occurred at the last possible moment, when Soviet soldiers were hours 
away.180 When directives arrived, or if at all, they emanated from various party, civil, or military 
offices; often they were contradictory, consistently they were belated, and sometimes they were 
completely without guidance beyond “every man for himself.”181 Utter chaos ensued “because 
every [functionary] acted on their own accord or not at all. One village packed and sent women 
and children away, the neighboring village had no orders or could not trek.”182 What appears as 
spontaneous flight in postwar literature was in fact a confusing combination of hasty independent 
departure and forced evacuation, depending on the local constellation of actors: In some cases 
the NSDAP overruled pleas for mass departure, in others they left people to their own devices. 
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However, German collective memory habitually overlooks that not infrequently, the 
regime or military decreed compulsory evacuations.183 While largely disorderly, the forced 
removals affected more civilians than independent flight, and sometimes proved successful: The 
mandated clearance of eastern Lower Silesia meant that 85% of its population—more than 
700,000 civilians—could be saved across the Oder River by the time Soviet forces cut off the 
retreat at Brieg (Brzeg) at the end of January.184 Yet perhaps more remarkable than the existence 
of beneficial measures, testimonies reveal widespread antipathy against coercive policies, 
underlining the forgotten fact that many in the German East refused to leave home and hearth. 
For contemporaries, the improvised and belated forced evacuations that sent women and 
children into sub-zero conditions amounted to, as one refugee recorded in their diary, “probably 
the greatest crime ever perpetrated on the German people.”185 Paul Peikert, a priest in Breslau 
(Wrocław), similarly condemned the measures as “one of the worst acts of madness of National 
Socialism” in their journal. 186 On January 22, Peikert added an entry on the “Breslau Death 
March” of 700,000 women and children in minus 20 degrees Celsius: The folly constituted a 
“crime against the German people, a rush into death,” but one which authorities accepted.187 
Elsewhere, military units forcibly removed inhabitants from their homes and threatened those 
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into the interior of Germany. Present are mainly the old, women, and children.” Cited in Hahn and Hahn, 281. 
184 Bessel, Germany 1945, 77. 
185 Quoted in Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 2:595. 
186 Paul Peikert, Festung Breslau in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, ed. Karol Jonca and Alfred Konieczny (Wrocław: 
Ossolineum, 2005), 226.  
187  Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 2:163. On the Breslau evacuation, see Johannes Kaps, Die Tragödie 
Schlesiens 1945/46 in Dokumenten, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Erzbistums Breslau. (München: Verlag 
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who refused to leave with execution.188 “Constantly the military police came, as the village had 
been ordered to be vacated, and only a few inhabitants remained….Now all were to be forced to 
leave,” recalled a woman from Sensburg whose family and neighbors decided not to flee.189 Yet 
not even threats of violence could convince those too terrified of the trek, stubborn to leave, or 
optimistic to flee.190 A good proportion “didn’t want to leave anymore because transportation to 
the Reich was hopeless,” and so many hid for days so as not to be “captured” by roving 
Wehrmacht patrols.191 Compulsory evacuation “with all means” and violence, another refugee 
asserted, was the true source of their misery, as now “sluggishly and under the greatest dangers 
and challenges,” German officials “exposed [us] to every air attack, every volley from planes.”192  
All in all, contrary to assertions of nearly everyone wanting to flee, for a variety of 
reasons a substantial portion of the population never left their homes. Only an estimated 50% of 
the population—around five million—departed either through force or independently.193 Yet 
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whether eager or reluctant to flee, the population soon realized that they faced an entirely 
different situation than in the previous fall: Unlike the limited incursion into East Prussia in 
1944, in 1945 multiple Soviet prongs penetrated deeply into the western reaches of the German 
East, creating large cauldrons and swiftly cutting off the line of retreat westward for the majority 
of the population within a matter of days. The unfathomable speed of the Red Army and 
instantaneous collapse of Wehrmacht resistance unleashed terror that spread like a contagion, as 
millions realized that this time the catastrophe would not be averted. 
 
The Trek  
 “Panic grips the people as the cry goes up: ‘The Russians are close’…Then a man comes 
by on horseback shouting in a loud voice: ‘Save yourselves, you who can. The Russians will be 
here in half an hour.’ We’re overcome by a paralyzing fear.”194 Shattered military units tore 
through towns, and panicked refugees from further east and their warnings, horrified 
onlookers.195 A diary from a woman in Schweidnitz (Świdnica) captured the confusion in Silesia. 
On February 2, inhabitants noticed that the sound of cannons got closer. “Refugees are no longer 
coming from that direction….We hear of gruesome rapes and murders of children and old people 
who could not flee.” A few days later more terrifying news: “The treks passing through speak of 
                                                 
though roughly 1.5 million were overtaken by the enemy. An estimated 1.5-2 million fell in to Soviet hands in East 
Prussia, West Prussia, and Pomerania. In general, judging from the community questionnaires in Bayreuth, few treks 
from the German East successfully avoided being overrun. Overall, of the 5 million, less than half managed to avoid 
the goal of evading the Red Army. Contrary to popular assumptions, “flight” was largely unsuccessful.  
194 Cited in Kershaw, The End, 177. 
195 Josef Buhl of Klodebach (Kłodobok) wrote in a 1946 letter that he first was made aware of the dangers by 
refugees who barely escaped Russian tanks arriving in the village. Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 
1:433. Refugees who briefly fell into Soviet hands but then managed to escape spread reports of rapes and murders. 
See also Schieder, 1:70; Schieder, 1:106; Schieder, 1:426; Fittkau, My Thirty-Third Year, 2. 
66 
 
divebomber attacks, dead horses and people.” Then, on February 8, the Red Army captured 
nearby towns, flight seemed imminent until a counteroffensive brought relief, and horror: “The 
Russian has been driven back. Frightful things happened to women and children, oh I can’t even 
put it down on paper.” 196 The German East descended into anarchy in the winter of 1945. 
The terrifying chaos rattled even the most devout National Socialists who hoped for a 
miracle: Upon realizing the disaster that lay at hand, Magdalene Krüger gazed upon her portrait 
of Hitler “full of hope and confidence. But even he cannot console me today.”197 Others were 
reduced to fatalism, “in their despair they screamed: ‘if only the Führer would send a few planes 
in order to strike all of us dead on the spot!”198 In Königsberg, Hans von Lehndorff overheard a 
woman proclaim: “The Führer won’t let us fall to the Russkis, he would rather gas us.”199  
Though less than one in two East Germans experienced it, the vast majority who 
attempted an escape did so under confusing circumstances described above. They fled on foot or 
on horse-drawn cart in columns of compatriots, as the speed of the offensive and insufficient 
planning left no time for alternatives. Because so many experienced it, and due to the suffering 
and traumata endured, “the trek” emerged as a symbol synonymous with “flight and 
expulsion.”200 As one refugee concluded in 1950: “Forever, as long as I shall live, the procession 
                                                 
196 Kempowski-Biographienarchiv 3924/3, “Letzte Kriegstage in Schweidnitz/Schlesien und erste Flucht der rot-
Kreuz-Schwester Else Z., 17.1.45-22.2.45 als Tagebuch, dann bis zur Rückkehr im Mai, aus der Erinnerung,” 4-6. 
197 Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 2:280. Others turned to the radio to hear Hitler address them, noting with 
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of suffering (Elendszug) of the refugees will remain in my memory, as soon as I hear the word 
‘trek,’ it is once again before my eyes.”201 Given its centrality in memories of the war, it is 
necessary to examine the trek and the experiences associated with it. 
Most journeys began with disorder and bedlam. With the NSDAP largely absent or 
discredited, it fell upon civil society to arrange for their own salvation in this hastily and 
improvised columns. Doyens of the community such as mayors, public servants, noblemen, or 
priests attempted to establish a sense of order in the hectic final hours before leading their 
citizens into the unknown.202 They organized groups and attempted to arrange transportation, 
beseeching those with wagons to keep their loads light to ensure room for the less fortunate.203 
They freed shops to sell wares without ration cards, which many took advantage of to stock up 
for the journey.204 Farmers now openly butchered and sold or gave away excess food, while 
members of the family buried precious items in the yard or woods nearby.205 In some cases, 
people shot their pets and any livestock that they could not take.206 Neighbors said farewells and, 
“realizing that for many it was…forever, the women began to wail loudly.”207 Recollections of 
introspection abound: Final walks through the barn and house, gathering soil for a keepsake, or 
                                                 
201 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:257. 
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attending a last church service marked the moments before departure. One expellee recalled the 
scenes: “A deep, solemn devotion descends upon the tortured people, disheartened, despairing 
calls for help to God that he may turn fate rise to Heaven.”208 These frenzied preparations 
frequently occurred in mere hours. 
If families decided to flee, they soon realized that few options were available. In 
Sensburg, rumors circulated that transports were on the way and due to arrive within hours; when 
a single “pathetically tiny” fire truck appeared, dozens of desperate women and their children 
immediately swamped it.209 In Freystadt (Kisielice), after only a few hours’ notice, inhabitants 
gathered to begin the march, but the assigned trek leader who knew the route already fled.210 In 
Namslau (Namysłow), farmers who committed to picking up the city’s inhabitants got cold feet 
and continued without stopping. Luckily, military trucks passing through took most of the 
women and children.211 In Elbing, waiting refugees tried flagging down retreating Wehrmacht 
units in vain. An officer stepped into the road and on his own authority commanded the soldiers 
to take on the “old, totally exhausted people, the screaming children and whimpering infants.”212  
The frenzied moment of departure—iconized in postwar literature and film in a 
whirlwind of terrified stampeding treks with shouts of “the Russians are here!”—sometimes took 
on less dramatic forms. In Insterburg, Berlin double-decker busses suddenly arrived to ferry the 
                                                 
208 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:100. 
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surprised throngs westward to safety.213 Fleeing refugees near Angersdorf (Proślic) glimpsed the 
local count loading his personal plane with luggage.214 An airport near Karlsberg (Mierzeja 
Wiślana) ferried refugees—mostly Nazi Party members or other dignitaries—to Danzig.215 Some 
of the inhabitants of Kamp (Kępa) boarded aeroboats at a nearby seadrome.216 In Königsberg, 
Dore Kleinert left her apartment and planned on walking to Pillau, but decided to board a tram 
with other refugees. Surreally, all the passengers paid the fare and drove through the burning, 
“unrecognizable moon and crater landscape” of the Prussian capital to the western suburbs, from 
where they managed to hitchhike with an army transport.217 
While the vast majority of fleeing civilians assuredly experienced anguish and fright 
during a perilous journey, some recall pleasant moments. Even during the dead of winter and in a 
combat zone, children in particular delighted in the flurry of activity.218 One woman recalled 
how “the children rather enjoyed the wandering life, as they were protected by duvets and the 
soldiers doted on them.219 During rests, they played and went sledding, and “complained a little 
that the tobogganing fun had to come to an end” when the trek continued.220 Not just the young 
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were charmed. Some adults, perhaps leaving their province for the first time, were energized by 
travel on naval ships and astounded by their ornate ballrooms.221 Countess von Sydow fondly 
remembered travelling through “magnificent forests” and being “enthralled” by the “silence of 
the deep snow, the grand pine forests, it is almost like a fairy tale.”222 Documenting the trek from 
his hometown of Lübchen (Lubów), private photographs of Hanns Tschira captured relatively 
unburdened, even laughing refugees that make the journey seem rather unspectacular in 
comparison to the more widely known images of suffering and horror.223   
Most, however, faced a daunting journey in temperatures dropping below minus twenty 
degrees Celsius and contending with extreme congestion. Countless testimonies affirm the 
summary of one refugee’s postwar account: 
“[D]ay after day, night after night, endless, ceaseless civilian treks trudge 
down snowy streets. They are heavily loaded, the horses can barely 
move…. The wagons creak and groan and—break. Then there are 
setbacks, traffic jams, confusion. And through all this sorrow the retreating 
German troops drive, continuously attacked by ever more Russian planes 
in constant waves. The dead, the wrecked wagons, the horses are shoved 
into the ditches of the avenues, without pause it is supposed to move on 
toward the west. Added to this harsh frost, deep snow.”224  
 
Confiding her despair and self-recriminations for having undertaken the senseless journey 
to her diary, Else Z. movingly captured what many must of thought: 
“On the road the refugee stream envelopes us. Now we are queued up in 
the great misery of the country lane. Next to us drive tanks. With their 
treads they make the muck even more abysmal. The tanktraps on the streets 
are a great obstacle. Every hundred meters the street is again clogged. Cars 
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with wounded overtake us. Horses, people, cows are driven on, it is an 
unnerving scene. No one is speaking. Mrs. P just sobs and sobs. Before me 
my daughter walks, I see her little feet go through the muck. My god, why 
did I even give birth to her! My kids must curse me for doing so. I look for 
an answer in the dark, starless sky, but I receive none. Halfway there we 
need to turn off. The road is blocked, so back…”225  
 
Adding to the congestion, columns of exhausted concentration camp prisoners forcibly 
evacuated on death marches confronted civilians with the undeniable evidence of the Third 
Reich’s murderous policies.226 The weather and road conditions were not the only sources of 
misery. To an even higher degree than the previous summer and fall, women and children 
comprised the treks, as roving military police dragooned men and boys from the columns into the 
Volksturm.227 Depriving families of their males had dire consequences, so that struggling to care 
for the young and elderly during one of the coldest winter in living memory in a combat zone 
represented a herculean task.228 Testimonies often fondly praise the bravery and dedication of 
Polish and French slave workers, but given that such altruism was coerced, many soon 
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abandoned their masters because for them “the war was over.”229 Without men skilled to 
navigate the congested roads covered in sheets of ice, as a police report summed up, women and 
children were “helplessly exposed to the most unheard of difficulties of this hasty flight.”230 
The Wehrmacht’s movements and desperation further added to the chaos.231 As in the 
fall, the military confiscated horses, wagons, and vehicles in order to make up shortfalls, 
effectively ending the flight of the affected civilians.232 To ensure its ability to maneuver, the 
army re-routed treks and closed bridges and roads.233 The congestion and chaos prevented few 
village treks from remaining together, and the majority broke apart into small, atomized groups 
of extended family and neighbors.234 In a region consumed by furious fighting, the columns 
faced artillery and strafing from enemy planes. Halted by military posts at the Oder River, Karl 
Siebert recalled the grim scenes as Soviet planes targeted the halted refugees: “The wagons, 
ensnared into a knot, lay in heaps, smashed into a desolate mass by the planes’ bombs….Horses 
and people dead…sawed in half by the machine guns of the planes.”235  
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From the outset, refugees faced horrendous conditions, so that many soon wondered 
whether it “would not been better to stay at home.”236 The extreme congestion and speed of the 
enemy meant that the enemy frequently overtook treks, sometimes only a few kilometers from 
their homes.237 The terrible weather conditions and unmoving traffic jams convinced many that 
continuing was senseless.238 Often blocked by German military indefinitely or with the enemy 
bearing down from all sides, a majority of treks turned back after only a few days or even 
hours.239 Even the Wehrmacht started to advise refugees to abandon their journey and find a 
place to “wait for the end.”240 Paul Peikert noted that many who had been forcibly evacuated 
from Breslau returned after only a few days, as in their haste they had not enough food and warm 
clothing to go on.241  
For those who continued, the dreadful circumstances produced acts of selfishness that 
further compounded desperation. When food ran out, the smell of cooking and “smacking of 
lips,” and refusal to share even a piece of bread, were agonizing.242 Mothers begged for milk for 
their infants in vain.243 Refugees seeking shelter were frequently turned away, “[n]owhere could 
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one find refuge or accommodation, one was always sent further on.”244 Refugees encountered 
closed doors and refusals from compatriots who “did not yet suspect that in the next hours and 
days, fate had intended the same fortunes of becoming a REFUGEE, to have no homeland and to 
not know where to lay one’s head at night.”245 Those stranded often remained so, unless they 
could barter for a ride or authorities intervened and, sometimes at gun point, forced travelers to 
lend a hand.246 At night, people struggled with rampant theft of horses, wagons, food, and 
clothing.247 In the cities, civilians and even the military ignored death penalties to engage in 
plundering.248 Tensions not infrequently ended in brawls between individuals or entire treks.249 
Authorities often feared intervening, as threats of violence made no impression on trekkers, who 
“also were armed and ruthlessly made use of the firearm.”250 Frustration spilled out against the 
NSDAP, as well. In Kahlberg (Krynica Morska), the Kreisleiter’s angry threats of chasing the 
wounded out of town were shouted down with calls to “beat the brown dogs dead,” and others 
proclaimed that “[i]f only the Russian were here already, maybe at least our children would not 
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be hungry anymore.”251 Hard-heartedness was the order of the day, and all solidarity 
dissolved.252 As a woman summed up: “Now I had to make the bitter experience that greatest 
misery does not generally unite, but instead makes people even more egotistical and hard.”253  
Despite the wartime dangers, memories of misery from cold and hunger stand as the 
greatest harbingers of suffering and death. “With the enormous cold, the shortage of food, and 
the week-long standing in open fields, people and animals died. Already after two weeks of 
flight one saw to both sides of the many hundreds of kilometers…countless cadavers of dead 
horses and here and there again a fresh gravemound with a simple wooden cross.”254 In their 
haste, people did not bring sufficient supplies for what turned out to be in some cases weeks of 
travel.255 “No milk or soup was readied in any of the locales for the children and infants, that is 
why so many small children and old people died, who were just laid in the ditches of the road 
because the ground was frozen rock-solid and everyone continued hastily.”256  
                                                 
251 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:95. Even in Berlin the party elite recognized that disastrous 
situation had in part been the fault of the Nazi Party. On February 13th, Joseph Goebbels confided: “The fiasco of the 
East Prussia treks is mainly being laid at the feet of the Party, and people are cursing the Party leadership in East 
Prussia good and proper. I also think that segments of the East Prussian Party did not rise to the challenge.” 
Fröhlich, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, 1993, 15:374. 
252 A refugee turning to an officer for help in finding transportation was cynically turned away with the advice that 
“trains are still running, and a hole in the Haff is still open as well.” The woman’s shock at this indifference from a 
fellow German seems to ignore that she herself concluded that most of the refugees were “real criminal times,” as 
demonstrated by their “crude, husky yelling.” Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:93–94.  
253 Schieder, 1:97. 
254 Cited in Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern, 275–76. 
255 Sometimes treks stopped for great lengths of time. In Karthaus (Kartuzy), refugees halted several weeks because 
they were barred from moving further. As the Soviets conquered their homes already, few wanted to return home 
and remained. BArch Ost-Dok 1/87, 10. Others became stranded against their own volition: Trek drivers from 
Beichau (Biechów) felt the cold was too great and the ice too dangerous for the horses, and decided to return. Those 
who had no vehicles were simply left stranded at the side of the road. Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 
1984, 1:421. 
256 Schieder, 1:172. Even Joseph Goebbels noted the disastrous issue of inadequate provisions in his diary on 
February 13th: “From East Prussia I receive desperate cries of help for bread and milk.” Fröhlich, Die Tagebücher 
von Joseph Goebbels, 1993, 15:374. 
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Most infants, some of born in “wagons during snowstorms,” did not survive the 
journey.257 Karl Wasner of Friedenshütte (Nowy Bytom) recalled “pitiful processions, fleeing 
families, whimpering children and endless columns” arriving with 19 frozen infants.258 Johannes 
Theissing, the vicar of Breslau’s cathedral, noted that on one day alone authorities brought 70 
frozen babies to the university hospital morgue.259 Pastor Paul Peikert reported the cold claimed 
so many already on January 31 that search commandos could not recover them all; a witness 
confided to him that he counted more than 400 victims on a short stretch of the 120 km 
evacuation route between Breslau and Kanth (Kąty Wrocławskie).260 Several months later, 
Peikert added that the spring thaws revealed the ghastly results of the forced evacuation: 
Specially created recovery squads uncovered 90,000 remains in Silesia alone.261  
For a population largely spared by the previous six years of war, being suddenly swept up 
in hostilities and facing inconceivable horrors took an enormous physical and psychological toll 
that lasted a lifetime.262 Many suffered from nausea, diarrhea, and headaches, a set of symptoms 
                                                 
257 BArch OstDok 2/127, 180 
258 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:406. 
259 Joachim Köhler, ed., “‘Peter Michajlowitsch Sidorenko lachte wien ein Pferd.’ Aufzeichnungen des Breslauer 
Domvikars Johannes Theissing in lebensbedrohlicher Zeit vom 1. Januar bis 9. Mai 1945,” Archiv für schlesische 
Kirchengeschichte 65 (2007): 14. Elsewhere in Breslau, “dead children are brought, frozen, exhausted, infants who 
died of starvation due to lack of milk.” Horst G. Gleiss, Breslauer Apokalypse 1945: Dokumentarchronik vom 
Todeskampf und Untergang einer deutschen Stadt und Festung am Ende der Zweiten Weltkrieges; unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der internationalen Presseforschung, persönlicher Erlebnisberichte von Augenzeugen und eigenen 
Tagebuchaufzeichnungen, vol. 7 (Wedel (Holstein: Natura et Patria Verl., 1993), 1689.  
260 Peikert, Festung Breslau in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, 31.  
261 Peikert, 227. If these numbers are reliable, Peikert’s January 31st conservative estimate of 150-200,000 dead 
through the travails of the flight for all of the German East are plausible. Sebastian Siebel-Achenbach concludes that 
18,000 died on the foot march between Breslau and Kanth. Sebastian Siebel-Achenbach, Lower Silesia from Nazi 
Germany to Communist Poland, 1942-49 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 60. 
262 BArch Ost-Dok 2/127, 180. 
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simply coined as Landstrassenkrankheit (“country road illness”).263 Testimonies from farmers 
consistently bring up the trauma of seeing the distress of their prized livestock and famed 
Trakehner horses.264 Charlotte Hedrich recalled an East Prussian farmer so distraught upon 
finding his horses frozen to the ground overnight that he collapsed into sobs and suffered a heart 
attack.265 The loss of all property similarly shattered spirits. Annemarie Kniep noted in her diary 
that her mother could not stop crying bitterly after their wagon was destroyed: “First the only 
son, then the grandson, then the home, now the last portable possessions—lost. For this the 
parents worked hard their entire life. It is very bitter.”266 
Desperation gave way to hopelessness; thousands broke down, resigned to their fates. 
Refugees succumbed to psychotic breakdowns and “lost their minds,” the stress and ardors left 
nearly all with headaches, dizziness, and sleeplessness.267 Fluctuating between extreme 
irritability and sorrow, “many were afflicted with screaming fits.”268 The anguish proved too 
much that some fell into a stupor, mindlessly wandering country lanes.269 After five days of 
walking with three children stricken with whooping cough, a young mother documented her 
despair in a postcard to her relatives: She had been brought to the brink, and could not “take one 
                                                 
263 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:95.. The symptoms, which many refugees exhibited, lasted for 
up to a year after the ordeal. 
264 BArch Ost-Dok 2/5, 194 and BArch Ost-Dok 2/5, 99. 
265 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:276. 
266 Schieder, 1:110.  
267 Schieder, 1:106; Schieder, 1:174. See also Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 2:383. 
268 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:253. 
269 As one refugee confided in a January 29th, 1945 letter, she could only wander by counting trees along the avenue 
and “dragging myself from tree to tree.” Many compatriots, however, sank down in resignation and gave up. Walter 
Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa. Ein Kollektives Tagebuch (29.1-5.2.1945), vol. 3 (München: btb Verlag, 2004), 56.  
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more step further”270 In Breslau,  Lena Aschner observed two crying children stroking the hands 
and face of their sick mother. They had travelled for four days and were out of food, and the last 
overcrowded train departed the main station moments before. “The woman’s blood-drained, blue 
lips are covered in foam…. Her eyes are closed. The head is leaned against the wall.”271 But of 
course, the loss of family members were the most shattering blows: In Breslau, a group of people 
wrestled a child from the arms of a distraught woman who, moments before, tore it from 
another’s pram. Only afterward did the woman realize that the baby was not her own; hers 
perished during the foot march from Oels (Oleśnica), a terrible fact she only discovered after 
several hours while trying to change her infant’s diaper.272  
  
“But Where Do They Want to Go Now?” Escaping the German East 
The German East in 1945 was an inferno. Contrary to postwar narratives, few treks 
reached the interior of the Reich. Moreover, they did not just stream westward. Their movements 
“crisscrossed” in every conceivable direction to escape Soviet forces closing in “from east and 
west,” or reach a port or strongpoint still in German hands.273 The struggle for survival also 
depended greatly on location. The population residing in the western German East, particularly 
                                                 
270 Haus Schlesien Library, Ber 0050, Letter February 3, 1945. 
271 Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 1:798. The woman had given up, and without Aschner’s arranging a space on a 
train from another station the next day, her fate would have been uncertain. 
272 Kempowski, 1:570.  
273 BArch Ost-Dok 2/174, 33; and BArch Ost-Dok 1/147, 7. A woman who had just given birth along with three 
female companions spent two weeks walking just ahead of the front until they reached the Vistula, where the bridges 
were closed. “At the Vistula the forest was full of refugees, and danger was great. It was fearful days, always death 
or the prospect of falling alive into the hands of the Russians.” The women decided to flee east along the Vistula 
Spit on a “dreadful journey” with “bullets whizzing past our ears” until they reached Hela, from where they were 
shipped to Denmark. BArch Ost-Dok 2/14, 12-17. This chaotic back and forth extended onto the sea; a refugee 
fleeing Stolpmünde eastward toward Kolberg on a steamer recalled encountering ships heading in the opposite 
direction, signaling that Soviets captured the port. Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:263. 
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west of the Oder River in Silesia, faced more fortunate prospects than their East Prussian 
compatriots. Not only did they have a few extra days to get ahead of both the Red Army and 
treks trudging westward, they also had relatively short distances to travel into Bavaria, Saxony, 
or the Sudetenland.274 The mountains to the south along the German-Czechoslovakian border 
also provided safe haven for many thousands of Silesians, where they lived in enclaves until the 
capitulation and arrival of the Red Army in early May.275  
Whereas Silesians stood decent chances of avoiding the front, the Soviet advance—with 
prongs directed toward Danzig (Gdansk), Küstrin (Kostrzyn), and Stettin (Szczecin)—placed a 
barrier between the Reich and the millions of Prussians and Pomeranians ensnared in a series of 
ever dwindling enclaves. Here they sat or drove in circles; numerous refugees fled, only to return 
home multiple times in order to tend to their businesses and farms.276 In short: For those pressed 
between the enemy and the Baltic, very few escaped via roads unless they resorted to daring 
attempts of slipping through the enemy’s lines.277 The vast majority who managed to reach 
safety, however, did so via trains and ships. 
                                                 
274 It is estimated that from a total population of 4.7 million in Lower Silesia, 3.2 million fled or were evacuated. Of 
these, half found safety to the south in the Sudetenland, the other half moved westward into central Germany. See 
Bessel, Germany 1945, 76. 
275 A pastor of Rogau (Rogi) who accompanied his community’s trek into the Riesengebirge near Glatz (Kłodzko) 
recalled that the refugees lived in their wagons from late January until early May. The local inhabitants did not flee, 
and made “good business” selling goods to the homeless compatriots. BArch Ost-Dok 2/174, 78ff. A farmer also 
seeking shelter in the rugged terrain testified that the impoverished local population there was elated with the arrival 
of the refugees, since their wagons proved invaluable for foraging trips to evacuated territories of Lower Silesia. 
BArch Ost-Dok 2/174, 200ff. 
276 BArch Ost-Dok 2/174, 33; and Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:437. For instance, once the 
Soviet forces had cut off most westward routes in central Pomerania, civilians were redirected toward Lauenburg 
(Lębork) and Danzig to the north and east. Another refugee recalled similar scenes: “Our trek breaks apart. In 
masses the refugees pour out of burning Landsberg. The coupes of the surrounding estates rush across the fields. 
Soldiers say: “Turn around and drive home. You will not get out of here, you are in a cauldron.’ From the opposite 
direction—from Pr[eussisch] Eylau—the treks approach us.” The author returned home, only to attempt to flee once 
again days later once the front shifted again. Schieder, 1:104. 
277 Several tens of thousands, caught between the Soviets and the Baltic Sea, dared an adventurous sally along the 
coast in columns of civilians and shattered military units, a veritable “migration of nations (Völkerwanderung) on 
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Given the speed of the front, the few that managed to procure seats on trains stood the 
best chances. However, the limited number of trains could not accommodate the mass of 
evacuees, who in any case ranked far behind the needs of the military and the shipment of 
supplies.278 Throngs of hysterical refugees nevertheless stampeded trains that pulled into 
stations, trampling the young and elderly and separating mothers from their children. In Breslau, 
Paul Peikert estimated that the heaving mob crushed between 60 and 70 children to death.279  
With desperation mounting, people’s anger boiled over into bitter rebukes against regime 
representatives. In Elbing, an officer warned an elderly man that the infant in his arms would die 
of exposure, the official received a dressing down: “Why don’t you ask the people who are guilty 
of this insanity, the murderers and louts!” Warned that his shouting would cost him his neck, the 
man charged at the authorities shrieking for them to “go ahead and hang my child with me, you 
crooks!”280 Only “utmost violence” could keep the frantic crowds at bay, and fights broke out 
                                                 
the beach.” Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:232. In a 1946 letter, a Pomeranian mother relayed 
how she and her child joined a band of women and children scurrying between the fronts, with fighting to the left 
and right. Everywhere small groups converged on the beach. “It was pitch-black, from the right the guns of our ships 
fired, and from the left the Russians banged their own rounds, and in between the crashing of the Baltic Sea.” 
Pressed between the sea and dunes filled with Soviet scouts, the refugees slipped out of cauldron. Schieder, 1:222. 
Other accounts corroborate the harrowing journey of the hundreds who on foot or even in cars travelled along the 
narrow beach littered with discarded items and the dead or wounded. Schieder, 1:224; Schieder, 1:260. 
278 The German High Command established five priority levels for train transport, where transportation of civilians 
ranked last; in parentheses, the document noted that there “practically were no more refugee trains” already in late 
January 1945. Cited in Beer, Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen, 73. 
279 Paul Peikert noted the scenes from the Breslau station in his diary on January 31st, 1945: “Many hours, even an 
entire day or two, the refugees had to wait at the stations during the greatest winter cold until it was their turn to be 
loaded onto a refugee train…It also happened that at the train stations expectant mothers prematurely went into labor 
from the terror and excitement of the flight. In the terrible jostling and burdened with much luggage, mothers often 
lost their children, whom they sometimes could not find again…It has been reported to me that at the main train 
station alone around 60-70 children were crushed or trampled to death. Where the trains are taking the enormous 
number of refugees can to this day not be ascertained, since communication lines are no longer possible.” Peikert, 
Festung Breslau in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, 29. 
280 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:56.  
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between civilians and officials.281 When authorities such as SA troopers physically assaulted 
civilians to prevent them from boarding trains without papers, many erupted in fury: “You damn 
dogs! Our dear Lord will ensure that you croak like dogs!”282  In Königsberg, armed guards 
fended off distraught crowds enraged by Nazi functionaries allowed to board.283 Trains “filled to 
the breaking point” often saw entire compartments crammed with party and military uniforms.284  
Instead of ports of safe haven and salvation, therefore, train stations transformed into 
scenes of bedlam and danger. The overfilled stations proved treacherous traps, and enemy fire 
wrought havoc.285 The fortunate few who managed to depart faced days-long journeys in the 
dead of winter, often in open-topped lorries, which took a deadly toll. Women who gave birth 
reportedly frozen to the floors of wagons; the dead were simply tossed out of the windows.286 An 
officer, recalling a train halted for days in Elbing, described appalling scenes: “Despite the 
horrendous cold, thousands of refugees squat in the train station in open (!) transport wagons, 
mothers with infants in their arms, old men, adolescents, sick, ailing, exhausted, in part already 
long without warm food, all animated by the faint hope to ride west even under suicidal 
circumstances.”287 Some refugees attempted to sit on top of the wagons or tried to cling to the 
sides; they soon froze to death, and fell dead onto the tracks. When the train finally reached the 
                                                 
281 Schieder, 1:56–57; Schieder, 1:424–25. 
282 Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 3:478. 
283 Kershaw, The End, 178. 
284 Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 1:449. 
285 BArch Ost-Dok 1/5, 89-98. 
286 BArch Ost-Dok 2/14, 12-13. 
287 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:56. 
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next station in Deutsch-Eylau (Ilawa) less than 100 kilometers away, the dead from the 
compartments were thrown overboard, including twelve children who suffocated to death.288  
Even if one survived the conditions, harassing enemy aircraft and gunfire, damaged rail 
infrastructure, and extreme congestion halted speedy getaways.289 Unless one managed to board 
a train in the first few days of the enemy’s offensive, many trains never made it far because the 
Red Army cut rail lines to the west. Traffic often stopped, then returned to their points of 
departure.290 In some instances, Soviet troops blocked the line captured entire trains.291 In 
Allenstein, enemy forces captured the city and station so unexpectedly, that for two hours trains 
from further east drove into the hands and guns of the Red Army.292 Yet despite the travails, the 
                                                 
288 In Stolp, the local deacon recalled that the sick, dying, and dead from passing trains were unloaded at the station. 
At nearby Jeseritz (Jezierzyce), he himself buried 30 dead children found by rail workers after a train departed. 
Schieder, 1:257. 
289 The last train from Cammin (Kamień Pomorski) came under fire from Soviet tanks that had blocked the rails, and 
the previous day another train from Wollin (Wolin) was shelled, claiming many lives. BArch Ost-Dok 1/147, 193. 
See also BArch Ost-Dok 1/90, 67; Schieder, 1:229; Schieder, 1:275; Schieder, 1:400. See also Schieder, 1:229; 
Schieder, 1:275; Schieder, 1:400.  
290 Kershaw, The End, 178.; Beer, Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen, 70.; and Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-
Neiße), 1984, 1:90. By January 23, trains leaving Königsberg were already returning, as the enemy severed all 
routes west. Lehndorff, Ostpreußisches Tagebuch, 18. 
291 Once trains halted, in a number of cases Soviet troops entered the wagons and plundered and raped the stranded 
refugees. A young mother of two remained on a stopped train in Pomerania for three days, until Soviet soldiers 
arrived and first plundered valuables before “the unspeakable suffering of many women began.” Schieder, Die 
Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:237. For a similar case, see also Schieder, 1:135..  
292 Red Army correspondent Lev Kopelev recalled the almost surreal scenes in his memoirs: “Half dead with fear 
and shame, [the traffic controller] reflexively recited his instructions based on the time table…Beyond the tall 
narrow windows with the meticulous dark-out curtains made of solid black packing paper the nervously agitated, the 
tenaciously demanding whistles of the locomotives sounded; wheels squeaked, from the valves billowing steam 
hissed, brakes screeched. Isolated shots barked, short machine gun salvoes. Screams, hurried clopping of feet. 
Alarmed din of the masses rushing to and fro, amidst suddenly erupting, hysterical, rapidly suppressed crying of 
women, screams of children, and again clopping, shots, commands, many-voiced cacophony of German voices. The 
arrivals were herded together, screams, shots, howling, cursing and then anew: whistles of locomotives, hissing of 
steam.” Cited in Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 2:187. 
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dedication of the locomotive drivers and rail workers, who ferried tens of thousands of civilians 
to safety, remains an unappreciated achievement.293  
While trains represented one of the most promising avenues of escape, the brief window 
of opportunity closed less than a month into the enemy’s offensive. With virtually all movement 
westward blocked by early February, the only hope lay in reaching a port city such as Pillau 
(Baltiysk), Gdingen (known as Gotenhafen between 1939 and 1945, and since 1945 as Gdynia), 
Hela (Hel), Swinemünde (Świnoujście) or Danzig, and evacuation via ship. An avalanche 
refugees therefore descended upon these locations, and NSDAP offices tried implementing travel 
bans in order to stem the tide.294 Nevertheless, the roads of Pomerania and East and West Prussia 
descended into chaos: In its daily report for February 5, Wehrmacht High Command noted that at 
Swinemünde alone, a traffic jam of 50,000 refugees stretching several kilometers blocked the 
roads.295 More and more nevertheless continued to flood into these bottlenecks. A witness asked 
incredulously: “But where did they want to go now? There was no way west, neither south nor 
east. Helplessly many wagons drove back and forth. On the avenues and country lanes a terrible 
chaos developed. Two columns next to one another dragged themselves westward, two columns 
next to one another drove east.”296 Refugees fleeing to the port of Kolberg found masses 
streaming in the opposite direction, as the enemy cut off the road; now thousands turned their 
                                                 
293 Many locomotive engineers periodically halted to check the lines up ahead, or made several trips back and forth, 
even through the small arms fire of passing Soviet patrols. See Kempowski, 2:195; Kempowski, 2:186. 
294 In Pomerania, Gauleiter Franz Schwede-Coburg attempted to turn back refugees from eastern regions, though the 
military overruled these measures. In Danzig and West Prussia, however, the Party successfully instituted a halt to 
further evacuations westward in February. Bessel, Germany 1945, 76. 
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84 
 
wagons and fled eastward.297 As the snare tightened, some two million refugees congregated 
around Wehrmacht defensive positions, such as the “fortress cities” of Danzig and Elbing.298 
 Further east, hundreds of thousands of refugees in the Heilegenbeil (Mamonovo) Pocket 
in East Prussia, also faced being trapped. After enemy forces drove north and besieged Elbing on 
January 26th, the Frisches Haff, frozen in an uncommonly cold winter, and then a journey along 
the Frische Nehrung (Vistula Spit) before the enemy fully closed the salient at the Baltic coast 
represented the only yet perilous path to the ports of Danzig in the west and Pillau in the 
northeast. Along the lagoon’s coast, in fishing villages and hamlets, refugees amassed for days 
waiting for the ice, which could not yet support the weight, to thicken. German military police 
forced travelers to discard items from their wagons to lighten loads and make room for women 
and children.299 During the agonizing wait, nerves wore thin among the densely packed mass of 
wagons, whose horse teams began biting one another. Along the avenues leading to the water, 
rows of dead claimed by shelling or the bitter cold lay unburied.300 More people arrived daily, 
fleeing the intolerable conditions of nearby cities.301 Others chose to risk Soviet occupation and 
escape these conditions, yet authorities cajoled the masses forward in order to prevent evacuees 
                                                 
297 BArch Ost-Dok 1/146, 88. 
298 Despite continuous evacuations and fleeing, many of German East’s cities increased in size. For example, 
Schweidnitz (Świdnica) increased from 35,000 to 80,000 and Glatz (Kłodzko) from 20,000 to 50,000. Peikert, 
Festung Breslau in den Berichten eines Pfarrers, 35. 
299 Dokumentation, 68. 
300 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:108. 
301 For example, in Braunsberg (Braniewo), a city of 20,000, more than 100,000 refugees faced atrocious conditions. 
With food low, water and power supply cut, and raging fires from daily bombardments, in early February many 
concluded that the uncertainty of the road offered better chances, and so flooded north toward the Vistula Lagoon. 
Schieder, 1:81; Schieder, 1:120. 
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from streaming back into combat zones and overcrowded cities.302 Pandemonium broke out: 
Desperate refugees needed to be prevented from crossing until the ice was strong enough, and 
those who forced their way nonetheless broke through and drowned.303  
Once the military deemed the ice strong enough, one of the most iconic images of “flight 
and expulsion” transpired over a period of several weeks.304 The aftermath of previous failed 
attempts, when the ice proved too thin, warned of the dangers of veering from the track: “On 
both sides of the path wagons that broke through, parts of the canopy and the ears of horses 
protruded from the water.”305 Day and night the movement continued in a painfully slow 
procession with frequent pauses, so that traversing the 15 kilometers took several days.306 The 
weight of the columns, periodic thaws, and tide of the Baltic Sea caused the ice sheet to slowly 
submerge under knee-deep water that reached up to the axles of the vehicles.307 The vicious 
conditions took their toll: Halfway across, one mother lost two children to hypothermia, whom 
she had to simply leave on the ice; her remaining two children perished before she reached the 
                                                 
302 According to one woman: “After eight days of driving we reached Passarge at the Frischen Haff. We were 
allowed to rest one night, the horses could go no further. From there we could now observe what was playing out on 
the ice. The sheet of ice was not yet very firm, so that it could not bear the entire load. So the first treks broke 
through and drowned. One could still see the wagons sticking through the ice. With my own eyes I saw how entire 
rows of wagons broke through. Once we saw all this, we refused to drive out onto the ice. The order came that the 
dam would be blasted in an hour and the village would be under water. So we were forced to drive out.” Quoted in 
Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern, 270. 
303 Hahn and Hahn, 271. 
304 As will be discussed in later chapters, media images and popular portrayals centered on the experiences of 
crossing the Frisches Haff. See, for instance, the vivid yet largely literary account loosely based on eye-witness 
reports in Jürgen Thorwald, Es begann an der Weichsel (Stuttgart: Steingrüben, 1950).  
305 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:109.. 
306 “Once in a while flares lit up the designated path. Then one saw the endless rows of treks, which silently moved 
unimaginably slowly forward at great intervals. It seemed to me like a long funeral procession.” Schieder, 1:95. 
307 Schieder, 1:73; Schieder, 1:81; Schieder, 1:109. 
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other side. No one, however, interceded: “Old people sat and lay dying or already frozen on the 
way…. [T]he people were already completely indifferent after weeks of tribulations.”308  
Ignoring orders to keep distance between one another, frantic drivers unnerved by 
standstills broke ranks in order to pass, incurring curses and inciting brawls.309 Added to this, 
Soviet planes and artillery attacked the columns and broke the ice, causing wagons to slip 
beneath the surface.310 These chasms only partially refroze, transforming into treacherous traps 
for following refugees. Gertrud D.’s recollections are representative of the experiences of many: 
“The Russian had long before announced that starting on [February 2nd] he would 
start firing upon the refugees on the ice. We then heard heavy firing of aircraft 
guns. Here and there people and horses were struck, and the ice cracked apart. 
[…] Then came a pitch-dark, gruesome night, continuous strafing through 
aircraft. The bullets and ice pieces crashed on the tin roof of the wagon. 
Shooting, screaming, and shrieking broke the silence of the night. […] Only at 
dawn came the most terrifying sight: corpses upon corpses, people and horses. 
Often only the drawbars of the wagons protruded from the ice, death had an 
abundant harvest.”311 
 
Though confronted with a harrowing crossing, refugees found no alleviation when 
reaching the Nehrung. On a spit no more than a kilometer wide, hundreds of thousands of 
evacuees and Wehrmacht units converged around Kahlberg. Massive congestion clogged the 
single road eastward toward Pillau or westward toward Danzig. Days of waiting in snow and 
                                                 
308 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:68. 
309 Schieder, 1:94. 
310 BArch Ost-Dok 2/5, 100. 
311 BArch Ost-Dok 2/14, 13-14. Another account by Countess von Sydow captures the pandemonium: “We decide to 
bypass all the wagons….The people are beside themselves. May they curse, here it is everyone for themselves, one 
cannot be considerate. Great cracks are in the ice, the storm keeps gaining strength, as does the fog. Up ahead 
supposedly everything is falling through, one cannot move forward it is said…The closer we come to the Nehrung, 
the more the vehicles and the greater the screaming. Finally, close to the shore, the noise is virtually deafening. 
There stand in shambles hundreds of vehicles, partially horses and wagons broken through. People have dismounted 
and fallen into the water, the children lay in the water and are screaming, people cannot find their wagons or 
children again. On top of all this pitch-black night, it is truly horrifying.” Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 4:384. 
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mud without food and water, exposed to the harsh winter, took their toll. As one witness 
reported: “In addition to the dead horses along the way, many old people already lay spiritlessly 
[by the roadside].” Mothers with dying children milled about helplessly, their treks having 
broken apart or abandoned them.312 A woman, witnessing “the most horrifying sight” of her 
flight, discovered a frozen infant in an abandoned pram.313 On a daily basis, new dead were 
added to the rows of corpses stacked beside houses and along the road.314 All this transpired 
under salvoes of Soviet artillery from the mainland and German ships at sea. Across the water “a 
really red sky, deep red, blood red” from burning cities presented a macabre spectacle.315  
These travails help explain why numerous testimonies recall the days on the Vistula 
Lagoon as the most horrendous, leaving deep psychological wounds.316 The mayor of Kahlberg 
noted that “people had become completely dull to the suffering of others and soon even their 
own, for they did not even have the time to bury their dead.”317 Lethargy and indifference 
prevailed, as one woman whose family’s wagon broke through the ice a few meters before the 
Nehrung bitterly remembered: No one stopped to help, onlookers gathered with hands in their 
pockets and watched.318 The hopelessness and despair left some of the deepest marks on 
survivors. The calls for help from the injured and abandoned on the Haff pierced the night, 
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branding themselves into the memory of exhausted and unnerved refugees.319 Another women 
confided the “hoarse, angry, and at the same time fearfully tortured yells” of the trek drivers 
continued to haunt her dreams.320  
The estimated 400-500,000 who braved the crossing hoped for a ship in Danzig or Pillau 
that could ferry them to northern Germany. Yet like train transport, the majority of civilians had 
little hope of securing passage. Though the German navy, along with the Wehrmacht, remains a 
celebrated savior of millions of East Germans in collective memory, this popular myth is at odds 
with the historical reality.321 As with transports via land, supply and the withdrawal of troops 
took precedence over the safety of the civilian population, who were afforded place on ships only 
when it did not interfere with military operations. In Pillau, the first vessels to carry refugees to 
westward destinations did not do so until two weeks into the Soviet offensive.322  
By this time, however, hundreds of thousands had descended upon the port cities, 
creating a humanitarian disaster. In his diary, Goebbels lamented that “it is hardly possible to 
feed [the hundreds of thousands]. For days they have not received any provisions, so that the 
situation has become entirely bleak.”323 The inhabitants of Pillau initially commiserated with the 
“people [who] arrived here after days of flight, hungry, nearly frozen, hounded and tormented by 
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frantic fear, many nearly insane, others dulled and indifferent from horror and grief, with hardly 
the barest of necessities, not always with all the family members together, having left the old 
parents behind, the children frozen along the way and left buried in the snow in the road ditches 
along the way.”324 In Gdingen, “women and children [spent days] lying next to one another in 
large halls, sitting on their bundles, waiting, cursing, and very embittered.”325 With 35,000 
refugees registered by the end of January and that number climbing daily, Pillau also devolved 
into utter disarray. Finding no room in the crowded public buildings, families camped out in sub-
zero temperatures, so that “many of the people…especially children” froze to death.326 Defying 
punishments for looting, refugees stormed bakeries and forced their way into homes “like a 
steamroller that tore down everything that stood in the way.”327  
After days or weeks of tortuous waiting, sheer anarchy erupted with the realization that 
there wasn’t enough transportation. Refugees stormed berthed ships and “any organization 
dissolved.”328 Those with travel permits needed to conceal their stroke of luck from frantic mobs 
in order to avoid an assault or lynching.329  Children became lost in the confusion, and NSDAP 
squads combed the crowds for young boys and old men “fit for combat,” leaving bereaved 
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mothers and wives alone on the piers.330 An undated postwar eyewitness report encapsulates 
what unfolded in the harbors along the Baltic coast: 
“At the harbor everyone was pushing towards the ships. There were 
terrible scenes. Human beings became animals. Women threw their 
children into the water [against the moored boats]…in order that they not 
be crushed to death in the crowd. The general confusion was now made 
even greater when completely disorganized military units streamed into 
the city and into houses, looted, intermingled with the refugees and also 
pushed to get themselves onto the ships. In order to get through the 
cordons to the harbor, soldiers took children from their mothers and 
claimed that they wanted to bring their families on board! Others put on 
women’s clothing and thus attempted to get away on the ships.”331 
 
To make matters worse, enemy air and artillery strikes wrought havoc among the 
dense throngs. In a 1946 letter to a husband relating the circumstances of his wife’s death 
in Swinenmünde, Anna Küsel captures the indecisiveness that could mean life or death: 
When sirens announced an American air raid on the harbor on March 12, she gave up her 
prized spot on the Andros to seek shelter in a bunker, while her friend remained onboard. 
The Andros took a direct hit, claiming the lives of over 600 refugees.332  
 Given the frantic scenes at the harbors, those lucky to find themselves on a vessel 
steaming out to sea must have felt a sense of relief.333 Yet reports and rumors of sunk ships 
unnerved passengers.334 These misgivings were not unfounded: Of the nearly 800 vessels 
operating in the Baltic Sea in early 1945, around a quarter fell prey to mines, air attacks, and 
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submarines; the sinking of the overfilled Wilhelm Gustloff (around 9,000 dead), Goya (7,000), 
and General Steuben (3,000) rank among the greatest maritime disasters in history.335 One of the 
less than 200 survivors of the Goya recounted the “fight for life and death” that unfolded in the 
lower decks and stairwells after a torpedo ripped through the hull. The ship sank in less than 
twenty minutes, yet the struggle for survival continued in icy waters, as “[h]orrifying, bone-
rattling cries for help pierce the night” before slowly fading.336 Nevertheless, despite these tragic 
individual fates, between late January 1945 and the end of the war, the German navy transported 
around 1.5 million refugees, wounded, and army personnel from the German East.337 
Statistically, therefore, the majority of those who managed to evade the Red Army did so by 
securing passage in the final months of the war. The majority found no such escape.  
 
Defeat and Retribution 
Escaping Eastern Germany—whether by train, ship, or on a trek—was not, as is 
popularly suggested, the most common experience. Most either remained, cut short their flight, 
or were overtaken from the enemy. The profound fear that many civilians must have felt can be 
measured by the staggering number of suicides. Unable to contend with the destruction of their 
lives or fear of a presumably heartless foe, the historians Hans Henning and Eva Hahn estimate 
that nearly 15,000 took their own lives in the German East, the Sudetenland, and Southeastern 
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Europe between the winter and summer of 1945.338 Indeed, suicide remains one of the most 
commonly reported incidents in the testimonies. Before the enemy arrived, in Königsberg 
“everywhere one heard” the talk of cyanide “in a light, casual tone.”339 Entire families 
contemplated “leaving this world.”340 In Tiegenhof (Nowy Dwór Gdański), a local farmer who 
saw off his community’s trek, finished his chores on the farm, and then shot his wife, daughter, 
grandson, and then himself.341 In Dambitzen (Dębice), 62 villagers reportedly committed suicide 
through drowning, poisoning, and shooting; the local game warden assisted those unable to 
procure a firearm.342 Mothers resolved to save their daughters from the prospects of rape; in 
Damerow (Dąbrowa), a woman hanged her six daughters and then herself.343 Elsewhere, mothers 
reportedly drowned themselves with their children in wells, rivers, and the sea.344 
Civilians had good reason to fear the enemy, as the first interactions with Soviet soldiers 
could often be violent affairs, as an account near Osterode (Ostróda) documents: Tanks “rammed 
wagons into the ditches, horse bodies lay dead in the ditches, men, women and children fought 
for their lives, the wounded screamed for help.”345 Yet just as frequently, the enemy bypassed 
                                                 
338 Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern, 703. The historians base their estimates on a number of 
regional studies. The Hahns are critical of expellee victimhood narratives to say the least, so that the figure of 
15,000 must be regarded as a conservative estimate. 
339 Lehndorff, Ostpreußisches Tagebuch, 24–25. 
340 BArch Ost-Dok 2/27, 106. Suicide became like a pandemic. For instance, in Lauenburg (Lębork), on the first 
night of Soviet occupation more than 600 inhabitants reportedly committed suicide. Schieder, Die Vertreibung 
(Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:266. 
341 Schieder, 1:294. 
342 Schieder, 1:274. 
343 BArch OstDok 1/146, 1.  
344 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:82; Schieder, 1:190., 82 and 190. 
345 The account continues somewhat melodramatically: “Behind me a young girl says to her father: ‘Father, shoot 
me!’, ‘Yes, father’ says the about 16 year-old brother, ‘I have nothing more to expect.’ The father gazes upon his 
93 
 
treks without incident, simply taking watches and taunting Germans with jeers of “Hitler kaput.” 
346 Almost surprised, some expellees reported that they were left unhindered after brief searches 
that typically ended with losing valuables, but no further harassment.347 Typically, Red Army 
troops simply confiscated goods, especially horses and wagons, and told refugees to return 
home.348 In some instances, they even allowed refugees to continue, going so far as to provide 
them tips on how to avoid the heaviest fighting.349  
Overall, the doubtlessly terrifying first moments were marked by the capricious whims of 
the conquerors.350 Plundering, executions of men in uniform, and rape appear frequently in 
testimonies. Entirely unpredictable in their actions, members of the Red Army could be helpful 
and accommodating one moment, then murderous the next.351 In one town the arrival unfold 
completely bloodlessly, while just a few kilometers away, executions and rapes were the 
norm.352 The most consistent theme in eyewitness accounts, however, are theft and rape: Troops 
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habitually detained people, locking them in houses or barns for days where they “constantly 
came with the typical ‘Uhri—Uhri’ [watch, watch] and at night with horrible ‘Frau, komm!’ 
[Woman, come].”353 From there, rearguard troops routinely deported them to do labor in 
unknown areas further east.354 Even women faced this fate: Within days of overrunning her trek, 
Soviet soldiers deported Käthe W. along with 600 other women on a 17 day train ride to a work 
camp in the “Urals (almost Siberia”); almost half died, and most were raped, before returning to 
Germany in December 1945.355 The historian Thomas Urban estimates that 520,000 German 
civilians engaged in forced labor, of which 185,000 perished.356 
Testimonies also document innocuous, friendly, and even humorous encounters. Soviet 
troops often immediately distributed rations to hungry civilians, and allowed local life to 
continue largely unhindered.357 One persistent theme is that children often tamed and even 
brought joy to Red Army troops, moving them to displays of tenderness and affection.358 Many 
Soviet soldiers seemed interested in making good impressions: In Breslau, an expellee recalled 
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with shock how a tank suddenly stopped, the driver emerged, and “amiably waved at me.”359 
Many members of the Red Army may have felt themselves as liberators and not mere 
vanquishers of the fascist foe, sometimes inviting civilians to join in their celebrations: After 
arriving with raised guns, Soviet troops later that evening invited some young German men to 
partake in the “usual joyful feasts with lots of schnapps, broads, and shooting.”360 Similarly, after 
fearfully meeting the enemy for the first time, Heinrich K. was told to lower his arms. The 
soldiers joined him in his home where they drank schnapps together. Though they departed with 
his liquor and cigars, they left him with cigarettes and “not a soul” harmed Heinrich.361 
Several reports suggest inquisitiveness. Expellees recalled troops barging into homes, 
only to allay their curiosity and seek a conversation with a German before departing 
peacefully.362 Sometimes these encounters took on surreal forms: Soldiers marched a priest not 
to his execution as he feared, but to his church where they requested he play the organ; the 
soldiers parted with thanks and handshakes.363 In his memoirs, Pastor Fittkau painted a rather 
jovial scene after encountering the first patrol: Apart from a moment of tension when exchanges 
of family photos revealed relatives in Wehrmacht uniform, the party departed with “smooches” 
and assurances that they would return for a longer visit when they had more time after the war.364  
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 The coming days showed Fittkau that he had “great luck with our first meeting with the 
Ivan.” For many, arrival of Soviet forces unleashed waves of arbitrary violence and destruction. 
Though Allenstein remained largely undamaged, Red Army forces deliberately torched the city. 
Viktor Seehofer described ghastly scenes: 
“Playing bandoneons, they moved through the alleys and courtyards and shot 
through windows. One of these units also barged into our building and destroyed 
the apartments. Crystal, porcelain, household goods, slit-open feather beds, 
pictures, crucifixes—everything stomped into disorder and smeared with 
excrement. And then something unbelievable happened: the houses were set 
ablaze, and those trying to save themselves from a fiery death on the street—
mostly women and children—were simply gunned down with machine guns. 
Snow covered the corpses, and the tanks crushed the little mounds.”365 
 
After the first night, many streets in the German East were littered with broken 
furniture, smashed windows, and corpses.366 Throughout the German East, the massacre 
of Nemmersdorf repeated itself. Higher authorities did not endorse such unbridled 
destruction, but found it difficult to impose order.367 The rampaging, frequently fueled by 
excessive drinking, often ended in bloodshed. Postwar historians estimated that two to 
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three percent of the population that remained in the German East were “shot or murdered 
through other means” during the first weeks of Soviet occupation, translating to 75-
100,000 victims.368 Vengeance motivated some killings, and suspected or actual Nazis, 
soldiers and veterans, or rich landowners faced particular danger.369 Occasionally, Red 
Army soldiers made clear that they were exacting revenge: In Lehlesken (Leleszki), a 
Soviet officer announced in good German that he was Jewish and would shoot all 
German men, after which he executed three victims.370  
Much of the killing had no clear underlying cause, however. In the course of 
pillaging, soldiers simply murdered anyone they came across, as the report of a refugee 
from Breslau who discovered five of his neighbors randomly shot suggests.371 Other acts 
appear as simple bloodlust: In Schlagenthin (Sławęcin), soldiers fired a flare into a barn 
filled with 50-60 hiding refugees, then gunned down those trying to escape the blazing 
building.372 Wehrmacht forces retaking Striegau (Strzegom) discovered a “town littered 
with corpses of murdered civilians,” and surviving Polish witnesses corroborated a 
catalogue of horrors.373 Often the killing was closely associated with sexual violence, as a 
case from Damerkow (Dąbrówka) illustrates: 
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“The next day…the Russians stormed into the village. During the course 
of the day many more refugees from neighboring villages had come, so 
that we were at least 30 people in one room. The first 
Russians…demanded watches, rings, and various valuables. […] 
Immediately after this, a big Russian came in. He said no word, looked 
around the room and walked all the way to the back, where all the young 
girls and women sat. He beckoned my sister just once with his finger. 
When she did not immediately stand up, he stood right in front of her and 
held his gun against her chin. Everyone screamed loudly, just my sister 
sat silently and resolved not to budge. And then all of a sudden the shot 
rang out. Her head fell to the side, and the blood ran in streams. She was 
dead immediately, without having made a sound….The Russian glanced 
at all of us and left the room without saying a word.”374  
 
 Far and away, the most persistent theme in the testimonies is witnessing or suffering 
rape.375 Norman Naimark estimates that as many as two million women experienced rape during 
the war and occupation.376 Occasionally Soviet soldiers, usually officers, intervened to prevent 
their men from carrying out their assaults.377 Sometimes the presence of children turned 
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assailants away.378 Nevertheless, even the old, prepubescent, and pregnant women fell victim to 
rape and gang rape as well.379 The rapes frequently occurred in the presence of the victim’s 
family, who were made to watch and were killed if they dared intervene.380  
Especially nights appear as terrible hours in the recollections: “Continuously Russians 
entered the room, threatened and cursed, and then moved on. Again and again prayers: ‘Dear 
Redeemer, let us perish.’”381 In a small village on the outskirts of Breslau, “[e]very night trucks 
with troops from the nearby front arrived and they poured into the homes, plundered, mistreated 
men and women and raped the latter in front of everyone or took them into some dark corner of a 
room or barn. The city echoed with shrill cries for help.”382 The only escape was feigning a grave 
communicable illness or hiding in barns or woods until the worst of the excesses died down. For 
those who managed to elude a gruesome fate, the emotional toll remained, as one woman 
seeking refuge in the forests of her Silesian hometown testified: The “screams of despair of the 
unfortunate victims still ring in my ears today after such a long time.”383   
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(Dobiegniew) testified that in his city, a pregnant woman and her daughter were raped side by side repeatedly. 
Schieder, 1:196. A 1946 letter written by an expellee from Eckersdorf (Florczaki) claims that his neighbor’s young 
daughter was “defiled by an entire tank company, namely from 8 o’clock in the evening until 9 o’clock in the 
morning.” BArch Ost-Dok 2/27, 106. 
380 BArch Ost-Dok 1/146, 88. 
381 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:100.  
382 BArch Ost-Dok 2/174, 251. The report also alleges that “these beasts raped the deceased women.” A similar 
incident corroborates aspects of the testimony, however: “Every night Russians…appeared, shot through the 
windows and doors, kicked in the locked doors and raped women and girls in front of the children.” Schieder, 1:196. 
383  Schieder, 1:332. Hiding also endangered families, as Soviets threatened to kill relatives unless they handed over 
their hiding female family members. Thus, many “had to fulfill [their] wishes.” Schieder, 1:196. See also Henke, 
“Exodus aus Ostpreußen und Schlesien,” 122. 
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 The humiliation and torment drove thousands of women as well as men to suicide.384 
Others suffered from mental breakdowns. In Königsberg, where a bitter siege and heavy losses 
stoked Soviet anger that then unleashed itself upon the conquered inhabitants, Hans von 
Lehndorff recorded that victims were driven mad: “Soon none of the women had any strength to 
resist. Within a few hours a change occurred within them, their soul died, one heard hysterical 
laughter that only made the Russians wilder.385 Even accounting for exaggerations, the suffering 
of the female population finds corroboration in the testimony of foreign observers. British POWs 
described how “Red soldiers during the first weeks of their occupation raped every woman and 
girl between the ages of 12 and 60. That sounds exaggerated, but it is the simple truth.”386 Soviet 
writers such as Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, a combatant in East Prussia, documented his disgust in 
the poem Prussian Nights:  
“Twenty-two Hoeringstrasse. It's not been burned, just looted, rifled. A 
moaning by the walls, half muffled: the mother's wounded, half alive. 
The little daughter's on the mattress, dead. How many have been on it? A 
platoon, a company perhaps? A girl's been turned into a woman, a 
woman turned into a corpse. . . . The mother begs, ‘Soldier, kill me!’”387 
 
 
                                                 
384 BArch Ost-Dok 2/174, 42. 
385 Lehndorff, Ostpreußisches Tagebuch, 73. He confided his guilt in his diary: “Can one even write about these 
things, the most terrible that there is among humans? Is not every word an accusation against myself? Weren’t there 
enough opportunities to intervene and to seek a decent death? Yes, one is to blame for still living, and therefore one 
cannot be silent about all this.”  
386 Alfred M De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans : Background, 
Execution, Consequences (London; Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1977), 67. Another English forced laborer made 
similar observations: “Flushed with victory—and often with wine found in the cellars of rich Pomeranian land 
owners—the Reds searched every house for women, cowing them with pistols or tommy guns, and carried them into 
their tanks or trucks.” De Zayas, 68. 
387 Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenit︠ s︡yn and Robert Conquest, Prussian Nights: A Poem (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1977). Lev Kopelev similarly records numerous atrocities, including rapes, in his memoirs. Kopelev and 




The disintegration of Nazi Germany and victorious onslaught of the Soviet military bore 
terrible consequences for German civilians, particularly the inhabitants of the German East. The 
astoundingly bloody coda brought the pitiless war of annihilation and bitter ideological conflict 
unleashed by Nazi Germany in 1939 violently crashing down on the Third Reich, sweeping up 
millions of guilty and innocent alike. Because of the unimaginable traumas witnessed or 
experienced by so many during the Red Army’s final assault on the fascist foe, the flight of 
millions of German civilians remains a firm fixture of German cultural memory of the last 
months of the war. The intensity of the suffering branded itself into the memories of victims, 
families, and German society alike. Popular assumptions of a near universal terror-stricken 
escape before merciless Soviets, treks on wintry roads, or sinking ships filled with refugees 
therefore remain powerfully entrenched images associated with “flight and expulsion,” because 
they reflected the reality of many.  
However, the documentary record also reveals that these were minority experiences, 
which nevertheless stood out and enflamed imaginations because of their particular horror and 
the intensity of their dreadfulness. Other common experiences—remaining at home and refusing 
to flee, or boarding a train to Saxony months before the deluge—remain forgotten. The voices of 
many millions that testified to death marches of Jews, condemned the Wehrmacht’s callousness, 
or praised the generosity of the enemy have been drowned out by descriptions of universally 
panicked and innocent civilians, cruel and radical Nazi caricatures, and heartless and barbaric 
Soviet monsters.  
What emerged as “representative,” and what became shrouded in silence, are not merely 
down to the raw number of people who experienced a particular fate. The potency of “typical” 
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images owe just as much of their resonance to a discourse that framed the events in a particular 
way and elided other—often equally characteristic—experiences. The key point here is that these 
selective recollections and silences did not merely emerge out of the postwar discourse and 
memory politics of the early Federal Republic, but that they originated already during the war as 
the events unfolded. The reports and rumors spread by refugees, but above all the Third Reich’s 
news reporting and propaganda, provided a foundation for commentators after 1945. 
The vignettes from this period anchored themselves into the historical consciousness of 
West Germans because even those personally far removed from the conflagration caught 
glimpses of it. Authorities described the despair of refugees, and warned that the influx would 
affect food distribution and lead to compulsory housing. The regime took great care to remind 
the Volksgemeinschaft (“people’s community”) of their duty toward those “who have suffered 
the most terrible fate.”388 Editorials in local papers, such as the Swabian Hohenzollerische 
Volksbote, also attempted to arouse sympathy and coax the nation to accept the victims: “The 
doorbell rings, one opens—a mother and three children and an elderly woman…who had to flee 
from the German eastern territories. They need to be housed, it must be possible.”389  
More crucially, Nazi media constructed a narrative with lasting impact. The propaganda 
campaign surrounding Nemmersdorf, as we shall see, survived into the postwar period. So did 
the idea that expellees fled a foe intending to exterminate all of Germany, rather than falling 
victim to the vagaries of war and a botched evacuation. On May 2, 1945, for instance, Finance 
Minister Johann Ludwig Graf Schwerin von Krosigk took to the radio to warn of the “stream of 
                                                 
388 Quoted in Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 3:402–3. 
389 Cited in Willi Rössler, “Schicksalsjahre der Heimatvertriebenen- Eine Dokumentation über Flucht, Vertreibung 
und Eingliederung der Heimatvertriebenen, die im Altkreis Sigmaringen eine neue Heimat gefunden haben,” 
Zeitschrift für hohenzollerische Geschichte 47/48 (2012 2011): 328. 
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desperate, starving people chased by dive bombers fleeing westward from unspeakable terror, 
from murder and defilement.” They suffered behind an “iron curtain” which obscured from the 
world the horrific Bolshevist extermination program.390 Prevailing postwar framings of a 
population universally fleeing the Soviet menace share a remarkable overlap with reporting in 
the Deutsche Wochenschau of March 16, 1945: “The onslaught of the Bolsheviks forced 
hundreds of thousands…to abandon all goods and land they possessed and bring themselves and 
the barest necessities to safety. In treks that stretch from morning to night, thousands of wagons 
and vehicles drag themselves over the ice toward the safety of the Reich.”391  
Moreover, refugees arriving in the rest of Germany offered authentic descriptions that the 
scarcely believable and unreliable official press elided, and their accounts of what loomed on the 
eastern horizon spread like wildfire throughout the Reich. Goebbels noted the circulation of 
“horrendous rumors,” but dismissed them as “exaggerated tales” spread by histrionic trekkers.392 
Yet whether rumor or fact, the suffering of the refugees reached audiences and left impressions 
even before the war was over. The victims themselves contributed to the communicative memory 
of “flight and expulsion” in conversations or hurried letters to loved ones, as a January 29, 1945 
postcard movingly captures: “Please don’t be frightened, dear mother, but I am not bringing Gabi 
with me,” a letter of a young mother in a forced evacuation from Silesia began. “I could no 
longer carry her further after she was dead. I could no longer stand it, and I wrapped her up well 
and laid her deeply into the snow on the street. There Gabi is not alone, since a couple thousand 
women with their children were with me along the way, and they lay the dead also in the ditch, 
                                                 
390 Quoted in Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern, 391. 
391 Quoted in Paul, “Der Flüchtlingstrek,” 668. 
392 Fröhlich, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, 1993, 15:292. 
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because there surely no wagons and no cars will drive and inflict more suffering upon them.”393 
Despair and disbelief permeate the traumatic account of the odyssey: 
“Gabi was dead all of a sudden. I definitely wrapped her up well in two 
blankets. But she was only four months old, and children between the 
ages of two and three died along the way. […] But the cold drove [us] 
always onward, except for those who simply remained sitting and maybe 
froze with their children. I saw many who sat there with their backs 
against a tree, and sometimes older children stood beside them and cried. 
A mother’s love certainly is the greatest love. But as great as all love 
may be, we are after all only frail creatures. […] I cried ceaselessly out 
of misery, and a few times I was at the point that I would rather have 
simply laid down in the snow in order to die. […] I don’t know what 
more I should write, dear mother, but everything now is so different from 
before. […] Don’t be angry because of Gabi, dear mother, but think of 
how you would have dragged yourself down the roads and through the 
snow. Maybe you will understand, and maybe Rudolf will also 
understand if he should ever make it out of Breslau and we once again 
reunite.”394 
 
The anguish and self-recrimination speak to the trauma that began in the summer of 1944 
and reached its peak in early 1945, yet did not cease with German capitulation. While the 
necessary defeat of Nazi Germany ended six years of unfathomable suffering for Europeans, the 
full measure of vengeance that cascaded upon the German East marked a caesura in “flight and 
expulsion.” The violent arrival of the Red Army not only heralded the start of a new order in the 
German East, it also marked the beginning of an entirely new phase of the forced migration that 
would last several years beyond the end of the war on May 8, 1945, and ultimately destroy 
centuries-old German life and culture in Central and Eastern Europe.
                                                 
393 Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa, 2004, 3:54–55. 





“THROW THEM OUT”: EXPERIENCES AND MEMORIES OF EXPULSION 
 
 
On December 15, 1944, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill took to the floor of 
the House of Commons to elaborate on his vision of a future Europe, and how to safeguard 
against yet another outbreak of hostilities that could plunge the world into war. “For expulsion is 
the method which, so far as we have been able to see, will be the most satisfactory and lasting,” 
the wartime leader explained, and victory over Nazi Germany presented a moment to implement 
policies so that “[t]here will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble as in Alsace-
Lorraine.” Churchill concluded with bravado: “A clean sweep will be made. I am not alarmed at 
the prospect of the disentanglement of population, nor am I alarmed by these large transferences, 
which are more possible than they were before through modern conditions.”1 Meeting with 
junior ministers in February 1945, Churchill noted that “most of the Germans in the territories 
now taken by the Russians had ‘run away already.’”2 To the British head of state, the 
“disentanglement” of Central Europe seemed a mere formality. 
Churchill’s comments touch upon a nexus of issues that this chapter will attempt to 
disentangle. First, in his ruminations before the House of Commons, Churchill addressed long-
                                                 
1 Quoted in Joseph B Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1946), 186.  
2 Quoted in Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 110. It appears that Churchill uncritically echoed assurances from Stalin, who 
informed Churchill and Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference that virtually the entire German population fled the 
territories over whose future the Big Three now deliberated.  
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term ideas on how to cope with perceived nationalities struggles, while at the same time touching 
upon perceived short-term catalysts of the war still raging in Europe. It is within this tension—
between longstanding notions of homogenous nation-states and desires to ostensibly eliminate 
causes of German aggression—that expulsion emerged. Added to this, the looming Cold War 
conflict and attempt of reordering Europe into spheres of communist and democratic influence 
decisively influenced the fates of not just ethnic Germans, but all who lived in the region. This 
chapter consequently aims to provide an explanation of the forces that led to the final destruction 
initiated by Nazi aggression of a pluralistic, multi-ethnic Central and Eastern Europe.  
Second, Churchill’s statements recognized the ongoing flight from the German East, and 
tied these to plans for an extensive population transfer through expulsion. While related and 
bleeding into one another, civilians fleeing warzones represented a phenomenon distinct from 
driving entire communities from their ancestral homelands. Churchill was not alone in his 
inability to distinguish between the phases of the forced migrations. Expellees themselves and 
German postwar discourse tended to conflate “flight and expulsion” into a single process, so that 
to this day the complex stages remain unclear. This chapter therefore attempts to differentiate 
between the brief “wild expulsions” of the summer of 1945, and “orderly and humane” transfers 
under Allied supervision that followed. The former, driven by violence and fear, need to be 
separated from the latter, which represented a far less deadly yet nevertheless intentional policy 
of ethnic cleansing. The emphasis of this chapter, moreover, will be on the “wild expulsions,” as 
postwar memory predominantly revolves around this stage of the forced migrations. 
The cavalier assurances of Churchill that revealed an indifference toward the suffering 
that forced migration—however implemented—would cause constitute a third argument of this 
chapter. As in the pages preceding it, a careful attempt must be made to take the traumata of 
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expellees seriously, while avoiding to reify postwar tropes and exaggerations.3 The consistent 
theme of testimonies speak to the anguish and disbelief as the world seemed to turn upside down, 
yet also call into question popular narratives forged by postwar actors intent on politicizing 
German victimhood. Moreover, by drawing out the similarities and differences, this chapter 
seeks to create a spectrum of experiences, paying particular attention on neglected voices. 
Lastly, in order to comprehend West German cultural memory of “flight and expulsion,” 
the forthcoming pages will continue to examine the layering of memory. Even as they unfolded, 
commentators and victims described the expulsions and participated in a discourse that created 
powerful tropes that left lasting impressions upon future actors, who in turn built upon these 
foundations. It is therefore necessary to analyze how contemporaries interpreted the events, 
constructed images, and thereby contributed to the master narrative of “flight and expulsion.”  
 
“A Clean Sweep Will Be Made”: The Roots of Expulsion 
While the war continued to rage, in February 1945 the leaders of the wartime alliance 
convened in Yalta to contemplate the postwar period. One major point of discussion revolved 
around the future of the territories and populations of Central Europe. Already at the 1943 
Tehran conference, Joseph Stalin insisted on retaining the portions of eastern Poland guaranteed 
to the Soviet Union through the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, corresponding roughly to the 
1920 Curzon Line.4 In 1943, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill issued personal 
                                                 
3 On an example of especially spurious testimonies, see Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung Sudetendeutscher 
Interessen and Wilhelm Turnwald, eds., Dokumente zur Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen (München, 1951); Heinz 
Nawratil, Vertreibungs-Verbrechen an Deutschen: Tatbestand, Motive, Bewältigung (München: Ullstein Verlag, 
1982). 
4 As early as late 1941, the British Foreign Office learned of Soviet territorial demands and goals of a forced 
deportation of ethnic Germans. A study concluded that seven million refugees would be affected. These conclusions 
became an orientation point for the War Cabinet, which in July 1942 determined that after the war German 
minorities would need to be deported from areas “where it is necessary and desirable.” Cited in Klaus-Dietmar 
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statements principally acceding to Soviet demands; in Yalta, the Anglo-American heads of state 
formally agreed to an effective halving of the Polish Republic. Affirming the partition of 1939, 
the Big Three awarded half of Poland, including its historic heartland of the Kresy, to the Soviet 
republics of Ukraine and Belorussia upon the cessation of hostilities.5 In order to compensate 
Poland, in whose defense the United Kingdom entered the war, the leaders tentatively agreed to 
allocate portions of eastern Germany to the postwar Polish state.  
While the westward shift of Poland left open the question of its western borders until a 
future conference to be held after the defeat of the Third Reich, all parties fundamentally 
approved a geographic reordering. As for the populations living in those areas, the protocols of 
the Yalta Conference reveal agreement on this point as well: Expulsion. Stalin assured his 
partners that forced deportation would prove unproblematic. Turning to Churchill, the Soviet 
leader explained that “when our troops come in the Germans run away and no Germans are left,” 
effectively depopulating the region. Churchill nevertheless pondered “the problem of how to 
handle them in Germany,” remarking that “we have killed six or seven million and probably will 
kill another million before the end of the war.” Stalin quipped whether it would be one or two 
million. Churchill seemed unperturbed: “Oh I am not proposing any limitations on them. So 
there should be room in Germany for some who will need to fill the vacancy.” The British head 
of government assured his conversation partner that unlike a substantial portion of the English 
                                                 
Henke, “Der Weg nach Potsdam-Die Allierten und die Vertreibung,” in Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem 
Osten: Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 
65–66. 
5 For a more detailed discussion, see Henke, “Der Weg Nach Potsdam”; Detlef Brandes, Der Weg zur Vertreibung, 
1938-1945: Pläne und Entscheidungen zum “Transfer” der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei und aus Polen 
(München: R. Oldenbourg, 2001). For a rather polemical account that nevertheless brings in a critical assessment of 
the Western Allied decisions, see De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam. 
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public, a violent mass expulsion would not at all shock him.6 If there were misgivings at Yalta 
over what the word “transfer” entailed, the meeting minutes don’t reflect any. 
 That Stalin proposed mass transfer seems unsurprising. Forced deportation emerged as a 
preferred method for dealing with ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union after 1941, as well as the 
Chechen-Ingush and Crimean Tatar populations.7 Several factors explain why the leaders of the 
Western Powers, ostensibly fighting to uphold democratic values, concurred with their Soviet 
ally. To begin with, population transfers after World War I provided seemingly persuasive 
precedents for a similar postwar policy. In accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, the defeated 
German Empire abdicated Danzig, the “Polish Corridor,” parts of Upper Silesia, and Alsace-
Lorraine to their neighbors, spurring the movement of nearly two million Germans unwilling to 
live under French or Polish rule. Hitler himself offered a powerful model for postwar plans: The 
conquering of Lebensraum in the East and accompanying Generalplan Ost fell short of the 30 
million Slavs slated for “removal” from subjugated lands, yet it resulted in the murder of more 
than six million Jews and the expulsion of 1.7 million Poles from annexed territories, as well as 
the resettlement of nearly a million ethnic Germans brought home “into the Reich.”8  
                                                 
6 See the minutes of Charles E. Bohlen and H. Freeman Matthews in Foreign Relations of the United States, 
Diplomatic Papers: The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1945. (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 
1955), 717; FRUS: Malta and Yalta, 720. Churchill formulated similar statements to Stalin in October 1944: The 
British Prime Minister calculated that some seven million German deaths would leave ample of room for those 
populations driven out of Silesia and East Prussia. “Record of Meeting at the Kremlin, October 9, 1944 (Churchill, 
Stalin, Molotov, et al.)”, Cold War International History Project Bulletin (CWIHP Bulletin) (Winter 2000), 36. 
7 Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 85–107. 
8 For more on Generalplan Ost and German expulsion plans, see Valdis O. Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries: The 
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1993); Doris L. Bergen, “The Volksdeutsche of Eastern Europe and the Collapse of the Nazi 
Empire, 1944-1945,” in The Impact of Nazism: New Perspectives on the Third Reich and Its Legacy, ed. Alan E. 
Steinweis and Daniel E. Rogers (Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, 2003), 101–28.; Christopher R Browning, The 
Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 36ff. 
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Yet it was the Greek-Turkish population exchange of some 400,000 Turks and 1.3 
million Greeks, sanctioned through the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which predominantly guided 
the thinking of Churchill and Roosevelt, becoming an “idée fixe.”9 Even though they generally 
preferred a moderate course and opposed a universal forced deportation that would mean great 
burdens on the Allied-occupied areas of Germany, American representatives consistently agreed 
in principle with population transfers.10 In the spring of 1943, the American President 
communicated to British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden that the transfer of East Prussians “in 
the same manner as the Greeks were removed from Turkey after the last war” seemed a harsh yet 
necessary measure to ensure future peace.11 Churchill’s above-cited reference to 
“disentanglement” echoed the “population unmixing” demands of British Foreign Minister Lord 
Curzon, one of the chief statesmen at Lausanne, who theorized that promoting “the greater 
homogeneity of the population [would result in] the disappearance of the causes of ancient and 
deep-rooted conflicts.”12  
                                                 
9 Henke, “Der Weg Nach Potsdam,” 50. 
10 Advisers within the Department of State recommended that the US endorse a policy of selective deportation of 
especially incriminated groups and under international supervision. See for instance Foreign Relations of the United 
States Diplomatic Papers, 1944. General. (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1966), 310. The US 
government, however, seemed unwilling to insist on this position. A January 12, 1945 State Department assessment 
concluded that it would be infeasible for the United States to oppose universal transfers in the case that the Czech 
and Polish exile governments, who enjoyed British and Soviet support, insisted upon them. FRUS: Malta and Yalta, 
189. 
11 Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1943. The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the 
Far East (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1963), 15.  
12 Quoted in Eric D. Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories 
of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing Missions,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 5 
(2008): 1557. A wide range of literature points out that nationalist sentiments are far from “ancient,” but rather a 
phenomenon of the late 19th century. See Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism (London; New York: Verso, 1991). For more recent studies on the linguistic borderlands 
of Germany that show how fluid identity was until the early 20th century, see Jeremy King, Budweisers into Czechs 
and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); 
Pieter M Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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Thinking in terms of ethnically homogenous nation-states, therefore, was not solely the 
domain of genocidal dictators such as Adolf Hitler or ruthless despots such as Joseph Stalin, but 
liberally-minded democrats as well. Though the methods and their lethality varied immensely, 
the calculus that underpinned conceptions of nationhood and self-determination, and remain 
powerful into the 21st century, did not.13 Expulsion was more than a tried method that was once 
again returned to in 1945; it was widely regarded as a legitimate tool of social engineering that 
reflected a shared way of thinking about the world and modern statehood. In either case, the Big 
Three’s plans “turned Hitler’s Generalplan Ost on its head.”14 Though decidedly less deadly, the 
“unweaving and homogenization process” brutally initiated by Hitler continued after 1945, and 
unequivocally fulfills the definition of ethnic cleansing.15 
 Besides an innate willingness to accept population transfers, the recent interwar past 
seemed to make it abundantly clear that only a radical demographic reordering could prevent 
future conflicts. As the academic Joseph B. Schechtman, widely regarded by contemporaries as a 
leading expert on minority policy, articulated in 1946, “the purpose of a population transfer is 
not to remove a high percentage of a minority group from the country of its residence, but to 
                                                 
13 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); Benjamin David Lieberman, Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006); Weitz, “From the Vienna to the Paris System”; Philipp Ther, Die dunkle Seite der 
Nationalstaaten: Ethnische Säuberungen im modernen Europa (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); 
Michael Schwartz, Ethnische “Säuberungen” in der Moderne: globale Wechselwirkungen nationalistischer und 
rassistischer Gewaltpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (München: Oldenbourg, 2013). 
14 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 314. 
15 Donald Bloxham, The Final Solution: A Genocide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 106. 
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remove a minority problem, to eliminate a threat to the future.”16 In this reading, population 
transfer proved an appropriate mechanism for eliminating fifth columnists. 
 The memory of the asymmetrical nationalities conflicts that substantially contributed to 
the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 in the first place lingered at the decision tables of 1945.17 
Using the Sudeten German population as a lever to pursue aggressive expansionary policies, 
Hitler mobilized irredentist sentiments to force territorial concessions from Czechoslovakia in 
1938. Similarly, Nazi Germany propagandized alleged persecution of ethnic Germans through 
the Polish state, sensationalizing and capitalizing in particular on the “Bloody Sunday” massacre 
in Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) in order to lend their saber-rattling moral weight and justify their 
invasion.18 In an August 1944 position paper of the Committee on Post-War Programs, American 
officials argued that expulsion of ethnic Germans would contribute to inner stability of East 
European countries, since these recently proved themselves as a “vanguard of National Socialist 
penetration,” and now faced justified anger from the rest of the population.19 Given their source 
of unrest, former US President Herbert Hoover deemed the removal of Germans from the region 
a “heroic remedy” against future turmoil.20 
                                                 
16 Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945, 478. Originally born in Odessa, Schechtman emigrated 
to the United States in 1941 and between 1944 and 1945 worked as an advisor to the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), the fore-runner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), on migration issues. 
17 This view is also shared by Richard Evans, who points to the real danger that German minorities posed for the 
Polish and Czech states once Hitler came to power and resolved to “bring home into the Reich” these ostensibly 
beleaguered populations. Richard J. Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape 
from the Nazi Past (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), 95–99.   
18 Gerhard L Weinberg, Hitler’s Foreign Policy, 1933-1939: The Road to World War II (New York: Enigma Books, 
2010), 497–504. On the German minority in pre-war Poland, see Winson Chu, The German Minority in Interwar 
Poland (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
19 Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1944. General., 310. 
20 Snyder, Bloodlands, 315. 
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The Allies not only hoped to eliminate one of the perceived causes of the conflict, but to 
permanently remove Germany’s future ability to wage wars after twice within two decades 
unveiling themselves as the aggressors. When Roosevelt specifically pointed out to Eden that 
“the Prussians will be removed in East Prussia,” he implied that the dissolution of this state, 
regarded as a hearth of militarist aggression, would eliminate the catalyst of Teutonic 
belligerence.21 British representatives argued that the “moribund corpse of Prussia” must be 
“finally killed,” lest the “dangerous anachronism” lead to future hostilities.22 An August 1946 
British memorandum articulated broadly held sentiments in the Western camp more concisely: 
“I need not point out that Prussia has been a menace to European security 
for the last two hundred years. The survival of the Prussian State, even if 
only in name, would provide a basis for any irredentist claims which the 
German people may later seek to put forward, would strengthen German 
militarist ambitions, and would encourage the revival of an authoritarian, 
centralized Germany which in the interests of all it is vital to prevent.”23 
 
The apparent need for a removal of “irredentist claims” was reinforced through lobby 
efforts since the outbreak of the war on behalf of the Polish and Czech governments in exile in 
London, which conferred with one another on a campaign to convince the Allied leaders of a 
postwar transfer.24 Czech President Edvard Beneš on numerous occasions received explicit 
                                                 
21 Henke, “Der Weg Nach Potsdam,” 56. 
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Soviet as well as vague American and British approval of his government’s demands for a 
removal of the Sudeten minority.25 These had been citizens of Czechoslovakia, yet the 1938 
Sudeten Crisis, enthusiastic support for the fascist movement headed by Konrad Henlein, and 
Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia convinced Beneš that radical solutions were needed. “Our 
Germans,” the Czech leader reportedly lamented, “have betrayed our state, betrayed our 
democracy, betrayed us, betrayed humaneness, and betrayed humankind.”26 The prevention of 
Germany from once again leveraging its ethnic populations “for pan-Germanic goals,” required a 
removal of the ethnic minority.27 Moreover, the “unequaled acts of barbarism” perpetrated by the 
Third Reich, such as the massacre of Lidice, made future coexistence within shared borders 
impossible.28 The Anglo-American partners recognized, as formulated by American Secretary of 
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State Edward Stettinius, “the injustice that Czechoslovakia has suffered from Germany and its 
German minority,” and sought to support efforts for a satisfactory solution, asking merely for 
Czech authorities to forego unilateral measures and await formal treaties.29  
Just as the Czechs, Polish representatives in exile cited their suffering under Nazi rule 
during their lobbying of the governments of the Allied powers. Poland possessed an arguably 
greater justification, however: Considered by the Third Reich as subhuman, more than 20% of 
the prewar population—around six million, including three million Polish Jews—died as a result 
of war, murder through extermination, hunger, disease, and forced labor. In comparison, less 
than 400,000 Czechs, or roughly 2.5% of the population perished.30 The issue was more 
complicated than a mere weighing of suffering and the legitimacy of grievances, however. The 
German minority in Czechoslovakia resided within the prewar borders of that country, whereas 
Poland’s wartime expulsion plans depended on territorial demands, which in turn relied on the as 
of yet unresolved claims of the Soviet Union.31  
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As early as February 1940, Polish Foreign Minister August Zaleski included the forced 
deportation of Germans from prewar Poland and East Prussia, which Poland hoped to acquire in 
an eventual Allied victory, as a Polish war aim. The ongoing conflict seemed to awaken 
nationalist ambitions, as a year later Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski demanded that “the 
German horde, which for centuries had penetrated to the east, should be destroyed and forced to 
draw back [to the west].”32 Indeed, records of the London-based Polish government reveal 1942 
plans for incorporating territory east of the Oder River, yet they called for the eastern Neisse 
River as a western border; the expulsion of the large and overwhelmingly German population of 
Lower Silesia between the Western and Eastern Neisse was seen as an impossible sell to the 
British.33 Moreover, a dramatic westward expansion would cement German animosity in 
perpetuity and require dependency on Soviet protection, so that exile government deemed an 
insistence on the Oder-Neisse Line as the western border of postwar Poland as “foolish.”34  
With the realization that the USSR would claim eastern Poland, and that the US and 
British governments sought to accommodate these demands, the government in exile somewhat 
reluctantly recognized that a large portion of their postwar state would encompass larger 
expanses of the German East than expected. Officials therefore developed legal procedures to 
prepare, such as depriving Germans of their Polish citizenship and expropriating their property. 
Polish representatives made it clear to the British government that Germans and Poles could not 
live together within the same borders, and that those who remained after the war would need to 
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be expelled.35 As with the Czechs, the Anglo-Americans remained “sympathetic” to Polish 
arguments and had “no objection in principle.”36 
While Polish and Czech delegations lobbied the wartime governments, a countervailing 
voice emerged from the German émigré camp organized around the Social Democrat and labor 
activist Wenzel Jaksch. In British exile since 1938, the ardent Nazi opponent unequivocally 
condemned the Third Reich and war crimes in the Protectorate such as Lidice in BBC 
broadcasts.37 His opposition initially brought him close to the Czech exile camp, where he 
learned of emerging deportation plans. An appalled Jaksch formed the Democratic Sudeten 
Committee as a sort of exile government to negotiate with Czech counterparts, and engage in 
propaganda work.38 Jaksch publically argued against “a mass transfer of minorities” upon 
Germany’s defeat on moral and logistical grounds.39 Not only was it, Jaksch reasoned, in line 
with immoral transfers such as the Greco-Turkish and Nazi resettlements, it also tarnished 
British values and threatened to destroy the foundations of the postwar European community.40 
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Unfortunately for Jaksch, few wanted to hear of mercy for Germans, even antifascist 
elements. As is apparent in the rhetoric cited above, the brutal conflict engendered extreme 
antipathy toward Germany. No Western statesman had any compunctions over a harsh treatment 
of Germany, whose aggression and attempts to secure a racial hegemony in Europe had caused 
untold suffering. Even an otherwise restrained Franklin D. Roosevelt purportedly said that 
Germans “deserved” to be expelled.41 Understandably few tears were shed at conference tables, 
where participants contemplated the consequences of German savagery. Few seemed alarmed 
that postwar solutions may contradict the foundational 1941 Atlantic Charter, which assured that 
territorial adjustments would only be made in accordance with the wishes of those concerned and 
that the right to self-determination of all peoples would be respected. For members of the anti-
Hitler coalition such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, or the Soviet Union, who suffered 
immeasurably worse under German rule, the thirst for retribution and indifference to German 
anguish was even greater. As an August 1944 bulletin of the Polish underground summarized in 
regards to the future policy toward Germans: “Now they will know what collective guilt 
means.”42 Stalin’s June 28, 1945 statements to Czechoslovak Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger 
and Foreign Minister Vlado Klementis reflected similar sentiments: “Throw them out. Now they 
will learn themselves what it means to rule over someone.”43 
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Neither the Soviet Union nor their Western partners therefore shrunk from severe 
punishment of their sworn enemy. Yet one remaining crucial factor dictated how it came to the 
largest forced migration in history: Even if Churchill and Roosevelt or his successor Harry S. 
Truman would have been inclined to stay the Soviet hand, there was precious little that they 
could do. At the Potsdam Conference in August 1945, Churchill and Truman suddenly voiced 
concern over the policy of a universal mass expulsion. The Soviet Premier attempted to reassure 
his partners: “The Germans have already been driven out” of Poland and Czechoslovakia.44 This 
was patently false, as only half of the 10-12 million residing in the German East attempted a 
flight, and of those many to returned home. Yet since Yalta it was clear that any possibilities for 
deterring Soviet demands, underpinned by millions of military deaths and sacrifices in a bitter 
war of annihilation, ebbed daily with each kilometer that the Red Army neared Berlin.  
Soviet-backed leaders aimed to establish civilian control over the liberated territories 
received personal instruction from Stalin to “create such conditions for the Germans that they 
want to escape themselves.”45 Thus, militia and police violently drove 700-800,000 Germans 
from Czechoslovakia and the German East each before the Big Three met at the Potsdam 
Conference.46 Indeed, while victorious allies conferred, at nearby Berlin’s train stations 
“spectacularly overloaded trains…were disgorging cargoes of the dead, the dying, the diseased, 
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and the destitute.”47 The expulsions were already underway. As the triumphant wartime leaders 
haggled, it immediately became apparent that Stalin cunningly orchestrated a fait accompli that 
his partners now had to accept. The decisions reached tentatively in Tehran and formalized in 
Potsdam would set more than 20 million Europeans—Czech, Polish, Slovak, Polish, Lithuanian, 
Ukrainian, Belorussian, Hungarian, and German—forcibly on the move, separating them from 
ancestral homelands and changing the ethnic and cultural landscape forever. 
 
The End of Nazi Rule and Inversion of the Social Order in the German East 
Wherever the Nazi regime lost its grip on power in the waning days of the war, the social 
order was suddenly and dramatically upended. The German “master race” saw itself cast to the 
bottom, and their erstwhile victims now reigned over them with relative impunity. Slave 
workers, even before Soviet forces arrived, sensed and eagerly anticipated the coming changes in 
fortune that the closing front heralded.  An inhabitant of Oels (Oleśnica) noted angrily in his 
diary that “the Poles are standing on the street and grinning impudently” at passing Germans.48 
Renate Schweizer, residing in an improvised refugee camp for evacuated youths in a palace near 
Streben (Ćiążeń), learned from the Polish maid in broken German that soon the children would 
clean the rooms for her.49 Many slave laborers and subjugated peoples of Eastern Europe 
fervently awaited liberation, when they could return home, loot goods and provisions, or even 
settle old scores with cruel German masters.  
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That moment typically arrived as soon as the Red Army appeared. Former slaves proved 
eager to assist the invaders: “The Poles squatted on the Soviet tanks as guides…and directed 
them to the most important strategic points of the city.”50 More commonly, with their 
enslavement effectively ended, slaves wagons and horses and headed home.51 “The suddenly 
liberated Polish agricultural workers plundered like ravens, loaded us on wagons, took the best 
horses for themselves, and drove eastward,” a man from an overrun trek recalled.52 Frida Lewin, 
overrun by Soviet forces near the Baltic Coast, initially felt relief that “her Poles” intervened and 
protected her family from the enemy, but then bitterly noted that they “fled into the hills” with 
the wagons, leaving them only a few items.53 In Treptow (Trzebiatów), after watching them take 
stock of “booty” in the house hours before the arrival of the Red Army, a refugee indignantly 
recalled how the Polish servants “immediately made friends with the Russian soldiers.”54  
Testimonies attest to the intercession of Poles on behalf of their former masters, saving 
them from execution or arrest.55 Depending on their disposition, however, liberation allowed for 
an immediate settling of scores. Allegations of German farmers being shot “by [their] own Pole” 
reveal how six years of exploitation and mistreatment often ended.56 Red Army soldiers 
possessed little compunctions over summarily executing perceived capitalists, particularly when 
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they benefited from Nazi Germany’s conquests and “hired” forced laborers. Egged on by 
liberated slaves, the conquerors meted out rough justice liberally. A refugee recalled what 
happened after her trek was overrun in Pomerania: “There already we see behind the trees the 
brown uniforms with the disgusting pelt hats creeping forward like cats…‘He Chitler [Hitler] 
and she Chitler!’…the denunciations of the Polacks begin, and the accused are immediately 
arrested.”57 In the village of Platenheim (Płotówko), several farmers were shot and a woman 
raped and hanged “at the behest of the Russian POW and the Polish maid, who had a child from 
the Russian.”58 Thea Winkler reported that in her village near Elbing (Elbląg), Soviets arrested 
and interrogated her mother and demanded to know how long her husband had a member of the 
NSDAP, and where the family concealed a cache of war materiel, including rifles and uniforms. 
Winkler suspected that “Wanda, the Polish girl, must have told the victors all sorts of stuff, she 
amused herself to her heart’s content with them.”59 
 Life in the German East devolved into a lawless “wild west” of plundering and 
mistreatment.60 Nevertheless, for millions of refugees who had fled the Soviet offensive and 
were now strangers stranded in unfamiliar surroundings, return to even a chaotic homeland 
seemed a worthwhile risk. Beginning in mid-May 1945, hundreds of thousands crossed the Oder 
River and travelled down roads that still bore the evidence of what transpired a few months 
earlier.61 As one expellee recalled: “Refugees upon refugees on the country lanes….The ditches 
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were filled with spilled oats, with beds, linens, clothing….Valuables in astounding scales lay 
scattered…and were going to ruin in the wet. Time and again one saw corpses of German 
soldiers, men, women, and children, which now at least were carried onto the fields and covered. 
Shudders upon shudders crept up our backs”62 Many wandered for weeks with nothing to eat 
except for what could be plundered from abandoned wagons, and some “remained lying at the 
road and died.”63 The returning columns faced plundering from partisans, liberated slave 
workers, and Soviet soldiers, and the confrontations often ended in murder or rape.64  
Some refugees were luckier: A pastor from Rogau-Rosenau (Rogów Sobócki) and his 
companions enjoyed an escort of Red Army soldiers who, other than taking valuables, didn’t 
abuse them and protected them from looters.65 A fortunate few, such as a priest who fled to 
Bohemia, enjoyed a boat ride—“like a nice dream…during the most wonderful sunshine”—to 
Pirna, Germany, from where trains ferried them unharmed to their home in Silesia.66 Throughout 
May and June, the pandemonium and administrative chaos ensuing from the war endangered 
displaced persons, yet also afforded relative freedom of movement. The desire to return home 
drove people on veritable odysseys. Freya von Moltke, a member of the resistance group headed 
by her husband James, returned to her estate in Silesia and extensively toured the German East. 
Even Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz, an émigré and special assistant to Allen Dulles, used his 
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diplomatic status to join von Moltke in order to observe the state of things.67 Within a few 
weeks, some communities saw nearly all of their evacuated residents return, though in many 
cases the homes were destroyed, the livestock slaughtered, and the machinery carted off.68 In all, 
over one million refugees returned to their homes in the weeks after the German capitulation.69  
The vacuum created by the defeat of the Nazi regime and sudden lawlessness produced 
dangerous potentials everywhere, yet things looked much different in Czechoslovakia. On the 
one hand, the majority of Germans never fled, as American forces advancing from the west and 
the Soviet military closing in from the East convinced many to conclude that “[i]f one were to 
fall into the hands of the Russians, then better [let it happen] in the homeland.”70 Moreover, 
unlike in the German East where the population faced the fierce onslaught of the Red Army, 
Czechoslovakia and the Sudetenland remained relatively peaceful until the final days of the war. 
Many also may have felt that generations of coexistence in communities far more ethnically 
mixed than in the German East made an eruption of violence unlikely. Yet on the other hand, the 
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high concentration of Germans meant that any outburst would prove particularly calamitous: 
There was nowhere to run to if neighbor would now turn upon neighbor.  
The war remained relatively distant until Silesian treks fleeing the Soviet January 
offensive poured into the region, bringing with them reports of atrocities and “causing a stir.”71 
Some 100,000 Germans, evacuated from Slovakia by German authorities, also started to arrive in 
the Protectorate by March 1945.72 Most unsettling of all, however, were the last remnants of the 
German military, among them the forces of the fanatical General Ferdinand Schörner and 
elements of the Waffen-SS, pressed between two fronts into one of the ever-shrinking last 
remaining enclaves of German control. The exhortations of Karl Hermann Frank, a Sudeten 
German who climbed to the rank of Secretary of State of the Protectorate, to fight to the bitter 
end added to the anxious climate. Frank’s radical radio addresses and obsession with partisans, 
and preparations for the final struggle that included forming two companies comprised of 
Sudeten Germans, suggested to the Czech population that the final moments of the war would 
prove bitter. Rumors circulated that the Nazi regime armed German civilians and raised guerilla 
units to continue the struggle past the war’s conclusion.73 These worries were not just hearsay. 
Resolved to resist to the last coupled with draconian measures such as mass executions and 
burning down of villages to quell simmering resistance, the German oppressors stoked terror and 
fury among those eagerly awaiting liberation.74 As the student Hildegard Holzwarth noted in her 
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diary on April 20, a “tremendous tension” developed between Germans and Czechs, and “small 
disturbances” broke out.75 The Protectorate developed into a powder keg. 
The tinderbox exploded on May 5, when SS forces violently put down a largely 
demonstrative rebellion in Prague.76 In 1947, a witness related how the sudden shooting caused 
“[f]urios men, terrified women, and curious children to scatter in confusion” and duck into 
doorways as a “young SS man fired warning shots left and right” into houses from a racing car.77 
The underground called Czechs to arms, and the city erupted in street fighting. The 
collaborationist Russian Liberation Army led by Andrey Vlasov, attempting to jump ship in the 
waning days of the war, turned on their German compatriots by joining the revolt. Some German 
troops “handed over their revolvers with smiles to the Czechs, who clapped them on the 
shoulders and let them go unharmed.”78 They were fortunate: Other captives were executed on 
the spot if they fell into the hands of the rebels. The SS meanwhile mercilessly executed captives 
and used civilians as human shields, creating a spiral of radical violence.79 Czech propaganda 
and rumors, such as the SS “nailing children to walls,” further fanned the flames of hatred.80 
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Vertreibung (Tschechoslowakei), 1984, 2:110. 
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The revolutionary “May days” in the Czech capital only increased in extremism after 
German forces withdrew from Prague on May 8 and the Red Army entered a day later, giving 
free reign to the mobs.81 “Retaliation was blind,” as people including old women were thrown 
from their apartment windows and non-Czech speakers beaten to death. Gangs forced entry into 
hospitals to hunt down victims.82 German “volunteers” were dragged from their homes and made 
to dismantle the barricades erected during the fighting while incensed Czechs harangued, 
shouted insults, and delivered blows. Many testimonies recalled the joy of the jeering crowds, 
who drew swastikas on coats, shaved women’s heads, and forced victims to walk barefoot over 
broken glass.83 Uniformed prisoners incurred the greatest wrath and fell victim to lynching at 
public squares teaming with celebratory onlookers; in some cases, the captives were doused in 
petrol and set alight.84 A Czech witness confirmed the ghastly scenes: 
“We had followed one crowd to a spot in the middle of Wenceslas 
Square….There, several Soviet tankists were standing on their tanks and 
manipulating containers of the gasoline they normally used for 
fuel….Today, after almost fifty years, I cannot recall precisely whether it 
was the Red Army soldiers…or some of our Czech civilians standing 
beside them, who poured combustible liquid onto two squirming victims 
in German uniform suspended heads-down from the arch and then set 
them on fire. Fortunately, we had several rows of people in front of us 
and could not discern the details of the conflagration, though Milan 
observed that some degenerates were lighting their cigarettes off the 
flaming bodies.”85 
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The Prague Revolt spread to other areas of the former Protectorate and Sudetenland, 
where similar scenes unfolded in hundreds of locations.86 The chaos of the collapse left Germans 
with no recourse and at the whims of their tormentors. Rituals of public humiliation and 
intimidation were among the most common occurrences that immediately followed the 
disintegration of German authority. Crowds harangued and forced Germans to clear rubble, 
sweep streets, fill trenches, and perform degrading tasks like cleaning latrines with their hands; 
often members of the bourgeoisie such as teachers or civil servants were earmarked for such 
work.87 Czechs also confronted Germans with the crimes of Nazi rule: in Neudeck (Nejdek), 
Germans were forced to perform the “horrific work” of exhuming concentration camp prisoners, 
“ostensibly shot by the SS,” with their bare hands. One individual who had failed to show for the 
assignment was led by partisans through the marketplace with a Hitler portrait around his neck.88  
As traumatic as these experiences were, justice could easily be far deadlier. Even as the 
world cheered the defeat of the Third Reich, the killing continued in Czechoslovakia. A 
combination of revenge-seeking and anxiety in a lawless atmosphere often spilled into murder.89 
In Pilsen (Plzeň), crowds reportedly stoned the elderly to death and beat infants on the ground 
and kicked them.90 Sometimes the violence seemed driven by sheer bloodlust. A 1947 testimony 
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of an expellee from Hermsdorf (Hermánkovice) claimed that a Czech clerk “used [a Silesian 
refugee child] as target practice,” gunning it down in the street.91 In Dobronin (Dobrenz), the 
revolutionary guard hacked to death several dozen civilians with picks and shovels.92 
Resistance, or fear of it, from Germans elicited deadly consequences. After catching a 
ride with SS “in a wild flight, trying to escape the clutches of the Russians,” a group of refugees 
became stranded in Tannwald (Tanvald), where Czech militia subjected the men to 
interrogations and exactions while forcing the survivors to clear rubble. “The Czechs savored 
watching the Germans and beating them with sticks,” the expellee recalled, when suddenly a 
“young man who no longer was willing to put up with such treatment…kicked at one of the 
louts.” A “swarm of young lads” descended upon him and “literally stomped [him] to death.”93  
Jumpy partisans were quick to act on any imagined Werewolf activity, collectively 
punishing German civilians for transgressions. In a town in northern Bohemia, a priest who 
accompanied the trek from Neumarkt (Środa Śląska) reported that during a ceremony honoring 
two Czechs and a Soviet soldier killed in fighting, a truck of SS soldiers and refugees fleeing 
Prague suddenly arrived at the scene, prompting a firefight. The Czech partisans threatened the 
refugees that they all would be shot if any more of their compatriots died.94 In a small village 
near Karslbad (Karlovy Vary), Silesian refugees noted that local Hitler Youth hoisted banners 
with inscriptions such as “Better dead than a slave” and “The way to the Reich goes only over 
our corpses.” The Red Army and Czech militia exacted a terrible punishment on the town for this 
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arrogance, forcing locals out of their homes and orchestrating public executions that all Germans 
were forced to watch.95 In a village near Aussig (Ústí nad Labem), the comrades of a murdered 
militiaman drove the local German men with shouts of “fifty for one” and “revenge for Lidice” 
past the body on the way to the execution site. In this case, the wives of the victims managed to 
beseech a Soviet officer to intervene before the first shots fell.96 In Teplitz (Teplice) careless 
workers caused an explosion in a munitions depot that claimed the lives of two Czechs, 
prompting the militia to drive the entire local German population to the nearby German border.97 
Civilians payed a heavy price for calamities eagerly attributed to German machinations. 
Though isolated murders remained the norm, the desire for vengeance or punishment of 
ostensible “resistance” occasionally escalated into mass killings. The most notorious case 
remains the massacre in Aussig on July 31, 1945.98 As in Teplice, an explosion in a munitions 
depot that claimed the lives of 28 German and Czech workers provided the catalyst for 
bloodletting.99 Rumors of sabotage and roving “Werewolf” militia incited outrage, so that 
immediately after the detonation Czech militia and soldiers, joined by indignant throngs of 
civilians and some Soviet troopers, sought retribution.100 The “Czechs stormed through all the 
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streets, beat the Germans down or shot at them if they ran away,” a Red Cross nurse recorded a 
year after the massacre.101 At the train station armed mobs fell upon surprised Germans, while at 
the marketplace victims were drowned in barrels used for firefighting.102 An Englishwoman 
witnessed women and children thrown into a burning building alive.103 Hundreds of Czechs 
intercepted workers returning at the end of their shift from across at the bridge across the Elbe 
River, and immediately bludgeoned and threw Germans—easily identified by their white 
armbands—into the river. Militiamen fired upon those who resurfaced.104 The crowd reportedly 
tossed a mother and infant, still in the pram, into the waters.105 The number of dead remains 
undetermined; Sudeten Germans consistently have spoken of several thousand, while recent 
scholarship has tended to estimate between 100-150 deaths.106 
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Elsewhere in Czechoslovakia, similar pogrom-like incidents occurred. In Landskron 
(Lanškroun), the head of the National Revolutionary Committee, Josef Hrabáček, oversaw a 
“people’s tribunal” comprised of prominent Czech locals. Holding court in front of the town hall, 
they tried more than two dozen local Germans and administered death sentences through 
shooting or hanging, or “lighter” verdicts of beating or dunking in the town fire pool, which also 
often resulted in death.107 While awaiting their sentencing, victims endured beatings and 
humiliations—including licking excrement from Hitler portraits—from partisans and locals, who 
were allowed to select the next “defendant.” Several were driven to suicide.108  
The harrowing scenes traumatized even those like Else Z., who thought she witnessed the 
worst horrors during the war and flight until her trek arrived in the Protectorate: 
“What now happened was the most gruesome part of our flight. We 
cannot pass the column [of German POWs] and must slowly drive 
behind it. On the sides of the roads lay broken down soldiers. They beg 
us to take addresses. We are being driven on and cannot help these 
people. We slowly hang back to increase the distance. But it is 
impossible. Slowly we are enveloped in the column. We see at the sides 
of the road shot people. Those who no longer can go on or don’t move 
like the armed Russians and Czechs want to are finished with a shot to 
the nape of the neck. We drive past them, as they are not yet entirely still. 
We want to scream or do something, and yet we are entirely silent and 
frozen. The Czech broads scream at us: ‘Here, take that along for your 
beloved Führer! German pigs!’ The spit at us, all while plundering the 
still warm bodies of our soldiers. These women behave like beasts. The 
boots are pulled off, letters and photos thrown into the street, they are in 
a frenzy of revenge. Will I forget the sight of a very young blonde man, 
whose hair hung in the pool of blood while his hands, like a child’s, open 
and closed in the death struggle? We had to cover our children with a 
blanket, so that they would not see it. The worst for us was seeing how 
one threw the executed onto a truck, which then backed up to a gravel pit 
and dumped them in. A Russian shot from the hip one last salvo into the 
pit with his machine gun. No identification tags were taken off of the 
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soldiers, and many will never know where their fathers, husbands, and 
sons disappeared to, and all of this after the war was over.”109 
 
Many of these brutalities can be attributed to the emotions and thirst for retribution that 
exploded into excesses at the long awaited moment of liberation. In the immediate postwar 
weeks, Central Europe offered undeniably grotesque scenes, yet the violence in Czechoslovakia 
eclipsed that in Poland. The likeliest underlying cause of this difference is that in the German 
East, Germans constituted the majority of the population; Poles only gradually occupied the 
Recovered Territories, as the Polish government referred to them. The largest source of danger 
before the summer of 1945 emanated from the Soviet military, which over the course of the 
spring gradually tamed its personnel and instilled discipline that checked wartime passions.  
In Czechoslovakia, however, the turbulence of the collapse of Nazi rule unleashed itself 
upon a German population living in close proximity to the Czech majority. Unlike in Poland, 
there was no extended period of time for passions to cool before Poles in great numbers 
confronted German inhabitants. Given the generations of coexistence between ethnic Germans 
and Czechs, the reckoning was often highly personal, as neighbors suddenly turned upon 
neighbors.110 The outbursts over the spring and summer of 1945 severed bonds already that 
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deteriorated under Nazi occupation, and utterly stunned many Germans who lived in multiethnic 
communities.111 Nevertheless, driven by a volatile combination of the “emotions at home, the 
collapse of institutions, the dialectic of violence at the local level, and the presence of an 
increasing number of German civilians, SS, retreating Wehrmacht troops, partisans, 
Czechoslovak troops, and Red Army liberators,” Czechoslovakia erupted in violence.112 This 
horror did not abate but continued into the summer, as now it was driven by a deliberate process 
that would ultimately culminate in the destruction of German communities Central Europe. 
 
“The German Question in the Republic Must Be Liquidated”: “Wild Expulsions” in 
Czechoslovakia 
 
The violence in Czechoslovakia after German capitulation morphed from largely 
spontaneous acts of vengeance into a directed process that reached its deadliest peak in the 
summer of 1945. The ostensible participation of the public suggests that these wanton excesses 
were expressions of the people’s rage, a “paranoid, hysterical fantasy of vengeance” that 
continues to color memories to this day.113 Czech authorities likewise happily endorsed the 
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outburst of retribution as emanating from the heart of the masses, though they systematically 
stoked a climate of extreme hatred and consciously drove the process. 
Officials initiated a vociferous anti-German propaganda campaign that emphasized the 
humiliations and suffering endured under Nazi occupation, and encouraged the population to 
settle accounts and drive the enemy from the country.114 Novo Slovo assured that “[t]he German 
possesses no soul, and the words that he understands best are—according to Jan Masaryk—the 
salvos of a machine gun.”115 A brochure—distributed by Beneš’s Czech National Social Party 
and edited by Prokop Drtina, the future Justice Minister—reminded Czechs that “the devil 
speaks German” and that “there are no good Germans, there are only bad and worse ones.”116 In 
May 1945, Drtina unmistakably called on Czechs to “clean out the republic as a whole and 
completely of Germans,” adding that all had a role to play in the “cleansing of the homeland.”117 
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Even members of the clergy spoke of a historic moment to “settle accounts with the Germans, 
who are evil and to whom the commandment to love they neighbor therefore does not apply.”118  
These were not the musings of isolated activists. Key politicians and public figures of the 
postwar state indulged in similar rhetoric. On May 11, 1945 Klement Gottwald called for the 
confiscation of properties of “active Nazis” and the revocation of citizenship of Germans and 
Hungarians who “heavily transgressed against our Republic.”119 Two days later a communist 
party declaration did not even differentiate between Germans and Nazis, arguing the need to 
“cleanse the fatherland of the agents of treachery without equal in the history of our people!”120 
President Beneš made similar appeals as he traveled the country and gave numerous public 
speeches in which he explicitly stated that “the German question in the Republic must be 
liquidated” and beseeched the entire Czech people to contribute to this goal.121 Local violence 
unsurprising spiked in locales directly following Beneš’s exhortations. 
The rhetoric reveals an intention behind the brutal measures, namely—in the words of 
Beneš—to “de-Germanize everywhere and in all parts of the Republic.”122 Czech authorities 
were not merely settling scores with their erstwhile oppressors or fulfilling wartime aims of 
eliminating reviled fifth-columnists, however. By creating conditions that made life in 
Czechoslovakia impossible for the beleaguered minority, they created arguments for the 
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necessity of expulsion. The inferno raging in Czechoslovakia made Beneš’s February 1945 
demands of the British government to back deportation, lest he “lose control over his 
countrymen who, after terrible suffering, will take the law into their own hands,” appear 
prescient.123 Foreign Minister Hubert Ripka also demanded a formal resolution to regulate an 
ostensibly uncontrollable state of affairs, casting the Aussig massacre as evidence for continued 
German terrorism that necessitated mass expulsion.124  
Though a veritable “sabotage panic” gripped Czechoslovakia, they based themselves on 
“sweeping statements, half-truths and sometimes outright inventions” that in any case made for 
convenient justifications for anti-German policies.125 Moreover, despite initially appearing 
spontaneous, the violence that gripped the country could best be described as managed chaos. 
This becomes apparent in the multitude of executions, particularly the massacres and pogroms 
over the summer, which authorities directed. Typically, as in Aussig in July 1945, military, 
militia, and non-local elements stood at the head irate mobs.126 A Czechoslovakian investigation 
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found that militia systematically tortured and murdered roughly 300 Germans in Brünn’s (Brno) 
Kaunitz College in May and June.127 On June 18, Czech troops removed 265 refugees, including 
120 women and 74 children, from a train near Prerau (Přerov), forced them to dig a mass grave 
next to the station, and then murdered them with shots to the nape of the neck.128 Czech soldiers 
and police also orchestrated the largest postwar massacre between June 5th and 6th: In groups of 
250 at a time, including women and children, elements associated with the regime executed at 
least 763 local Germans on a pheasant farm near Postelberg (Postoloptry).129 These mass 
murders were not “spontaneous” outpourings of public rage, but orchestrated military initiatives. 
By August 1945, an estimated 1.6 million partisans, revolutionary guards, liberated 
concentration camp inmates, and settlers roamed the Sudetenland carrying out targeted violence, 
exacting revenge, or seeking their fortunes.130 A flurry of decrees sanctioned their actions. A 
June 19, 1945 announcement concerning the “punishment of Nazi criminals, traitors, and their 
accomplices as well as the extrajudicial courts” extended carte blanche for those seeking 
vengeance and protected them from legal penalties.131 Yet another set of ordinances enabled the 
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seizure of property of all “unreliable persons,” initiating wild plundering.132 “[E]very Czech 
wanted a house or a villa,” and they moved swiftly to secure them before others could lay 
claim.133 When a German woman demanded to see documentation that stated she had to 
surrender her home, the Czech who claimed the property pointed to his rifle as sufficient 
authorization.134 An August 1945 report smuggled out of the country succinctly described the 
situation for Sudeten Social Democratic leaders in London: “The Germans without any 
distinction are robbed of their goods, including all foodstuffs. A Czech arbitrarily comes, picks 
out the house of a German in the town, and is now the new trustee. In reality he is not only 
immediate owner, but also master of life and death of the German inhabitants.”135  
With the blessing of authorities, Czechs could force Germans to work for no, sometimes 
on their own property. Moreover, a series of local ordinances deprived Germans of radios, 
bicycles, typewriters, barred them from public transportation, and forced them to wear armbands 
identifying themselves as Nĕmci, or Germans.136 “At inns, theaters, [and] shops one can read: 
‘Germans are strictly prohibited from entry.’ It reminds one of the Nazi time: ‘Jews undesired 
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[Juden unerwünscht].’”137 In several locales such as Brünn (Brno), relatives were ordered to 
remove all gravestones with German inscriptions. Quoting an uncited English paper, a German 
noted that the vindictive measure blatantly attempted to “change the character” of the city and 
support the fantasy that “Brünn is a purely Czech town.”138 
Robbed of their rights, Czech police and militia next drove many Sudeten Germans into 
makeshift detention centers erected in schools, movie theaters, barracks, and stadiums.139 They 
repurposed former Nazi concentration camps as well: In the spring of 1945, some 90,000 
Germans found themselves imprisoned in Theresienstadt.140 Not even children were spared: “On 
a Wednesday evening it was said ‘all men over the age of ten into the camp.’ One can even see 
small undernourished lads with a small package under their arms who cannot be older than six 
years old. One saw the lame and the sick being led on handcarts and wheelbarrows.”141 
Unsurprisingly, removing previous owners from their properties streamlined the transfer of 
possessions into Czech hands: “While the people are in the camps their houses are plundered, 
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clothes, laundry, dishes, and furniture are carried off on carts and cars, the fruits and vegetables 
in the gardens, the grain in the fields is harvested and taken to the Czech towns, no one can 
identify the culprits.”142 Occasionally entire towns were forcibly marched to these facilities.143  
From the very outset, guards subjected prisoners to terror and brutal mistreatment. In 
Pilsen, Czech factory workers took their German colleagues into “protective custody” and drove 
them to the district prison, where a crowd greeted them with “curses, slaps, and other abuses.”144 
Appointing former prisoners of the Nazi regime as guards was common practice.145 In any case, 
the overseers purposefully turned Nazi methods of torture and humiliation on their German 
victims.146 Numerous reports dwell on insults and insolence endured.147 Women, who constituted 
the largest population in the camps, suffered especially terribly. They were routinely decried as 
“pigs” and “Nazi whores,” and systematically sexually assaulted.148 Women and girls stripped 
                                                 
142 BArch Ost-Dok 2/240, 125. 
143 BArch Ost-Dok 2/240, 124. See also Beer, Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen, 80. 
144 BArch Ost-Dok 2/311, 41. Numerous reports chronicle similar rituals. Prisoners in the internment camp Friedek-
Mistek (Frýdek-Místek) were “greeted with blows and insults.” Cited in Alois Harasko, “Die Vertreibung der 
Sudetendeutschen. Sechs Erlebnisberichte,” in Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, 
Ereignisse, Folgen, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1995), 136. In 
Maltheuern (Záluží), prisoners were stripped to search for Waffen-SS tattoos. “When one among us…was 
discovered, a number of Czechs fell upon him…and worked over the unfortunate with cat o’ nine tails until he gave 
no sign of life. One of these blonde young lads defended himself with his fists, after which they…spread his legs 
and in the most bestial way smashed his genitals. The terrible spectacle of the beating of 10 or 12 men lasted until 
1400 hours. At 1500 hours followed a march…during which we had to maintain our gaze upon the mound of 
bloody, disfigured bodies of the beaten. Whoever refused was forced to with rifle butts.” Cited in Harasko, 141. 
145 Jaksch, Petition, 69. Wenzel Jaksch’s 1947 report to the UN concluded: “Some of the assistant commanders were 
former concentration camp inmates who now practiced what they had learned from the Nazis, others were just 
ordinary criminals, indeed Germans among them who tried to win favor with their new masters by acts of cruelty.” 
146 A Moravian noblewoman, whose castle’s basement had been turned into interrogation cells, asked why the 
victims were whipped and beaten, to which the Czech militia responded that “the SS had these same methods.” 
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148 Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 118–19. 
142 
 
naked and whipped before audiences of jeering soldiers and officers.149 Female prisoners faced 
forced prostitution, as camp commanders opened their doors to militia and Soviet soldiers 
seeking sexual gratification.150 Suicides, unsurprisingly, were rampant. 
But by far, the furiousness of the guards pervades nearly every report.151 Regardless of 
sex, prisoners endured violent interrogations, beatings—often carried out by prisoners on each 
other—and sadistic “sport” intended to compound the torment.152 In Wekelsdorf (Teplice nad 
Metují) near Braunau (Broumov), Germans were “mistreated in the most horrific manner” in the 
local prison by drunk revolutionary guardsmen; “pools of blood and shreds of skin” could be 
seen in the interrogation cells, and the “shrieks of pain of the tortured” kept residents near the 
building awake at night.153 Guards carried out arbitrary executions as well: A survivor recalled 
how the prisoners in Prague’s notorious Pankrać prison were suddenly awoken and “startled by 
shots, screams in the hallways, slamming of doors, salvoes, and renewed screams.”154 In 
                                                 
149 Harasko, “Die Vertreibung der Sudetendeutschen,” 146. 
150 Jaksch, Petition, 63 and 71; Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 119. 
151 Not all guards, Sudeten Germans acknowledged, were cut of the same wood. “Some of the Czech gendarmes 
behaved correctly, others demanded large bribes, others took part in the orgies.” Jaksch, Petition, 56. For an 
eyewitness account with a differentiated assessment of both guards and fellow prisoners, see Margarete Schell, Ein 
Tagebuch aus Prag, 1945-46 (Bonn: Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte, 1957). 
152 Prisoners were, as one eye witness account describes, required to participate in daily “exercise” in the yard of the 
Aussig prison, consisting of throwing oneself to the ground, jumping, and running, accompanied by blows and 
insults from the guards. BArch Ost-Dok 2/240, 9. Other prisoners had to “jump like frogs” for hours and forced to 
sing the German national anthem. BArch Ost-Dok 2/240, 27. Elfriede Steiner’s 1947 testimony corroborates similar 
experiences: “Often at night we were driven…to the camp yard, then dancing, singing, slapping one another, 
crawling around on all fours, etc.” Cited in Harasko, “Die Vertreibung der Sudetendeutschen,” 136. 
153 BArch Ost-Dok 2/245, 1. Similar statements are found in a report on the events in Aussig (Ústí nad Labem), 
where “often the screams of the tortured” could be heard outside the prison building. A 1947 report from an expellee 
from Pilsen claims that former Czech prisoners stripped Germans naked and beat them for days, including children 
and the elderly. The most horrific treatment was reserved for the young: The breasts of teenage girls were burned, 
while infants were taken by their feet and beaten to death against the wall in front of their mothers. BArch Ost-Dok 
2/240, 9.  
154 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Tschechoslowakei), 1984, 2:133. 
143 
 
Maltheuern (Záluží), the commandant executed a man and his two sons to mark the anniversary 
of the Lidice massacre.155 Between beatings and murder, guards enriched themselves from 
plundered possessions and even gold fillings of their victims.156  
The facilities largely developed into holding pens from where prisoners were distributed 
to other labor camps or from where local Czechs could “acquire” workers directly. The grueling 
work in mines, industry, and farms combined with mistreatment, disease, and inadequate 
nourishment led to a high death rate within the camps.157 Daily rations during the immediate 
postwar period consisted of a watery soup and as little as 180 grams (6.3 ounces) of bread, 
though prisoners could go days without food.158 In the Hagibor camp, a British observer 
estimated the daily ration at 750 calories, “which is below the Belsen [concentration camp] 
level.”159 Expectedly, children and infants rarely survived.160 “Veterans” of such conditions 
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delivered perhaps the most damning verdict: “There were also Germans who came here from a 
concentration camp, who said that it was better there than in the Czech camp.”161 Indeed, for 
members of the organized working class who opposed fascism, or even German Jews, the wave 
of retaliation that now swept over them was particularly bitter.162  
Not all Czechs abandoned their German neighbors, however. The unbridled ferocity 
appalled many. An anonymous Czech from Komotau (Chomutov) complained to authorities that 
militia tortured to death over a dozen Germans at the city square, declaring that “[e]ven the 
brutal Germans did not get rid of their enemies in such a manner, instead concealing their sadism 
behind the gates of concentration camps.”163 Many testimonies recall how Czechs attempted to 
help by, for instance, hiding friends and neighbors from furious masses scouring cities and towns 
throughout Czechoslovakia.164 Local officials attempted to arrest and try Czech vigilantes, 
though few were convicted.165 Czechs even disguised themselves with white armbands to 
approach camps and distribute food secretly.166 Such acts of kindness were widespread enough to 
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warrant a Ministry of the Interior decree making it a criminal offense to hide or provide food or 
clothing to Germans, and the press regularly denounced the “increasing number of cases” of 
“unpatriotic” Czechs providing aid.167 The majority of Czechs likely fell in between utter hatred 
and sympathy, and remained silent for fear of being decried as a collaborator, as so many 
thousands of real and suspected “traitors” were following liberation.168 
Foreign observers equally expressed horror over the “wild expulsions.” Harold Perkins, a 
British intelligence officer, encountered a “howling mob” of about 100 Czechs driving two 
women through the streets of Prague who were “just one mass of blood from head to foot” 
before them. He “itched to join in and tell that crowd exactly what [he] thought of them,” but 
realized that it would potentially cause an international incident.169 Writing her sister, Marjorie 
Quinn explained how the Czechs of Trautenau (Trutnov) “developed plundering and torturing to 
a fine art,” adding that English POWs “made themselves very unpopular among the Czechs by 
protecting German women and children as far as they could; they too are horrified at what is 
happening here.”170 The formerly pro-Czechoslovak Manchester Guardian correspondent F.A. 
Voigt’s condemnations were even more forceful: The Czechs established “a racial doctrine akin 
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to Hitler’s…and methods that are hardly distinguishable from those of Fascism. They have, in 
fact, become Slav National Socialists.”171 
Members of the Red Army, too, were shocked by the ferocity. Some Germans in Soviet-
occupied Czechoslovakia initially anticipated the “long wished-for arrival” of the Czech military 
that would end the pillaging, murder, and rape. “Now there would be order, or so we all hoped. 
But what disappointment, they brought true hell. Often the Russians had to be begged for help 
against the Czechs, which they did, as long as it wasn’t a matter of hunting down women.”172 
The ferocity sometimes shocked Soviet soldiers, who intervened to protect German civilians.173 
Disgusted Red Army troopers reportedly tore off the armlets marking Germans for maltreatment 
and were occasionally offended by the swastikas painted on the backs of civilians.174  
A confidential report to the Central Committee in Moscow noted that many Germans 
were terrified of Soviet occupation forces withdrawing: “‘If the Red Army leaves, we are 
finished!’ We now see the manifestations of hatred for the Germans. [The Czechs] don’t kill 
them, but torment them like livestock. The Czechs look at them like cattle.”175 Often considered 
more humane in comparison to Czechs in the testimonies, Soviet forces nevertheless “provided 
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only arbitrary and sometimes chaotic oversight” and often “worked in tandem with 
Czechoslovak troops, locally appointed police, or Communist partisans.”176  
Unease—whether domestic or foreign—did little to dissuade Czech leaders in London 
and their Moscow-backed rivals from furiously attempting to create facts on the ground that 
would then merely necessitate rubber-stamping from the Allies at the forthcoming Potsdam 
Conference. In the hopes that an already initiated mass movement would secure approval of a 
process already irreversibly underway, Czech authorities moved to deport as many Germans to 
Austria and Germany and Magyars to Hungary as possible in the summer months.177 A Czech 
administrator who later emigrated Great Britain described the process in Aussig:  
“The local national committees were obligated to inform persons of 
German nationality, members of the Nazi party, of deportation. They 
worked on the registries late into the night. In the early morning hours 
military units comprised of revolutionary guard and so-called partisans 
arrived in the affected communities. […] The action began. One went 
into the homes, and in a half hour every family had to be at the meeting 
place of the community. Jewelry was confiscated, and just be sure the 
genitals of girls were searched to see whether there weren’t more 
valuables hidden. After this the ‘transports’ were stuffed into the street 
car toward Tellnitz [Telnice], and from there they had to go on foot over 
                                                 
176 Glassheim, “The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia, 1945-
1947,” 203–4. It was not unheard of that Czechs often led Red Army soldiers to Sudeten homes, where they would 
pillage and rape the female inhabitants. Numerous accounts reveal that the Czechs were the initiators of Soviet 
excesses, who often reacted to denunciations of Germans motivated out of political or purely private reasons. The 
Schieder Commission rather aptly summed up the Soviet military in Czechoslovakia: “As unpredictable as Red 
Army soldiers were in their actions and as unforgotten as the experiences during the Soviet invasion were, already in 
the first months of the consolidation of the Czechoslovakia Republic and the start of the system of persecution 
against Sudeten Germans it is clear that often Russian soldiers protected and helped the persecuted. The more 
pronounced the Czechs appeared as exponents of the politics of revenge against Sudeten Germans, the more positive 
the attitude of Soviet soldiers is judged and described in the reports. The reports on experiences during the time of 
the invasion appear milder when compared to the ensuing measures in the ČSR against the Sudeten German 
population, which culminated in the expulsion, and reflect the disappointed hopes that the Sudeten Germans had 
placed in the Czechs during the time of their plight at the hands of Soviet troops.” Schieder, Die Vertreibung 
(Tschechoslowakei), 1984, 1:32. 
177 As an August 1945 report details, Czech radio reported that the thousands of Germans arriving in the Soviet Zone 
had left Czechoslovakia “voluntarily.” BArch Ost-Dok 2/240, 125. 
148 
 
the Erz Mountains into Germany. Even 78-81 year-olds were not spared 
this road to Calvary [Kalvarienweg].”178 
  
The reports of the expellees, sometimes compiled immediately upon their arrival in 
Germany, more or less corroborate this description. In Langenbruck (Dlouhý Most) authorities 
informed inhabitants at 2 a.m. on June 17, 1945 of their impending departure: 
“Ca. 60% of the population received these terrible news. Permitted were 
30 kg of luggage, but neither money nor jewelry. Shouts of terror erupted 
from the people, since none of the affected had the foggiest notion where 
they were being shipped. Scores preferred to leave this life through 
suicide, as is the case with a family in our neighborhood where the 
husband killed children aged 3 and 4, then his wife, through shooting. 
Also a neighbor, an 80 year old woman who also was ordered to leave 
her home that same night preferred to voluntarily depart life by opening 
her arteries. I still see this woman before me, how she, her whole body 
shaking, just kept shaking her head, she could not believe it.”179 
  
Next, inhabitants of Leitmeritz (Litomĕřice) described, authorities typically corralled 
expellees in abandoned barracks or similar structures. “Here we were completely robbed of the 
last remaining things we had, whoever possessed contraband was beaten, and our money was 
almost entirely taken. There we spent two nights lying on planks in bug-ridden rooms without 
food. At night there was shooting, doors were kicked in, girls and women were raped and men 
beaten bloody.”180 Partisans next crammed victims into open train cars bound for Teplitz 
(Teplice), where after four days of waiting on the tracks, they drove everyone on a “death 
march” at gunpoint across the border to Germany.181 Karl Platz of Saaz (Žatec) reported that 
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“whoever could not endure the marathon and broke down was shot and thrown into the ditch.”182 
A woman from the town of Freiwaldau (Jeseník), after a weeklong journey on foot and in open 
train lorries with hardly any food, reported how guards harangued her column with whips and 
warning shots. At the German tollgate, the militia subjected everyone to “one last search in the 
most ignoble manner, and then with blows we were driven over the border.” Soviet guards 
checked papers, but then left the refugees to their own devises.183  
Posts at the border did not always allow the bedraggled columns into Germany, as was 
often the case particularly with the American Army. In those instances, the guards returned the 
expellees to their starting points by the same methods, forced the column onwards until 
amenable border guards could be found, or simply dumped the victims into no-man’s land, 
where exposure, hunger, and roaming bandits posed great danger.184 A number of Czech troops 
simply shot their charges if American or Soviet soldiers refused entry.185 The death rate among 
children was terribly high, and infants rarely survived as mothers all too often could no longer 
produce breast milk.186 The ordeal did not end once arriving in Germany, where community 
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governments and occupation officials were unprepared for the waves of refugees, and shuffled 
them from one place to the next for weeks.187 
The most notorious example of such marches remains the Todesmarsch (death march) of 
Brünn, which quickly became a fixture in Sudeten German collective memory.188 While 
expellees often depicted it as a template for the “wild expulsions,” there were some fundamental 
differences. Allied bombing left the industrial city heavily destroyed, and an acute housing 
shortage prompted demands for the eviction of Germans from their homes. Communist 
organizations threatened to strike or take the issue into their own hands.189 The pressure on 
officials grew after an incendiary speech by Beneš in Brünn.190 On May 30, with the consent of 
the Ministry of Interior, city officials selected 20,000 Germans and marched them toward the 
Austrian border under guard of the military, partisans, and even Czech workers; a further eight 
thousand were added to the column from villages along the route.  
Margarete Weber and her three children received fifteen minutes notice, and before 
leaving the Brünn needed to surrender all valuables.191 The arduous journey on foot across much 
of the country, combined with limited supplies and mistreatment, cost many lives.192 Weber 
witnessed “mothers who had to bury their own little children.”193  The misery escalated when the 
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acting Austrian government refused the refugees entry; instead of being allowed home, the 
victims vegetated in makeshift camps at the border, where hundreds died of disease and 
starvation.194 Sudeten Germans often speak of more than 10,000 victims, a number that is 
undoubtedly exaggerated.195 Eagle Glassheim calculated the death toll at around 1,700.196 These 
figures obscure the human cost. Weber survived the ten day march, yet lost two of her three 
children. Less than two years afterward she confided her despair to the historical record:  “Is this 
not a gruesome fate? Now only my bare life can be taken. Death would be a salvation.”197  
The combined efforts of mistreatment and deportation forced some 600-700,000 
Germans from their homes before the Potsdam Conference brought a temporary halt to 
deportations.198 Sudeten sources often speak of nearly 300,000 Sudeten German deaths during 
the entire expulsion process, translating into nearly ten percent of the prewar population.199 
These exaggerated figures are a product of the West German government and the expellee 
organizations’ memory politics, as will be seen.200 The historian Philipp Ther sets the figure at 
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30,000 deaths, or a death rate of one percent of the total number of Sudeten Germans expelled, 
and far lower than other cases of ethnic cleansing. This should not diminish, Ther cautions, that 
30,000 nevertheless represents the population of a small city, or that it includes women and 
children or methods of shooting or even burying alive.201 
Moreover, whatever the actual figure, the brutality of the “wild expulsions” left the 
victims in absolute shock and often unable to comprehend what happened, nor imagine a 
possible future. As one expellee bitterly noted: “Now far from our beloved home we suffer great 
spiritual anguish, have already lost two beloved family members who died from the 
mistreatment, ardors, and privations….Destitute we stand before ruin. Our goods and chattels, 
home and hearth, savings and heirlooms had to be left behind. We are left with no jewelry, no 
money, and no mementos, and even our wedding rings were taken off of our fingers…we have 
become absolute beggars.”202  
Unable to contend with their fate, many chose suicide; Red Army officials informed 
NKVD chief Lavrentiy Beria on June 8, 1945 that “up to 5,000 Germans arrive in Germany from 
Czechoslovakia [daily], the majority…women, old folks, and children. With their futures ruined 
and having no hope for anything better, many of them end their lives by suicide, cutting their 
wrists.” On one day alone, authorities found 71 dead from suicide in one region.203 Yet a 
palpable relief that the worst was over with the arrival in Germany persisted as well: “At the 
border at Eger [Cheb] there stood nice birch trees all along the tracks, and all of a sudden the 
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German armbands flattered through the air and remained hanging in the branches.”204 While an 
uncertain future loomed, their immediate suffering had ended. Most of their compatriots 
remained in the brutal and cruel homeland awaiting their fate. 
 
“Treat Them as They Have Treated Us”: The “Wild Expulsions” in Poland 
In June 1945, a young German heading into Germany from Silesia encountered 
“thousands of refugees” near Görlitz going in the opposite direction. “They did not believe that 
we had to leave there. They could not understand that there was not going to be a return home,” 
the young man recalled.205 Similarly, four families from the Pomeranian town of Rützow 
(Rusowo) attempted a return home like so many hundreds of thousands before them, but after 
only three kilometers into what was now the Recovered Territories they met acquaintances with 
a dire warning: “Don’t waste your energy, there is no point, the Germans are being expelled from 
all communities.”206 By June, Germans travelling to the farms and homes they fled from months 
before started to meet resistance that went beyond mistreatment or chicanery. What the people 
seeking a return to a sense of normalcy after wartime chaos could not know was that their futures 
had already been decided. The “wild expulsions” had begun in Poland. 
The “Lublin Committee” that followed on the heels of the Red Army sought to 
consolidate as much power in Poland before any sort of international agreements could prevent 
Stalin from shaping the postwar state to his liking. This included initiating the removal of 
Germans particularly in the areas of the postwar Germany-Poland border so as to strengthen 
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arguments for the acceptance of the redrawn borders and expulsions at the Potsdam Conference. 
The May protocols of the Polish Worker’s Party capture the sentiment of Polish officials: “If we 
do not polanize the former German territories, we will no longer have any justifications for 
taking what they [the Allies] don’t want to give us. […] We need to throw them [the Germans] 
out, since all nations are founded on national, not multi-national, principles.”207 
Already as early as mid-April Polish authorities initiated voluntary transports from 
Danzig to Red Army occupied territories in Germany, which many shell-shocked inhabitants 
eagerly took advantage of in order to escape the ruined city.208 Alarmed by the continued waves 
of returnees to the Recovered Territories, moreover, Polish troops attempted to seal crossings 
across the Oder River starting in May. In Frankfurt an der Oder, troops regularly opened fire on 
civilians approaching the western shores of the river, be they refugees heading home or 
fisherman.209 Guards intercepted Germans heading eastward and intimidated them with beatings; 
one woman recalled one of her tormentors exclaiming that he had “stuck it out in your 
concentration camps for six years, but you can’t stand even one week with us!”210 After several 
days, she and her compatriots were marched to the border and re-expelled into Germany.  
Throughout the summer of 1945, Polish authorities also deported entire communities, 
mostly from Pomerania and East Brandenburg.211 Typically, in the early morning hours soldiers 
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roused towns without prior warning and after fifteen or twenty minutes began marching them at 
gunpoint westward, allowing only minimal luggage.212 Sleeping in the open or in barns, the 
journey could last weeks. Most did not pack enough food, and so had to scavenge in order to 
survive. A refugee from Schwiebus (Świebodzin) reported that “[m]any weak and sick people, 
old folks and children had to be left on the road dead. It was a lamentable procession of utmost 
misery. We had all lost much weight and many of us looked like skeletons. Heaven only knows 
how often we were plundered by Poles or Russians and how many times the women were 
assaulted again and again.”213  
A small number of expellees were packed onto trains, which officially were barred from 
entry into the German occupation zones. Here the conditions were often worse, as people were 
“squeezed against each other like sardines in a can,” forcing people to stand for the entire 
journey which could last days or weeks. Without food or water, the death toll soared, and “many, 
many bodies [were] left lying along the track.”214 One woman painted a grim scene: 
“After the Poles fell upon us from all sides everywhere and robbed us, 
we came to a transport train (c. 45 cattle cars for 4,5000 people). In my 
care there were 116 people. One could neither stand nor sit. We all sat on 
top of one another. After the Poles had once more robbed us thoroughly, 
the train started in motion, only after some time to stop again, 
somewhere out in the open or on the track of some station, constant 
robbing for 11 days. […] In our wagon there were 2-3 dead daily. We 
then came to Franfurt/Oder from Posen. There we suffered a new shock. 
On the last station before Frankfurt the polish soldiers violently removed 
our youngest and last daughter Gerda. All pleading or efforts were in 
vain. So now everything was over, all hope was lost. Then the people 
started dying like the flies….Of 4,500 ca. 1,500 perished.”215 
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In total, the Polish military estimated that they deported 1.2 million people, a number that 
is in all likelihood an exaggeration and contains a significant number of individuals who were 
deported numerous times after repeated attempted returns to their communities.216  
Guiding these policies were directions from Moscow-backed Władysław Gomułka, who 
dispatched party officials, militia, and military units to the borderlands to create prevent 
repatriation and implement targeted expulsions. If they could not remove the population, 
however, Gomułka endorsed a policy of creating “the kinds of conditions…so that [the Germans] 
won’t want to remain” and opt for “voluntary expulsion.”217 Directives from commanders 
encouraged soldiers to “treat them as they treated us.”218 On June 24, 1945, General 
Świerczewski invoked “directives from Moscow” and explicitly cited methods employed in 
Czechoslovakia and their success in terrorizing the German population. Świerczewski exhorted 
his troops to “perform one’s tasks in such a harsh and decisive manner that the Germanic vermin 
do not hide in their houses but rather will flee from us of their own volition and then in their own 
land will thank God that they were lucky enough to save their heads.”219  
The policy of making life as difficult as possible for Germans in order to encourage them 
to leave the Recovered Territories, turned the western portions of the German East into a “wild 
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west.”220 Whether roving bandits seeking their fortunes or militiamen orchestrating deliberate 
abuse, both often resorted to deadly violence.221 One postwar author found it impossible to 
“speak in public about the kinds of animalistic perversities” she endured, while another confided 
that it was difficult to talk about her experiences, simply adding that “[i]f one would imagine the 
worst, then it remains far behind the truth.”222 The lawlessness even exacerbated a Polish official 
in Oppeln (Opole): “Terrible arbitrariness is the rule; the people have lost all feeling for right and 
wrong, no crime arouses any sense of surprise. The militia and in part also the security forces 
rape and pillage the population, so that people break out in terrible anxiety if they even see a 
militiaman.”223 In Elbing (Elbląg) and other areas, the establishment of a police force by the 
summer saw a period of calm set in, where particularly gruesome excesses subsided.224  
More typical were humiliations and harassment, which nevertheless spelled out that a 
departure seemed the best choice. An April 1945 plan to force Germans to wear identifying 
armbands never materialized, though in many locales authorities passed such measures on their 
own accord.225 In some regions, local officials instituted a “compulsory salutation” requiring 
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Germans to deferentially greet Poles they encountered.226 Some towns barred Germans from 
restaurants, movie houses, and taverns; German newspapers and schools were shuttered.227 To 
further turn the Recovered Territories Polish and simultaneously encourage Germans to see that 
they had no future there, Poles removed German inscriptions and destroyed cemeteries. In Bütow 
(Bytom) for instance, authorities directed the German community to bury their dead in mass 
graves, as only Poles and Soviet soldiers were now allowed to be interred in the municipality’s 
cemeteries, while in Stolpmünde (Ustka), deceased Germans were relegated to the beach.228  
Militia and police forced Germans to labor on farms, in some cases their own, for little or 
no money and poor food.229 The administrator of Waldenburg (Walbrzych) outlined what life for 
remaining Germans meant: “We will treat the Germans like work animals. They should interest 
themselves in nothing. They should know only where they should work and their bunks.”230 
Aiding in the exploitation of labor were over 200 penal institutions, including reappropriated 
Nazi concentration camps such as Auschwitz, and several hundred labor camps: Here more than 
100,000 Germans of both sexes and all ages worked on local farms, industries, and mines.231  
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As in Czechoslovakia, the camps functioned as slave labor holding pens and institutions 
of vengeance and terror. One camp commander, dancing on a woman beaten to a pulp, claimed 
that in this manner “we lay the foundation for a new Poland.”232 At his trial for his mistreatment 
of German prisoners in 1959, the commandant of the notorious Lamsdorf internment camp 
(Łambinowice) Czesław Gęborski admitted that his goal was to “exact revenge” on Germans.233 
Contrary to orders, Gęborski modeled the regulations on Lamsdorf on those of German camps 
that he himself experienced as a prisoner. The commandant of Potulitz (Potulice), Izydor 
Cedrowski, similarly survived Auschwitz and lost his family in the Holocaust; Jewish survivors 
frequently found their way to leading positions of the interment system.234 The combination of 
revenge, exposure, hunger, and disease claimed the lives of 30,000-60,000 victims in Poland’s 
postwar camps.235 Especially for Silesians, Lamsdorf evolved into a central fixture of expellee 
collective memory, often acting as a moral counterweight to Auschwitz-Birkenau.236 
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As excruciatingly unforgiving as life within the camps was, life outside of it proved 
equally harsh. Starting in June, Polish settlers—many of them themselves destitute expellees 
from the Kresy—increased the pressure on German inhabitants because a desperate competition 
for scarce resources such as food erupted in the completely desolate Recovered Territories.237 
Germans, however, faced greater hardships due to punitive decrees. In some towns, Polish 
authorities refused to hand out ration cards to Germans.238 Elsewhere, the cards proved utterly 
useless, as Poles who appropriated shops did not accept them and drove up prices for non-Polish 
customers.239 With an extreme shortage or limited access to sustenance, in larger cities such as 
Breslau prostitution, crime, and hawking emerged as common problems.240 The German 
communities, often atomized groups of several families comprised of single mothers and elderly 
relatives, found themselves suddenly thrown out of their homes and forced into dilapidated 
buildings by the Polish arrivals.241  
Under these dreadful conditions, the death toll soared, unless resourceful scavengers 
could find berries, mushrooms, or herbs in the forests.242 A lack of wood and coals, which lasted 
for many years until 1949, made heating and cooking nearly impossible.243 Hunger and typhus 
outbreaks claimed many lives; in West Prussia, 250 people in Lenzen (Łęcze) and 54 in 
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Baumgart (Ogrodniki) died in the immediate postwar months.244 In Breslau, where in July 300-
400 Germans died a day due to disease and rations at half to a third the allotted amount, 
immunization shots were offered free of charge to Poles, while Germans had to pay 100 złoty.245 
Few children survived.246 By late summer and early fall, mothers secretly abandoned infants—
usually the product of rape by Soviet soldiers during the invasion—unable or unwilling to care 
for them.247 With dismal survival chances for the young, perhaps it was a relief when authorities 
took children from their mothers and sent them to orphanages.248 By September 1945, many of 
the 80,000 Germans remaining in Insterburg (Chernyakhovsk) perished, according to expellees 
arriving in Germany: “In droves the elderly and children died….And in the countryside in the 
destroyed areas they more than ever, but this was a tactic of the Russians, the German people 
should die and rot.”249 There was no deliberate starvation policy, but simply very little food, 
especially for Germans who stood at the bottom of the social hierarchy.  
In short, Poland during the summer of 1945 was a “time of capriciousness, injustice, and 
insecurity marked by the mutual, conflicting, and even contradictory rule of the Soviet and 
Polish authorities.”250 The competing claims to authority between Soviet and Poles could both 
help and torment: Often the beleaguered Germans received “repeated help and sympathy” from 
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Poles, then other times Soviet soldiers appeared as moderating forces on Polish impulsiveness.251 
Indeed, even with memories of brutal behavior on the part of the Red Army, many testimonies 
indicate that Poles were more unrelenting in their persecution.252  
Soviet officials for instance decried the expulsion of productive laborers that disrupted 
prosperous farms and factories, and frequently overruled Polish militia attempting to heard 
Germans away from facilities crucial for the occupying force and the reconstruction of the Polish 
state.253 To the political section of the Red Army, Polish measures seemed illogical and 
inhumane: “The German population is starving in many places, in other areas they are under the 
immediate threat of starvation in the future. Not only does the plundering of the Germans on the 
part of the Poles not stop, but it gets stronger all the time. There are more and more frequent 
cases of unprovoked murders of German inhabitants, unfounded arrests, long prison 
confinements with purposeful humiliation.”254  
Altercations between Red Army soldiers and Polish paramilitary elements were frequent, 
and observant Germans soon concluded that “the Russians and Poles did not get along.”255 The 
tension afforded Germans breathing space. To be sure, with the first waves of migrants from the 
Polish interior, Soviet occupation forces often backed the Poles during the selection of houses 
and farms.256 Red Army commanders also almost immediately appointed Polish mayors, 
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sometimes from among former slave laborers liberated in the area, upon pushing out Wehrmacht 
forces.257 By the summer, Soviet officials nevertheless preferred dealing with Germans, and 
appointed a German administration to act alongside Polish ones.258  
Recognizing that the Soviets promised greater protection, Germans could easily avoid 
Polish excesses as long as they could prove themselves useful to the Red Army, which heavily 
relied on them for food and labor. Occasionally, Soviets engaged Germans for bizarre reasons: 
Two women from Königsberg needed to report to the Sambian Peninsula, where their sole yet 
crucial task was to care for a llama that escaped the Königsberg Zoo during the war’s fighting 
and was found wandering the countryside by stupefied yet concerned Red Army soldiers.259 
In either case, the relationships Germans forged with their Soviet “employers” often 
proved crucial during the expulsions; in Breslau, Red Army troopers intervened to stop the 
eviction of their “friends” from their apartments and resorted to gun play to drive off the Polish 
soldiers. 260 German servility infuriated occupation authorities. As one official complained: “It’s 
not the German women who are raped by Soviet soldiers but, on the contrary, Soviet soldiers 
who come under attack from prostituted German women.”261 The cavalier and cynical 
assessment ignored the dire straits German women found themselves in, yet touched upon a 
reality: The German population was pressed between a rock and a hard place. 
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Even with this occasional protection, more than a few East Germans held little hope for a 
better future. Many therefore opted to leave “voluntarily.”262 Leaving behind the hunger, 
arbitrary arrests, and forced labor, a woman from Königsberg resolved to leave for Germany in 
August of 1945. “Farewell with Königsberg wasn’t difficult for us, because Königsberg is a dead 
city and because we had experienced much too much hardship there,” she wrote to acquaintances 
in January 1946. “We were happy once the wheels of our flight rolled, but as we drove through 
our once so beautiful, rich East Prussia, now completely devoid of people and entirely barren, we 
all cried.”263  
 
“Horror in Europe”: The “Orderly and Humane”  
The eventual destination for the majority of Germans evicted from the Recovered 
Territories was Berlin, where refugees swamped the destroyed city.264 17,000 expellees streamed 
into the German capital a day; the Berlin Office of Social Welfare recorded 537,000 refugees 
passing through in July, with a further 494,000 in August.265 Expecting expulsions to follow only 
after formal treaties, the influx caught authorities completely unprepared. Berlin’s improvised 
transit camps could only provide lodging for at most a few days and a daily ration of 100 grams 
of bread and watery soup. Given the “large amount of contamination” caused by refugees 
“defecating in the open,” a dysentery epidemic followed by a breakout of typhoid seemed hardly 
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surprising.266 British observers noted thousands of aged and sick, and children separated from 
their families wandering the streets.267  
To avoid becoming drowned in the desperate throngs, Marshal Zhukov closed the city to 
non-Berliners in late July, but this had no discernable effect and placed the burden on other 
cities: By August, 50,000 refugees tripled the population of Zittau, while 100,000 swamped 
Görlitz. Soviet officials closed sections of the German border to transports from Czechoslovakia 
and the Recovered Territories, where 45,000 crossed each day.268 Cities along the Oder and 
Neiße Rivers now flooded with thousands of refugees, exposed to the elements, extreme hunger, 
and roving Soviet and Polish bands.269 In Görlitz, people caught in this no-man’s land spent 
weeks “sleeping in parks in vast numbers with their tattered possessions, searching for their 
relatives among the countless notices fastened onto trees.”270  
 Not by coincidence, this humanitarian disaster coincided with the arrival of the wartime 
leaders at the Cecilionhof Palace in Potsdam, where they sought to hammer out details of how to 
contend with defeated Germany. Hundreds of journalists accompanying them descended on 
Berlin to cover the proceedings. Deprived of details of the conference, bored journalists found 
the destroyed capital a font of stories and human interest pieces, ranging from the ruins of 
Hitler’s chancellery and bunker to frivolous street scenes of triumphant Red Army troopers, 
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jovial GIs, and gregarious Fräuleins.271 The destroyed city and raucous nightlife featured heavily 
in Anglophone press, yet one of the most striking figures in Berlin’s postwar landscape—the 
refugee—found little space in the bylines.272 It was not until a week after the conclusion of the 
conference that the crisis found serious coverage.273 Prior to August, reporting overwhelmingly 
sympathized with the expelling governments and uncritically accepted population transfers.274 
For instance, Daily Express correspondent Peter Smollett filed a report on July 20, 1945 after 
accompanying a group of 500 Germans on their expulsion to Saxony, in which he clearly 
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endorsed the Prague government’s policies as “revenge for Lidice,” and failed to note 
mistreatment of Germans.275 
 Smollett’s piece, however, unnerved one reader in particular. Perusing the Daily Express 
between sessions at the Potsdam Conference, Winston Churchill penned a note to Foreign 
Minister Anthony Eden that he was “much disturbed” by what he read, wondering whether the 
issue should be raised at the conference. He recognized that “[o]f course there must be an 
exodus, but it should be conducted with due regard to the repercussions in other countries.” He 
further requested a report on the total numbers of refugees and to what zones they were being 
deported, and under what conditions the transfers took place.276  
Two days later, Churchill raised the issue in the plenary session. President Truman, 
worried by the sheer number of displaced persons, wondered where they would go. Stalin 
retorted that the “Poles do not ask us. They are doing what they like, just as the Czechs are.”277 
Churchill suddenly expressed “grave moral scruples regarding great movements and transfers of 
populations,” adding that some should return to their homes. The Soviet leader exclaimed that 
“the Poles would hang them if they returned.” When Churchill proposed that at the very least 
Beneš should be consulted before finalizing the Sudeten issue, Stalin demurred flippantly: “But 
is this not serving mustard after supper? The Germans have already been driven out.”278  
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 Leaving aside the fact that it took Churchill chancing upon a newspaper to realize that 
expulsions were already underway, the sudden concern revolved less around the welfare of 
Germans, but rather over who should take responsibility for the care of millions of penniless 
refugees that very well could destabilize the occupation zones. Wrangling between the Anglo-
Americans and the Soviet delegations erupted immediately after Churchill’s protest of “wild 
expulsions,” an independent action on the part of the Polish and Czech governments sanctioned 
by Stalin. Eventually, the parties reached a compromise for a temporary halt to the deportations 
until December 1945, after which point an “equitable” distribution of expellees over the 
occupation zones under supervision of the Control Council would unfold. Moreover, Article 13 
to the Potsdam Agreement called for transfers conducted in an “orderly and humane manner.”279  
As has been shown, broad agreement existed among the Big Three that preventing future 
conflict could only be achieved through population transfers. Joseph Stalin’s strategy of 
initiating these prior to a final formal agreement set in motion a process that Churchill and 
Truman felt they could not reverse. If they could not prevent them, the British representative on 
the sub-committee that discussed the transfer plans confided, then the Western Allies should 
“ensure that they were carried out in as orderly a manner as possible in a way which did not 
throw an intolerable burden on the occupying authorities in Germany.”280 It was not until the full 
dimensions of the mass movement of peoples, and the threat that the humanitarian crisis could 
undo the fragile peace that had been so bitterly won in Europe, that the Anglo-American leaders 
committed to a policy that seemed a fait accompli anyways. The “orderly and humane” transfer 
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may therefore have been a response to the shocking ferocity of the “wild expulsions” and an 
earnest attempt to alleviate the suffering of deportees, but also an attempt to exert a modicum of 
leverage over a situation that they had little control.  
Moreover, the “orderly and humane” clause represented a concession from the Soviets 
that included the guarantee of free and fair elections in Poland. Realizing that Stalin’s greater 
ambitions, Churchill and Truman tested the Soviet leader on Poland by acceding to expulsions. 
Despite the death toll decreasing considerably once the Allies intervened, the notion of an 
“orderly and humane” transfer was a fiction that nevertheless allowed the Western leaders to 
disavow responsibility for the excesses, which were laid at the feet of the East European states 
and the Soviet Union. The expellees become objects of the victorious powers, so that Winston 
Churchill’s ruminations on the “tragedy of great proportions” on the floor of the British House of 
Commons on August 16, 1945 ring rather disingenuously.281 Just a few months later, the “mass 
expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undreamed of” had become a weapon 
in the emerging Cold War.282 
In either case, though Stalin and his allies in Warsaw and Prague effectively achieved a 
recognition of the fait accompli they orchestrated all summer long, the Soviet Premier 
nevertheless only “grudgingly accepted” the deal.283 Undeterred by the limitations, Stalin stated 
that “he did not expect any considerable results” from the provisos, which he declared “a mere 
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shot in the dark.”284 Indeed, the officially banned “wild expulsions” continued in Czechoslovakia 
as well as in Poland by means of “voluntary emigration.”285 Some of these operations even 
enjoyed the support of the German Communist Party (KPD) in the Soviet zone, who coordinated 
transports with Soviet officials.286 Soldiers continued to evict Germans but, fearing backlash, did 
not accompany them to the border; in many instances the unsupervised deported “dispersed 
again into the countryside.”287  
 The deportations that continued after the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference were on 
full display for journalists at Berlin’s train stations into the fall. Some pundits remained 
unmoved: “It is the turn of the Germans now,” the Daily Express gleefully noted. “The great 
conquering race that transported millions of slaves from all over Europe […] is now being 
transported itself,” the correspondent continued, lauding the expellers for “a thorough job.”288 
When in September 1945 the National Peace Council issued a call for Britons to accept reduced 
rations to feed refugees, a letter to the Daily Herald demanded that Germans be starved just as 
the “men, women and children of Greece and Russia” hungered under Nazi occupation.289 
Goronwy Rees, an officer attached to the Allied Military Government, wrote in the Spectator 
that it was “inevitable that millions of Germans must die in the coming winter” and “find no 
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resting place but the grave,” as averting the disaster would require a stupendous act of 
philanthropy that would offend the Soviet Union and the unity of the victorious powers.290 
Such bluster seemed to be confined to a minority. Reuters correspondent Henry Buckley 
warned of a “gigantic refugee problem,” which many papers echoed.291 Robert Cooper of The 
Times lambasted continued deportations against the accords hammered out at Potsdam, adding 
that the transfers had “gone too far for the introduction of the word ‘humane’ to have much 
effect.”292 According to the Times, 60 women and children evicted from Danzig spent days in a 
cattle car without food or water; 20 on the transport perished.293 Charles Bray of the Daily 
Herald reported on the “cattle truck mortuary” that each night transported the dead from Berlin’s 
Stettiner Station, and described heinous scenes of Polish DPs entering trains to pillage and rape 
in the open. It was irrelevant whether the Nazis conducted similar policies, Bray argued, “these 
excesses, wreaked only on the women and children of Germany, on families of the modest 
means of shopkeepers or small farmers, cannot be allowed to continue.” 294  
The News Chronicle’s Norman Clark also recounted terrible scenes at Stettiner Station, 
where he discovered four corpses, with several more refugees too far gone “just being allowed to 
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die.” Clark witnessed an emaciated woman attempting to feed her “two whimpering babies” 
from her “milkless breasts—a pitiful effort that only left her crying at her failure.” The scenes, 
Clark declared, “gave me no satisfaction, although for years I have hoped that the Germans 
would reap from the seeds they had sown.”295 A British relief worker noted that it was little 
wonder that journalists “describe the scenes on the railway station as being Belsen all over 
again,” adding that he had “never seen a hard-boiled pressman so near to tears.”296 Daily Mail 
reporter George Bilainkin, despite his confessed disdain for Germans that permitted him from 
even shaking hands with them, confided to his diary that the “picture of elderly women, and 
young girls, with children almost dying on [the] railway stations of Berlin after long journeys 
from their former homes, provides [a] test of political convictions. Humanitarian, not soft-
hearted, considerations rise unwillingly to the surface.”297 
The scenes left seasoned combat veterans and witnesses to the horrors of Nazi 
concentration camps equally aghast. The British officer Richard Brett-Smith regarded the “more 
dead than alive” refugees as among the most moving experiences of his time in Berlin.298 For the 
future Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, Gerald Gardiner, the arrival of “voluntary” expellees 
evoked memories of his service in an ambulance unit that worked with concentration camp 
survivors: “The removal of the dead in carts from the railway stations was a grim reminder of 
what I saw in the early days in Belsen.”299  
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A battle-hardened Major Stephen Terrell, outraged by “entire populations dying by the 
thousands on the roads from starvation, dysentery and exhaustion,” sent a thirty page report to 
the press and government ministries via Charles Bray. A trip to a Berlin hospital, Terrell decried, 
“is an experience which would make the sights in the Concentration Camps appear normal.”300 
Adrian Kanaar, a British medic at the liberation of the Belsen Concentration Camp, was so 
enraged upon seeing an expellee train with 75 dead from overcrowding that he risked court 
martial by leaking his observations and testimonies of refugees to the press, declaring that he had 
not “spent six years in the army to see tyranny established which is as bad as the Nazis.”301 
Robert Murphy, the State Department’s senior representative in Germany and participant at the 
Potsdam Conference, also documented similar quandaries in a memo alleging that the Allies 
incurred guilt for the same crimes that Nazis committed and that had “provided part of the moral 
basis on which we waged the war and which gave strength to our cause.”302   
It was apparent that neither demands for an “orderly and humane” transfer nor a halt to 
deportations until December 1945 changed the facts on the ground in the expelling states. In fact, 
the continued flooding of the occupation zones with emaciated refugees was a brutally effective 
argument for forcing the Allies to come up with a system for “organized” expulsions. In late fall 
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of 1945, the Czech and Polish governments presented a scheme for the deportation of the 
remaining 6.65 million ethnic Germans in their states by summer 1946, which the Allied Control 
Council approved on November 20, 1945. Nevertheless, the “ACC agreement” made few 
provisions for overseeing deportations, and merely outlined their timing and the proportional 
distribution of the expellees over the German occupation zones.303  
The task of coming up with basic uniform welfare standards and mechanisms for the 
transports was entrusted to the Combined Repatriation Executive (CRX), which also oversaw the 
transport of a further two million Allied Displaced persons.304 The dimensions of the proposed 
operation proved astounding: A New York Times editorial noted that the number of Germans to 
be moved in seven months was “roughly equal to the total number of immigrants arriving in the 
United States during the last forty years.”305 The Polish government faced an even greater, nearly 
Herculean task: besides deporting millions of Germans, had to simultaneously repatriate Poles 
from east of the River Bug. As the historians Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse put it, the 
operation “required administrative expertise of the sort attributed to Adolf Eichmann, and 
logistical planning on a scale at least twice as large as anything attempted during the 
Holocaust.”306 The “organized expulsions” were a tall order. 
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 The disorganization had disastrous consequences. When the first “organized” transports 
from Czechoslovakia arrived in Bavaria on December 13, 1945, US Army observers were 
appalled that the “stripped conditions” had not prevented their journey in temperatures of minus 
nine degrees centigrade. Three days later, Red Cross workers opened the doors on 94 dead 
passengers, including 22 children.307 A Polish Red Cross train from Breslau, meant to showcase 
the care of elderly and sick deportees, similarly ended in disaster: the passengers, including a 
number of Alzheimer’s patients who “did not realize even during the journey what was going on 
with them” arrived in Germany with five dead and another two that died thereafter due to the 
paltry 150 gram per day ration.308 Though the death rates gradually declined in part to Allied 
pressure, the expellees bore signs of physical trauma and, as a reporter of the Manchester 
Guardian confirmed after speaking with a British medical officer, “most of the women had been 
violated, among them a girl of 10 and another of 16.”309 Many of the transports were subjected to 
plundering at the border, even with Allied demands for greater security.310 
Though the Germans who had not fled the Red Army and stuck it out under Polish and 
Czech rule had seen the handwriting on the wall, the deportations came as a shock to many; in 
the Recovered Territories, where Polish settlement was moderate, Germans continued to 
constituted the majority and remained on their farms until more than a year after the war.311 In 
fact, until mid-1946, Poles did not make out the majority of the population in the Recovered 
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Territories and lived side by side with Germans until then.312 In Breslau, less than 35,000 Poles 
were registered in December 1945, compared to more than 150,000 Germans.313 The streetcar 
operators of the Silesian capital continued to be German until 1946, as were the letter carriers 
due to the their familiarity with the urban landscape.314 Skilled workers were not just prized for 
their expertise and indispensability, which explains why they were often deported last; they 
developed genuine relationships with Poles. For more than two years, Poles and Germans 
sometimes lived in the same house. As a Polish refugee from the Kresy recognized “that both 
sides were somehow joined by the same miserable fate. We had been driven from our native soil 
by the [Ukrainian] bands, and they were paying for a war that had been started by a devil . . . 
Despite the language barrier, our relations developed in a friendly fashion.”315  
These fragile arrangements ended by late 1946, when the majority of the deportations 
were completed.316 In total, more than five million Germans from Eastern Europe had been 
transferred to occupied Germany. All that remained of a German present east of the Oder River 
were 400,000 Germans who had opted for Polish citizenship. These so-called “amphibians,” 
residing particularly in multiethnic border regions such as Masuria or Upper Silesia, possessed 
adequate linguistic abilities that they could pass as Polish.317 In some areas of Poland, the 
deportations created entirely unpopulated areas that remained devoid of people for years.318 This 
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was likely far from the minds of the millions disembarking throughout Germany. Despite 
arriving in an unknown land that they were now to call home, many breathed a sigh of relief that 
years of uncertainty, arbitrary violence, and deprivation were at an end. As one refugee put it: 
“We could once again become humans.”319 
 
Conclusion 
“As their train bumps on towards the Reich, the Sudetens will perhaps recall the happy 
days when the Jewish shop-windows went flying into smithereens and the fires in the trade-union 
buildings were starting up, and the folk, the ordinary folk, were running about looking for 
somebody to take a smack at, and shouting, ‘We want to be home in the Reich!’ Soon they will 
get their wish.”320 A British journalist’s cynical observation of an expellee transport touches 
upon a poignant truth: Hitler’s genocidal attempts to transform Central Europe into a racially 
homogenous empire boomeranged fiercely. The Silesian poet Gerhart Hauptmann recorded in his 
diary on September 30, 1939: “After waking up, the terror of the war pressed in my chest: 
Poland! How much hate has been released there. We destroyed Poland, delivered up half of it to 
the Russians, calling forth all the spirits of revenge on us for a century. Why is it that this pitiless 
nationalism has been aroused everywhere and in everything.”321 Six years later, the Nobel Prize 
winner lay on his deathbed and uttered his last words: “Am I still in my house?” A handful of 
Silesian earth was placed in the coffin in which he was expelled in the summer of 1946.322 
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By the time Hauptmann passed away, the “orderly and humane” expulsions were in full 
swing, and had already depopulated vast areas of their German population. This capped a process 
that began in the final days of the war, when the Nazi collapse opened the door for vengeance 
and retribution against guilty and innocent Germans. Whereas in most of Europe these passions 
died down, they took on dreadful dimensions in Poland and especially Czechoslovakia. The 
score-settling transitioned into “wild expulsions,” a process of extreme violence, abuse, and 
deportations directed by Polish and Czech leaders. Violence seemed an end to itself, but also 
aimed to set as many on the move in order to create facts that the American and British needed to 
accept: There were no more Germans in the German East, and in any case they faced a bleak 
future, so that agreeing to massive transfers and border changes seemed the best course.  
The process in Czechoslovakia differed little from that in Poland, though in the former a 
greater degree of orchestrated violence between May and July can be discerned. Unlike in 
Poland, most Germans never fled their homes and lived among the Czech population, and so 
faced greater exposure to roving militia. Apart from rampaging Soviets, many East Prussians or 
Silesians did not see Polish settlers for weeks, and even then they remained in the majority. 
Secondly, in the German East the Red Army furiously smashed the defenders; in 
Czechoslovakia, the German occupiers ruthlessly put down opposition in the eleventh hour of 
their reign, fighting on in some areas as late as May 11th.323 Czechs continued to suffer at Nazi 
hands under the longest occupation in Europe while the rest of the continent celebrated the defeat 
of the Third Reich. This created what Chad Bryant described as a “dialectic of violence” that 
potently exploded in the first weeks of the postwar period.324  
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Another reason that the “wild expulsions” took on such a deadly form in Czechoslovakia 
was that here violence was politically useful: Government and state agencies in a negative 
competition attempted to politically capitalize on the situation. All major political camps forged 
a consensus on the ethnic composition of the postwar nation: While Stalin blessed the expulsion 
plans of Beneš, the communist representative in Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, similarly 
grasped the removal of all Germans as an opportunity to establish his party’s legitimacy after 
having previously declared that the German proletariat was innocent of the crimes of fascism.325 
The communists possessed powerful cards, for in addition to controlling key ministries—
including the Ministry of National Defense, headed by the pro-Soviet Ludvík Svoboda, a key 
ally of Gottwald’s—they also dominated the national committees and therefore exerted 
enormous influence over local politics and therefore the treatment of the German minority.326 
With elections looming in 1946, no one wanted to lose footing in the “social revolution” of 
Czechoslovakia by looking “soft” on the key postwar challenge: The German question. The 
political contest, culminating in the 1948 communist coup, over the future of the Czech state had 
a profound impact on the fate of its German and Hungarian minority as well. 
In either case, the “wild expulsions” constitute a distinct phase separate from the “orderly 
and humane” stage, which did see a general improvement in conditions and decline in the death 
toll. Nevertheless, Germans at the time and even to this day continue to ignore the stages of the 
expulsions, as the press office of the CDU marking the five year anniversary of the war indicate: 
“It must always once again be stated that the expulsion of many millions of 
people from their ancestral homelands cannot be sanctioned by any 
agreements or paragraphs, and instead will for eternity remain a crime 
                                                 
325 Bryant, 215. 
326 For more, see Bradley F Abrams, The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of 
Communism (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Frommer, National Cleansing. 
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against humanity. The expelling states did not even hold to the measly 
mandate that the Potsdam Agreement meant to protect the expellees. In the 
areas east of the Oder and Neisse, in Czechoslovakia and in the Southeast, 
at least 2.5 million Germans perished. They in part succumbed to the 
ordeals of flight and acts of violence of the revolution, they found death 
through hunger, disease, and inhumane exploitation through forced labor, 
but in large part they were victims of camps and the expulsion itself. From 
exceedingly numerous transports the expelled needed to immediately be 
brought into hospitals, many however reached their ordained 
destination…as corpses. […] They were crammed into camps and 
transports, even though they could no longer hold out such ordeals. The 
expulsion would be a crime against humanity even if it had been 
undertaken with Salon cars. The gravity of the crime however was pushed 
into the unquantifiable when the expelling states in countless cases 
didn’t…adhere to the even primitive protective regulations of the Potsdam 
Agreement. This makes the commitment to conduct the expulsion ‘in an 
orderly and humane manner’ continually seem as a bitter mockery of all 
humanity.”327  
 
The commentary reveals how frequently postwar Germans conflated images and 
narratives of the “wild” and “orderly and humane” expulsions, and fused them into a central 
concept of “flight and expulsion.” For this reason, the Potsdam Agreement’s provision appears 
as a cynicism sanctioning the excesses of the spring and summer of 1945, when in fact they 
emerged as an explicit response and safeguard against a repeat of such travesties. 
One understandable reason that the “wild expulsions” came to disproportionately 
represent the entire forced migration after 1945 and dominates the narrative is because of the 
intensity of the violence; murder, rape, and abject misery tend to stand out more strongly in 
memory. Yet the testimonies also reveal utter dismay and an inability to contend with the world 
suddenly turning upside down, where loss of property and homeland often stand out as even 
more incomprehensible than death. Indeed, although the narrative is about the short-range wild 
expulsions, the historical significance lays in the “orderly and humane transfers,” which had 
                                                 
327 Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP) 07-001-3437, “In ordnungsgemässer und humaner Weise”, 
DuD Nr. 52, April 11, 1950 [unpag.] 
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long-range and eternal demographic and cultural consequences: The multi-ethnic and cultural 
landscape of Central Europe had changed forever between 1938 and 1948. War, genocide, and 
lastly the forced migrations of some 20 million Europeans destroyed a vibrant, pluralistic world. 
 One last conclusion pertinent to the argument of this dissertation must be made: Another 
reason that the “wild expulsions” stand out, or why boxcars emerged as representative symbols 
or Aussig emerged as a central fixture of expellee memory, is because as the events unfolded, 
contemporaries contributed to the narrative. As has been seen, Western journalists and observers 
circulated accounts and descriptions which, as we will see, ended up in the hands of expellee 
leaders. Yet Germans themselves were talking. Whether smuggling out reports from camps in 
Czechoslovakia that then were further distributed or published, exchanging accounts in the 
streets or refugee camps of Germany, or writing letters to share and fill in information, the 
victims added another layer to the narrative of “flight and expulsion,” blending fact with rumor 
into an inextricable blend. As we will see, these memories proved immensely valuable to the 





“THE POLACKS ARE COMING!”: ARRIVAL AND THE FORGING OF A 
“COMMUNITY OF FATE” 
  
In January 1945, the sight of the first trek wagons arriving on her East Elbian estate in 
January 1945 moved Armgard von Schmidtseck to compassion: “Silent figures and little bodies 
sit on them, and as we take the children down they cry out bitterly from exhaustion and 
cold…warmth, inner and outer, and the feeling of momentary security is what these people need 
first of all. And for the inner warmth a friendly word and the feeling that they have been received 
gladly and with utmost understanding for their plight suffices for these people, who have the 
hardest behind them that a person can experience.”1  
Unfortunately, most refugees found a “cold homeland” in Germany.2 In June 1946, the 
Communist Party of Germany (KPD) organ Neues Deutschland reprinted an open letter of a 
refugee by the name of Anna Scharmacher, in which she attempted to describe the last “one and 
half years flooded with tears” for readers. “Every single word is a tale of misery,” she explained, 
but of course “millions have it this way.” Speaking for those millions, the author expressed 
dismay and frustration that expellees found no understanding from the rest of the population. 
Scharmacher ended with a demand: “What have we done that we alone must bear the misfortune 
                                                 
1 Günther Lass, Die Flucht, Ostpreußen 1944-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, 1964), 65. 
2 Andreas Kossert, Kalte Heimat: die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945 (München: Siedler, 2008). 
183 
 
of the entire German people?” Even if expellees were to be “personally addressed, their plight 
understood,” it would do much to bring a “sigh of relief” to the victims.3  
With the Third Reich’s defeat, the figure of the German refugee appeared on German 
streets, a familiar and ubiquitous presence for years after the war in all of Germany’s zones of 
occupation. Yet before they emerged as “Germany’s Nr. 1 Question,” they were a victim 
group—if slightly larger and more desperate—among many.4  What’s more, they faced 
indifference, revulsion, even antipathy from Germans and Allied occupiers alike. Overcoming 
this apathy proved one of the first and crucial challenges for activists fighting for the integration 
of 10-12 million displaced Germans in the postwar period.  
 Before there was even a German beuracracy to contemplate financial support and legal 
privileges, however, there was the moment of arrival and struggle for survival. The official 
responses, and expellees and state agencies paved the way for material aid and mastering the 
refugee crisis, will be left for a later. This chapter strictly examines the first chaotic postwar 
years, when millions of disoriented and impoverished refugees traumatized by war and forced 
migration, arrived in Germany. Often a lacuna due the fragmentary source base, this brief period 
between expulsion and integration nevertheless is crucial for understanding how the expellees 
themselves coped with their suffering by speaking with one another, recounting their experiences 
to their new neighbors, and asserted themselves and claimed an identity. In short: the 
forthcoming pages analyze how “flight and expulsion” were narrated and perceived   
                                                 
3 “Ein Notruf von Millionen. Wir appellieren an die Solidaritaet des ganzen Volkes,” Neues Deutschland Nr. 52, 
June 25, 1946, 2. 
4 “Deutschlands Frage Nr. 1,” Das Parlament, March 12, 1952, 1. 
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 In order to analyze how refugees emerged as highly visible Heimatvertriebene 
(“homeland expellees”) who then could make social and material demands, this chapter 
addresses three interlocked issues. First, it looks at how refugees contended with their arrival in 
Germany, and how they grappled with their experiences. Whether attempting to process their 
own traumas, figure out where family and friends ended up, or commiserate and find solace with 
others in shared suffering, “flight and expulsion” featured as a pervasive element of the postwar 
landscape and conversation. This chapter therefore attempts to provide window into this semi-
public world of coping with war and loss from the perspective of the victims, who 
simultaneously helped shape and circulate a coalescing narrative of their ordeal. 
 Second, this chapter examines the media of the occupation zones, who much like the 
expellees also sought to find an explanation for the war and its consequences, even as these 
unfolded. Influenced by the sights of treks and arriving trains filled with disheveled, dazed 
refugees, journalists and supervising occupation officials sought to provide an interpretation of 
“flight and expulsion.” They thereby set the parameters of public discourse, and also contributed 
to the layering of memory on the forced migrations. 
 Lastly, one must assess the responses of the German people to the refugee crisis. While 
many expressed sympathy and compassion, the overriding sentiment toward the expellees was a 
mixture of fear and resentment. By briefly surveying the resistant dispositions that expellees 
faced, one can measure how effectively—or rather ineffectively—the narratives from refugees 
and the media made inroads into the population. The hardheartedness also is crucial for 
understanding how expellees formed into a Schicksalsgemeinschaft, a “community of fate.” 
Moreover, it permits insight into how gradually a “sympathy narrative” emerged that sought to 
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turn expellee suffering into an argument for accepting the displaced millions as compatriots 
entitled to material aid and social recognition. 
 
“My Life Has No Purpose Anymore”: Coping With “Flight and Expulsion”  
Arriving in Germany, many felt utter relief after months or years of hardship: “Once we 
held in our hands the first ration cards and ate the first buttered bread and saw the well-dressed 
people, we thought we were dreaming. The whole thing was like a movie….I physically broke 
down,” one woman confided to an acquaintance.5 The rapid processing through transit camps to 
German communities or refugee camps, however, were among the first disorienting experiences 
of millions of expellees, many of whom survived harrowing ordeals only in the recent past and 
still raw. The novelist Peter Härtling captured the unnerving experience in a 1967 article: “At the 
start there was the passage through the camps, places whose names one had never heard of that 
now spread fear: Wasseralfingen or Pasing, stopping points for those infested with scabies, the 
delousing had by now become a ritual, even the typhus shot into the breast.”6  
Once discharged, German officials decided where to permanently settle refugees, though 
occupiers insisted that communities not be established together in order to spur assimilation.7 
Understandably, after years of hardship suffered together, the disbanding of tightly knit 
                                                 
5 Kempowski-Biographienarchiv 1872, Letter from Mrs. B. to Professor Lang, January 30, 1946, 2-3. 
6 Peter Härtling, “Die Flüchtlinge,” Der Monat 220, 1967, 20. For more on expellee memory of the camps, see 
Albrecht Lehmann, Im Fremden ungewollt zuhaus: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Westdeutschland; 1945 - 1990 
(München: Beck, 1996), 56–65. 
7 A 1947 transport consisting of 2,000 persons was, for example, distributed in the Western Zone over 158 
communities. Mathias Beer, Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen: Voraussetzungen, Verlauf, Folgen, 1st ed. 
(München: C.H.Beck, 2011), 104. That East Prussians largely ended up in northern, Silesians in central, and ethnic 
Germans from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in southern Germany can be attributed to the Allied desire for a fast 
transfer and therefore reliance on the shortest distances between the point of origin and Germany, and not, as has 
been popularly alleged, a policy of retaining cultural cohesion. 
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emotional communities came as a huge psychological blow to expellees who now faced the 
unknown alone. Many first spent some time in refugee camps, erected in abandoned barracks, 
schools, air raid shelters, and even concentration camps such as Dachau. Temporary emergency 
camps sprouted like mushrooms at the edge of towns throughout Germany, and soon developed 
into permanent fixtures.8 In the Soviet Zone, the ZVU oversaw more than 600 camps holding 
nearly a half million people.9 The postwar landscape of Germany in popular memory consists of 
devastated urban centers and “rubble women,” though the Quonset huts and barracks dominated 
the scene just as well. Reinhard Jirgl’s Die Unvollendeten (“The Unfulfilled”) states it rather 
plainly: “For where the refugees are, there also always are The Camps [sic]…” In 1940s 
Germany, the refugee was everywhere. 
 The struggle for survival—searching for food, shelter or jobs—naturally took priority for 
the refugees. But of equal importance was trying to piece together fractured lives by finding 
families dispersed through the chaos of the forced migrations. A casual glance at the postwar 
photographic record reveals the ubiquity of refugees and near perpetual reminder of the 
“catastrophe” that befell Germany. Men stood with placards in public places with names of loved 
ones and last known location, and countless notices scribbled onto scraps of paper could be 
found fastened onto trees, bulletin boards, or lampposts.10 In Munich, daily hundreds of refugees 
                                                 
8 In Bavaria alone, in October 1946 1,375 camps held 146,000 refugees. The number of inhabitants dropped to 
64,000 a year later, but climbed back to 100,000 by the end of 1949 due to an influx of refugees fleeing the GDR, 
among whom a large percentage were expellees. Franz J. Bauer, “Aufnahme und Eingliederung der Flüchtlinge und 
Vertriebenen. Das Beispiel Bayern 1945-1950,” in Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, 
Ereignisse, Folgen, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 209. As late as 
1955 nearly 2,000 such facilities continued to hold a quarter of a million inhabitants in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Kossert, Kalte Heimat, 67. 
9 R.M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane. The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2012), 309. 
10 Franz Scholz, Wächter, wie tief die Nacht?: Görlitzer Tagebuch 1945/46 (Eltville: Walter, 1986), 45. 
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descended upon the tracing service, as a Sudeten German recalled: “Very soon after its opening, 
long lines of 300 to 500 meters formed. In a ruin…they therefore had to open a waiting room, 
where people could fill out search forms. On some days up to 300 families could be reunited.”11 
One could not easily escape the reminders of broken lives. On the radio and in cinemas, 
newsreels and recordings of children searching for their parents confronted the public with the 
humanitarian crisis, while outside in public spaces posters called attention to the Suchkinder 
(“searching children”), infants and children separated from their mothers during the flight or 
orphaned and needing the assistance of distant relatives. The German Red Cross issued 
newsletters describing the “extent of children’s suffering” during the war and “the whirlpool of 
the fleeing misery.” They also provided reminders of how flight occurred: “It is clear…that 
many thousands of infants, children, and youths died from the deprivation of flight during winter 
alone, even when they were in the company of their parents. Every participant of the trek 
movements…has seen with his own yes the associated dying of children.” The Red Cross 
explained that thousands of youths continued to wander the countryside or lived in camps alone, 
and that the “haggard and teary faces of women…who continually try in some way to find 
assurances over the fate of their children” represented the greatest priority in postwar Germany.12  
The painful reminders undoubtedly left deep impressions on adults, but mortified some 
children, as one expellee recalled years later: 
“[C]onstant messages of people searching for the missing came over the 
radio. They spoke of refugee children who were searching for their 
parents: name, height, eye color, etc. That was terrible for us all back 
then, the idea of searching for parents and siblings. In any case this thing 
                                                 
11 Erich Maier and Sudetendeutscher Rat, 40 Jahre Sudetendeutscher Rechtskampf: die Arbeit des Sudetendeutschen 
Rates seit 1947 (München: Sudetendt. Rat, 1987), 28. 
12 Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP) 001-377-09/9, “Suchaktion nach verlorenen Kindern,” 
Deutsche Hilfe. Mitteilungsblatt der deutschen Hilfsgemeinschaft Nr. 2, December 20, 1945, 7-8. The Red Cross 
published the newsletter. 
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must have preoccupied me a lot, as my best friend and I, we constantly 
imagined how awful it would be if we ourselves would have to flee. If 
we were to flee, in no case must we lose one another and so forth. But if 
that should happen nonetheless, then we would have to notify the Red 
Cross without fail, so that we could find one another. Back then I dreamt 
very often that I had to leave our home, our beautiful house, that I was in 
flight and had lost my parents.”13 
 
Occasionally joyful turns of event reached the public, yet nevertheless giving pause for 
contemplating “flight and expulsion.” For instance, the film studio DEFA’s series “The Eye-
Witness” aired emotional reunions of separated families: “The months of the wild flight of 
millions emerge from these ‘human documents’ before us. Much silently born, heavy suffering, 
reignited by the shimmer of hope, speak to us and grip our hearts.”14 Displaced and lost children 
and grieving mothers together with the recent sight of treks in the last weeks of the war ranked as 
the earliest visual associations with expellees. 
As they waited in queues or gathered around notices beseeching information on lost 
friends and family, the refugees undoubtedly talked with one another over their miseries and 
shared sorrows. Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Anne O’Hare McCormick, foreign news 
correspondent for the New York Times, found in her travels through Germany that the arrivals 
from the German East were “eager to talk, crowding around visitors to relate their 
experiences.”15 Non-expellees assuredly picked up snippets of conversations in these semi-public 
                                                 
13 Quoted in Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War to Peace (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010), 92. 
14 “Kinder suchen ihre Eltern. Schicksale im Strom der Zeit. Ein Griff in das Archiv des ‘Augenzeugen,’” Berliner 
Zeitung, March 12, 1947, 3.   
15 Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Problem of Places for the Refugees,” The New York Times, November 13, 1946, 24. 
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settings. In pubs, for instance, expellees gathered to sing songs and reminisced about the 
homeland, and shared experiences of the flight or the expulsions.16  
Contemporary journalists similarly noted that in public places such as train cars, the 
dialects of the German East—“like a foreign language”—and exchanging of personal 
biographies and travails were unmistakable: A “horrifying report” of a Silesian woman, the 
journalist noted, “that one can hardly believe that it didn’t destroy her life,” another woman 
showing family photos and the “blooming garden of the lost homeland.” The chatter produced a 
cacophony of miseries: 
“Where are you from”—“Oh, we were not far from there”—“When did 
you scedaddle?”—“Did you see anything [of the war]?”—“We already 
left in March”—“We had to leave my mother, she couldn’t walk quickly 
enough. Haven’t heard from her”—“Where are you going?”—“To bring 
the child to my sister in Wasserburg. We don’t have anything to eat, one 
already died”—“Yes, he looks bad, the boy.”—“Hasn’t eaten since 
yesterday, but he will make it”—“How did you come over?”—
“Yesterday night, illegally over the border. I dragged the boy, my sister 
the bags, we sprinted for an hour through the darkness”—“Do you think 
you will all be able to stay?”—“No, we don’t want to. I am driving back 
tomorrow, my sister a little later, she needs to rest.”—“Does your sister 
in Wasserburg know you are coming?”—“No.”—“And if she has no use 
for you?”—“Oh, she will take us. It’s just her husband…”17  
 
Children of expellees are also a good measure for the pervasiveness of “flight and 
expulsion” in family conversation. “Yes, my mother—and my grandmother as well—constantly 
talked about their homeland, about the beauty of their homeland. And they often spoke about the 
flight,” one expellee explained.18 Even when they did not speak explicitly about what happened 
and traumas remained uncommunicated, the expulsions left telltale marks that allowed one to fill 
                                                 
16 Cited in Kossert, Kalte Heimat, 57. 
17 Ilse K. Bembé, “Im D-Zug. Sommer 1946, nachts,” Die Gegenwart, September 24, 1946, 31-33. 
18 Quoted in Bessel, Germany 1945, 92. 
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in the blank. Returning from the war and a POW camp, the future famous author Günter Grass 
recalled in his autobiography how irrevocably his parents’ experiences in Danzig changed them: 
“We embraced, compulsively, over and over. Wordlessly, or with 
meaningless phrases. Too much, more than could be put into words, had 
happened in the course of a time that had no beginning and could have 
no end. Some things came up later, others were too horrible for words. 
The repeated violence done to my mother had muted her. She was old 
now and ailing. Little of her liveliness and wicked tongue remained. And 
was that shell of a man my father? He who set such great store by dignity 
and self-possession.”19 
 
Grass himself experienced the war, and knew enough to surmise what ordeal his mother 
and father went through. Yet even children born after 1945 document in their writings the 
unceasing ubiquity of stories of the past at dinner tables or gatherings. In the East German novel 
Wir Flüchtlingskinder, Ursula Höntsch-Harendt has her protagonist confide to her diary in 
December 1945 that her parents “no longer laugh and only speak of home and that it is unjust 
that only the Silesians have to pay for the war, because after all we are not responsible for this 
alone.”20 The author Petra Reski, asking her mother why they had no heirlooms or antiques like 
her friend’s family, recalled the matriarch’s incredulity before responding with “the phrase that I 
already knew so well: But we lost everything on the flight…The flight, the flight, always the 
flight. The history of the flight always came up when two adults came together. It began with 
WHEN THE RUSSIAN CAME and ended with tears.”21 Hans-Ulrich Treichel documents the 
confusion over the endless discussions of the war and meaningless reference points: 
“During his childhood, time and again friends, neighbors, acquaintances 
or even relatives of his parents from the East appeared who spoke a 
curious German, wore old-fashioned clothes, and spoke of things of 
which he had no idea. The East, and all that was associated with it, 
                                                 
19 Günter Grass, Peeling the Onion (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt, 2007), 240. 
20 Ursula Höntsch-Harendt, Wir Flüchtlingskinder: Roman (Halle: Mitteldt. Verl., 1989), 152. 
21 Petra Reski, Ein Land so weit. Ostpreussische Erinnerungen (München: List, 2000), 148. 
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remained for him as a child and youth completely incomprehensible, he 
could never unravel the topographical and historical jumble the adults 
presented to him when conversations turned to Silesia, East Prussia and 
Pomerania, to Breslau, Königsberg and Lodz, to Masuria and the Giant 
Mountains, to evacuations and resettlements, flight and expulsions 
before, during and after the First World War as well as before, during 
and after the Second World War.”22 
 
The ethnologist Hermann Bausinger noted the phenomenon of “new citizen narratives” 
while researching Swabian folklore in the early 1950s.23 Experiences during flight and expulsion 
were an unmistakable part of village talk, and expressions of hatred and desires for vengeance 
were the dominant themes Bausinger recorded. The ethnologist Alfred Karasek visited refugee 
camps in Bavaria and drew similar conclusions, documenting narratives that resembled modern 
sagas and contained themes of miraculous rescues, just punishment for tormentors, supernatural 
spirits protecting lost property, and prophesies of imminent return.24 As the illustrated magazine 
Quick explained in 1951, the ghosts of the brutally murdered, including through crucifixion, 
tormented the Poles living on “robbed land”:  
“Again and again Polish village mayors—so a reliable person in the 
Soviet Zone who often travels to Poland on business reports—are 
beseeched by simple farmers: they no longer want to remain on the 
German farms allotted to them. They want to flee before the ghosts of the 
wicked deed. Above fields they see floating crosses of birch, German 
soldiers who disappear into thin air when one approaches them…the 
horror has gripped the invaders! They cannot enjoy in their theft!”25 
 
                                                 
22 Hans-Ulrich Treichel, Menschenflug (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2015), 51. 
23 Hermann Bausinger, “Lebendiges Erzählen. Volkskundliche Gegenwartsuntersuchungen im schwäbischen Dorf” 
(PhD Thesis, Tübingen, 1952), 71. 
24 Heinke Kalinke, “Gerüchte, Prophezeiungen und Wunder. Zur Konjunktur sagenhafter Erzählungen in der 
unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit,” in Zur Ikonographie des Heimwehs - Erinnerungskultur von Heimatvertriebenen, by 
Elisabeth Fendl (Freiburg i. Br.: Johannes-Künzig-Inst. für Ostdt. Volkskunde, 2002), 159–74. 
25 “Nicht durch einen Krieg,” Quick Nr. 39, 1951, 1305ff. 
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Refugee narratives depended on the “horror of remembering,” so that these conversations 
therefore consisted of meticulous descriptions of brutalities.26 In letters, friends and neighbors 
exchanged descriptions of the fighting and occupation or travails of the flight, filling in missing 
information on the last days in the homeland and “how…you survived the flight.”27 The effect of 
this discourse was that within a few years after 1945, the conversations about the war became so 
familiar that, as one refugee woman from Braunsberg/Braniewo put it, “to report the details of 
the path of suffering (Leidensweg)…would go too far, and is unfortunately known all too well by 
the millions of [this] fate.”28 Despite trying to connect the dots and comprehend the fate of their 
community, the recycling and passing on of reports blurred the lines between personal 
experience and group memory. Expellees in the district of Gumbinnen, for instance, the postwar 
reports of people wanting to “corroborate” details of the Nemmersdorf massacre, but who had 
not been personally present, seemed to trace back to one family that after 1945 spread the news 
through letters, though they themselves also were not present during the massacre.29 Reality and 
interpretation soon fused into an inextricable blend by the 1950s. A confounded Theodor 
Schieder, head of a commission documenting flight and expulsion, concluded: “Nowhere does 
legend grow more uncontrollably than exactly here and the horrific becomes ever more horrific 
when it is told from one to the other.”30  
                                                 
26 Lehmann, Im Fremden ungewollt zuhaus, 190. 
27 Kempowski-Biographienarchiv 1872, Alice W. to her family, July 15-20, 1946, 3. See also Ibid, Letter from Mrs. 
B. to Professor Lang, January 30, 1946, 2; and Ibid, “Auszugsweise Abschrift eines Briefes eines Könisgbergers 
vom Februar 1946 (Königsberg verlassen am 23. September 1945),” 2. See also BArch, Ost-Dok 1/19, 104 and 
BArch, Ost-Dok 2/5, 11. See also Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:305. 
28 BArch, Ost-Dok 2/5, 121. 
29 BArch, Ost-Dok 2/13, 34. 
30 Theodor Schieder, “Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten als wissenschaftliches Problem,” 
Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, no. 8 (1960): 9. 
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Conversations between expellees also revolved around exchanges of advice, or where to 
get food and how to navigate bureaucratic hurdles. However, with the Potsdam Agreement’s 
ambiguity of the lost territories remaining under “Polish administration” until a final peace 
conference, widespread hopes for a return abounded. In some areas of Bavaria, observers 
warned, refugees relying on rumors of an imminent return to the homeland no longer stocked 
firewood for the winter.31 An aid worker in Germany warned the Sudeten German leadership in 
London that “confusion about whether they will be going home soon” was widespread among 
refugees. Most alarmingly, agitators distributing fliers in refugee camps proclaiming that the 
“war is not yet over” and prophesying an imminent “cleansing” of the homeland and return of 
the expellees stirred unrest.32 Equally as confusing were supposedly Czech pamphlets distributed 
in German refugee camps encouraging expellees from the “Czech Corner” around Glatz 
(Kłodzko), which Czechoslovakia aimed to annex from Poland, to return. 
“Your homeland is at the moment Polish territory. Terror and horror are 
at home there. At night the shots and the cries of the drunken militia and 
soldiers echoe through the streets and villages. But this won’t last long 
anymore! In a few weeks or even days your homeland will again be 
liberated. The district of Glatz is coming to Czechoslovakia. Czech 
soldiers will protect your possessions and chattels from Polish 
capriciousness until it will be delivered into your hands. Almost all…will 
return to their homeland. Active National Socialists are the exception. 
[…] We know that in the area of Glatz that not many were for Hitler, and 
we want to help those. They shall build a new life in their beautiful 
homeland. That’s why have courage and patience! England and America 
stand on our side. They hate the injustice that the Poles inflicted upon 
                                                 
31 Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD), NL Jaksch, J32, SPD Kreisgruppe Marktoberdorf to Jaksch, December 
6, 1947. 
32 AdsD, NL Jaksch, J32, Hermann Grimm to Wenzel Jaksch, November 2, 1947. The flier read: “One day, Poland 
and the CSR will share the same fate as the Hitler accomplices. The war is not over yet. The day when your 
homeland will be cleansed is already set. When the time comes we will act, yet the moment has not yet come and we 
cannot speak of it openly. Ensure that the news is spread, this is your task. Your representatives are with us and have 
their instructions. Your men and sons, who are imprisoned, do not want to fight us. Do not have fear. The motto is: 
The Sudeten Germans will be granted autonomy, the Czechs who came to the Sudetenland in 1945 must leave, 
return of your property and restitution, quick repatriation through America and your homeland will become 
American territory. Germans, remain disciplined and true to your homeland.” 
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you just as much as us. They know just as us: Glatz is neither Polish, nor 
Czech, Glatz is German!”33 
 
Most postwar communication involved reconstituting ties to family and community, 
however. Refugees attempted to recreate virtual communities and identify who survived and 
ended up where. More ambitious souls took it upon themselves to compile reports of the events 
during and after the war and conducted a sort of primitive census.34 After receiving her first mail 
“from the Reich” after three months, Alice W. was elated to hear from her family and eagerly 
shared of her life in East Prussia, where she remained. The content did not revolve around the 
war or devastation, but news of acquaintances and where people ended up, and encouragement 
for those in Germany to take up contact with family friends still in East Prussia. For Alice, the 
“big question” was where her brother and father were. “When will we see each other again? Are 
we just building castles in the sky?” The author praised the strength that family gave her in the 
difficult times she faced now: 
“My dear parents, how I love you. Everything that you told me in nice 
serious hours has now come true and is of manifold worth. When we 
celebrated holidays all together, how father always emphasized this. And 
anyways, that we children had to do everything on the farm at least once, 
how good. Only now does one know what being a mother means. And 
those like ours no longer exist. Not a day goes by where you aren’t an 
example. And especially one word of yours has become wonderful truth: 
what one gives…selflessly, comes make manifold.”35 
 
                                                 
33 AdsD, Seliger Archiv VII, 2069, “Absrchrift, Tschecholsowakisches Rotes Kreuz in der brit. Zone, Hamburg, 
May 20, 1946. An alle deutschen Flüchtlinge aus der Graftschaft Glatz, Übersetzung in die deutsche Sprache!” The 
curious pamphlet went on to clarify that Glatz would come under Czechoslovakian administration, and that after two 
years Germans could decide whether to stay or leave for Germany again. The appeal closed with the blatant 
underlying attentions: It sought the help of Germans to reconstruct the area, and “help support our efforts that your 
land is freed from Poles” with monetary contributions. In other words: It sought to harness German expellees from 
Czechoslovakia for the effort of annexing territories granted to Poland. 
34 See for example BArch, Ost-Dok 1/19, 94 and BArch, Ost-Dok 1/146, 189. 
35 Kempowski-Biographienarchiv 1872, Alice W. to her family, July 15-20, 1946, 2-3 
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Given the immense interest for news and need for solace, and despite the coalition ban, 
immediately after the expulsions remnants of communities attempted to reunite. Lacking the 
political tenor of the massive demonstrations of the 1950s, these smaller, more intimate 
gatherings were scenes of “joyful greetings” where the lost homeland could be revived for an 
afternoon.36 In 1947, for instance, 1,000 former residents of Reppen/Rzepin met at Berlin’s 
zoological garden, where questions and tales of the last days of the community “had no end.”37 
Through these meetings and updating of contacts, newsletters of current news, greetings to one 
another, as well as stories of individual wartime experiences circulated throughout Germany.38 
Even in the Soviet zone, where such meetings were regarded with deep suspicion because of 
ostensible “revanchist” content, expellees risked arrest to exchange news, advice, personal 
histories, and talk about the homeland and how it looks today.39  
Above all, whenever refugees communicated with one another, the East Prussian 
sociologist Elisabeth Pfeil noted in a 1948 survey of the expellees, discussions turned to worries 
about the state of the homeland: “are our homes dilapidated, are the paths we forged turning 
wild? Are our fields and gardens overgrown with weeds? Are forests filling the meadows?”40 
                                                 
36 “Heimatbrief an die Heimatfreunde von Reppen und der umliegenden Dörfer,” 1, Landesarchiv Berlin, C Rep 901 
Nr. 419. 
37 Ibid, 3. 
38 See, for instance, the newsletters in Landesarchiv Berlin, C Rep 901 Nr. 419. 
39 See the informant reports in Landesarchiv Berlin, C Rep 901 Nr. 419. The memos swing widely between 
impressions of non-political chit-chat and a “coffee party” atmosphere to condemnations of fascist rallies. 
Nevertheless, into the 1950s and even 60s, these meetings continued to be organized by word of mouth in the GDR. 
For more on homeland meetings in the GDR, see Heike Amos, Die Vertriebenenpolitik der SED 1949 bis 1990., 
Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte; Sondernummer (München: Oldenbourg, 2009), 32–41; 
Christian Lotz, Die Deutung des Verlusts: Erinnerungspolitische Kontroversen im geteilten Deutschland um Flucht, 
Vertreibung und die Ostgebiete (1948-1972) (Köln: Böhlau, 2007), 103–9. 
40 Elisabeth Pfeil, Der Flüchtling: Gestalt einer Zeitenwende (Hamburg: Hugo, 1948), 74–75. 
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Curios about “how it is back home” led to flurries of letters between family, friends, and 
acquaintances, some of whom remained in the homeland or had just recently been expelled.41 As 
one woman who remained in the Sambian Peninsula wrote in a December 28, 1949 letter, it felt 
good to talk with a friend about her suffering before taking her on an imaginary walk to show 
what was still standing and what had been destroyed.42 Often, the news was not good: A German 
in Königsberg informed a friend in Germany in February 1946 that her house burned down.43 In 
a November 1946 letter to Germany, an East Prussian categorically emphasized that there was no 
more homeland, and for those in Germany to give up hope for a return: “Everywhere graves. The 
villages looked sad and barren, ruins everywhere, furniture, doors, and windows torn out and 
destroyed. The wind howled through the open houses and buildings. A rotten, musty air, 
decaying livestock, swarms of rats and mice, overgrown fields with wild flora, countless swarms 
of mosquitos and flies.”44 
While many accounts condemned the “glaring injustice” that befell them and demanded 
“a return to our beloved homeland and hope that the human rights we were robbed of will be 
returned,” other voices—equally as typical in the historical record, and perhaps of greater 
interest to ordinary expellees—did not cement themselves in the “master narrative” of flight and 
expulsion.45 The East Prussian Bishop Maximilian Kaller’s September 1945 appeal to his 
                                                 
41 See for example the letters in Kempowski-Biographienarchiv 1872. See also BArch, Ost-Dok 1/19, 131 and 
BArch, Ost-Dok 2/27, 108.  
42 BArch, Ost-Dok 1/30, 81. 
43 Kempowski-Biographienarchiv 1872, “Auszugsweise Abschrift eines Briefes eines Könisgbergers vom Februar 
1946 (Königsberg verlassen am 23. September 1945),” 2. 
44 BArch Ost-Dok 2/27, 108.  
45 Quoted in Harasko, “Die Vertreibung der Sudetendeutschen,” 139. 
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congregation ranks as an emblematic voice of warning against delusions of a return. After having 
led elements of his flock across the frozen Vistula Lagoon during their flight from East Prussia, 
Kaller returned to the homeland during the summer of 1945. He felt compelled to share the 
dismal conditions that he discovered with those waiting on a return:  
“Out of deep conviction I therefore state that I do not find it right to 
return to East Prussia…Our homeland is lost to us. This is hard. But we 
cannot ignore hard facts. The sorrow for the lost homeland must be 
consoled and comforted; it is the will of God.” Kaller encouraged his 
community to “search for a new homeland, to find, to build…From the 
indestructible bond with Christ you will draw trust in God and courage to 
start anew, as once your forefathers did after the 30 Years’ War, the wars 
with Sweden, after the Napoleonic Wars that destroyed your 
homeland.”46 
 
Such future oriented messages did not fit into the narrative that expellee leaders wished to 
propagate, as will be shown. Indeed, as Andrew Demshuk has argued, these exercises of 
imagining the homeland as it existed—desolate, destroyed, and emptied of its community—led 
to the creeping realization for most expellees that through the irreversible changes, the homeland 
no longer existed.47 Instead, the “revanchist” undertones of injustice and demands for the 
atonement of suffered indignities provided the grist for the memory politics of the expellee 
organizations during the 1950s. At the time, the active communication didn’t go unnoticed by 
occupation authorities, who also detected harmful irredentist sentiments. As an OMGUS 
psychological study from February 1947 complained, the “refugee will send chain letters to all 
his friends as long as he can delude himself with the idea that there is a chance for return.”48 
                                                 
46 Cited in Franz Lorenz, Schicksal Vertreibung - Aufbruch aus dem Glauben. Dokumente und Selbstzeugnisse von 
religiösen, geistigen und kulturellen Ringen mit dem Vertriebenenschicksal (Köln: Wienand, 1980), 34. 
47 Andrew Demshuk, The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945-1970, Reprint 
edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
48 Cited in Douglas, Orderly and Humane, 315. 
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What the OMGUS report and Theodor Schieder’s dismissive remarks failed to take note 
of, and what becomes evident in the letters, is that these were not expressions of a political claim, 
but a coping mechanism for contending with immense traumata and finding consolation. 
Unsurprisingly, these efforts of coming to terms with one’s personal travails could lead to 
resignation and despair, as the letter of a woman deported to Germany after many months in a 
labor camp in the Urals reveals: 
“And now I sit here in the countryside, without love, without money, 
without home, without homeland, and I do not know what will become 
of me, since I don’t know where my family and relatives are. My only 
possessions are what I have on, I don’t receive any support, no pension. 
Our entire fortune is gone. You know best, what kind of days we 
experienced and now through the Nazi war we have become beggars. My 
tears, my despair, my silent helpless sorrows are accusations against 
what I endured in Russia. Realistically I tell myself, that my Ruth and 
my husband no longer are alive because the ardors were too great, but 
emotionally I hope to see them again. I give myself a year for a reunion 
with my loved ones, this separation I could yet endure and then—then 
my life has no purpose anymore.”49 
 
The documentary record also reveals an immense catharsis that came with articulating the 
traumas one endured, however. The comfort in talking becomes evident in a short piece in the 
high-brow newspaper Die Gegenwart, where a journalist simply recounted snippets of 
conversations overheard on a night train one summer night in 1946. Filing in and out, Sudeten 
Germans, Prussians, and Silesians variously exchanged experiences, inquired about each other’s 
fates, and offered words of sympathy and encouragement: “You will make it.”50 When expellees 
                                                 
49 Kempowski-Biographienarchiv 1872, “Aus einem Brief (gekürzt) von Frau Käthe W. bei Dittmar,” December 7, 
1945, 1-2. 
50 Ilse K. Bembé, “Im D-Zug. Sommer 1946, nachts,” Die Gegenwart, September 24, 1946, 31-33. 
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came together and talked, however, they not only sought comfort, they simultaneously circulated 




“Through Hitler’s Fault”: Explaining “Flight and Expulsion” in Occupied Germany 
Even as the forced migrations of ethnic Germans still unfolded, a cacophony of voices—
Nazi propaganda, refugee reports, and press commentary—turned “flight and expulsion” into an 
inextricable combination of experiences, rumor, fear, yearning, and ideology. It was against this 
backdrop of memories and word-of-mouth reporting that some Germans attempted to make sense 
of the consequences of the Third Reich and its defeat, and communicate those interpretations to 
their compatriots. Contrary to assumptions of West German amnesia and resistance to 
contemplate the years 1933-1945, not all Germans shied from confronting their compatriots with 
the past. In Cologne, the future mayor Ernst Schwering commissioned a series of placards in the 
summer of 1945 to educate the population on the sources of their grievances. The “jostling, 
shoving, cursing, pounding” on “overfilled old streetcars” were the “inheritance left by the Nazi 
pest.”51 To those suffering waiting in queues at hydrants, posters reminded that this was the 
result of voting for Hitler; standing in lines and long waits for food were the abundance of 
Hitler’s garden; and “nothing would have happened” to the symbol of the city, the Cologne 
                                                 
51 “Drängeln, Stossen, Schimpfen, Schlagen, überfüllte alte Wagen ist was uns die Nazipest als ihr Erbe hinterlässt.” 
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Cathedral, if Hitler had not ruled.52 But concerning the refugees, a Schwering placard offered a 
biting epitaph: “Through the streets just as beggars we crawl, thanks to the Nazi Reich.”53     
The Sudeten German politician Richard Reitzner, returning from British exile in 1946, 
likewise pointed to the past in in order to make sense of the expulsions and simultaneously offer 
a plea to vote for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD):  
“A harsh fate has befallen us Sudeten Germans. At the end of the 
sacrilegious politics of Hitler and Henlein stands the loss of our dear, 
beloved homeland. We Social Democrats have tirelessly called for 
humanity and justice in a world poisoned by the total war. That our voice 
has not reached the centers of international decision making really was 
not our fault. It was above all the crimes that the Hitler system 
committed against humanity. Once before we appealed to your political 
intelligence in September 1938. […] Wenzel Jaksch at that time called to 
you: ‘Compatriots! Sudeten Germans! Consider in this fateful hour: the 
youthful fanatics that call for violence have no inkling what great horror 
and destruction the word ‘world war’ entails. They have experienced no 
drumfire, they do not know how poison gas corrodes the lungs, they have 
not yet seen peaceful villages and cities ignite into flames. The misery of 
homeless refugees, the dying of innocent children, the pain of the wives 
and mothers who mourn the torn bodies of their loved ones is foreign to 
them!’ […] Learn from the past! […] We clearly see the massive rescue 
effort that we Social Democrats face, we want to through positive work 
in the service of the expellees and new citizens make an earnest 
contribution to the rebuilding of Bavaria, Germany, and Europe and to a 
dearly won yet nevertheless prosperous future of the German people!”54   
 
German politicians and journalists struggled to engage with the interconnectivity of 
dictatorship, war, and the defeat’s consequences. However, in the first two postwar years, the 
                                                 
52 "Müsst ihr am Hydrant euch quälen, Denkt das kommt vom HITLER-wählen"; “Schlange stehn und langes Warten 
Früchte sind aus HITLERS Garten"; “Dem Kölner Dom wär nichts passiert, hätt' Adolf Hitler nicht regiert." Other 
similar posters: "Trümmer hat der Krieg gebracht, den die Nazis angefacht"; "Hier wird wieder Recht gesprochen, 
wo die Nazi es gebrochen"; "St. Martin wie die Welt es kannte, eh' Hitlers Krieg es niederbrannte"; "Alle Kirchen 
sind vernichtet, das hat Hitler angerichtet." All texts “museenkoeln.de | Bild der Woche: ‘Drängeln, Stossen, 
Schimpfen, Schlagen...,’” accessed March 4, 2018, https://www.museenkoeln.de/portal/bild-der-
woche.aspx?bdw=1998_47.  
53 "Durch die Straßen Bettlern gleich, ziehn wir Dank dem NAZI-Reich". For a reproduction of the refugee placard, 
see Gabriele Brodmann, Die Bewältigung der deutschen Vergangenheit aus deutscher und ausländischer Sicht. 
(München: Grin Verlag, 2005), 8. 
54 AdsD, Seliger Archiv VII, 2074, “Aufruf an die Neubürger,” c. fall 1946. 
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Nazi past—and not “selective remembering” of German suffering—loomed large over the public 
discourse over the refugee crisis.55 As officials attempted to prepare their population for the 
upcoming challenges, explanations for why they were there to begin with were sorely needed. 
The early journalism in occupied Germany proved a crucial medium for describing, explaining, 
and coming to terms with the Nazi past and its consequences, including the expulsions. Not only 
did journalists emerge as important actors in making sense of the columns of refugees and 
emergency camps that became ubiquitous features in the postwar landscape, they also played a 
vital role in translating the scenes into political messages of the occupation forces who wanted to 
make plain that the postwar burdens were Germany’s responsibility. If Germans could 
understand that it had been Nazi aggression which produced the catastrophe, perhaps they would 
be more willing to accept consequences and the victors’ imperatives of denazification, 
demilitarization, decartelization, and democratization.56 Concerning the waves of refugees, one 
step in getting Germans to roll up their sleeves in rebuilding efforts seemed to illuminate the link 
between the waves of unwanted strangers and the bygone criminal Nazi regime. 
The Allies hoped to achieve this through a rigorous ban on all militaristic and nationalist 
organizations, which strongly proscribed expellee activities. This left the official Allied-licensed 
German media as the sole shaper of public discourse. The occupiers vigilantly controlled opinion 
forming institutions in order to project messages that aligned with their occupation goals of 
denazification and establishing democracy or socialism, meaning that German self-pity or 
recriminations against the victors were a nonstarter. This likely explains why descriptions of 
                                                 
55 Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003). 
56 Konrad H. Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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what had occurred during “flight and expulsion” remained vague and only sporadically appeared 
in American and British Zone headlines prior to the foundation of the FRG and greater press 
independence. Surprisingly, in the Soviet Zone (SBZ) such discussions featured relatively 
frequently and in rather open language in the early postwar years. Despite the danger of alluding 
to the role of the Red Army in Germany suffering, German refugees allowed for an emotional 
and forceful indictment of the criminality of Nazism and need for socialist correctives.  Both 
Western and Soviet presses initially acknowledged a catastrophe and horrendous suffering. 
Condemnations of fascism should hardly come as a surprise when one peruses the 
occupation press in the Soviet Zone. Prior to 1949, however, readers in the West German zones 
also could not escape references to the past when opening their newspapers. Until the late 1940s, 
for instance, the Liberal-conservative Freiburg-based Die Gegenwart and Allgemeine Zeitung in 
Mainz consistently ran features focusing on Nazi atrocities, war crimes trials, and investigative 
reports of the dictatorship. The two papers represented the postwar journalistic elite in the 
Western Zones, and their often critical tone sought to promote the type of introspection that the 
Anglo-American press officers welcomed.57 The expellees, despite their prominence in postwar 
society, appeared infrequently in reporting. When Western Zone papers addressed them, they 
typically identified their root cause: The Third Reich and the lost war. The most striking case, 
and among the first overt references to the expulsions, appeared on the front page of Die Zeit, a 
center-left periodical founded in February 1946 in Hamburg under British license. A week after 
                                                 
57 Both papers consisted of sophisticated reporting on international and domestic politics and allocated much space 
to literary contributions and short stories from literary notables. A number of collaborators of Die Gegenwart, which 
appeared until at least 1956, had previously worked at the liberal Frankfurter Allgemeine shuttered by the Nazi 
regime in 1943. The Allgemeine Zeitung, reformed in 1945 by Erich Dombrowski and former Frankfurter 
Allgemeine journalists, continues to appear in Mainz. Some of its collaborators and staff of Die Gegenwart together 
with Dombrowski formed the centrist Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 1949. The two papers, in other words, 
boasted many of the postwar journalistic elite that had opposed the Nazi regime and who shaped public discourse in 
the early FRG. 
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firing up its presses, the front page featured an illustration of bedraggled figures accompanied by 
the allegorical apparitions of hunger, misery, and sickness returning “home into the Reich.”58  
By invoking the Nazi rallying cry to bring all ethnic Germans into the borders of a 
unified state, the editors suggested that Nazi hubris had produced the disaster, which ironically 
had in its own disastrous way fulfilled Hitler’s vision of an ethnically homogenous nation. The 
accompanying caption acknowledged the expulsions as a “new milestone in the path of suffering 
of the German people…unequaled in history,” yet went on to castigate not just National 
Socialism for producing the unprecedented humanitarian disaster. “When from the dismal 
procession of human misery the dull and yet all-shattering denouncement against the war and its 
destruction rises to the heavens, we must remain silent. We have become less than beggars. Our 
guilt makes us voiceless.”  
While for some an unspecified guilt explained German self-pity, the Berlin’s Der 
Tagesspiegel, a periodical with similar political tendencies as Die Zeit published under American 
license since September 1945, offered a different take. Appearing in June 1946, “Through 
Hitler’s Fault” declared expellees as the “poorest of the affected,” yet attributed their suffering to 
the “insanity” of the deceased dictator.59 Readers were left to ponder for themselves what aspects 
of National Socialism were “insane,” but by blaming Hitler, “ordinary” Germans could count 
themselves among the war’s victims and avoid contemplating responsibility for the outbreak and 
consequences of the war. Others were more specific: Pointing out that the “movement of 
peoples” had first been unleashed by “Hitler, the modern Genghis Khan,” a lengthy Die 
Gegenwart article detailed the murderous population politics of the Third Reich that had now 
                                                 
58 “Heim ins Reich,” Die Zeit, February 28, 1946, 1. 
59 “Durch Hitlers Schuld,” Der Tagesspiegel, June 9, 1946, 3. 
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“rebounded terribly.” It was all the result of “the lost war unleashed by National Socialism.”60 
Moreover, to prevent the formation of even yet another dangerous “fifth column,” Germany 
itself needed to contend with the “fate…it has created for itself or even conjured.”61 
The Third Reich also lingered in an article from April 1947 in the Niedersächsische 
Rundschau, a weekly paper of the CDU in Lower Saxony: “The current unprecedented 
debasement [erniedrigung] of Germany is the consequence of political errors made in 1933. 
Something like this cannot happen again.”62 The article’s indictment, however subtle, of 
National Socialism culminated in an appeal to expellees and non-expellees to support the only 
party that fought for the rights of refugees and all Germans by transforming expellee suffering 
into an argument for Christian-democratic values: 
“The refugees have experienced themselves [am eigenen Leib] with 
utmost severity and cruelty to what consequences politics with a purely 
materialistic worldview leads. Their eyes must have been opened to the 
fact that the German catastrophe had its root causes in spiritual decay, in 
deviation from Christendom. They today daily experience egoism and 
harshness and lack of understanding in their inconceivable need. They 
must interpret such dispositions as a consequence of purely materialistic 
thought. This realization can only lead expellees to the conclusion that 
they politically turn to only those powers that want to build a new, a 
different Germany”63 
While not specifically commenting on the long-term roots of the expulsions, a report on 
the condition of expellees arriving from Poland in Marienthal in Der Spiegel, a social democratic 
oriented weekly magazine founded by British press officers in Lower Saxony in 1947, provided 
                                                 
60 R.H., “Der fünfte Stand?”, Die Gegenwart, November 30, 1946, 9. 
61 Ibid, 12. 
62 “Flüchtlinge-Ostvertriebene! Euer Schicksal liegt in eurer eigenen Hand!”, Niedersächsische Rundschau: 
Wochenschrift der Christlich-Demokratischen Union, April 12, 1947, 1. 
63 Ibid, 3. 
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among the first nationally circulated images and detailed descriptions of the people “from the 
East.”64 The photo of an emaciated man clinging to his papers when “everything else had been 
taken from him” dominated the cover of the magazine’s fourth addition in January 1947.65 The 
accompanying article, “The 65th Death: A Cold Experiment,” detailed the horrible humanitarian 
conditions on the deportation transports.66 
British papers and military reports corroborate the details.67 Apart from a somewhat 
cynical headline, the balanced tone refrained from criticizing occupation authorities who 
oversaw the process, and in fact pointed out that they vowed that they no longer would accept 
unheated transports. Instead, the Polish government appeared as the culprit in this debacle. One 
must assume that British press officers, who sat on the board of Spiegel until the magazine’s fifth 
edition, had a hand in the piece’s language as well for its entire raison d'être. Coinciding with 
considerable press coverage in the United Kingdom as well as Germany of the poor conditions of 
the transfers, British authorities had grown weary of the financial and administrative burdens of 
“Operation Swallow,” the organized deportations from Poland to the British Zone. The 
Marienthal incident provided an opportune justification to file formal protests with Polish 
                                                 
64 A total of four British officers, including Harry Bohrer, a Czech national who had fled to the United Kingdom in 
1939, explicitly designed the periodical to emulate British news magazines. Initially founded in Hanover as Diese 
Woche, the British sat on the editorial board until the fifth edition, after which it was reformed as Der Spiegel in 
Hamburg under British license. See “Betr.: Harry Bohrer,” Der Spiegel, October 7, 1985, 3.  
65 Cover, Der Spiegel, January 25, 1947. So compelling was the image that a 1981 picture book of “flight and 
expulsion,” brought out by the publisher Podsun which specialized in popular histories focusing on the expulsions 
and the German military in WWII, reprinted it. Stripped of its context, the caption continued to explain that the man 
had been left with nothing but his papers, but that he was one of the lucky few to have “escaped the hell” of the 
Czech and Polish “concentration camps.” Werner Arndt, Ostpreussen, Westpreussen, Pommern, Schlesien, 
Sudetenland 1944/1945: die Bild-Dokumentation der Flucht und Vertreibung aus den deutschen Ostgebieten 
(Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas-Verl., 1981), 194. 
66 “Die 65. Tote. Ein Kälte-Experiment,” Der Spiegel, January 25, 1947, 5. 
67 See Douglas, Orderly and Humane, 195–97. 
206 
 
representatives. While the expulsions continued until 1947, British indignation saw a reduction 
in the scale of transports and improved conditions.68 Through Spiegel, occupation authorities 
registered their qualms over egregious inhumane violations while placing the entire 
responsibility for the outcome of Allied policies squarely on expelling states behind an 
increasingly hardening Iron Curtain. 
Perusing the periodicals of the Western Zones in the immediate postwar years, one finds 
that the moralizing and somewhat self-critical tone of these articles is an anomaly, however. The 
forced migrations hardly featured as a topic of discussion, with only occasional fictionalized 
short stories or reports in 1945 and 1946 that referenced specific travails of the German East.69 
On the one-year anniversary of German capitulation, Die Gegenwart printed a series titled 
“Chronicle of the Collapse,” with one edition dedicated to the “tragedy of the East” and the 
Wehrmacht’s “heroic” defense of a region doomed to “descend into an inferno of fire and 
horror.”70 Silence, as opposed to exhaustive coverage, as the general rule and reminders of 
German aggression when the subject arose must doubtlessly be attributed to American and 
British supervision. In any case, the discourse of 1945 and 1946 reflects Allied aims of directing 
                                                 
68 For more on British policy and the organized expulsions, see Douglas, 197–222. Above all, the negative press 
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Germans toward an understanding of the expulsions rooted in National Socialism and, 
increasingly as the Cold War confrontation emerged, communist brutality.  
Soviet occupation authorities shared the goals of their Anglo-American counterparts, so 
that one would expect to see a similar desire to brush German victimhood under the carpet, 
particularly since the Red Army featured prominently in such discussions. The conscious effort 
to refer to expellees as Umsiedler (resettlers) or Neubürger (new citizens), as increasingly was 
the case in the late 1940s, derived from Soviet directives and relativized allusions to violence or 
injustice implied in the terms “refugee” or “expellee.”71 Nevertheless, even communist organs 
did not shy away from discussions of “flight and expulsion” or deny the cruelty of the 
experiences. Far from it, as a commentator put it bluntly: “Resettlers, refugees, expellees—we 
may call them what we want, they are victims of the Hitler war.”72 German victimhood needed to 
be contextualized while serving as an object antifascist lesson.  
For instance, Wolfgang Parth of the Berliner Zeitung, produced in the Soviet sector of 
Berlin since May 1945, acknowledged the general terrible misery wrought by utter defeat, but 
couched it as the same agony that the nation had inflicted upon its neighbors.73 Referencing the 
German expellees specifically, Parth argued that they needed to serve as a reminder that 
displaced persons had existed since 1933: “Racial hatred” and political oppression drove 
thousands abroad, reaching their apex in Nazi resettlement of ethnic Germans and millions of 
slave laborers brought to the Reich. These were the true source of German misfortune, Parth 
                                                 
71 From the protocol of the first ZfdU meeting, the chairman Joseph Schlaffer explained the terminology “resettler” 
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explained, for the millions who, though free of individual guilt, needed to now “pay for the 
politics of predation of the war criminals.” A few months later, Berliner Zeitung again 
contextualized the German migrations in the fascist “reordering of Europe” that produced 
“everywhere extermination, expulsion, or deportations” and “millions of people driven from 
home and hearth onto the country lanes, wandering into the unknown.” Before one should 
contemplate the German forced migration, one needed to ponder how Hitler “like 
Attila…uprooted millions of people through his criminal racial and population policies, and 
under the slogan of ‘reordering Europe’ he created chaos.”74 Soviet Zone papers pursued a 
unified line of framing the expulsions as “the last act of the movement of peoples that began with 
300,000 German Jews…encompassed 20 million people.”75  
Communist presses naturally omitted references to Red Army violence perpetrated 
against Germans during the forced migrations. Because of their widespread knowledge, this 
outright absence would have undermined the narrative, so that writers shifted the blame for 
undeniable civilian suffering onto the Wehrmacht and Nazi party. Jumping on instances where 
German authorities implemented forced evacuations, Berliner Zeitung explained that millions 
were chased “mostly against their will” from their homes, where “many died in the road 
ditches!”76 The expulsions were, as the title of the story alleged, the “last act of a migration of 
peoples criminally initiated by Hitler.” For Parth, expellee plight also represented a “last act of 
this great tragedy, which has cost all peoples rivers of blood and seas of tears.”77 This “tragedy,” 
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Soviet Zone papers emphasized, started with fascist aggression, and the “entire German people 
now reaps the terrible harvest of a twelve year long politics of insanity.”78 Fascism’s 
consequences needed to be atoned for, as Michael Tschesnow put it succinctly in Neues 
Deutschland: “Like a boomerang the German people are struck by what they expected of other 
peoples through its support of the Hitlerian politics of predation [Hitlerische Raubpolitik].”79 In 
contending with this reality, Germans should not indulge in a “fruitless bemoaning of ‘fate,’ but 
instead constantly think of the guilty with a holy hatred” and recall what the “blood-soaked Nazi 
clique” wrought upon Germany.80 
In the first two years after 1945, SBZ attempts at explaining the calamity that had 
befallen Germany corresponded to some Western Zone efforts that also saw a relationship, 
however vaguely articulated, between the “guilt” of the Third Reich and the disastrous outcomes 
of its defeat. The communist press more forcefully acknowledged expellee suffering than their 
Western counterparts, because their relatable misfortune powerfully underlined the criminality of 
fascism and served as one of the most compelling arguments for a “New Germany.” Moreover, 
the SED’s unpopularity and the greater effort needed to transmit the desired values required for 
this rebuilding meant that the link between fascism and German victimhood and acceptance of 
the consequences of German hubris needed to be more explicit. While communist elites endorsed 
a recognition of a self-made disaster and, by implication, an acceptance of reality, few in the 
Western Zones spoke so plainly. While the press lamented Germany’s misery and reproached 
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Nazi bigwigs, the vague formulations of guilt did little to persuade readers confronted with the 
abject deprivations described in previous chapters.    
As numerous surveys of the occupiers demonstrated, explanations of how it came to the 
dire postwar situation did not make their desired point. A July 1946 American survey found that 
only 45 percent of residents in Munich, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart agreed with the proposition that 
National Socialism ultimately caused refugee plight; in communities under 10,000, only one in 
three concurred.81 Similar refusals to see the interconnectedness between German suffering and 
the war that it launched prevailed in the SBZ, as a 1947 anonymous letter of an Upper Silesian to 
the SED Directorate of Greater Berlin reveals. Condemning the SED’s lack of a position to the 
territorial question, the author explained that twelve million people had been robbed of their 
“entire goods and chattels” and were driven “completely naked to the Reich” while Poles 
plundered and robbed them along the way. In Germany they have been “exposed to hunger, 
misery, and the cold,” and the little help that is offered is not enough. The letter culminated in a 
rejection of the type of reporting circulating in the SBZ:  
“One has accused Nazism of monstrosities; these monstrosities however 
were committed during the war. But already three years have passed 
since the end of the war and the monstrosities are being committed with 
the greatest enthusiasm by the humane peoples of Poland and Russia 
during peace. Is it not terrible to throw people out of their homes and 
even plunder their belongings?”82 
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These views were far from a minority opinion. Expellees understandably felt their own 
suffering more intensely than that of others. The administrator of Guben summarized the 
contradictory sentiments among refugees at public gatherings in October 1948: “Why did the 
Russian not tolerate us as refugees in Poland, why did he not keep us? We so long for our 
homeland. We of course know that we lost the war and want to atone for everything [wieder 
gutmachen], but the Russia should just let us back into the East…We would embrace and kiss 
the Russian if he were to give us the homeland on which we depend so much back…Must we 
resettlers pay for the war alone?”83 Fearing the persistence of organizations cultivating a self-
understanding of victimhood at odds with its antifascist narrative, the SED planted agitators in an 
attempt to steer conversations into more suitable waters. As the 1948 guidelines for these 
informants explained, the expellees “simply don’t want to know anything about the factories of 
death in Treblinka, Auschwitz and Maidanek,” and needed to be reminded that Poles would 
“never again allow a ‘master race’ to rule in their lands with unheard of capriciousness.”84  
The first postwar years saw a concerted effort to impart political messages and move 
expellees and the rest of the population to accept the expulsions as a result of National Socialism 
and a war of annihilation waged by Nazi Germany. Yet broad unwillingness to accept the war’s 
consequences as a purely German problem, as will be argued, abounded. For now it must be 
reemphasized that while expellees contended with their traumas and circulated their stories, the 
media of occupied Germany helped construct a narrative of “flight and expulsion” that added to 
this layer of memory. 
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“Dear God, send this rabble home”: German Responses to the Expulsions 
The sudden emergence of traumatized and destitute throngs, competing for jobs and 
resources in close-knit communities and challenging the local cultural, political, and confessional 
harmony created enormous tensions that threatened the fragile peace and undermined postwar 
reconstruction. The whole enterprise was, according to a German refugee commissioner in 1946, 
a “great experiment.”85 The historian Mathias Beer goes further in the assessment, calling the 
“absorption of many thousands of expellees…a daring involuntary effort with incalculable risk 
and unforeseeable outcome.”86 The herculean task that German bureaucrats faced during the 
refugee crisis became clearer after the 1950 census: The Western Zones had taken in some eight 
million expellees, while 3.2 million landed in the Soviet Zone.87 In other words, in the immediate 
postwar period, East Germans constituted more than 24% of the population in the Soviet Zone 
and 16% in the Western Zones.88  
While food shortages weighed heavily, housing posed the most significant predicament. 
More than a quarter of all dwellings in Germany were completely or heavily damaged; urban 
centers were the most affected, with many cities over 50% destroyed. Rural communities had to 
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bear the vast majority of the influx, with more than 85% of expellees sent there.89 The local 
population was soon overwhelmed. In the village of Beckedorf near Celle, a 1947 protocol 
reveals that more than 400 refugees had been settled in the community of 480.90 The Catholic 
bastion of Vechta in Lower Saxony saw its prewar population of more than 50,000 swell to over 
75,000 after the arrival of Protestant East Prussian and Silesian expellees in 1946, topping out at 
just under 80,000 by 1950.91 On average, every third person in the Western occupation zones 
was a refugee or expellee.92 
Though this was an issue throughout Germany, studies suggest that expellees in larger 
cities faced fewer resentments from the local population as they sought to carve out a place in the 
new homeland.93 Though the dire housing and food shortages created an intense competition for 
resources in German cities between 1945 and 1948, the refugees represented a smaller proportion 
of the population and were less visible. In addition to being generally more cosmopolitan and 
less sensitive to “outsiders” than their bucolic compatriots, city dwellers were better informed of 
wartime events such as the expulsions, as an American survey concluded in July 1946, and 
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willing to accept their consequences.94 Moreover, urban residents had faced greater deprivations 
during the war, enabling an identification with refugees and a mutual understanding based on 
common experiences of suffering.95 
Things looked vastly different in the countryside, where the majority of expellees sought 
a new home. A Franconian paper in 1948 acknowledged the “fruitful relationship” that had 
developed between expellees and the indigenous population remained an illusion in the small 
communities and villages, where “meanness and intolerance is still often making the hard 
existence of the expellees more difficult.”96 A 1950 investigation conducted by the sociologist 
Elisabeth Pfeil for the state of Bavaria corroborated these observations, finding that the social 
tensions were greatest in communities with less than 2,000 inhabitants.97 Regional studies have 
supported the conclusion that the integration in rural communities was fraught with greater 
conflict.98 Being generally more conservative and closed off from the war and its consequences, 
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the expellees faced a much more insular world. Village elites exerted a decisive influence on 
whether and how expellees would be taken in and provided prospects of local rural 
communities.99 When the refugees emerged from their transports in the undamaged countryside, 
where the destruction of the war had been an abstract concept until the final months or weeks of 
the war, they typically faced scorn and hatred. “The people who have lost the most,” Philip Raup 
of the Food and Agriculture Brach in the American zone commented in October 1946, “have 
come into very close contact with the farmers who have lost the least.”100 
The often hysterical tenor that accompanied the refugee crisis remains largely forgotten, 
overshadowed by a West German “success story” of integration. Expellees and particularly their 
children often frame family histories as a tale of self-made achievement, where years of suffering 
during and after the war were overcome in a difficult “fresh start” with hard work and an 
industriousness that garnered social recognition and economic prosperity.101 In turn, politicians 
and the media lionized expellees as an essential element of the Federal Republic’s triumphs; 
indeed, in these “out of ashes” narratives, they are “the symbol of the success of the Federal 
Republic” and an integral foundational myth.102 In the introduction to the 2011 temporary exhibit 
Angekommen (Arrived) guide, the president of the Federation of Expellees Erika Steinbach 
concluded that the integration “has largely succeeded and become a part of the postwar success 
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story of our country.”103 Personal memories of animosities and feuds during the process of 
integration today are often recalled as humorous misunderstandings, while national narratives 
ignore the “cold homeland” that greeted the displaced East Germans.104 These romanticized 
notions obscure very profound hostilities that expellees encountered and needed to confront in 
order to truly “arrive”; before they were foundations of democracy, the expellees were the 
dynamite that threatened it.   
The first hurdle to be overcome was the widespread refusal on the part of Germans to 
comply with the Allied directives to accept the expellees. Although the ACC issued a decree that 
sanctioned the appropriation of rooms and property as well as compulsory rental agreements for 
refugees, the enforcement depended on local authorities and police who often were unwilling to 
back the newcomers against the interests of the community.105 In Hessen, a police chief for seven 
weeks simply ignored a court order mandating that police permit refugees who had been locked 
from their sublet back into the home, until state agencies suspended him and intervened.106 Even 
when authorities managed to forcefully find accommodations, it set up an awkward and 
acrimonious dynamic, as Gertrud K. recalled: “The family screamed and shook because they had 
to give up the small room to us. These people still had everything and did not know what it 
means to lose the homeland.”107 
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Bypassing provisions proved relatively easy, particularly in the Soviet Zone, where by 
1948 only 4% of available dwellings in Brandenburg had been inspected to ascertain their 
suitability for refugee housing. 108 Open defiance of the law required the Allies to conduct snap 
inspections, which in some cases led to arrests, but a British officer concluded that “at the best 
they get the minimum prescribed by law and at the worst they have to accept accommodation 
which is scarcely fit for cattle.”109 To enforce their directives, occupation troops occasionally 
moved refugees into confiscated housing at gunpoint.110 On at least two occasions, US military 
courts sentenced obstinate resistors along with their families to several weeks of life in a refugee 
camp with nothing but a few kilos of luggage, consciously reproducing the expellee 
experience.111  
Even when refugees managed to find room in a house or barn, their unwelcome presence, 
foreign mannerisms, and unfamiliar customs caused consternation. The strange smells of their 
cooking unleashed what contemporaries called a “war of cooling spoons,” and homeowners 
often made life as miserable as possible by denying access to kitchens or bathrooms and 
stipulating specific times when their “guests” could enter or leave the property. 112 Other 
observers spoke of an “acute war between old and new citizens,” noting “clear outlines of 
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a…class struggle.”113 Though the countryside had been spared the worst of the wartime 
destruction, expellees and non-expellees competed for the same limited resources, and locals 
resented sharing even the most trivial of items. A refugee recounted how even her request for 
straw in order to make pillows was rejected by an irate farmer, as then “everyone will come.”114 
Another woman recalled years later how after her mother had gathered stinging nettles and 
saltbush for food, villagers complained bitterly that “now they eat all the food for our geese! We 
have nothing for our little ducks and geese.”115  
The key to survival for expellees lay in securing a paying position, which meant an 
extreme competition for the more limited work opportunities in the countryside. One of the few 
options available was agricultural labor, where the sudden liberation of farmers’ slave workers 
that they had enjoyed during the Third Reich produced huge demands.116 In February 1946, 
Alois Schlögl, co-founder of the Christion Social Union and dominant force in Bavarian politics, 
complained in an open letter of labor shortages and indolent refugees: “These conditions are 
scandalous. It must be the task of the Bavarian council of ministers to finally and quickly 
intervene with radical measures. Whoever wants to live and eat in Bavaria needs to work here as 
well. No lady is too fine and lovely so that she should be above farm work.”117  
German authorities were willing to help meet agricultural demands. In the spring of 1946, 
the Helmstedt labor office resorted to separating able-bodied men from their families, sending 
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the women, children, and elderly onward for distribution to the various communities. In Bavaria, 
local authorities intercepted trains from the Sudetenland if they had higher proportions of young 
adults, rejecting and sending on trains with the elderly and sick to other states, who protested 
being stuck with “unproductive” elements.118 Once they arrived at their final destinations, 
farmers “selected” the best laborers to take in, leaving the rest behind at the square or train 
station for the authorities to deal with.119 Social workers from Marburg complained to regional 
officials of veritable slave or cattle markets, and that at the arrival of expellees “the people act 
like beasts, one absolutely must intervene with police.”120  
Despite being a welcome source of cheap labor, anger erupted when expellees didn’t play 
along or show sufficient “gratitude.” At the mercy of domineering “hosts” and forced to work 
long hours for minimal pay, expellees quite often felt that they were indentured servants, whose 
presence was barely tolerated. Their reduction to agricultural workers and hired help represented 
a real social degradation for erstwhile independent farmers, skilled laborers, and expellees from 
urban areas alike. Moreover, the exploitation combined with seething resentment and demeaning 
treatment produced endless humiliating incidents that often left deep marks: Years later, a 
woman living for a time on a farm continued to angrily recall a particularly mortifying incident, 
in which she had to serve guests during a wedding feast at the house and periodically endure the 
matriarch opening and inspecting her mouth to see if she had eaten any of the food.121 
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Expellees engendered sheer contempt among many, who saw in them an existential threat 
to, as one 1947 report put it, “the homeland-rooted character of our community” and the “ancient 
tribal values” of “hospitality and moral uprightness.” 122 An inhabitant of Celle in 1947 claimed 
that “every farm is completely undermined by the ferment of refugees, this foreign element 
actually undermines every enterprise. They are hostile to family and to work, and…permanently 
shatter the uniform character of our villages and farms.123 Another complaint from Baden-
Württemberg protested that “the homeland expellees can’t forever pester us. […] We aren’t at 
fault that they had to leave their homeland. They may always talk about how we all lost the war; 
but one can’t just so simply want to share everything. […] The homeland expellees must leave 
here and will. If necessary, then one must use force. One wants to take the land away from us 
little people so that the homeland expellees get farms.”124 A Lower Saxon farmwoman’s 1948 
letter was more succinct: “The refugees are difficult to stomach.”125 
These tensions were partially related to perceived differences in lifestyles between the 
local community and its new citizens. The outsiders engendered an existential threat to, as one 
1947 report put it, “the homeland-rooted character of our community” and the “ancient tribal 
values” of “hospitality and moral uprightness.” 126 For the isolated and tight-knit communities, 
the sudden introduction of large groups of people with a different cultural, social, or religious 
background provided real and imagined gulfs between the indigenous people and newcomers. In 
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the Soviet Zone, refugees faced particular animosity in areas with a high proportion of Sorbs, a 
Slavic minority, who in some instances reportedly pelted arrivals with stones.127 A tremendous 
point of contention were differences in social background. In Celle, a clergyman complained that 
the refugees from mostly urban areas brought “big city assumptions to the countryside as well as 
an unwillingness to help.”128 In rural Franconia, Paul Erker’s study found that Silesians faced 
similar rejections of their “urban attitudes and lifestyle [that] seemed to represent a foreign way 
of life which destroyed the homogenous character of the village.”129  
Denominational differences played a considerable role in the antagonism between the 
two populations as well, though researchers remain divided on how central these truly were.130 
Numerous examples, however, suggest that at the very least, religion and different religious 
practices within the same confession could become a pretense for discrimination and 
misunderstandings. In the pietistic communities of Württemberg, the vivacious and very urban 
catholic Sudeten Germans caused indignation by introducing movie theaters, dance venues, and 
sport clubs to village life.131 The cultural shocks also worked in reverse: Devout expellees from 
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Hungary openly demonstrated as late as the mid-1950s against the Shrove Tuesday celebrations 
of the Swabian-Alemannic region, which they decried as “unchristian” blasphemy.132 
Indeed, as societal leaders, prominent clergy were in a position to promote greater efforts 
of lending a hand. Yet ambivalence emerged even in institutions intimately involved in the care 
of the expellees like no other organization in the immediate postwar era. A December 1946 
pastoral letter of Archbishop Michael Faulhaber to the diocese of Munich painted evocative 
images for Bavarian Catholics: “In long columns, accompanied on both sides of the avenues by 
the apocalyptic riders of famine and death, the millions of refugees…have migrated into 
Bavaria.” Faulhaber preached that “those who have are obligated before God and their 
conscience to help those who have not within the limits of the possible and reasonable.” The 
message was undercut, however, with the reminder to refugees that they could not violate the 
Ten Commandments that delineated the sanctity of property and sin of covetousness, and the 
importance of Bavarian “age-old and holy tradition” such as families reserving places in church. 
The expellees were to find their appropriate places on the “benches for refugees.”133 
Faulhaber not only implied a second class citizenship, but explicitly doubted whether the 
refugees had a future: Only pending peace treaties which could “open the return of the homesick 
expellees to their homeland” or emigration, as “was possible…for the Jews,” offered feasible 
solutions. When a delegation of refugees approached Faulhaber in mid-1945 to request the 
bishop’s assistance, he demurred and directed them to the Bavarian Red Cross; the Protestant 
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State Bishop Hans Meiser likewise declined support.134 The churches were, in effect, highly 
ambivalent. The Council of the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) insisted to the Allied 
Control Council and United Nations that “[expellees] will never find their way out of misery” 
and would “rip the rest of the German population deeper into perpetual hunger crisis” if the 
forced migrations were not reversed or the agricultural breadbasket of the German East 
returned.135 Despite the famous Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt of the EKD in October 1945, 
clerical notables generally refrained from informing the public in detail of the causes of their 
suffering or addressing German war crimes, and instead lamented the effects of war on 
Germany.136 For many in a position to intervene, there was no future for expellees in Germany 
and, therefore, a reluctance to pave the way for their integration.  
From a 21st century perspective, these tensions seem quaint and rather mundane, and 
speak to how much the postwar displacement of millions of Germans diminished such cultural, 
linguistic, and religious differences. Yet in 1940s Germany, these were still powerful sources of 
identity and the influx of large groups of people with “foreign” habits was seen as a humanitarian 
as well as existential crisis that seemed irresolvable. Refugees needed to leave, locals argued, if 
they and their way of life were to survive.  Long after 1945 in Lower Saxony, locals continued to 
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allege that “the three great maladies [after the war] were the wild boars, the potato weevils, and 
the refugees.”137 Poems from the 1940s capture local resentments: 
“Dear God in heaven, see our suffering, 
we farmers have no lard and no bread. 
Refugees gorge until they are fat and plump 
and steal our last bed. 
We starve and suffer great harm, 
dear God, send this rabble home. 
Send them back to Czechoslovakia, 
dear God, free us from this swarm. 
They have no faith and no name,  
these threefold accursed, forever and ever Amen.138 
 
Germans attributed all manner of ills to the new inhabitants. The historian Rainer Schulze 
notes that “rumors circulated that most newcomers were prone to stealing and other dishonest 
activities, that the people from the East were dirty and slovenly; some also felt the newcomers 
had no ‘culture.’”139 A city council woman in Passau, who freely admitted that “at the sight of 
that rabble, one’s stomach churns,” objected to the building of facilities at the refugee camp, 
pondering “why people who have never seen a bathtub need a bathroom!” 140 Others alleged that 
the East Germans were “cowardly” because they had fled and let themselves be driven from their 
homelands; “vagrants” who “gypsied around” and were “rootless”; “asocial” who were “lazy and 
work-shy”; or “dirty” and “infested” with flees and lice.141 Expellees were blamed for the 
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increase in venereal disease and children born out of wedlock, the result of rapes endured during 
the forced migration. In Bavaria, the rise in divorces was blamed on refugees, though other 
factors such as husbands killed during the war or missing in action explain the anomaly.142  
Some of the allegations entered the realm of the patently absurd. In Mecklenburg, locals 
believed that expellees used their knowledge of Slavic languages to masquerade as Soviet 
soldiers and engage in plundering.143 In southern Germany, meanwhile, a community drove a 
woman from the farm she had been assigned to after being accused of being a witch after locals 
and livestock inexplicably became ill.144 The Rhein-Neckar Zeitung newspaper endorsed these 
malicious recriminations: “The refugee is fundamentally dirty. They are generally primitive, they 
are even in principle dishonest. That they are lazy goes without saying, and they would rather 
swindle an honest native than to take on work from him. Having said all that, they are the most 
quarrelsome people that arrives in our lanes and alleyways. And they know no thanks for what is 
being done for them. This is what one hears in ninety of a hundred conversations about 
refugees.”145 Profound animosity, paired with a sense that locals’ sacrifices and generosity went 
unappreciated, dominated the general feeling in Germany’s countryside.146 
Much of the disdain was rooted in profound ignorance, as Sudeten Germans discovered 
when their surprised neighbors asked how they could speak German so well if they come from 
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Czechoslovakia.147 For others, the appearance of refugees seemed to be the first time that they 
were made aware of the consequences of the war: After arriving in the Swabian village of Aalen, 
a woman recalled a perplexed civil servant asking her why she had not simply stayed at home 
instead of coming there.148 For those who had spent the war in the isolation of the countryside, 
the stories of flight and expulsion elicited disbelief among many who understandably could not 
imagine such suffering. Without an understanding of what had happened “in the East,” few could 
see the disheveled columns arriving at the local train station as victims of war.  
The refugee crisis also permitted the reframing of recent history and deflection of war 
guilt for those unwilling to contemplate the legacy of Nazism or attempting to distance 
themselves from the immediate past. A British Military Government’s 1947 survey on the 
integration of refugees found that the indigenous population frequently justified their disdain for 
the newcomers because many were “Nazis and militarists.”149 Natives deflected responsibility 
and guilt for Nazism by frequently painting expellees as the source of National Socialism and the 
lost war.150 The October 1945 report of a district administrator in Rosenheim on the mood of the 
local population capture condemnations leveled against the expellees: “Bavaria wants absolutely 
nothing more to do with Prussia…for Prussia signifies to us fascism and militarism.”151 
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However, when the expellees demonstrated an impeccable opposition against the Nazi regime as 
was the case with registered antifascists, suspicions of and disgust for their relationship to 
communism and preferential treatment particularly in the Soviet zone sparked resentment and 
envy.152 
The conflicted confrontation with the refugees as representatives of the collapsed Third 
Reich in either case produced self-serving justifications to refuse aid and demands for 
preferential treatment from occupation authorities in the face of the threat the newcomers 
represented. This becomes especially clear when expellees threatened the tranquility of 
communities navigating the denazification directives of the occupation authorities, thereby 
sparking a “veritable victimhood competition.”153 The indigenous population feared that 
involvement in the Nazi regime could cost them their livelihood and employment, and argued 
that they were disadvantaged in comparison to expellees, who could hide in anonymity and 
connive their way into replacing them.154 Allegations that the East Germans were the true Nazis 
abounded; a Bavarian civil servant lamented in June 1946 that he had “never seen as many 
giving the Hitler salute as in the Sudetenland” and pleaded that all refugees should be assumed 
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guilty until proven innocent.155 Expellees for their part framed themselves as the greater victims 
of the war and in need of leniency, as in many cases they lacked necessary documentation to pass 
the denazification process.156 The clearance of a tribunal represented the first step toward 
employment, and expellees complained that local courts dragged their feet to protect local 
business interests and lamented that the mass migration deprived them of networks of witnesses 
who could testify on their behalf.157  
The reframing of the Nazi past and shifting of blame often revealed deep-seated regional 
stereotypes and, ironically, fascist rhetoric. Jakob Fischbacher, co-founder of the nativist 
Bavarian Party, made national headlines with a tirade in May 1947 against Prussians, whom he 
held accountable for “seducing” Bavarians to Nazism. To eliminate “un-Bavarian tendencies” 
that would plunge Bavaria into disaster, Fischbacher called for their deportation to Siberia.158 His 
comments reveal how the mass migrations amplified longstanding regional animosities toward 
“Prussians,” who had long carried the blame for German militarism and the subjugation of 
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regional identities.159 Even Konrad Adenauer in May 1946 feared an implantation of “the 
Prussian spirit in our Rhenish youth.”160  
Fischbacher’s racially charged diatribe, however, also demonstrates extant bigotries 
toward peoples “in the East.” Refugees were referred to as Wasserpolen (“watered-down Poles”), 
“Russians,” Rucksackdeutsche (“backpack Germans”), “forty-kilo gypsies,” and “Pimoks,” a 
Westphalian slur used to describe Polish laborers during the 19th century.161 Longstanding 
disgust toward “the East” combined with more recent Nazi racism were quickly directing 
themselves toward the expellees. Even Joseph Goebbels was stunned by East Germans during a 
chance encounter with a trek in March 1945, remarking that “what is streaming into the Reich 
under the label of German is not exactly exhilarating. I think that in the West more Germanic 
peoples [i.e. Allied troops] are intruding by force than Germanic peoples are coming into the 
Reich peacefully.”162 The Nazi propaganda chief was not alone in his skepticism: National 
Socialist rhetoric permeated a protest letter of rural notables in the late 1940s which argued that 
the “purity of the blood is very questionable” and threatened the “authentic character of our 
people [Volkstum] through mixture with foreign and dissimilar [artfremd] character.”163 
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Ostensible inferiorities could just as easily be forgiven, however, when the presence of DPs and 
foreign slave workers unified expellee and non-expellee in their animosity.164  
The curious mixture of radicalism, racial hatred, and shifting of blame for National 
Socialism and the war onto East Germans implied that they were not only a threat to postwar 
German social harmony, but outsiders undeserving of sympathy and aid. Nowhere was this 
paradoxical combination more pronounced than in Schleswig-Holstein, where a nativist 
movement mobilized fears of Prussian subversion and a National Socialist reemergence to forge 
alliances with the Danish minority and force a secession from Germany to Denmark. Writing to a 
Danish-language paper in 1947, a farmer warned that “one should not believe that the Prussian 
spirit is dead with the end of the Nazi regime and dissolution of Prussia. No, it lives in all those 
people who came to us from the East and under whose foreign rule we have to live.”165 In a state 
where the Nazi Party celebrated some of its first electoral breakthroughs, nativist elements 
ironically now attempted to distance themselves from the Third Reich by accusing the East 
Germans of fascist sympathies. “The refugees saved their savings books but lost their party 
memberships” a popular refrain jested.166 The journalist Tage Mortensen produced a brochure in 
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which he spelled out the dangers of “Hitler’s guests,” whose “Slavic-Germanic blood mixture” 
had formed “the foundation of all of the German politics of conquest from Frederick the Great to 
Hitler.”167 At stake, he alleged, was the preservation of the democracy now trying to take root. 
The rejections of fascist ideology were undermined, however, by the racism that 
drenched the suspicions and disapprovals of some inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein. Already in 
October 1945, a letter to Field Marshal Montgomery urged him to ensure that natives retained 
positions of power, explaining that “this stream of foreigners…threatens to extinguish 
[auslöschen] our ancestral Nordic character and represents the centuries-old danger that our 
people may become Prussian.” In an accompanying addendum, the authors claimed the refugees 
would “suffocate or even biologically pollute [überfremden]” and “racially extinguish” the 
native population.168 Even Tage Mortensen’s defense of democracy included an examination of 
the racial peculiarities of the Prussians, a “mulatto race” and people of “mixed-blood” 
(Mischlinge) whose women had broad cheekbones and “powerful and stubby fingers like the 
Polish girls who in recent times [i.e. the Third Reich] worked on the southern islands of 
Denmark during the beet harvest.”169 Caricatures in Danish-language papers depicted the 
refugees as rats, and locals assured British observers that these “foreign people” possessed the 
“worst human characteristics” and “lived a parasitic life.”.170 “Throw that shit into the North 
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Sea,” radicals demanded.171  With such rhetoric, several populist nativist parties achieved 
moderate electoral successes into the 1950s in elections in Kiel, Lübeck, and Flensburg, where 
they even won a majority.  
The hateful language often culminated in threats of violence.  In March 1947 a placard in 
the Bavarian town of Egmating demanded: “Out with the refugees from our village! Give them 
the whip instead of accommodation—this Sudeten rabble! Long live our Bavarian land!”172 Into 
the 1960s, Rhineland carnival songs professed that the population “would laugh ourselves silly if 
they were gone again” on a transport, or jested that expellees would be “knocked dead” if the 
East Germans wouldn’t disappear on their own.173 A popular “prayer” at the time decried the 
“wretched rubbish from the East” that “live on our dime” and concluded that if the natives want 
to have their lives back, “then the others must drift toward heaven.” 174 Traces of the Third 
Reich’s barbarism reared their ugly head as well: a notable wine merchant received a 1,000 DM 
fine from the Wiesbaden criminal court after refusing an invoice from an expellee freight carrier, 
declaring “you refugees all belong in Auschwitz in the box [i.e. gas chamber].”175  
It is unsurprising that the combination of extreme hatred and violent rhetoric spilled over 
into actual physical confrontations that ended with injuries and occasionally death.176 In an 
interview decades later, an expellee recalled that “he had the feeling as a child that one was all of 
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a sudden not someone anymore, but instead ostracized cattle…Constantly youths would come 
who would say, if you don’t give us that, then we will beat you dead and nothing will happen to 
us.” Another woman who settled in the same Bavarian village remembered on her first day trying 
to play with a local boy who exclaimed “now the dirty Polaks are coming,” firing at her with a 
slingshot.”177 It was not unheard of that fights broke out particularly when authorities attempted 
to forcefully move refugees into confiscated homes, as was the case involving a seemingly 
notorious pair of “hard-hearted perpetually unwed crones” in a village near the Swabian city of 
Sigmaringen. On October 31, 1947, the local paper informed readers, the women “stubbornly 
refused for hours to cede three of four completely vacant rooms to a refugee family.” The 
authorities present were “bombarded with the foulest of insults and it even came to fisticuffs, 
during which the town’s mayor received an injury to his forearm and a police official had his tie, 
uniform buttons, and insignia torn off.” Inconceivably, “Luise St. behaved the most ‘dignified,’ 
as even after having already been arrested and locked into a room, she leaped out of the window 
in order to continue to participate in the contumacy.”178 
Events often took a much more serious turn when outraged locals and desperate refugees 
faced off. In Sigmaringen, the local paper painted a bleak and tense situation in the city center at 
the height of the crisis in December 1947: 
“Evening upon evening and night upon night the overcrowded trains 
bring travelers from all directions. Many transients mill about the train 
station. The possibilities for an overnight accommodation are limited and 
on top of that the station mission is no longer distributing blankets, since 
many have already been stolen. Therefore the entire burden falls to the 
sisters of the Fidelishaus. But they receive no thanks for their selfless 
sacrifice. Just recently 30 wool blankets were taken, along with light 
bulbs, watches, linens, and coats. Yet the most terrible thing is that 
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robust hoarders have managed to address the sisters as “scallywags” 
when there is no more room to spend the night. Others talk of ‘burning 
down the shack.’”179 
 
While the report indicted refugees for thievery and intimidation, all too often natives 
resorted to violence. Klaus Seiler recalls how he and his father were caught stealing potatoes. 
“Over the din of the tractor: my father yells, the farmer screams and waves the arms about; 
curses, expletives, the men tear at the sacks. Then my father raises the pick, it’s raised, it quivers 
in the air—the farmer directly under it; real close. We hold our breath. What happens, when it 
comes crashing down? An eternity passes. My father lets the pick sink. We are numb. Our 
handcart is empty.”180 Such altercations could end tragically: in the Bavarian town of Degendorf, 
a farmer beat a refugee child he had caught stealing pears from his orchard to death.181 
On November 6, 1946, the front page of the Freie Presse, a regional newspaper for the 
state of Lippe, reported that the “scenes of misery are becoming increasingly more dreadful,” 
producing “a terrible crop for the future.” The editors asked what many readers must have 
thought: “Is this how the world should recover?”182 A refugee poem that emerged in Lower 
Saxony during the 1940s captures an equal amount of uncertainty and anxiety when expellees 
contemplated the future: “Dear God, let us soon return home/ because in Oldenburg we can no 
longer stand it/ Where the farmers are more stubborn than tanks/ there is no homeland for 
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Silesian children.”183 With no way back and the new homeland cold and foreign, expellees 
themselves needed to fight for recognition. 
 
“We Forever Belong Together”: Expellees and the Birth of the “Community of Fate” 
Arriving in many cases with nothing but the clothes on their backs, the first priority for 
many refugees was to impress upon the indigenous Germans that they were not paupers looking 
for handouts. The sudden decline in social standing was difficult to bear, and expellees often felt 
a veritable compulsion to explain their previous lives and sense of loss to native Germans, as the 
poem in a 1949 letter to the Sudeten German labor leader Wenzel Jaksch expresses: “Understand 
me, I want to say to the other/ You still have a country over which you can bother/ I however 
must carry the most terrible sorrow/ For my homeland is in the hands of the robber.”184 “Hardly a 
refugee enters a stranger’s house without noting that he himself also once had his own house,” 
the sociologist Elisabeth Pfeil noted in her 1948 study.185  
 The urge to cast off the suspicion of vagrants often led to miscommunication, however. A 
young refugee from Budweis recalled the indignation her mother felt after the farmer with whom 
they were housed offered leftovers to the family instead of feeding it the pigs. This kind gesture 
rubbed the erstwhile wealthy bourgeois woman, who listed the jewelry and possessions she once, 
the wrong way. “They lastly probably did not believe her. She after all had no evidence, not even 
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a photo.”186 A Sudeten German years later said that often one heard from neighbors: “Yes, yes, 
where you were everyone probably had big houses.”187 Locals soon began to joke that refugees 
came from the land of Wir-hatten (“we-had”), a disbelief that turned to envy once material aid 
started to flow in the 1950s; if all the information of lost properties on the compensation forms 
were true, it was remarked, then Germany must have reached to the Urals before the war.188 
 Sometimes expellees managed to address larger audiences of native Germans and evoke 
sympathy and understanding, however. Intent on organizing a Christmas celebration “like we 
had back home,” a Sudeten woman in a small town in Hessen managed to attract curious 
neighbors and regale them with traditional songs and stories. The event featured expellee 
children explaining their traditions, interrupted with a staged interjection from an older child: 
“You still have it well. You still have your mother…But I have no one, I am from the 
Sudetenland.”189 The play was such a success that in subsequent years it was performed in 
neighboring villages. Locals were exposed to and moved by flight and expulsion narratives in 
other contexts as well. In the small Hessian town of Todenhausen, a couple who owned a local 
inn not only took in refugees, but expressed a keen interest in their experiences. Once a month 
they organized a “homeland evening” for local expellees and natives. “The natives sang their 
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songs, the East Prussians the ‘Land of Dark Forests,’ the Silesians the ‘Great Mountain Song,’ 
and because all were unified in the wish to have a good time, one got along well together.”190 
 These “organic” attempts of approaching their neighbors and asserting themselves 
undoubtedly evoked sympathy and eased the social integration into communities. In the face of 
antipathy and prejudice, refugees insisted upon being seen as equal members of the German 
community. In January 1948, the refugee Franz Renelt pleaded the case of the expellees before 
the city council and citizens of the Swabian community of Nürtingen, where refugees constituted 
half of the population:  
“We are definitely not refugees. Against all moral rights we were chased 
out of our homes and driven from our homeland, robbed of all 
possessions, brought here unwillingly and without being asked, and 
certainly not voluntarily. We also are not at fault for the war, as we so 
often hear. Because the movement that conjured the greatest misfortune 
in German history reached maturity here and was brought to us. We 
certainly are not inferior people from the East. […] I beg you to consider 
that we alone did not lose the war, and we cannot believe that we alone 
must pay for it with our possessions and property, we expect a just 
equalization of the burdens. We therefore plead for your understanding 
for the situation and support. I appeal to your sense of justice 
and…[request] your help in improving the difficult situation of the new 
citizens so heavily afflicted by fate.”191 
 
By asserting themselves, expellees also claimed an identity within an emotional 
community. Camps in particular offered an incubator for this community, as here expellees could 
cope with the loss of their homeland and rely on the support of one another instead of the 
unfamiliar and hostile outside world.192 So unifying were the bonds of shared suffering in a 
hostile and strange place that in some cases expellees refused to leave their support network and 
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police force was required to resettle them.193 The scenes once “for the first time people who had 
still maintained their erstwhile village communities even in the Bavarian refugee camps were 
separated from one another” were bitter and glaring to even observers of the local press.194 But 
there was something more than emotional support at stake. Summarizing the first reunion of the 
citizens of Reppen, the author articulated the “unspoken thought” all had on their minds: “We 
who are loyal to the homeland, who had to give up and leave the homeland, we forever belong 
together, we are a Schicksalsgemeinschaft born in a time of profound experience.”195  
 This Schicksalsgemeinschaft gradually coalesced into a vehicle for political and social 
demands, as we shall see in later chapters. For now, it must be noted that a communal identity 
organically emerged in response to hostility and apathy expellees faced. A 1948 hunger strike of 
72,000 refugees in Dachau and nearby refugee camps demanding increased food rations and 
monthly stipends revealed the contours of this emerging social force.196 Led by the Sudeten 
German Egon Hermann, the American journalist Ernest Leister recounted the fiery rhetoric: “A 
burning-eyed man of fifty was exhorting them with the controlled rage of a practiced orator. ‘Let 
them remember,’ he shouted in a German which had the thick accent of the Sudetenland, ‘that 
we are German too, that German blood runs fiercely in our veins. Let them not dare any longer to 
treat us as aliens in an alien land. When the might of the Fatherland was marching in triumph, we 
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marched along. Let them care for us now in defeat.’”197 Hermann’s appeals to the Bavarian 
government and German people variously spoke of refugees in Dachau suffering from conditions 
“worse than in a concentration camp,” as reduced to the status of wartime “Ostarbeiter,” and 
victims of intentional destruction who preferred “the quicker and painless path of extermination 
in the form of gassings or other known means of liquidation.”198  
Leister’s dismay over the demagoguery, and German politicians’ fears of a Bolshevik 
uprising paving the way for communism in Bizonia, overlooked Hermann’s appeal to expellee 
identity.199 Herrmann’s hijacking of a narrative of Jewish suffering for German refugees revealed 
a potent development. By appropriating mental images associated with the victims of the Third 
Reich and Germany’s war of annihilation, Herrmann shrewdly maneuvered the expellees into the 
postwar category of “victims of fascism” through an association with the persecuted of the Nazi 
regime. It also revealed the articulation of an identity, of expellees as the “victims of war.”  
This is how many expellees indeed saw themselves. They had not waged the war, yet had 
paid for it dearly. They were not mere refugees, but Heimatvertriebene.200 They were victims, 
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but a special kind of victim: Those most harshly afflicted by fate. To win social recognition and 
make claims for material aid, expulsion narratives needed to be communicated to non-expellees. 
As an August 1947 letter surmised: “What all is in that word Ostflücthling. Often without any 
understanding or sympathy, or even with disdain in tone, this word is spoken. What new strength 
it gives when one finds a person who attempts to understand all of our fortunes and to 
help….Then our lot will no longer be so heavy and this word ‘Ostflücthling’ will lose much of its 
harshness.”201 These contours provided a useful point of departure for the expellee organizations 
to politicize and instrumentalize “flight and expulsion.” 
 
Conclusion 
In 1948, the East Prussian expellee and sociologist Elisabeth Pfeil attempted a first 
academic assessment of the social impact of the ubiquitous “figure of a turning point in history,” 
the refugee, simultaneously issuing a plea for sympathy and aid: “Here are the millions of 
homeless…a million-fold yearning, many thousand-fold embitterment. Doesn’t it lay like a cloud 
of pain over Germany at night? Doesn’t anyone hear the lament?”202 While the world seemingly 
refused to listen, expellees indeed were lamenting their past, as well as fearing for their future, 
with one another and their new neighbors.  
In attempting to cope with their biographical ruptures, expellees circulated narratives of 
“flight and expulsion.” The press as well sought to provide explanations for the disaster that 
befell Germany. Through constant telling and re-telling, both of these levels of discourse were 
contributing to a stylized narrative and adding another layer of memory that focused on 
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commonalities of loss and suffering, and began to streamline the immense plurality of 
experiences during the forced migrations.  
Furthermore, with each other, the recounting fostered a sense of emotional community 
and forged a Schicksalsgemeinschaft. As a woman writing from the Kaliningrad Oblast in 
February 1947 reminded her friends: “Even if now as slave and maidservant, you are among 
Germans...when all are together, then everything can be born easily. Then one laments his plight 
and one consoles one another, but alone like this life is tough, especially in these times.”203 
Directed toward their hard-hearted neighbors, it was an assertion of their identity as victim and 
implicit demand for recognition which in the short term helped expellees find a niche and ease 
their transition into the community. In the long term, leveraging their suffering as an argument 
for an obligation for aid and tolerance would prove the means for integration. In other words: 
The crucial immediate postwar years laid a foundation upon which expellee associations could 
build in order to obtain legal and economic guarantees.
                                                 









“Let us accept that these things happened with the acquiescence of the democratic 
Western Allies and continue to happen, and that they are clad in idioms such as ‘securing of 
peace’ and ‘defense of democracy.’” Speaking in 1947 on a summer day in Munich, the Silesian 
continued his denouncement of the expulsions, pointing out that they were “committed by 
nations who officially—and in contrast to the ‘barbaric’ Germans—are counted among the 
‘lovers of peace and justice,’ the ‘democratic’ and ‘culturally high-standing,’ the ‘protectors of 
human rights’ and the ‘carriers of the ideals of freedom.’” The speaker ended his rebuke with an 
appeal, beseeching the governments of the United States and Great Britain to “not create a new 
hearth of sickness that one day both peoples must regret deeply.”1 These bitter recriminations 
were not uttered by a Nazi or embittered nationalist, but by the venerable Social 
Democrat Paul Löbe, former Vice President of the Weimar National Assembly, Reichstag 
President, and head of the German chapter of the Paneuropean Union. During the interwar years, 
the parliamentarian worked to try and reverse German territorial losses to Poland. In the summer 
of 1945, he personally experienced the effects of geographic reordering: Together with hundreds 
of others, Löbe boarded a cattle car in Glatz (Kłodzko). 
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The values cynically identified by Löbe nevertheless presented inroads for expellee 
activists, who sought to capitalize on these principles and cultivate sympathy abroad. A number 
of advocates already in the summer of 1945 recognized that their best chances lay with American 
and British audiences, whose compassion they then could channel for their agendas of halting or 
reversing the still ongoing forced migrations, and getting the Anglo-American world to provide 
material support. Expellee leaders quickly grasped that improving the lot of their constituents or 
revising the postwar order required Western support.  
Examining expellee lobby efforts abroad is necessary for several reasons. First, in order 
to sway foreign audiences, the expellee advocates developed rhetorical strategies that 
underpinned the appeals and demands leveraged against Western governments. These arguments 
rested upon illuminating expellee suffering, yet two distinct strands emerged, which will be 
treated in two case studies focused on Sudeten German activists in the social democratic and 
conservative camps. An “antifascist expellee narrative” developed by Wenzel Jaksch sought to 
mobilize wartime rhetoric and appealing to mainly British audiences that the expulsions were not 
only morally wrong, but affected innocent antifascist Germans. A second “nationalist expellee 
narrative,” however, attempted to engage in whataboutism and denounce Allied crimes, and was 
closely associated with elements that would fuse into the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft, or 
homeland association. These two differing narratives predated the later, more well-known 
anticommunist revanchist discourse of “winning back the homeland,” yet must be examined 
because they laid important foundations for later activists to expound upon.  
While immensely difficult to reconstruct due to a fragmentary source base, these early 
campaigns aiming to change Allied policy remain underappreciated in the historiography.2 With 
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an uncommonly extensive source base, focusing on the Sudeten Germans makes eminent sense. 
Moreover, it is unsurprising that the Sudeten Germans stand at the center of this analysis, as they 
spearheaded lobbying efforts. Their experience as a prewar minority pressure group struggling 
for political rights made them keenly aware of the power of the court of international opinion, 
and provided a strategic playbook that they turned to in 1945. Furthermore, figures such as 
Wenzel Jaksch cultivated extensive networks while in exile that other expellees did not possess. 
Moreover, as the second-largest bloc of expellees generally and the largest in the American 
Zone, so that an examination of Sudeten special pleading captures not only the most significant, 
but also influential early postwar efforts to internationalize “flight and expulsion.”  
Second, identifying the Western Allies as the key audience to win over was not merely 
sound because as occupiers they held considerable power over the treatment and policy 
governing the fates of expellees. As will be shown, there existed tremendous trepidation over the 
expulsions in the United States and Great Britain among politicians, journalists, key public 
figures, and even the public. This surprising level of outrage and concern remains largely 
overlooked. However, the mounting pressure and indignation—supplied with German arguments 
and literature—managed to make a “breach in the wall of silence,” as expellees crowed.3 Though 
ultimately failing to end or reverse the expulsions or winning back the homeland, expellee 
victimhood helped convince the Anglo-American governments to adopt more generous policies, 
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which translated into crucial material aid in the lean years before 1948, but also set the stage for 
Marshall Aid and the reconstruction of Europe. In other words: Expellee lobbying is an 
important yet neglected factor in explaining how and why West Germany was absorbed into the 
Western community of values. 
Lastly, and most crucially, in their international lobbying, Jaksch and his colleagues 
emerged as the first collectors of testimonies and constructors of expellee memory. Their initial 
activities streamlined the expellee narrative into a politically useful chronicle, parts of which 
influenced the discourse in Germany: Their efforts created a feedback loop, in which Americans 
and British supporters adopted their arguments, which were then translated back into German 
and entered collective memory. We must therefore examine the narratives constructed and 
circulated abroad because they are an overlooked layer in the master narrative of “flight and 
expulsion.” The cultural memory of the forced migrations is largely attributed to German 
domestic actors and the Landsmannschaften. However, these organizations built on the efforts 




“A New, and Greater, Lidice”: Wenzel Jaksch and the “Antifascist Expellee Narrative”, 
1944-1949 
 
The first source of expellee lobbying emanated from the Social Democrat and labor 
activist Wenzel Jaksch.4 As has been explained in earlier chapters, Jaksch’s exile since 1938 in 
London brought him into contact with Beneš and the Czechoslovakian government in exile, as 
well as the Labour Party. The involvement in the anti-Hitler coalition conferred onto Jaksch a 
certain esteem, yet also exposed him to emerging deportation plans circulating within the exile 
and émigré community. In response, Jaksch formed the Democratic Sudeten Committee as a sort 
of exile government working to thwart Czechoslovakian expulsion plans.5  
As we have seen, the Committee and Jaksch publically argued against “a mass transfer of 
minorities” following Nazi Germany’s defeat on moral grounds.6 Jaksch’s appeals even found 
reprinting in leftist papers such as Forward and Left News, thanks in large part to his stature in 
the Sudeten German labor movement and credentials as an avowed antifascist.7 Realizing in the 
summer of 1945 that appeals to prevent a universal expulsion failed, Jaksch committed himself 
to limiting the scale of the deportations and assisting as many expellees as possible. “We are 
very well informed about the monstrously sad situation in the Sudeten territories, and it is 
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extremely difficult to shake the terrible impressions that we take from these reports,” Jaksch 
confided to an émigré friend, adding “our politics now is about getting help for our friends and 
relatives suffering heavily, and whenever we encounter English personalities, our motto is the 
known Goethe words [from Faust]: ‘Enough horror has been disseminated, let rescue be 
inaugurated.’”8  
Jaksch’s rescue efforts mobilized wartime conceptual frameworks of “fascism” and 
“antifascism” in order to plead that Sudeten German antifascists who stood by the Czechs and 
suffered under the yolk of Nazism should be spared from a policy of collective punishment. To 
make his case, Jaksch immediately in the summer of 1945 gathered reports from his contacts in 
Germany and Czechoslovakia.9 The first compilation of these materials was a memorandum 
titled Mass Transfer Becomes Slave Trading, in which Jaksch called for a “total revision” of the 
expulsions to prevent the ruin not just of the Sudetenland, but Europe.10 The exiled Sudeten 
German ironically called for a speeding up of the deportations to save innocent victims from 
“Democratic Belsens” and the plight of “outright slave labour [sic].” Jaksch condemned the 
naiveté of foreign observers who let Czech observers pull the wool over their eyes:  
“Almost every foreign guest is being shepherded to the ruins of Lidice, 
that landmark of Nazi barbarism, while in the Sudetenland thousands of 
new Lidices are being created at the same time. Anyone who has the 
least chance of planting an article in a foreign paper, of course praising 
the expulsion policy, can have a cheap stay in the finest hotels of Prague, 
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plenty of food off the ration, pleasure trips into the countryside, and 
many glasses of the famous Pilsner beer.”11 
 
How Jaksch utilized the information trickling to him in London can be discerned from a 
draft titled “Cain, Where is Your Brother,” an undated memo from 1945 or 1946 located in his 
personal papers. Written in an impassioned tenor and lacking the sophisticated argumentation of 
later appeals, the article exhibits one remarkable curiosity: The names of cities in the examples 
of Czech atrocities committed against the wives of social democrats persecuted by Hitler are 
listed as “x,” “y,” and “z.” The emotionally worded incidents nevertheless read generic enough, 
so that the impression arises that Jaksch drafted a form letter with “fill in the blanks” to which he 
could add names later.12 This strongly suggests that the narrative that Jaksch started constructing 
from abroad constituted a blend of testimony, rumor, and fictionalized incidents. 
In any case, Jaksch resolved to make his case to the general public and confront them 
with the chilling accounts. His initial effort consisted of a series of brochures compiled of his 
source material and published as a supplement to the July and October 1945 editions of Der 
Sozialdemokrat, a publication of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party in London.13 
Dedicated to “all true friends of the Czech people,” the Deportation Drama in Czecho-Slovakia 
informed readers that “the Czech people need your help to save them from the degradation of 
Nazi methods,” framing the persecution of Sudeten Germans as a sort of civil war among 
Czechoslovakian and German antifascists. Appearing as the deportations unfolded, Jaksch cited 
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non-German observers’ estimates of 800,000 deportees, of which at least twenty percent 
purportedly died.14  
While Jaksch did not shrink from castigating the British and American governments for 
their role in the expulsions, he traced Western agreement to the deportations to lies and 
distortions of a duplicitous Beneš and his coterie. Quoting critical British observers, the 
publication also included testimonials of Western observers confirming “the case of a dying 
people.”15 These were juxtaposed with damning quotes of Czech elites and eyewitness accounts 
ranging from an “anti-Fascist woman-refugee” to an “old social democrat” describing scenes of 
appropriation, starvation, beatings, and murder.16 What was happening in Czechoslovakia, 
Jaksch argued, was a violation of Western laws, of democratic principles, and a betrayal of 
Sudeten democrats who had been abandoned in 1938. 
Within the reports, British readers encountered images and rhetoric that must have been 
all too familiar: Czech “concentration camps” that, according to Sudeten victims of Hitler, were 
worse than in the Third Reich; ruthless Czech “storm troopers”; “ghettos” so miserable that even 
German-speaking Jewish Holocaust survivors were appalled; and gruesome massacres such as 
Aussig—which allegedly claimed the lives of as many as 4,000 Germans—that were “a new, and 
greater, Lidice.”17  
The indictments against Potsdam came from a bona fide “hero” of Sudeten democracy, 
readers were assured in closing remarks by the social democratic Sudeten German Richard 
                                                 
14 Jaksch, Deportation Drama in Czecho-Slovakia, 2. The pamphlet went on to allege that the number was likely 
closer to 300,000, an alleged death rate of just under 40%. 
15 Jaksch, 19. 
16 Jaksch, 2–3. 
17 Jaksch, 4–9. 
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Reitzner.18 Jaksch indeed possessed impressive antifascist credentials, and the effort to 
differentiate between Nazis and Sudeten German socialists continued efforts during the war to 
convince the British public of the existence of “other Germans.”19 Yet by conflating genuine 
opponents of Hitler and Henlein with the fate of all Sudeten Germans, Jaksch made an 
emotionally powerful case in a language that British readers could understand. Moreover, by 
selecting expulsion reports that faintly resembled Nazi atrocities, and editorializing them with a 
language typically reserved for German war crimes, the narrative suggested that fascist barbarity 
did not end with Germany’s defeat, and the hard-won victory of democracy was tarnished by the 
barbarism of the expulsions.  
The theme of twice-betrayed antifascists was even stronger in The Tragedy of the 
Socialists of the Sudetenland.20 Asking readers to file protests against the expulsion of “socialists 
from their homes” with their parties and unions and soliciting donations for their aid, the Relief 
Committee for Sudeten Socialists sought to tell the “story of a great wrong,” namely the 
“sentence of death for countless men, women, and children” who have started a “long weary trek 
into the unknown.”21 Deprived of their possessions and denied refuge, “many are dying of 
hunger and exposure.” After a brief history of peaceful German settlement which turned 
                                                 
18 Jaksch, 25. Reitzner, who accompanied Jaksch into exile in London, used the closing page of the brochure to 
combat Czech allegations of Jaksch being a Henlein supporter. Pointing out that “not a single Czech or Slovak 
quisling has yet been tried,” and that instead “Slav Racialists are hunting for ‘Fascists’ everywhere…in the 
internment camps for women, children and babies, among the heroes of the pre-exiled spokesmen of Sudeten 
Democracy.” Reitzner cited that according to the Manchester Guardian, Jaksch’s name appeared on a Gestapo list 
of some 2,500 people to be immediately arrested upon a successful German invasion of Great Britain. Moreover, 
Reitzner highlighted the numerous ways in which Jaksch opposed fascism before 1938 at home and then abroad.  
19 Treuegemeinschaft Sudetendeutscher Sozialdemokraten, Forgotten Heroes: The Victims of Nazi Terrorism in the 
Sudetenland (London, 1943). The publication provided detailed lists of Nazi atrocities against Sudeten German 
socialists, social democrats, and Jews and included biographies and the fates of the victims. 
20 The Tragedy of the Socialists of Sudetenland. (London: Relief Committee for Sudeten Socialists, 1947). 
21 The Tragedy of the Socialists of Sudetenland., 2. 
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“wilderness into prosperous towns and villages,” the brochure pointed out that many Sudeten 
Germans only turned to fascism after the Czech state and the Great Depression turned them into 
paupers in the interwar period. Readers were assured, however, that the majority of expellees 
were “comrades who fought many a battle with us against the international capitalist class.”22 
With an image of Nazis herding Sudeten socialists into concentration camps, the pamphlet 
reminded that “Sudeten workers” had been betrayed three times in a decade: At Munich the 
Western democracies abandoned them, the Czech government handed many over to the Gestapo 
after relinquishing the Sudetenland, and lastly the victors surrendered them to a cruel fate at 
Potsdam.23 The brochure ended with a rousing exhortation to “forge a bond of fraternal solidarity 
with our comrades in Europe, and help to bring to reality that resounding slogan of Karl Marx: 
‘WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE.’”24 
These argumentative strategies—establishing the innocence and victimhood of the 
Sudeten Germans by emphasizing their antifascism, framing the expulsions in a long line of 
betrayals of the German minority, casting the forced transfers as illegitimate violations of law 
and principle, and appropriating words of condemnation from Western figures—set the tone of 
subsequent publications and utterances of exiled Sudeten Germans in London attempting to issue 
“appeals to the conscience of the world” into the late 1940s.25 Jaksch’s “antifascist expellee 
                                                 
22 The Tragedy of the Socialists of Sudetenland., 6. 
23 The Tragedy of the Socialists of Sudetenland., 5. 
24 The Tragedy of the Socialists of Sudetenland., 8. A 1946 flier titled “The Story of a Great Wrong,” itself a reprint 
from an article in The New Leader, seems to have served as the template for The Tragedy of the Socialists of the 
Sudetenland. Informing readers that “they starved in Buchenwald: Now they starve in ‘liberation,’” the pamphlet 
included the same image of arrested socialist Sudetens and even the same turns of phrases. Readers were asked to 
“agitate politically” and demand the end to the deportation of all Sudeten Germans, thereby conflating antifascists 
with the rest of the population. “The Story of a Great Wrong,” in AdsD, Seliger Archiv VII, 2056. 
25 They are apparent, for example, in a series of public speeches intended as “appeals to the conscience of the world” 
in the spring of 1949 by Jaksch and his associate Eugene de Witte, another Sudeten German who spent the war in 
exile in London. Wenzel Jaksch and Eugen de Witte, Der Kampf gegen die Austreibung Appell an das Gewissen der 
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narrative” intended to distance Sudeten Germans from fascism, and therefore must be understood 
as a counter-narrative competing with Czech efforts to emphasize their suffering before the court 
of world public opinion. This narrative circulated as far as Canada, where emigrants and friends 
of Jaksch who founded the émigré community of Tupper Creek after their 1938 flight reprinted 
Sudeten German literature in an effort to convince the Canadian government to raise their 
immigration quotas.26 
In addition to publications and speeches, Jaksch organized charity drives to help his 
compatriots in Germany. These initiatives also doubled as initiatives to arouse sympathy among 
Britons. A Sudeten Christmas fair in December 1945 in Hampstead organized for the benefit of 
“people indiscriminately expelled from Czechoslovakia” and featuring Sudeten German 
handicrafts and foods promised visitors an opportunity to “solve your gift problems” while 
simultaneously helping to raise funds to “relieve suffering of women and children expelled from 
their homes.”27 A number of organizations connected to Jaksch’s circle, including the Relief 
Committee for Sudeten Socialists, the Parliamentary Delegation of Sudeten Labour, and the 
Anglo-Sudeten Club, engaged in PR and fundraising efforts in Great Britain during the 1940s as 
well.28 The Rescue and Relief Committee for Socialist Refugees and Expellees, established in 
                                                 
Welt. 2. Reden ... (Stuttgart: Volkswille, 1948). See also “The Expellee Problem: Czechs and Sudeten Germans after 
the Expulsions,” in AdsD, Seliger Archiv VII, 2056. 
26 Jaksch’s friend, the almost inconceivably named “Willy” Wanka, reiterated Jaksch’s talking points in the 1946 
pamphlet “Twice Victims of Munich: The Tragedy of the Democratic Sudeten Germans.” The same tropes of a 
romanticized history followed by betrayals in the recent past were deployed after descriptions of “terror in the 
Sudetenland.” Wanka assured readers that the “account of conditions…has been gleaned from reliable 
sources...whom I know personally and in whose veracity I have every confidence.” “Twice Victims of Munich: The 
Tragedy of the Democratic Sudeten Germans,” in AdsD, Seliger Archiv VII, 2057. Another contact in Chile, Karl O. 
Paetel, issued similar literature. “Der Todesmarsch der Zehn Millionen,” in Deutsche Blätter 29, January 1946, 4-11, 
in AdsD, Seliger Archiv VII, 2056. 
27 “Come to the Christmas Fair”, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD), Seliger-Archiv VII, 2057.  
28 The Anglo-Sudeten Club, for instance, was founded by Jaksch associate Rudolf Storch in 1948. Emulating the 
tradition of British clubs, the association developed cultural and economic initiatives for the benefit of Sudeten 
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Munich by Almar Reitzner to minister to the “antifascist transports,” also engaged in propaganda 
work to move American and British authorities to aid social democratic Sudeten Germans.29 A 
variety of similar social democratic organizations were constituted in Frankfurt am Main, 
Wiesbaden, Stuttgart, and Weimar, the latter being disbanded after the formation of the SED.30 
The efforts of the Sudeten Germans in London culminated in an official appeal to the 
signatory powers of the Potsdam Agreement and the General Secretary of the United Nations on 
“behalf of the non-Nazi Sudeten population.”31 Jaksch sought materials that revealed “what 
crimes were perpetrated against us,” and used contacts in Germany to solicit a “crushing 
quantity” of evidence in the form of “authentic depictions” documenting “atrocities perpetrated 
against innocent people since the invasion of the Czechs into our homeland.”32 Adolf Tutsch 
distributed leaflets among Sudeten German expellees exhorting them to provide evidence of a 
prescribed series of crimes.33 Above all, Tutsch entreated, “the indictment against the Czechs 
                                                 
refugees and sought to establish contacts to other organizations in order to promote the Sudeten German case. 
Tobias Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende?: sudetendeutsche Organisationen, 1945-1955 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Lang, 2008), 214, 445. A similar club was founded by Sudeten German social democrats living in Sweden since 
1938 in Malmö, Sweden in January 1951. 
29 A 1947 flyer sent to “organizations and persons known to us” in the United States and Great Britain, attempted to 
raise awareness of the harsh conditions for Sudeten and Silesian social democrats. The authors reminded readers that 
these expellees had been the victims of “unfortunate international decisions several times,” and had engaged in a 
“heroic struggle at the side of Czech democracy against the Nazi-Heinlein movement.” Many were victims of fascist 
concentration camps or had served since their exile in the Allied forces. “Help us save these old champions of 
freedom and democracy,” the pamphlet closed. “Hilfskomitee für ausgewiesene Sozialdemokraten,” in AdsD, 
Seliger Archiv VII, 2060. 
30 Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende, 209. Weger emphasizes that this network of social democratic Sudeten 
German organizations, all with loose ties to its nominal leader Jaksch, formed the basis for future SPD expellee 
organizations after the lifting of the coalition ban in 1948. 
31 Wenzel Jaksch, A Petition to the Signatory Powers of the Potsdam Agreement and to the General Secretary of the 
United Nations on Behalf of the Non-Nazi Sudeten Population by the Parliamentary Delegation of Sudeten Labour 
in Great Britain (London, 1947).  
32 Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (BayHStA), Sudetendeutsches Archiv (SdA), NL Wenzel Jaksch 725, 
“Sudetendeutsche, folgender Aufruf,” undated [c. January 1947]. 
33 The desired reports should document crimes concerning “[a]ll persons who had to suffer bodily mistreatment, 
deportations in an inhumane manner, who were tormented to death in coal mines and through slave work in 
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must be scathing.” The operation was heralded as a “first little step in winning back our 
unforgettable homeland,” a duty in which “no one can stand by, all must help, as it is for the 
most important thing: ‘For our homeland.’”  
The directives indicate the agenda of Jaksch as well as the desired tone of the reports, so 
that the end product is hardly surprising. Expanding on his October 1945 pamphlet, Jaksch 
presented to world leaders a history of a peaceful Sudetenland starting in the medieval period 
before chronicling the thwarted self-determination in 1919 and the annexation of 1938, depicted 
as yet another betrayal. As pawns of history, the historic suffering of the Sudetenland culminated 
in its destruction in 1945. The petition proposed the founding of a neutral investigative 
committee under the patronage of the UN, and called for the protection of rights of Sudeten 
Germans in their homeland. It also insisted upon allowing representatives of the Sudeten 
Germans to attend the 1947 foreign ministers conference in London, and demanded the UN and 
victors force Czechoslovakia to pay reparations for damages estimated at four billion US dollars.  
To substantiate its case, the brochure ended with several pages of testimonies from 
various cities. Alleging that the excesses were official Czechoslovak policy and the result of the 
Potsdam Agreement that sanctioned them, the litany of atrocities failed to differentiate between 
the various phases of events in Czechoslovakia. Violent brutalities in the spring of 1945, the wild 
expulsions of the summer and fall, and the orderly transfers were conflated into a single concept 
of “expulsion.” Moreover, the testimonials, often unattributed to ostensibly protect identities, 
ranged from rather matter of fact first person accounts to salacious and dramatically narrated 
                                                 
internment and work camps, the disappearance without a trace of people, etc.” Reports were also requested that 
could speak of “the inhumane edicts that made us into beggars, that chased us into the unknown, many only with 
what they had on their own body. Of the downfall of blooming regions, of the economy, of agriculture, industry and 
trades resulting from the inability of the Czech administrators, as well as of the many conflagrations and wanton 
destruction of realities through which irreplaceable values of the people’s economy went under, which will bring 
with them disastrous consequences for all of Europe.” 
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third person reports from second or third sources. Though Jaksch’s initiative failed, the petition 
was an early attempt of gathering and selecting of testimonies that were in turn arranged into a 
particular narrative for the purpose of raising sympathy among audiences that could intervene in 
the refugee crisis.  
Besides these ambitious appeals, Jaksch attempted to make his case through the British 
press. As a trained journalist, he understood the efficacy of the press and its role in shaping public 
opinion. His high standing in certain British circles opened the door at papers critical of the 
expulsions such as New Statesman and Nation, The Times, and The New Leader, who granted 
Jaksch and his allies space to air their grievances in the summer and fall of 1945.34 Left-leaning 
papers such as Forward, Manchester Guardian, and The Observer echoed the arguments and 
sharply criticized the forced transfers, appealing to the Labour Party to avoid the punishment of 
German workers through excesses that closely resembled Nazi methods.35  
As a social democrat and avowed antifascist, Jaksch placed great hope in internationalism 
and the assistance of foreign socialists. He and his network built relationships to a myriad of 
socialist institutions that, so it was hoped, would aid their Sudeten German brethren.36 Writing to 
a friend in 1946, Jaksch expressed faith that “the good reputation of our movement still offers a 
bridge to the well-meaning of other peoples,” adding that “often we have discussions with our 
                                                 
34 See for example “In this 12th Hour: Help Us Now! An Appeal by a Sudeten Socialist,” The New Leader, January 
19, 1946, 3. Jaksch reiterated the familiar tropes of a “double enslavement” in 1919 and 1938. After longing for an 
end to the war and rejoicing at the sight of American troops, the Sudeten Germans were yet again betrayed when 
Czech authorities turned the country into “one vast concentration camp.” Jaksch included excerpts of letters from 
“socialist comrades,” including a report alleging that in the camps “you can find the same yellow faces as in Belsen 
or Buchenwald.” 
35 Frank, Expelling the Germans, 105. 
36 While admitting the limited success abroad, a letter to Jaksch listed some of the organizations that had been 
approached: Fabian International Bureau, United Nations Association, Federal Union, International Socialist 
Conference. A wide range of left-leaning journals had also demonstrated friendly dispositions: Daily Herald, 
Spectator, New Statesman and Nation, National News Letter, and Socialist Leader. 
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Labour friends who, despite the impressions of the total war and despite the great estrangement 
between the peoples have maintained a feeling heat and a solidary socialist ethos.”37 Jaksch 
nevertheless overestimated his standing. 
As the food crisis in Germany subsided and conditions on transports and in camps 
improved due to international pressure, one Labour ally after another abandoned Jaksch, who 
lamented that they had been “deceived by the clever Prague propaganda.”38 In 1949, the 
Committee of the International Socialist Conference (COMISCO), the forerunner of the Socialist 
International headed by Labour politician Walter Morgan, declined a request from Jaksch’s 
associates for Sudeten German representation on grounds that it violated the organization’s 
statutes.39 Their case would not be part of the agenda of organized international socialism. 
Other concerns may also explain the organization’s refusal. The exile Julius Braunthal 
alerted COMISCO of the “völkisch” activities of social democratic Sudeten Germans with ties to 
the London faction in Austria. Writing to Erich Ollenhauer in 1950, Braunthal expressed concern 
over the “alliance of our comrades with half-Nazis and full-Nazis.”40 Jaksch’s energetic lobbying 
engendered disdain in many circles and raised suspicion of irredentism.41 Similar concerns led to 
rejections of Jaksch’s requests for emigration to Bizonia from Allied military governments, who 
                                                 
37 AdsD, NL Jaksch, J3, Jaksch to Schmiedl, April 24, 1946. 
38 Quoted in Frank, Expelling the Germans, 235–36.  
39 COMISCO provided only one membership per country, and Czechoslovakia already had delegates represented. 
The West German SPD refused to intercede, arguing that the Sudeten Germans could find a new home among social 
democratic parties in West Germany or Austria. Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende, 214–15. 
40 Quoted in Weger, 214–15. 
41 In August 1947, the journalist Edwin Hartrich classified Jaksch as a “skilled propagandist” engaged in a “Sudeten 
pawn game,” who promised his compatriots an imminent return to their homeland. The Czechoslovakian Foreign 
Minister Vladimír Clementis voiced similar concerns in December 1947, denouncing Jaksch as the “leading spirit 
of…revisionist goals.” Weger, 212–13. 
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feared that his politics could radicalize the SPD that, reportedly, considered Jaksch for the 
position of party spokesperson.42 An American intelligence report in the spring of 1947 
disapproved of Jaksch-affiliated organizations in Germany, many of which cultivated ties across 
zones and established offices in cities near the Czechoslovakian border. The operation, the 
memorandum stated, had as its goal the “reconstitution of the Sudetenland” and caused unrest 
among expellees with a leafleting campaign.43 Suspicions were further amplified by intelligence 
reports of Jaksch’s contact with the “left wing” Nazi Otto Strasser, in Canadian exile since his 
flight from Germany in the wake of the “Knight of the Long Knives” putsch in 1934. 
Supposedly, the two forged plans for a German nationalist political movement.44  
Ultimately, advisors to Clay concluded that Jaksch had taken up contact with irredentist 
groups, but had convincingly distanced himself from their claims. Assessing that his integration 
into the SPD would have a positive influence on the assimilation of the expellees in Germany, 
Jaksch received permission in 1949 to permanently settle in Wiesbaden, where he continued his 
campaign for the Sudeten Germans and quickly became an influential figure in the SPD and a 
driving force behind the party’s expellee politics.45 
                                                 
42 Richard Reitzner, who returned to Germany in 1945 and ascended to the position of undersecretary of Bavaria’s 
refugee administration, aided Jaksch’s efforts. Hans-Werner Martin, “ ... nicht spurlos aus der Geschichte 
verschwinden”: Wenzel Jaksch und die Integration der sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokraten in die SPD nach dem II. 
Weltkrieg (1945-1949) (Frankfurt am Main [u.a.: Lang, 1996), 249–92. 
43 Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende, 210. Ignaz Kasperl, who stood in direct contact to Jaksch and was 
classified as the representative of “right-wing groups in exile,” had already been ordered to cease his activities after 
his pamphlets had caused disturbances among expellees. Possibly a pamphlet, signed in Jaksch’s name and 
forwarded to him by an associate in Bavaria, caused OMGUS consternation. In all likelihood a forgery, the fliers 
were distributed in refugee camps, stirring confusion especially among the old and adding to the rumors and 
cluelessness of what to do. AdsD, NL Jaksch, J32, Grimm to Jaksch, November 2, 1947. See Chapter 3, footnote 32 
for a text of the flyer. 
44 Weger, 213. 
45 Edmund Jauernig, Sozialdemokratie und Revanchismus; zur Geschichte und Politik Wenzel Jakschs und der 
Seliger-Gemeinde. (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1968), 195. 
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Wenzel Jaksch, who in the postwar period enjoyed a “similar image to that of Wilson 
between 1918 and 1920” among Sudeten Germans, presents a peculiar case.46 Among the first to 
collect testimonies and arrange them into narratives, Jaksch became one of the earliest architects 
of the West German narrative of “flight and expulsion.” His antifascist brand of memory politics 
failed to avert the forced migration of Sudeten Germans, but Jaksch managed to achieve some 
small victories. He himself credited public backlash and the activism of British contacts that 
pressured Czech and Polish authorities to improve conditions in labor camps and on transports, 
thereby “saving countless lives,” to his lobbying.47 One can also attribute the “antifa transports,” 
which allowed hundreds of antifascists to leave Czechoslovakia and Poland with the majority of 
their property, to the pleading of Sudeten social democrats to spare genuine opponents of 
Nazism. Moreover, as one of the expellee’s first advocates, Jaksch publicized their suffering and 
laid a foundation that future lobbying efforts could build upon. 
In a November 1948 letter, Jaksch professed that he would be willing to work with every 
party, with the exception of those weighed down by “blood guilt.” He owed that much to 
“comrades” who had suffered in Nazi concentration camps. Many with “pure motives” defected 
to Henlein’s camp, and it was this great “folly” of the Sudeten Germans that engendered mistrust 
and “aided the expulsion plans.” Jaksch ended the missive self-critically: “We cannot grapple 
with the injustice perpetrated against our people if we don’t simultaneously break with that 
völkisch romanticism that threw the Sudeten Germans onto the anvil of a gruesome fate.”48 
Writing to his close confidant Eugene de Witte a year later, Jaksch remained resolute and 
                                                 
46 Fritz Peter Habel, “Die sudetendeutsche Volksgruppe nach 1945 in der Bundesrepublik Detuschland, 
Mitteldeutschland und der ČSSR, Ein statistischer und organisatorischer Überblick,” Literatur-Spiegel, 1979, 44. 
47 Wenzel Jaksch, Europe’s Road to Potsdam. (New York: Praeger, 1963), 432. 
48 AdsD, NL Jaksch, J3, Jaksch to Suchy, November 17, 1948. 
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contemplated initiating a “broad Sudeten German debate” in order to isolate the “incorrigibles 
[Unverbesserliche]” attempting to claim the mantle of Sudeten German expellee leadership. A 
“national unification” with them made no sense, since if tomorrow all expellees would return 
home, “the whole theater would start anew.”49  
By the time Jaksch settled in West Germany, the expulsions had largely concluded. 
Irrespective of political background, the Sudeten Germans were now bound by a common fate. 
The conclusion of the forced migrations and collective treatment made Jaksch’s “antifascist 
expellee narrative” superfluous, and toward 1950 it disappeared. His arguments turned 
progressively polemical and anticommunist, and his advocacy adjusted to the Sudeten German 
Association’s “homeland politics” aimed at recovering the Sudetenland. The contacts to dubious 
figures like Strasser reveal Jaksch’s desperate habit of turning to seemingly any sort of figure 
professing support and propensity for pursuing false friends. The introspective letters and vows 
of staying true to his social democratic roots belie Jaksch’s rightward shift around 1950, born out 
of bitterness over the expulsions. His unrelenting pursuit of the homeland would align him with 
compatriots with the same goal, many of whom came from the complete opposite end of the 
political spectrum. These also engaged in lobby efforts of their own in Germany, as we will see. 
 
“History Will Exact a Terrible Retribution”: Anglo-American Responses, 1945-1947 
As has been shown in the previous chapter, the press critically covered the expulsions 
already in the summer of 1945.50 The British papers New Statesmen, The Times, Forward, 
                                                 
49 AdsD, NL Jaksch, J32, Jaksch to de Witte, November 21, 1949. 
50 Perhaps the best known case in Great Britain was the reporting of Rhona Churchill, who accompanied and vividly 
described the forced march of the German population of Brno to the border. “’Out in 10 minutes’ order to 
Germans,” The Daily Mail, August 6, 1945. See also Kurth, “In der Sicht des Auslandes,” 531. 
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Guardian, and The Observer regularly condemned the brutality of the forced migrations.51 As 
the excesses subsided into 1946, the anxieties over whether the forced migration and potential 
destabilizing of Central Europe seemed prudent continued. The editorial board of The Observer 
expressed horror that 1945 Germany evoked the “dark depictions of life in Bavaria, Bohemia, in 
the Rhineland, or in the Palatinate” during the Thirty Years War.52 American reporting generally 
echoed British reactions to the transfers occurring “often under conditions which recall those 
created by the Nazis.”53 The celebrated Dorothy Thompson and the Pulitzer Prize winner Anne 
O’Hare McCormick were early critics of the expulsions, with McCormick deeming their scale 
and conditions “without precedent in history.” “No one seeing its horrors first-hand can doubt 
that it is a crime against humanity for which history will exact a terrible retribution.”54  
The concerned observations of journalists created backlash at home. Churches were the 
quickest to voice their condemnation of German suffering. In Great Britain, a number of 
denominations joined in an opposition to British policy in homilies and public statements, 
including a rally in Albert Hall in November 1945.55 George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester, 
spoke in the House of Lords and rebuked the government for agreeing to deportations of people 
on “racial grounds,” a contradiction of the values for which the Allies fought.56 The Archbishops 
                                                 
51 See Frank, Expelling the Germans, 105. Formerly outspoken anti-Nazi correspondent Frederick Voigt of the 
Manchester Guardian and German émigré Sebastian Haffner of The Observer ranked as among the most prominent 
critics. R.M. Douglas, Orderly and Humane. The Expulsion of the Germans after the Second World War (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 293.  
52 Cited in Isaac Deutscher, Reportagen aus Nachkriegsdeutschland (Hamburg: Junius, 1980), 42. 
53 “Boundaries and People,” New York Times, December 16, 1945, 8. 
54 Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Wiesbaden Plans Portentous Exhibition,” New York Times, October 23, 1946, 25. 
55 Frank, Expelling the Germans, 153–63. 
56 Kurth, “In der Sicht des Auslandes,” 530. 
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of Canterbury and York similarly deemed the expulsions “a violation of the principles of 
humanity that the Allies are pledged to uphold” during the fall of 1945, and petitioned Prime 
Minister Clement Attlee to increase aid to the refugees and suspend the transfers.57 Attlee 
acknowledged that the suffering was “a very terrible thing,” but “only one of the facts” facing 
Europe: The British government had done all it could, and ultimately the Germans themselves 
were responsible for their fate. “You cannot ravage a Continent like this,” Attlee explained, 
“without paying the penalty, and that is what is happening now in Europe.”58 
A number of American Catholic bishops voiced deep concern over the treatment of 
expellees during the expulsions as well, stating that “[w]e boast of our democracy, but in this 
transplantation of peoples we have perhaps unwillingly allowed ourselves to be influenced 
by…heartless totalitarian political philosophy.”59 Other clergymen, such as Bishop Muench in 
March 1947, reproached their congregations: “What did you do to protest against the devilish 
measures of the forced deportation of people from their ancient homeland, which were carried 
out under such miserable and distressing conditions and have no precedence in history?”60 The 
Christian Century, the flagship publication of American Protestantism, raised the question of 
whether “we are murderers” of “elderly, especially women, nursing mothers, children.” The 
editors reminded readers that the United States “more than any nation” bore responsibility for the 
                                                 
57 Church of England and Synod of York, The York Journal of Convocation: Containing the Acts and Debates of the 
Convocation of the Province of York. (York, 1945), 54. The delegates pledged their support of government energies 
“to relieve the sufferings of Europe,” an effort that “a great mass of Christian and educated opinion” stood behind. 
Quoted in Frank, Expelling the Germans, 158.  
58 Quoted in Frank, Expelling the Germans, 158. 
59 Cited in Committee Against Mass Expulsion, The Land of the Dead: Study of the Deportations from Eastern 
Germany (New York: Committee against mass expulsion, 1947), 31. 
60 Quoted in Kurth, “In der Sicht des Auslandes,” 516. 
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“millions robbed, defiled, thrown from their homes, driven into slavery, starved, induced to 
suicide, murdered.”61 Msgr. Edward Swanstrom’s Pilgrims of the Night included similar strongly 
worded condemnations in the name of leaders of the American Catholic church.62 
That men of the cloth would invoke moral obligations seems hardly surprising. They 
were joined by intellectuals and notables calling upon their governments to do more to alleviate 
their misery. In Great Britain, the renowned philosopher Bertrand Russell decried Allied policy 
in the Times in the fall of 1946. Concerned with the welfare of expellees, Russell pointedly 
reproached the victors’ hypocrisy of leveling charges against Nazi war criminals, when similar 
deadly deportations were carried out in their names.63 In In The New Leader, Russell went to 
great lengths to explain what the territorial losses of Germany’s agricultural territories meant for 
the country’s food shortage, relaying reports from people witnessing scenes of “Belsen over 
again” and conditions that “make the sights of the concentration camps seem normal.” If millions 
would die, as was expected, it was the British public that bore the responsibility, Russell 
warned.64 Writing in The Observer, George Orwell acknowledged that the expulsions may not 
have been preventable, but that they should nevertheless be protested and condemned for 
creating a “monstrous peace.”65 
                                                 
61 Quoted in Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern: Legenden, Mythos, 
Geschichte (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2010), 364. 
62 Edward Ernest Swanstrom, Pilgrims of the Night: A Study of Expelled Peoples (N.Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1950). 
63 The Times, October 23, 1946. 
64 Quoted in Congressional Record 92 (February 5, 1946), 879. The fact that US congressmen quoted Russell 
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More prominent were the activities of the publisher Victor Gollancz and his “Save 
Europe Now” initiative.66 Intending to raise sympathy for defeated Germany and argue for a 
benevolent occupation with earnest material support, Gollancz partially addressed the expulsions 
by rejecting notions of “collective responsibility” leveled at Germany, as such allegations could 
cut both ways since the forced transfers.67 His Our Threatened Values and In Darkest Germany, 
which contained several dozen photographs of conditions on the ground that the author himself 
witnessed on a visit in 1946, clearly affirmed and denounced German atrocities, yet questioned 
the practicality of keeping an entire defeated nation living in abject misery.68 Gollancz 
energetically organized donation drives for German refugees and organized a series of public 
demonstrations, managing to fill Albert Hall in November 1946 with protestors.69  
In the United States, a wide variety of figures similarly appealed to the public and 
lawmakers with reasoned and sober arguments. The philosopher Sidney Hook penned a 
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provocative piece in The New Leader alleging that “Hitler’s spirit still lives” through Czech 
atrocities and the perpetration of “hundreds of other Lidices.”70 However, the most concerted 
effort of progressive intellectuals to steer American policy toward a more concerted effort of 
alleviating expellee pains was the Committee Against Mass Expulsions (CAME), formed in late 
1946 in New York. This collective of activists from across the political spectrum included the 
philosopher and reformer John Dewey, the pacifist and socialist politician Norman Thomas, 
Sidney Hook, as well as celebrated journalists such as Dorothy Thompson, The Christian 
Century editor Paul Hutschinson, William Henry Chamberlin, and Varian Fry, the famed 
journalist who helped thousands of Jews and opponents of the Third Reich flee Europe.71 The 
initiative was closely associated with the American Civil Liberties Union, several of whose 
board members joined CAME, including the founder of the ACLU Roger, Nash Baldwin.  
Members individually published articles and appeals condemning the forced deportations 
of ethnic Germans and demanding restitution for the injustices suffered. As a group, however, 
CAME released a series of pamphlets with titles such as Tragedy of a People, The Land of the 
Dead, and Men Without Rights.72 The flurry of activity in 1947 coincided with the upcoming 
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foreign ministers conferences, which CAME hoped to influence by providing materials to 
delegates.73 Including eye-witness reports of journalists based in Europe and expellees 
themselves, these brochures emphasized the criminality of population transfers and argued for a 
revision of the Potsdam Agreement that not only represented an injustice, but an accord that the 
Soviet Union and East European states had violated by failing to uphold their commitment to an 
“orderly and humane” expulsion. Barring a return of territories to Germany, CAME argued that 
economic restitution was necessary, as expellees of German ethnicity were still barred from 
many forms of international and Allied aid and their return to the lost homeland seemed 
admittedly unlikely or in the distant future. The Committee’s proposals were forwarded to 
American and British politicians, universities, and over 1,500 journalists.74  
The arguments of CAME did not go without objection.75 Yet the combined pressure of 
journalists, intellectuals, and members of the public moved politicians in Great Britain and the 
United States to at least take a position. Statements decrying the expulsions as “repugnant and 
unacceptable,” as Potsdam Conference participant General W. Bedell Smith declared in the 
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spring of 1946, partially attempted to distance signatories from the unappealing consequences of 
their decisions at negotiation tables.76 On October 26, 1945, British Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin urged the House of Commons to imagine if 60% of the United Kingdom were “suddenly 
turned out of their homes and drifting somewhere else,” and shared the “pathetic sight” he had 
seen while in Berlin: “[T]he stream of perambulators and small vehicles…and the people were 
nearly all women and children, with very few men at all. One could not help saying, ‘My God, 
this is the price of stupidity and war.’ It was the most awful sight one could see.” Bevin 
concluded that the problem was “almost beyond human capacity to solve quickly, and all I can 
say is that we will do our best.”77 The government’s efforts had not alleviated the conditions in 
the British Zone a year later, prompting renewed handwringing on the part of the Foreign 
Secretary, who swore that he only with the “greatest reluctance” acceded to the expulsions in the 
hope of “free and unfettered elections” in Poland.78  
Some criticisms of government response was blatant opportunism on the part of political 
oppositions. In the United States in August 1945, Herbert Brownell, Jr., chairman of the 
Republican National Committee, accused the Truman administration of “sowing of seeds of 
rancor” in Europe without consulting Congress, adding that “[s]ome day, when the time is ripe, 
the people of this country will hold the Administration [sic] to strict accountability.”79 Similarly 
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in Great Britain, Winston Churchill impressively combined crocodile tears and criticism of a 
policy that he shaped, yet now foisted upon others: Assuring the House of Commons in August 
1945 that he was “particularly concerned” by the accounts reaching London that suggested a 
“tragedy of great proportions on a prodigious scale,” the former Prime Minister criticized his 
rival Anthony Eden by demanding “any statement…which would relieve or at least inform us 
upon this very anxious and grievous matter.”80  
As the disastrous scale of the expulsions became clearer a few months later, Labour 
parliamentarian Michael Foot decried the “wanton and deliberate creation of a new sore in 
Europe.”81 “Speaking for myself, and as a Socialist, I will never accept the doctrine that their 
German nationality absolves them and excludes them from the bounds of human compassion,” 
Foot explained, before reading the testimony of an East Prussian grandmother’s arduous trek to 
Berlin with her grandchildren whose mother had perished on the road. Now without a homeland 
or “future aim in life,” Foot warned his colleagues:  
“For women and children, creatures such as these, there is for their 
protection an older law than any promulgated at Potsdam: ‘But whoso 
shall offend against one of these little ones which believe in me, it were 
better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck and that he 
were drowned in the depth of the sea.’ If these infamies are to be allowed 
to continue there will be a shortage of millstones to set beside the other 
shortages of Europe.” 
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Foot assured the assembly that his criticisms of inadequate reconstruction plans, allegedly 
designed solely to “prevent starvation and disorder,” were intended as calls to action. Moreover, 
Foot invoked Great Britain’s “duty to show that this country of ours is the foremost champion of 
tolerance and decency” with an obligation to “act, conquerors and conquered, in the name of 
humanity.”82 Few British politicians, however, seemed genuinely motivated by such appeals. For 
many conservatives, the expellees confirmed the Soviet Union’s innate barbarity, yet the British 
Left was hesitant to criticize the wartime alliance and the Kremlin in the immediate postwar 
period.83 With the exception of Labour MP Dick Stokes, who waged a virtual one-man campaign 
from the floor of the House of Commons and in newspaper articles informing readers of the 
situation in Czechoslovakia, government officials accepted the expulsions and did little to 
articulate policy to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Germany.84 The brief flurry of 
condemnation subsided as the worst concerns over refugees “dying in the streets in very large 
numbers” largely failed to materialize in the spring of 1946.85 
Similar concern could be heard in the American Congress. Already in December 1945, 
senators read stirring appeals of charities operating in Europe pleading for an increase of 
American food supply into the Congressional Record.86 A few months later, Senator Homer 
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Capehart (R, Indiana) issued a scathing denouncement of what he saw as a deliberate policy to 
“draw and quarter a nation now reduced to abject misery.”87  He criticized the military 
government’s handling of the refugee crisis and argued that the “starvation rations” of 1,550 
calories in the US zone were an overt attempt to destroy the German people. After distributing 
photos of emaciated children depicted in a Victor Gollancz pamphlet, Capehart read from letters 
of witnesses chronicling sorrowful vignettes of the refugee experience that American policy had 
caused.88 The indignant senator alleged a betrayal of American principles, an opinion ostensibly 
shared by many: Selecting letters published by the American Friends’ Service Committee in five 
leading papers pleading for a change in policy, Capehart quoted American soldiers and Jews who 
lost family in the Holocaust, yet didn’t want Germany turned into a “vast extermination camp.”89 
The remarkable overlap between the German and Anglo-American discourses is not a 
mere coincidence. In large part, they had common roots. Western critics provided useful 
condemnation for Germans, allowing expellees to turn the words of journalists, clergymen, or 
statesmen such as Churchill back onto Western governments and demonstrate that the whole 
world recognized and accepted German arguments. Jaksch for instance quoted extensively from 
the American and British critics quoted above, appropriating the writings of Gollancz and 
twisting them out of context to make the “the case of a dying people.”90 
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 Something more was at play, however. The reason that Americans and Britons sounded 
remarkably similar to expellee advocates is because, in many cases, they explicitly relied on their 
arguments, formulations, and evidence. Jaksch explicitly intended his memos and compilations 
of testimonies to act as reference material for his foreign contacts. Publications such as The 
Guardian and The Observer sounded so similar to Jaksch because they in all likelihood relied on 
his interpretations and sources. Many British journalists, as the historian Mathew Frank points 
out, never saw the expulsions in person but relied on second- or third-hand reports exclusively of 
Sudeten German origin and.91 The Czech media certainly credited adverse British reporting to 
the influence of Germans in London, particularly Jaksch and his circle.92 Jaksch himself 
attributed editorials penned by British hand to his engagement and connections to British 
politicians and journalists.93  
Indeed, the Bishop of Chichester George Bell for example felt a particular affinity with 
the Sudeten German exile, who supplied Bell with materials and provided assistance to his 
preparations for his speeches before the House of Lords condemning the expulsions and calling 
for a motion on the subject.94 Jaksch’s politics naturally endeared him to the Labour Party, where 
he cultivated an especially close relationship with Michael Foot and Richard Stokes. 
Czechoslovakian critics accused Jaksch and Foot, a former editor of the Evening Standard, as the 
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source for Prague-critical reports in the Labour-affiliated Daily Herald.95 Stokes, as has been 
noted, made frequent interventions in the House of Commons opposing the expulsions and for 
years lent his support to the Sudeten German cause, even writing forewords to their literature.96  
Stokes’ appeals, relying on reports supplied by Jaksch, were so passionate that the 
Central European Observer challenged the MP to travel to the Sudetenland to observe the 
deportations “instead of relying on distorted news from an informant who obviously belongs to 
the clique which is seeking to intrigue against the Czechoslovak State from abroad.”97 Stokes 
accepted, travelling to Prague in September 1946 after having been briefed and provided a list of 
“reliable” contacts by Jaksch personally.98 His impressions, appearing in numerous English 
papers, were reprinted by the German exiles for mass distribution to Anglo-American 
audiences.99 Even though Stokes eventually conceded that the forced migrations were 
unavoidable and over time improved, Jaksch praised him as a friend to the Sudeten German 
                                                 
95 Douglas, Orderly and Humane, 291. 
96 Stokes for instance wrote the foreword to Almar Reitzner’s report on his 1948 trip to Czechoslovakia. Calling for 
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cause and one of the “courageous fighters for a humanist Europe” whose advocacy to improve 
the conditions of deportations saved countless lives.100 
The remarkable overlap in testimonies and argumentation must also raise the suspicion 
that Jaksch acted as a source for some of the materials to CAME, or rather its short-lived 
predecessor American Friends of Democratic Sudetens, who published a report on 
Czechoslovakia and the expulsions in June 1946.101 Particularly CAME’s republishing of a June 
1945 poster announcing discriminatory ordinances against Germans suggests contact to Jaksch: 
Cited by the Americans as a typical manifestation of the racism driving the expulsions, Jaksch 
and others also consistently invoked the ordinance as representative for the situation in the 
Sudetenland. It appears in much of Jaksch’s literature and was cited for decades in other works, 
including in Jaksch associate Richard Reitzner’s adventurous 1948 report on his trip to 
Czechoslovakia, where he claims to have seen the poster.102 The historian Johann Wolfgang 
Brügel claimed to have personally taken down the ordinance and then passed it on to Jaksch, yet 
noted that the decree had hung only a few hours before officials removed it.103 Whatever its 
provenience, the poster entered into Sudeten German cultural memory. 
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“We Solemnly Relinquish Vengeance and Retaliation!” Expellee Victimhood Narratives in 
Occupied Germany 
  
Developing parallel to Jaksch’s efforts in London, activists in occupied Germany also 
attempted to make their case before world opinion. This constellation of actors faced greater 
challenges than their colleagues in exile, however. First, the Allied coalition ban of nationalist 
organizations, and wide dispersal because of the chaos of the expulsions, significantly complicated 
and delayed the formation of cohesive congregations. This deprived expellees not only of 
institutional structures but also of prominent figureheads, so that the limited organization that 
developed under the watchful eye of the occupation authorities unfolded generally at the local level 
and under the “protecting and camouflaging bells” of the churches104 Secondly, as the occupied 
and conquered, expellees in Germany possessed very little standing. Moreover, unlike social 
democratic exiles, several doyens of the expellee community had personal histories of complicity 
with the Nazi regime that dissuaded them from attracting attention before the Allied authorities 
backed off from denazification efforts in the late 1940s.105 This was particularly true of the 
rightwing faction of the future Sudeten German Landsmannschaft, many of whom opted for 
Henlein and the Third Reich. Lastly, given the chaotic conditions, expellees and the organizations 
dealing with the crisis spent most of their energy contending with day to day concerns, something 
that expellees in Great Britain did not have to grapple with.  
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Because the churches operated with relative freedom in the first postwar years, it is 
unsurprising that from their ranks emerged the first voices pleading with the Allies to intervene in 
the refugee crisis. One of the earliest prominent voices was that of the Rhinelander and Protestant 
pastor, Heinrich Grüber. The humanitarian engaged in resistance during the Third Reich, which 
led to a lengthy incarceration in Nazi concentration camps. After the war, his activism continued: 
He co-founded the Union of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime in 1947, and ministered to 
concentration camp survivors. His efforts encouraged the Soviet authorities to appoint Grüber as 
the head of welfare services in Berlin. Through his work to provide aid to the victims of war, 
Grüber witnessed on a daily basis the horrific dimensions of the refugee crisis, and recognized the 
need for Allied help. Grüber used his credentials as a humanitarian and Nazi opponent to take up 
contact with foreign clergy, particularly George Bell, whom he knew from before the war. Despite 
his experiences with Nazi terror, what he was witnessing in Germany was “worse than anything 
that I have experienced before,” Grüber assured Bell.106 In addition to Jaksch, therefore, Grüber 
acted as a source of evidence for the British bishop, who incorporated Grüber’s reports into his 
public appeals in Great Britain and the House of Lords.  
 Grüber was a sober, results-oriented humanitarian interested in alleviating the anguish of 
his fellow man. A slightly different tone could be discerned from the church leadership. In a “pulpit 
promulgation of the West German bishops” in the fall of 1946, the clerical elite expressed its 
inability to “no longer…remain silent over the terrible lot of more than 10 million East Germans.” 
The address lamented the “terrible brutality and disrespect of all humaneness” of the expulsions, 
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before alleging that the world was remaining silent in the face of this “terrible tragedy, as if an iron 
curtain had descended before this part of Europe.”107 Not only did the international community 
accepted these crimes without a word, they were responsible and seeking vengeance: 
Acknowledging “terrible crimes” committed by Germans in passing, the bishops demanded to 
know “since when it is acceptable to take vengeance on innocents and atone for crimes with 
crimes?”108 The declaration upbraided the victors:  
“One should unrelentingly bring to justice the true culprits. But who wants 
to be responsible for the mass deaths of children, mothers, old people? 
Who wants to take upon themselves the despair of many thousands, who 
in their horrendous misery end their lives? We beg and we plead that the 
world may break its silence; those who have the power may prevent that 
might is right, and that once again the seed of hatred is sown, which can 
only bear a calamity within it.”109 
   
The Catholic bishops understood the expulsions as “victor’s justice” which needed to be 
tempered. They presented their arguments to Lucius D. Clay in the summer of 1945 with the 
request to have their appeal forwarded to President Truman.110 Clay politely declined, pointing out 
that German minorities destabilized interwar governments and contributed to the outbreak of the 
war, and that while the victors knew that many innocent people had been affected by the transfers 
to prevent future similar conflicts, it was impossible to ascertain individual guilt.111  
The pulpit promulgation led nowhere, yet is crucial for understanding the prevailing 
sentiment that underpinned German and expellee interpretations of the forced migrations. The 
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historians Eva and Hans Henning Hahn argue that the framing of the expulsions as vengeance from 
Allied governments obsessed with hatred and retribution conforms to narratives of Third Reich 
propaganda, and that many of the postwar statements reveal lingering Nazi rhetorical and thinking 
patterns that had a profound effect on German cultural memory.112 Indeed, there were direct links 
and continuities. Finance Minister Johann Ludwig Graf Schwerin von Krosigk’s May 2, 1945 radio 
lament that German suffering unfolded behind an “iron curtain” which concealed expellee misery 
from an indifferent and callous world carried into the postwar period.113  
In his closing statements on October 1, 1946 before the Nuremburg Tribunal, Hans Frank 
recognized German guilt that “a thousand years could not take from us because of the behavior of 
Hitler in this war.”114 A few moments later, he came to speak of other “colossal mass crimes of 
the most appalling kind,” namely “those carried out and still being carried out by Russians, Poles 
and Czechs against Germans above all in East Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania and in the Sudetenland.” 
The condemned man alleged that “already today they have completely paid for every possible guilt 
of our people,” before asking the court who might “one day judge these crimes against the German 
people?” Frank had doubtlessly digested some of the evidence presented by the German defense 
team, which entered into the record reports of Soviet atrocities such as Nemmersdorf that included 
mass rape, the murder of infants, and nailing of women to barn doors.115 Intending to discredit the 
Soviet judges and relativize Nazi war crimes, the defendants’ legal counsel and Frank became 
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among the first Germans in postwar Germany to publically leverage “flight and expulsion” 
narratives against the Allied victors.  
The combination of self-pity, ambiguous acknowledgment of German responsibility, and 
denouncement in the utterances of indicted war criminals and Catholic bishops, in other words, 
traced a general rhetorical strategy that expellees in Germany would replicate in their appeals to 
foreign audiences, and which would dictate the direction of “flight and expulsion” for decades to 
come. Unlike the network of Sudeten German socialists organized around Jaksch, the second type 
of lobbying directed against the Western Allies developing in occupied Germany constituted a 
loose coalition of actors. Many did not know one another personally or take up contact with one 
another, and they espoused diverse political ideologies, though generally they were nationalist and 
conservative. What united them, however, was a shared interpretation of the expulsions, and how 
to present arguments to the American and British occupiers.  
Despite these issues and a fragmented source base from the period before the formation of 
expellee organizations in 1948, a discernable argumentative strategy developed in Germany that 
distinguished itself from the lobbying of Wenzel Jaksch. Here again the Sudeten Germans, mostly 
from the conservative or nationalist camps, spearheaded efforts, as their history as an ethnic 
minority helped them to instinctively recognize the power of presenting grievances to higher 
powers. As Reich citizens, Silesians and Prussians had no experiences beyond the Wilhelmine 
Empire or Third Reich, so that developing an engaged lobbying effort to present their plight to 
foreigners constituted a foreign concept that took years to grasp. Nevertheless, whereas Jaksch 
attempted to bring the Sudeten Germans into the antifascist fold and make a case for the unjust 
punishment of opponents of Hitler, the “sympathy narratives” directed against the Allies from 
groups in Germany oscillated between arousing pity for German victims and indicting the victors.  
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  One of the first and most prominent expellee critics was the Bavarian Catholic priest 
Emmanuel Reichenberger. His career took him to Bohemia, where his vocal opposition to 
Henlein’s Sudetendeutschen Partei (SdP) forced the cleric to flee to Great Britain after the German 
occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939. There he joined Wenzel Jaksch, with whom he co-founded 
the Democratic Sudeten Committee. Reichenberger’s London activities primarily focused on 
negotiating with the Canadian government to accept a limited number of Sudeten Germans into 
the country, before he himself settled in South Dakota and eventually Chicago.116 There he became 
an early and vocal critic of the expulsions, which he deemed “the greatest persecution of Christians 
of all time,” especially among German-American circles, giving public speeches and writing 
numerous essays in German-language newspapers such as Chicago-based Nord-Amerika.117  
These articles formed the basis for the 1948 book Ostdeutsche Passion, one of the first 
German publications on the forced migrations.118 With an eye-catching cover featuring an 
illustration of a column of emaciated and bowed figures marching under an enormous westward-
pointing cross in the sky, the book familiarized readers with the history of the German East, the 
background to the forced transfers, and included eyewitness accounts and quotes from foreign 
observers. What sources Reichenberger consulted to tell the story of the 18 million expelled and 
five million dead remained unclear, and the often salacious testimonials were uncorroborated and 
legitimized with assurances that the author “knew many [of the victims] personally.”119 A 
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hyperbolic and emotional language permeated the entire book: “The Bloodlust in Friesetal,” “The 
Hell of Hodolany,” “Children Under the Gallows,” “The Mass Graves of Brünn,” “Sadists Rage 
in Raase,” “Bullets to the Nape at the Open Grave,” “In the Torture Chambers of Mährisch-
Rothwasser,” “The Jägerndorfer Kindermord,” “German Girls Trampled to Death,” “Raped, 
Starved, Bludgeoned,” “The Beast Unchained,” and “Polish Terror in Upper Silesia” were but a 
few of the reports Reichenberger included.120 
The work appealed to the UN and Western governments to right these injustices, a 
precondition for a lasting peace in Europe. At the heart of the book however was a vociferous 
rejection of German collective guilt and a condemnation of atrocities committed against Germans. 
In the opening pages, Reichenberger contemplated who bore the “guilt for the catastrophe,” and 
alleged that the role of the Germans “could not so easily be answered.”121 Holding Hitler 
responsible, he explained how National Socialism could not be “restricted to the German people.” 
Leveraging his objectivity as a Nazi opponent and exile, Reichenberger argued that the Sudeten 
Germans had been forced through economic hardship and the misery of minority status under 
Czech rule into the fascist camp; most, the author attested, rejected annexation in any case and had 
no desire to return “home into the Reich.”122 Like Jaksch, Reichenberger bemoaned the betrayal 
of the many democrats who fought valiantly for democracy, yet ultimately suffered in vain because 
the wheels of history had ordained the Sudetenland for catastrophe. The second part of the goal 
was an indictment of the true guilty parties, particularly the “Pharisees-like disposition of the 
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Czech people that stands as a counterpart to the barbarism of Hitler.”123 These “nauseating” and 
“grotesque” crimes were not individual acts, but thousand-fold crimes that had no source in 
National Socialism. Their tradition, Reichenberger explained, were the tradition of the Husites 
who already in the 15th century had “locked German women and children in churches and let them 
die through an excruciating fiery death!”124 While the Sudeten Germans had proven their humanity 
for centuries, the Czechs and their Soviet backers, whose “behavior in comparison to German 
soldiers must not be iterated,” were motivated by age-old passions. Though Reichenberger denied 
the concept of collective guilt, he did not afford Slavs the same privileges.  
Barred from entering Germany for many years, Catholic Sudeten Germans managed 
arrange a Germany tour for Reichenberger in the summer of 1949 billed as an “appeal to the 
conscience of the world.”125 Speaking before tens of thousands at fourteen mass rallies, 
Reichenberger compared the expulsions explicitly to the Holocaust and levelled charges against 
the expellers of perpetrating an intentional genocide.126 Addressing the occupation authorities, 
Reichenberger pleaded for a comprehensive treatment of the refugee problem that constituted an 
“Atomic bomb” in the heart of Germany and “the fateful question for Western Civilization.”127 
These themes were reiterated in the book Europa in Trümmern that emerged a year after his 
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journey, in which he relativized Germany’s role in World War II and accused the Allies of having 
engaged in a “crusade” against the German people and especially the expellees.128 
Reichenberger, the proclaimed “Father of the Homeland Expellees,” is an important yet 
often overlooked figure, as he was among the first of the expellee leaders to iterate expellee history 
and present it to audiences domestically and abroad.129 His works and statements therefore are a 
foundation of the collective memory of the expellees as well as West Germans, and reflect the 
historical worldview of the Sudeten Germans. More importantly, his efforts of attempting the 
Western governments to reverse the expulsions augmented similar tactics pursued by particularly 
conservative expellees in Germany after their political organization in 1948. 
In February 1950, a coalition of expellee organizations drafted an open letter to the 
“representative of the great American people,” the US High Commissioner John McCloy, 
invoking the authority of “higher principles of right and justice” in order to decry Western 
silence over the crime of some five million deaths “of mostly innocent women and children.”130 
Speaking on behalf of the “millions of downtrodden,” the letter raised an “eternal accusation 
before God’s judgment” that the Allies were guilty of and indicted the Western double standards 
and a false application of justice that seemed to be granted to the peoples of the world “including 
the uncivilized tribes of inner Africa,” but not to Germans.131 Appealing to McCloy and the 
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“conscience of the American people and entire humanity,” the letter demanded justice for 
“inhumane and barbaric fate” that had befallen “16 million innocent people,” closing with an 
assurance that God would “slowly but surely punish this injustice.” A second public address to 
McCloy denouncing American hypocrisy followed two weeks later, penned a Sudeten German 
“who happened to have the luck not to have been burned alive by murderous Czech bands or 
who was slaughtered after days of painful torture, and who had the misfortune of being driven 
into a defeated, destroyed, and unlivable Germany.”132 Silesian associations engaged in similar 
tactics of underlining American responsibility for expellee suffering during the spring of 1950.133  
The strategy of token acknowledgment of vaguely worded German guilt combined with 
indictments and condemnations of Western hypocrisy culminated most famously in the “Charta 
of the Homeland Expellees.” In August 1950, thirty representatives of every major expellee 
association signed and publically proclaimed the “Charta” in which they “relinquished 
vengeance and retaliation” that the “unending suffering that especially the last decade has 
wrought on humanity.”134 Besides imploring the world to “recognize that the fate of the 
expellees is as with all refugees a world problem whose solution requires the highest moral 
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accountability and commitment,” the signatories also fashioned a victimhood formula with 
tremendous political import. Just as the expellees had generously forgiven, the “peoples of the 
world should feel the joint responsibility for the fate of the expellees as those most affected by 
the misery of these times” and meet their insistence for the correction of historic wrongs. The 
demand that now the victors needed to engage with questions of guilt and collective 
responsibility dovetailed with the “selective remembering” and “dominant victimhood mental 
state” of the early Federal Republic, where the “Charta” was celebrated as an important postwar 
document of contrition and reconciliation.135 Furthermore, the ostensibly clear-minded 
indictments combined with the influence of the expellees as a pressure group politically very 
quickly convinced the Federal Republic to endorse and insist upon the borders of 1937 as the 
first criteria of discussion in future unification negotiations, thus paving the way for the 
politicization of “flight and expulsion,” as will be shown.136  
 
“Make the Germans Do It!”: Responding to the Refugee Crisis in Germany 
The crucial context for expellee lobbying and the critical responses was the refugee crisis 
ignited by the war and expulsions. These created seemingly insurmountable challenges for 
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occupation authorities and German administrators alike. In Berlin, nearly fifty reception centers 
attempted to provide accommodations for the thousands of refugees arriving daily; between July 
1945 and June 1946, the US sector of Berlin alone processed close to a million refugees.137 Even 
without the influx of millions of refugees, the humanitarian situation going into the winter of 
1945/46 looked so grim that a British officer attached to the Allied Military Government 
concluded that it was “inevitable that millions of Germans must die in the coming winter.”138  
Indeed, Germans died in large numbers in 1945. The daily death toll in Berlin soared to 
several hundred in August 1945, and only five percent of infants born in the summer months 
survived.139 Food shortages were the biggest immediate threat. Soviet officials admitted to their 
allied counterparts that only the populations of Berlin and Dresden were receiving official 
rations, with all others, including expellees, left to fend for themselves.140 The consequences 
were predictable: In Frankfurt an der Oder, one of the chief crossing points for refugees from the 
Recovered Territories, German authorities documented more than twelve thousand deaths 
through starvation between May and December 1945.141 While the Western Allies noted modest 
improvements by the fall, authorities feared a repeat of the coldest winter in recent history for the 
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year 1945/46 would undo progress and end in catastrophe. With Germany already struggling and 
swamped with refugees, the start of the “orderly and humane” transfers in December 1945 saw a 
further four million mouths added to the equation. As it stood, some experts glumly predicted 
that daily rations would need to be reduced to 400 calories per day.142 
Lack of cooperation between the victors, as well as inadequate planning, compounded the 
situation. The British and Americans surprisingly did not confer with one another on expellee 
matters until January 1947, while the Soviets likewise guarded their independence.143 Despite the 
dangerous humanitarian situation, however, the Allies refused to offer more than basic help, and 
all parties pursued a policy of complete “decreed assimilation.”144 One crucial step toward this 
goal was the banning of expellee coalitions by all military governments, fearing that these would 
act as an incubator for nationalist resentment.145 International and intergovernmental agencies 
likewise refused aid; the International Refugee Organization, explicitly founded in April 1946 to 
                                                 
142 Frank, Expelling the Germans, 196. 
143 In fact, overwhelmed by the sheer numbers which already by summer of 1945 exceeded two million, Soviet 
authorities engaged in chicanery to relieve the pressure at expense of the Anglo-Americans: In Saxony, officials 
loaded several thousand refugees onto rafts and let them drift down the Elbe River into the British zone, while 
elsewhere misleading directives attempted to set millions westward. In November 1945, a radio broadcast in the 
Soviet Zone ordered all Germans who had ever resided in the Western Zone to vacate Brandenburg, sending 
thousands of “homeless, starved old people, children, and Wehrmacht cripples” toward the British zone. According 
to the Manchester Guardian, “along the 70-mile stretch of road between Weimar and…Friedland at least half a 
million people are estimated to be lying in the highways, paths and in ditches.” Manchester Guardian, November 5, 
1945. A similar August directive in Saxony mandated all expellees to leave the state within 48 hours. Anglo-
American officials protested and Soviet authorities rescinded the orders, citing a translation error, though Western 
commentators alleged that the initiatives were attempts of influencing ongoing ACC agreement negotiations. The 
Economist, November 10, 1945. In all likelihood, these ruses were an attempt for overburdened local Red Army 
commanders to relieve pressure. 
144 Mathias Beer, Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen: Voraussetzungen, Verlauf, Folgen, 1st ed. (München: 
C.H.Beck, 2011), 103. Touting the Soviet line, Paul Merker called for an “assimilation of the resettlers in their new 
homeland and the conjoining (verwachsen) with the indigenous population.” Paul Merker, Die nächsten Schritte zur 
Lösung des Umsiedlerproblems (Berlin: Dietz, 1947), 7. 
145 In June 1946, General Lucius Clay ordered the coalition ban of expellees, as otherwise “each large group of 
migrants would have been justified in forming political parties. Nothing could have been more injurious to theier 
cause—or to democracy.” Cited in Douglas, Orderly and Humane, 315–16. 
286 
 
contend with the largest number of people on the move since the Thirty Year’s War, forbade 
assistance to “persons of German ethnic origin” and enshrined this policy in its constitution, even 
though expellees constituted the largest group by far. The United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Agency similarly did not acknowledge expellees as part of its mandate, and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross ended all relief initiatives for civilians after 1946.146  
Few American or British occupation officials expressed satisfaction at the sight of 
emaciated refugees arriving from the German East. Nevertheless, the expulsions, though 
distasteful, were a reality and ultimately the Germans’ own doing. As the American High 
Commissioner Lucius Clay concluded, “if there had been no German aggression…the [refugee] 
problem would not exist.”147 This assessment reflected Allied policy, which deemed the refugee 
issue an exclusively German problem that would be solved alongside a general reconstruction of 
Germany. While provisions were in place to assist non-German displaced persons, no single 
policy concerning the expellees emerged.148 The prevailing sentiment, as a member of the 
American occupation put it succinctly, was clear: “Make the Germans do it.”149 
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Overcoming the crisis would prove difficult for the occupied, however, as German 
authorities had limited autonomy.150 As a government official in Württemberg-Hohenzollern 
remarked in 1946, the Allies in essence foisted upon German offices a “burden that we in our 
great plight are additionally saddled with.”151 Nevertheless, trains carrying deportees continued 
to arrive in beleaguered communes. The critical humanitarian situation, which seemed to have no 
end in sight, is the crucial backdrop for understanding both Western critical responses and 
expellee advocacy discussed above. The task at hand for German voices was to move the Allies 
to intervene immediately to prevent an unimaginable catastrophe in the heart of a destroyed 
continent, and which would disproportionately affect the homeless and destitute expellees.  
The hopelessness and desperation formed a central argument of reports fluttering across 
the Atlantic. For instance, Congressmen Capeheart’s emotional condemnation of his 
government’s inaction in the face of horrendous calamity, cited above, relied heavily on the 
reports of an “outstanding economist” warning of 15 million Germans on the move, four million 
deported to the Soviet Union, and a further three million dead through murder and starvation. 
Capeheart additionally read from letters of German “friends” who described scenes in Germany 
of “millions of homeless, tattered, hungry, sick, helpless, hopeless human beings fleeing 
westward” because of American decisions at Yalta and Potsdam.152 At least one of these sources 
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in all likelihood was Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz, the special assistant to Allen Dulles, who 
together with Freya von Moltke braved a journey to the Recovered Territories in order to gather 
facts for the American government.153 Senator William Langer (R, ND), who also recounted and 
vociferously condemned the disastrous conditions in Europe, similarly cited German sources in 
his descriptions of “mass migration under conditions of indescribable and wanton cruelty 
unknown to civilized nations.”154 Langer introduced eyewitness accounts of Freya von Moltke, 
as well as articles of Frederick Voigt on conditions in Mecklenburg, Brandenburg, Danzig, and 
the Sudetenland, and materials from CAME. 
In any case, the discomfort of American lawmakers and castigations of the press over 
potential mass starvation in Europe were enough for Harry S. Truman to dispatch Herbert 
Hoover to Europe in 1947 in order to get an overview of the chaotic conditions and formulate 
proposals for their alleviation. Finding the state of Germany disastrous, the former US President 
emotionally appealed to the American public’s patriotism:  
 “Those who believe in vengeance and the punishment of the great mass 
of Germans, not concerned in the Nazi conspiracy, can now have no 
misgivings, for all of them, in food, warmth, and shelter, have been sunk 
to the lowest level known in a hundred years of western history. If 
western civilization is to survive in Europe, it must survive in Germany. 
After all, our flag flies over these people. That flag means something 
more than military power.”155  
 
Hoover’s findings, which anticipated the Marshall Plan, urged Truman and Congress to 
increase aid and foodstuffs, develop economic initiatives until German export industries could 
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sustain the country, and consider emigration as a safety valve.156 Though a veritable drop in the 
bucket before Marshall funds began to flow in 1948, American government funding of 
Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) combined with private American 
initiatives operating in Germany with OMGUS blessing, such as the Cooperative for American 
Remittance to Everywhere (CARE) and the Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation 
in Germany (CRALOG), meant a very real difference between life and death for DPs as well as 
expellees, especially in the lean years between 1945 and 1947.157 
Expellee lobbying therefore substantially contributed toward alleviating the dire 
conditions in Germany. Yet as the previous chapter has shown, even with the thwarting of 
immediate existential concerns, the Allied demand for complete assimilation of Germans from 
the East in their new communities remained an illusory and unrealistic expectation. Allied 
officials underestimated the capacity and willingness for t defeated nation to absorb the sudden 
influx of millions competing for limited resources. Occupation officials in both zones registered 
the simmering social tensions, which posed a serious issue for longterm recovery. In the Soviet 
Zone in 1946 for instance, some 45,000 complaints from expellees over their mistreatment at the 
hands of their new neighbors landed on the desk of the Brandenburg government alone.158 An 
American officer concluded that “in Bavaria or perhaps the whole of Germany there is no 
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difference between a Nazi and Antinazi [sic], Black or Red, Catholic or Protestant. The only 
difference is between natives and refugees.”159  
Statistics backed these general impressions. In March 1946, a confidential American 
survey found that only seven percent of expellees were dissatisfied with the treatment at the 
hands of non-expellees, yet by September 1947 that number had grown to 64%. In the spring of 
1946, 60% of expellees believed that they would get along with the native population, with only 
25% expressing doubt; those numbers had completely reversed a year later. Meanwhile, 
investigators discovered that the number of native Germans who predicted that expellees would 
not get along with them had grown from 25% to nearly 66%, and only 59% regarded their new 
neighbors as German citizens. 85% of refugees expressed a desire to go home in September 
1947, compared to 79% less than a year before, and 91% of native Germans “expected” the East 
Germans to one day return. Less than half of the indigenous population, the survey found, 
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thought that Germany should support the expellees.160 Surveys in the Soviet zone in April 1947 
likewise registered an increasingly deteriorating situation since December 1946.161 
 The reports indicated the immense concern and interest with which the occupation 
authorities monitored the refugee crisis. They also captured a startling trend that alarmed the 
victors: “Dissatisfaction [was] mounting” in Germany.162 At the heart of this disorder lay the 
Schicksalsgemeinschaft, by 1948 a substantial power bloc demanding political rights and 
economic assistance. After three years of legal limbo, expellees now resorted to explicit threats 
of dire consequences lest non-expellees continue to marginalize expellees. The popular revival 
preacher Johannes Leppich, known as the “machine gun of God” and himself an expellee from 
Upper Silesia, regularly warned West Germans that “a revolution will come from the bunkers 
and barracks if no help is extended.”163  
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Leppich’s warnings seemed to hold weight. In October 1948, in defiance of the coalition 
ban, 35,000 expellees took part in demonstrations, and between 1948 and 1949 issued more than 
500 protest resolutions to the Bavarian government.164 At election rallies in Baden-Württemberg 
and Nordrhein-Westfalen, expellees assaulted speakers or clashed with police when they 
attempted to arrest refugees attempting to hold speeches against the state government.165 A 
number of “trek associations” formed, with as many as 32,000 families pledging to travel in 
wagons across Germany as during the winter of their flight unless the West German government 
accelerated planned resettlement of refugees from overpopulated states.166 Among the most 
alarming incidents in early postwar Germany, however, was the 1948 hunger strike led by Egon 
Hermann, already discussed in the previous chapter.167 American journalists saw the potential for 
a dangerous “fuehrer of Germany’s expellees and, through them, perhaps of all Germany.”168 
German politicians meanwhile suspected Hermann of being a Bolshevik agent fomenting unrest 
among East Germans and paving the way for communism in Bizonia.169  
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The military governments remained steadfast in their efforts “to get the Germans to 
accept persons coming from the East as their own people, and not to regard them as foreigners 
foisted upon them,” as a British occupation official explained. The Germans were not 
cooperating, however.170 On February 4, 1947, the American High Commissioner Lucius Clay 
beseeched German politicians to make greater strides in providing a future for the new citizens 
suffering in their midst: 
“These Germans after all belong to you. The future harmonious 
coexistence of your citizens depends on the manner in which you absorb 
them. If it continues as it does, then you will create a minority that in 
coming years will perpetuate hatred and enmity. You should know the 
problems that were caused by minority groups in the past.”171  
 
Three years later, Clay’s memoirs again criticized ambivalence toward the “continuing 
major threat in Germany and in central [sic] Europe.”172 Unremittent German foot-dragging 
prompted General Charles Gross to forego tact: Complaining to American journalists that 
German politicians were failing to implement policies for overcoming the refugee crisis, Gross 
assured his audience that “there is not a single people in the entire world that is so unwilling to 
take on a responsibility as the Germans.”173  
Gross downplayed the challenges that Germany faced five years after the end of the war. 
His comments also ignored the curtailed sovereignty which tied German hands; the victors ran 
the show but ostensibly refused to accept responsibility or provide assistance, and resented the 
notion of doing so. The contradiction was implied in a 1950 report of the American High 
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Commissioner, which reiterated that the issue remained “primarily a German problem and… 
responsibility” while acknowledging that the military “must devote much of their time to joint 
efforts with other occupying powers and German authorities on the refugee problem.”174  
The “Make the Germans Do It” approach failed to engender German recognition that 
expellees were equal citizens and acceptance that their presence was permanent.175  Reluctantly, 
the occupation authorities conceded that mere pressure on German officials alone would not 
solve the issue, but rather required financial assistance to alleviate the catastrophic perpetual 
destitution and lack of life chances that would derail the Western democratization project while 
still in its infancy. A February 1947 OMGUS psychological study of refugees made a strong case 
that continuous alienation would scupper any chance for producing reliable citizens invested in 
the future of Germany: 
“As he looks about himself, it appears to him that he alone lost most in 
the war since the native Germans, who were not expelled, retained their 
homes, land and cattle. The expellee will have to own things in his new 
country before he can be expected to take an interest in it, or develop a 
sense of ‘belonging’.”176 
 
British military governor Brian Robertson, writing to Anthony Eden in February 1949, 
echoed these sentiments. Between castigating the “latent impulses of the German character to 
persecute the underdog” as one cause for the misery of the expellees, Robertson denounced how 
German society had turned them into “a class apart bearing a stigma which only the passage of 
time combined with a marked improvement in their physical condition can hope to efface.”177 
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It was at this crucial juncture of 1947/48 that American lawmakers once again took up 
the issue of the expellees. Among the most fervent advocates were those of German extraction or 
representing districts with a high proportion of German-Americans alarmed over the fate of their 
compatriots and, in some cases, distant relatives in the Old Country. Senator Langer, whose 
father was born in Moravia, explained to his congressional colleagues that the afflicted Germans 
were a “subject dear to [his] heart, and…dear to the hearts of the people of [his] State [sic].”178 
Organizations such as the Steuben Society, Federation of American Citizens of German Descent 
in the USA, German-American National Congress, American Friends of Democratic Sudetens, 
American Friends of the Sudetenland, and the Rescue and Relief Committee for Socialist 
Refugees and Expellees in Southern Germany pressured officials and pleaded for increased aid 
and a revision of American policy that gave preferential treatment to non-German refugees.179 In 
the immediate postwar period, these groups also organized invaluable charitable contributions 
and published eyewitness reports in the dozens of German-language newspapers in the United 
States.180 As forthcoming chapters will elucidate, many of these organizations stood in close 
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contact with expellees and acted as their “representative in the USA” and evaluator of the 
American “cultural landscape.”181  
The colorful isolationist Langer, however, remained the most consistent champion of 
expellees and critic of the Potsdam Agreement.182 By 1949, when Langer’s repeated warnings of 
impending disaster seemed all too prescient, the Senate contemplated how to accelerate 
European recovery. Again Langer intervened, disparaging the Marshall Plan’s inadequate 
funding to Germany before quickly turning to a critique of deliberate “mass starvation of 
20,000,000 Germans under the American flag” and censure of occupation authorities preventing 
UNRRA, the Red Cross, and churches from assisting Germans in the first postwar months.183 
Langer assured the Senate that the expulsions were “the greatest crime against humanity in all of 
history.”184 According to the senator, 15 million had been expelled, of which five million 
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perished, part of a series of “criminal betrayals of American principle…and extension of human 
slavery of the white race.” Langer expounded upon what was transpiring in Europe: 
“Nowhere in recorded history, has such a grim chapter of brutality been 
written than in the account of what has already taken place in Eastern 
Europe. Already, from fifteen to twenty million people have been 
uprooted bodily from their ancestral homes of a thousand years and 
thrown into the torment of a living hell, to perish, or to be driven like 
cattle across the wastes of eastern [sic] Europe. Women and children, the 
old and the helpless, the innocent and the guilty alike have been 
subjected to cruelties which have never been surpassed, even by the 
Nazis themselves. Yet, we are now committed to a continuation of these 
inhuman policies in the future, although the conscience of the American 
people cries out against such bestial practices.”185 
 
Langer asserted that at the Nuremburg Tribunals, Nazi functionaries had faced charges 
for these very policies, before closing his speech by once again citing financial analysists’ 
concerns for the future of postwar Europe and demands for a re-orientation of policies toward 
“German-speaking people” and a constructive solution to the “German problem.”186  
 In the fall of 1949, Langer once again took to the floor of the Senate with demands for an 
expansion of emigration for expellees. The senator set the tone for the speech that would last the 
better part of the afternoon from the very onset: 
“It is the plight of millions of helpless people who for generations lived 
peacefully in certain eastern European countries, but who, by one single 
stroke of the pen, found themselves expelled from their homes and 
driven from their soil for no other reason, Mr. President, than that they 
spoke German. Never, in the course of inhuman events, has any group of 
people been so ruthlessly treated as the so-called expellees who augment 
their daily prayers with a supplication that somewhere on earth a place 
can be found where their sole crime, the stigma of being able to speak 
only German and of being of German ethnic origin, will be pardoned, so 
that they may once again raise their faces skyward and breathe an air not 
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polluted by bigotry, abuse, and the stench of rotting bodies of their 
miserable friends and wretched relatives.”187 
 
The presentation sought to emphasize the victimhood and abandonment of expellees and 
secure an increase in immigration quotas from which Germans were excluded. Already in the 
previous year, Langer had spearheaded efforts to include an amendment to the 1948 Displaced 
Persons Act granting eligibility for 12,000 ethnic Germans to emigrate annually. Calling for this 
figure to be expanded to at least 52,000, the speech included lengthy digressions on the history of 
migration, definitions of the term “ethnicity,” and periodic interruptions from colleagues.  
At the heart of the lecture was a racially charged juxtaposition between DPs and 
expellees. Engaging in blatant victimhood competition, Langer offered anecdotes of unruly 
Slavic DPs documented in numerous complaints to his office, and reports from Europe that 
revealed how the Third Reich’s erstwhile victims formed “the hard core of Europe’s teeming 
humanity.” They were “far from angelic,” with many being criminals and communists or Nazi 
collaborators.188 Langer questioned laws benefiting hundreds of thousands of “aliens, whose sole 
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melodramatic claim to eligibility…would be that they, not unlike many millions of others, have a 
burning desire to come to the United States.”189  
The DP “pressure groups and the Potsdam schemers” brought these elements to 
American shores while deliberately barring expellees from escaping from Europe, the senator 
argued.190 Langer assured listeners that he hardly dismissed the Third Reich’s crimes, yet 
reminded colleagues that they had pledged to prevent their repetition.191 Yet “scarcely a finger 
has been lifted for the relief of the expellees,” Langer lamented, “and we sit quietly in this 
Chamber while those very expellees are slowly being exterminated like rats, and welcome into 
our midst shipload after shipload of displaced persons, many of whom have greatly abused our 
hospitality.”192 While the DPs themselves and their victimhood were questionable, expellees 
were of better “stock” and possessed a “more desirable character.”193 Indeed, their mental caliber 
and moral codes are as admirable as their distant relatives in my State and many of the other 
sovereign States of the Union,” Langer assured.194 As skilled farmers and laborers, they would 
benefit the American economy. Their victimhood, moreover, was beyond doubt. 
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Langer passionately pleaded that it had been a catastrophic mistake to appease the USSR 
in 1945, “thereby licensing their hordes to legally crack a cat-o’-nine-tails brutally over the heads 
of some 12,500,000 innocent people.”195 The crimes were ostensibly without historic precedent: 
“Never in peacetime has so large a congregation of humanity been caused to float aimlessly on 
the sea of broken dreams, deprived of a pilot, and robbed even of their compass. Pushed, kicked, 
beaten, and cowed, with only the remnants of clothes to warm them, their aching feet protected 
by cardboard, newspapers, or tattered rags, these outcasts eke out an existence as scavengers in 
the woods or in the back alleys of cities and villages because their only crime was being of 
German ethnic origin.”196 Langer spoke alternately of three and five million dead, but all had 
been “virtually condemned to death.”197 Repeated descriptions of “despicable atrocities…[that] 
baffle the human conception of decency” punctuated Langer’s presentation. He described how 
farmers who love their soil were “simply thrown out, ruthlessly and unceremoniously” from their 
homes, and then packed onto trains from which crews tossed still living babies out of windows 
into the snow.198 Now they were “drifting from place to place, haunting from pillar to post” 
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Expellee representatives have often lamented that the world remained silent in the face of 
their suffering. This is a patent falsehood: Sympathy and condemnation were consistent themes 
in newspaper columns and political debates in the United States and Great Britain. Remarkably, 
even the interpretations, imagery, and specific examples bore a striking resemblance to how 
expellees discussed and characterized their fate. Langer’s long denouncements of history’s most 
“fiendish plot” were mawkish overtures to be sure, but exceptional only in their hyperbole.200 
Why this is the case is down to the surprising international lobby efforts of the expellees, which 
allow a number of crucial conclusions. 
First, though frequently overlooked or treated as an exoticism, expellee arguments are an 
important factor in explaining the postwar stabilization and recovery of Germany. The successful 
influence of American and British discourse on the crisis in Central Europe, and not simply the 
seriousness of the calamity itself, led to increased aid and foodstuffs and the easing of 
restrictions that made a real difference in the lives of expellees in the dire period before 1947. 
Reports of continued and even growing social tensions in the American and British occupation 
zones from 1947 onwards, as well as limited German progress toward a longterm solution to the 
expellee question, forced a fundamental rethinking in American policy in Germany. Emerging 
Cold War demarcations of course played a central role; but expellee suffering, and the successful 
campaign to raise international awareness of the need for greater intervention, played a part in 
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paving the way for the Marshall Plan and legislation that would finally integrate expellees, as the 
next chapter will demonstrate. 
Second, the remarkable similarity between American and expellee discourses reveals how 
successfully German conversation partners impressed their narrative on foreign audiences. 
British and American perceptions rested upon materials and arguments provided by expellees. In 
turn, German seized upon foreign conclusions and reintroduced them domestically to underline 
Anglo-American second-guessing of the expulsions, establish political legitimacy at home, and 
assuage expellees that their suffering struck a chord.201  
This transatlantic feedback loop also had immense influence on German discourse and 
the collective memory of “flight and expulsion.” For instance, expellees within the CDU 
published and circulated a translation of CAME’s Land of the Dead, transforming Western 
criticism of the expulsions into a plea for a reversal of the transfers and return of ceded 
territory.202 The afterword noted “with satisfaction” the growing criticism abroad and praised the 
pamphlet’s “open language” in naming the main culprit: “Russia and its vassal states.”203 While 
the pamphlet suggested that the CDU recognized the earnestness of the refugee crisis and 
somehow had influence abroad, and therefore deserved the expellee vote, the publication also 
presented a whitewashed history that attempted to avoid offending reader sensibilities: While the 
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edition meant for internal party use entailed a verbatim translation of the original English, the 
public version omitted CAME’s section on the “monstrous balance of the Nazi crimes” that 
partially explained the origins of Allied policy. The injustice of “flight and expulsion” had no 
relationship to the twelve years of Nazi rule, and instead appeared as an irrational crime resulting 
from Western mistakes and East European brutality against Germans.   
Lastly, the efforts of expellees to immediately after 1945 gather testimonies and arrange 
them into a narrative created a streamlining of experiences and memories, which added another 
layer to “flight and expulsion.” Over time, Wenzel Jaksch’s “antifascist expellee narrative” lost 
out to the accusatory victimhood narrative propagated by expellees in Germany, many of whom 
ascended to leadership positions within their parties and expellee associations. While in the 
1940s it lacked the overt political tenor and demands of getting the homeland back, this longterm 
successful framing of the expulsions not only provided a crucial bedrock for the “homeland 
politics” of the 1950s, it created a transatlantic network that expellees hoped to utilize in order to 
achieve a revision of the postwar order, as will be shown.  
All in all, the international memory politics not only profoundly shaped how the 
consequences of the Second World War were overcome, but also remembered. It also explains 
an overlooked aspect of how “flight and expulsion” narratives circulated and anchored 





SHARING THE BURDENS OF DEFEAT: EXPELLEE SYMPATHY NARRATIVES 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INTEGRATION 
 
 
On February 1, 1945, the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (German News Agency) issued 
warnings to the German people that a mass of refugees fleeing the Bolshevik hordes would soon 
be arriving in the streets of the Reich. It was everyone’s “duty to in every manner help these 
fellow Germans who have lost their homes and workplaces under the most difficult 
circumstances” and who “suffered the most terrible fate.” The statement closed with a promise of 
a forthcoming law that would provide for a “just distribution of the burdens” across the entire 
German people for the damages incurred by the refugee crisis.1 The regime, busy with its 
existential struggle, never passed such a resolution, leaving it as one of the first main tasks for 
the postwar German authorities; not until 1952 did the Federal Republic implement a type of 
scheme articulated in the press release in the form of the Lastenausgleichgesetz (LAG), or 
“equalization of burdens law.”  
If it had been easy to bear sacrifices during dizzying victories, the disaster of total defeat 
strained the supposed bonds of solidarity of the “people’s community.”2 Just as many within 
                                                 
1 Cited in  alter Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa. Ein Kollektives Tagebuch (29.1-5.2.1945), vol. 3 (München: btb Verlag, 
2004), 402–3. The bulletin, anticipating complaints over food shortages, went on to explain that the East Germans 
had “grown not only their own food, but provided surpluses for the Reich” during the war.  
2 Historians have questioned whether the “people’s community” existed more in Nazi propaganda than in reality. Ian 
Kershaw has argued that the Volksgemeinschaft was nothing more than a “vague” concept constructed by Nazi 
propaganda, which utterly failed to overcome social and economic differences in German society. Ian Kershaw, The 
Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 172. Michael 
Wildt and Frank Bajohr generally concur, but take the ambitions of the regime more seriously and point to the fact 
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society looked upon expellees with profound ambivalence, leading German politicians adopted a 
“wait and see” attitude. Responding to a letter that expressed fear of a subversion of local culture 
through the refugees on May 26, 1946, the future chancellor Konrad Adenauer was of two 
minds: “On the one hand we must be good to them, yet on the other they…cannot transplant the 
Prussian spirit into our Rhenish youth. We must attempt to assimilate them and have them adopt 
our spiritual mindset. An accumulation of eastern refugees in leading positions of course cannot 
occur.”3  
Unlike his colleague from Cologne, Konrad Adenauer’s political rival Kurt Schumacher, 
the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), possessed a connection to the 
German East. Born in Kulm/Chełmno, the West Prussian nevertheless also initially demonstrated 
uncertainty at the prospect of millions of expellees flooding into Germany in October 1945: “The 
flood of refugees from the East…eclipses all of the previously imaginable. The hunger winter 
will drive even more masses from the East into our territory. Today already we see conditions 
develop that remind one of the concentration camps.”4 In this and other public statements, 
Schumacher lamented the “indolence and coldness of many a heart,” yet the leading Social 
Democrat did little to foster sympathy. Instead, the refugees appeared as a hostile flood of 
outsiders, excluded from the German national community and obligations of aid.  
                                                 
that many Germans bought into the promise of a “people’s community,” which mobilized national awareness and 
partially contributed to political and social stability. Frank Bajohr and Michael Wildt, Volksgemeinschaft: Neue 
Forschungen zur Gesellschaft des Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2009). 
Götz Aly argues that the Nazi regime achieved very real gains in equality and social upward mobility, and that it 
was the destruction of the Jews that provided the integrating function for the constituting of a unified “people’s 
community.” Götz Aly, Hitlers Volksstaat Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus (Frankfurt am Main: 
Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verl., 2006). 
3 Hans Peter Mensing, ed., Adenauer. Briefe 1945-1947 (Berlin: Siedler, 1983), 255. 
4 Quoted in Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern, 416. 
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Yet within a few years, both Schumacher and Adenauer would sing different tunes. 
Expellee victimhood by the founding of the Federal Republic was without question, as was their 
membership within the nation. Indeed, the “community of fate” for all major parties constituted a 
vital component of postwar political identity: A shared sense of collective victimhood that cut 
across every party line, save for the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), dominated the public 
discourse of the early Federal Republic in the late 1940s and 1950s. While disagreements arose 
about the details of how to master the crisis, the importance of alleviating expellee suffering and 
goal of integrating the millions of displaced were national goals that virtually every West 
German politician subscribed to solving “Germany’s Nr. 1 Question.”5   
This chapter examines this dramatic turnaround, and investigates how expellees went 
from marginalized figures struggling against societal ambivalence to war victims par excellence 
deserving of assistance and special rights. Of interest here is not an evaluation of the expellee 
associations, or the relationship of the West German parties to them and their concerns.6 Neither 
will it attempt an exhaustive history of the LAG, which has already been investigated elsewhere.7 
Instead, the forthcoming pages will assess how expellees and their supporters fostered a largely 
apolitical “sympathy narrative” of “flight and expulsion” in order to illuminate the fate of 
                                                 
5 “Deutschlands Frage Nr. 1,” Das Parlament, March 12, 1952, 1. 
6 See Hans W. Schoenberg, Germans from the East: A Study of Their Migration, Resettlement, and Subsequent 
Group History Since 1945 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970); Manfred Max Wambach, Verbändestaat und 
Parteienoligopol; Macht und Ohnmacht der Vertriebenenverbände. (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1971); Matthias Stickler, 
“Ostdeutsch heisst Gesamtdeutsch”: Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der 
deutschen Vertriebenenverbände : 1949-1972 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2004); Pertti Ahonen, After the Expulsion: West 
Germany and Eastern Europe 1945-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne 
Ende; Matthias Müller, Die SPD und die Vertriebenenverbände 1949-1977: Eintracht, Entfremdung, Zwietracht 
(Berlin: Lit, 2012).  
7 Michael L Hughes, Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat: West Germany and the Reconstruction of Social Justice 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Paul Erker, Rechnung für Hitlers Krieg: Aspekte und 
Probleme des Lastenausgleichs (Heidelberg: Verl. Regionalkultur, 2004). 
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refugees and underpin social and material claims. Instead of examining the political history of 
how the path to integration was forged, in other words, it will examine how the case for 
including the expellees into the national community was made and how, in the process, they 
emerged as a symbol of German suffering and central element of West German political identity. 
In short: The Heimatvertriebene (“homeland expellees”) and Schicksalsgemeinschaft 
(“community of fate”) needed to be constructed and sold to the West German people between 
1945 and 1952.  
 
“Do You Know What it Means to Lose the Homeland?” Early Refugee Activities and the 
Foundations of a Sympathy Narrative in the Western Zones, 1945-1947 
 
The year 1947 was a crucial turning point. Two years after the end of the war, the 
challenges of arrival and survival turned toward the longterm question of integration. 
Simultaneously, social unrest reached a dangerous boiling point, leaving the prospects for a 
peaceful and prosperous Germany in doubt. As has already been examined, expellees on their 
own claimed an identity and asserted themselves against their neighbors. From the beginning, 
however, they were supported by a handful of non-expellees who attempted to make the 
argument that the new arrivals were equal citizens deserving of sympathy of aid. 
The bureaucrats tasked with aiding refugees often attempted to shame resistant elements 
among the population by openly pointing out how their unsympathetic dispositions stood in stark 
contrast to the previously vaunted Volksgemeinschaft of the Third Reich. Fritz Ulrich, the social 
democratic Interior Minister of Württemberg-Baden in the American Zone, in April 1946 decried 
that the worst “inhumane” acts could be seen exactly among those “who could not scream ‘Heil 
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Hitler’ loudly enough in the Third Reich.”8 The district administrator of the Rheingau, Peter Paul 
Nahm, also took his constituents to task, pointing out in editorials throughout the region’s 
newspapers that they would likely be more willing to take in refugees if they were laborers: 
“When in recent times [during the Third Reich] the labor offices dispersed foreign workers, none 
of the farmers could get enough of them on his farm...Now no foreign workers are coming, but 
German people, just like us.”9  In the Soviet Zone, Michael Tschesnow, the vice president of the 
Central Administration for German Resettlers (ZfdU) impugned the “people’s community,” 
remarking that it lasted as long as it was at the expense of others, but now when there were true 
“‘brothers in need,’ precisely those fail who couldn’t run their mouths enough.” In 90 percent of 
the cases in which the ZfdU investigated mistreatment of refugees, Tschesnow fumed, the guilty 
parties were “Nazis in disguise or their cronies.”10  
Making plain to all that the expellees were here to stay no matter what rumors or fantasy 
might say was the first step for German administrators and officials on the business end of the 
refugee problem, namely. Fliers and posters appeared throughout Germany warning in simple 
terms that refugees were inbound and that the local population had no choice but to accept the 
imposition. Placards of the Relief Aid of the Province of Sachsen (Hilfswerk der Provinz 
Sachsen) called upon the inhabitants of Naumburg to “help the resettlers!” to donate clothing and 
other goods in “freely,” adding that representatives would come house to house to explain the 
situation and take in collections before the arrival of the next refugee transports arriving on 
                                                 
8 Quoted in  Thomas Grosser, Die Integration der Heimatvertriebenen in Württemberg-Baden (1945-1961) 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2006), 328. 
9 Quoted in  Hans Jandl, Flüchtlinge und Heimatvertriebene im Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis: Flucht und Vertreibung, 
Aufnahme und Unterbringung, Prozeß der Eingliederung (Bad Schwalbach: Bund der Vertriebenen, 1991), 135. 
10 “Mit Herz und Kopf,” Neues Deutschland, June 6, 1946, 2. 
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January 20, 1946.11 A 1947 poster in Chemnitz depicting shadowy figures of a man and woman 
carrying an infant pulling a handcart above the skyline of the city warned of the impending 
arrival of 6,000 resettlers and demanded that the population “give them a new homeland!”12 
Often local leaders took the population to task: In Baden-Württemberg, for instance, the 
Lutheran Bishop Theophil Wurm pleaded his congregation to “take in the people robbed of their 
existence not as bothersome foreigners, but as compatriots, as people who are close to us.”13 
Similar messages could be discerned on the airwaves. In early 1946 the Bremen district 
administrator and SPD politician Louis Biester issued an appeal to community leaders to provide 
for a just distribution of housing and integrate the refugees “as much as possible” into the labor 
market. “The refugees are staying here,” Biester informed listeners, “they will be our 
[community] members and citizens, they may not be regarded as beggars who came to us. It is 
our duty to ensure that they enjoy a sense of belonging [Heimatsgefühl] and homeland rights 
[Heimatsberechtigung] here. They must be born as if they have been here with us for years, 
because we know they will likely never return.”14 The stern, matter of fact language 
corresponded to the brusque manner in which occupation governments shunted off the refugees 
onto the communities and reflected the dire situation that the responsible administrators faced.  
Pleas in the socialist zone of occupied Germany likewise took on an urgent tone. In 
December of 1945, Berlin’s Soviet-appointed mayor Arthur Werner launched a series of direct 
                                                 
11 See flier in Haus der Geschichte, Bonn. 
12 See poster in Haus der Geschichte, Bonn. 
13 Cited in Grosser, Die Integration der Heimatvertriebenen in Württemberg-Baden (1945-1961), 329. 
14 Track Nr. 1, “Aufruf an die Bevölkerung. Ansprache von Landrat Biester,” Radio Bremen, 1946, in: Flucht und 
Vertreibung im Rundfunk. Tondokumente aus den Jahren 1945 bis 1960, Alina Laura Tiews and Hans-Ulrich 
Wagner (Hamburg: Hans-Bredow-Institut, 2017). 
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appeals in the Soviet-licensed Berlin press to demand patience from the city’s population and 
solicit donations in order to create a worthy Christmas for the refugees trying to find “peace and 
refuge from their ardors.” “You must help them! We appeal to you! Even if your plight is great 
as well, it is not great enough to make out even a portion of the suffering that these people are 
exposed to.” Werner promised that “the day will come when we all will have what we need,” and 
that the humanitarian efforts now “can no longer be destroyed through war or bombing raids.”15 
The Central Administration for Public Health in the Soviet Zone similarly issued calls for goods, 
blankets, and volunteers to help at train stations where refugees arrived. “The entire German 
people now reaps the terrible crop of twelve years of politics of insanity,” yet the “Hitler clique” 
had disproportionately harmed the expellees: “Those who are affected the most are the resettlers, 
who have lost home and hearth and who now face an uncertain and dark future” after long 
journeys in the cold. “The terrible plight of the present can only be overcome through the force 
of a true and active [tatbereiten] democracy.”16 
The messages left little doubt as to the inevitability of the situation and directed listeners 
that they had no choice but to comply. These rather purely informational notifications soon gave 
way to appeals to guilty consciences. Into the late 1940s, placards and pamphlets in the two 
Germanys, often utilizing gendered metaphors for innocence and vulnerability such as a refugee 
mother and child, pleaded with Germans to provide “help for all.” The remarkable similarities 
cut across zonal borders and ideological divides: A placard from the Soviet Zone featured two 
hands reaching for a family of five, including a woman with an infant in her arms, and their 
                                                 
15 “Helft den Flüchtlingen!” Berliner Zeitung Nr. 176, December 7, 1945, 2. See also “Weihnachtshilfe für die 
Flüchtlingslager. Ein Aufruf des Oberbürgermeisters,” Neue Zeit, December 7, 1945, 4. 
16 “Helft den Umsiedlern!” Berliner Zeitung Nr. 194, December 29, 1945, 2. 
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pitiful cart with the entreaty to “accept them into your midst” and “help the resettlers.”17 In the 
Western Zones, a flier with a sketch of a family pulling their possessions past an indifferent 
couple, the husband in Wehrmacht uniform with hands thrust into pockets, called upon viewers 
to “Pitch in!” and reminded Germans that “It concerns all of you!”18 
One common strategy were PR campaigns which attempted to familiarize the expellee 
and non-expellee population with one another. When starting in 1947 French authorities 
gradually opened their zone to refugees, the Württemberg-Hohenzollern refugee commissioner 
Theodor Eschenburg’s “integration bulletins” went a step further in preparing the population: 
“The expellees come from a foreign land, their customs and their mentality are different from our 
own, their clothing their way of cooking is different, many of their work methods vary from our 
own. Their dialect is different from ours. Some will find it difficult to communicate with them in 
the early days. What seems foreign to you is not in and of itself malicious and worthy of 
condemnation, perhaps only after weeks and months you will be able to render a judgment over 
your new cohabitants and neighbors.”19 Eschenburg at the same time took care to explain local 
customs to the expellees and remind them that integration required mutual effort and patience.20  
                                                 
17 See examples in  Andreas Kossert, Kalte Heimat: die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945 
(München: Siedler, 2008), 65.  
18 CD Jacket  in: Flucht und Vertreibung im Rundfunk, Tiews and Wagner. 
19 Cited in Andrea Kühne, Entstehung, Aufbau und Funktion der Flüchtlingsverwaltung in Württemberg-
Hohenzollern 1945-1952: Flüchtlingspolitik im Spannungsfeld deutscher und französischer Interessen 
(Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1999), 240. 
20 “The people here in this land have maintained their customs through centuries of change. They are honest, close-
mouthed, and thrifty and they measure the new arrivals according to these traits. They are tireless in their work, 
especially the women with their housekeeping, and expect the same of others. They are scrupulously tidy and very 
sparing in their own consumption, they think that it must be this way with others. In principle they are modest, but 
very sensitive to criticism and strangers who are know-it-alls. Their words are earthy, but hidden behind them are 
much love and helpfulness.” Quoted in Kühne, 245. 
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Throughout Germany, state activists attempted to leverage the plight of fellow Germans 
into arguments for greater understanding. Commissioned by the district administrator of 
Lippstadt to deal with arriving refugee transports, the writer Theo Breider sought to address his 
Westphalian compatriots directly in late 1945. Writing poems in the dialect of the region, Breider 
encouraged his compatriots to “mak’t uap” (open up) their doors and demonstrate greater charity 
to the “people of our blood who have lost homes,” reminding readers that “they are German 
people, those are our farmers, the men were our soldiers.”21  
Peter Paul Nahm, the district administrator of the Rheingau, argued in similar tones. 
Nahm from the onset adopted an uncompromising and consequential tone in his directives to the 
mayors of the region when refugee transports started to arrive in February 1946, warning that 
“the arriving shall not be treated as temporary lodgers or foreign elements, they are comrades of 
the community who are to have their own room and opportunities for cooking.”22 Nahm 
emphasized that “there is no option to refuse reception” as elsewhere in Germany, where 
communities ignored instructions or implemented them with the greatest reluctance and delay. 
The rigid commands did little to assuage the population, however, and reports of altercations and 
chicanery led Nahm to engage in a vociferous press campaign in order to issue “grave words in 
serious times” in the region’s papers. Despite his clear guidelines to the community 
governments, Nahm chided, numerous incidents continued to anger and disappoint him: 
“As the experiences have shown us, the refugees have in many 
communities been received poorly and dishonorably. The most 
unmentionable scenes have transpired. In some places the poor people 
sat for hours on their possessions in front of the doors of farm houses 
waiting for lodging. No one wanted to be the first to take these people 
                                                 
21 Friedrich-Carl Schultze-Rhonhof and Gesellschaft für Ostdeutsche Kulturarbeit, Neuanfang in Münster 
Eingliederung von Flüchtlingen und Vertriebenen in Münster von 1945 bis heute (Münster: Ges. für Ostdt. 
Kulturarbeit Münster e.V., 1997), 55. 
22 Cited in Jandl, Flüchtlinge und Heimatvertriebene im Rheingau-Taunus-Kreis, 131. 
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into his home. […] Above all, everyone was allowed to keep their 
homeland. Do you know what it means, to lose the homeland? Could you 
even imagine how you would feel if you were forced to leave your 
homeland with 100 kg of luggage or to work as a laborer on the farm 
where you once were the farmer? As the experiences have shown, this 
sympathy is missing everywhere. I expect of my mayors that they go 
before all in their community as a shining example and in every matter 
are the first. The inhabitants of the communities should look upon the 
mayor, who was elected by them in free elections after twelve years of 
dictatorship, with pride. […] Everyone must be aware that the refugee, 
who must live pent-up in the most crowded space, will become 
impatient, and that through this insalubrities will develop in every home. 
In various communities my delegates had to intervene.23 
 
 
The media played a crucial role in facilitating integration. Some papers also let refugees 
speak directly: In June 1947, Die Gegenwart reprinted a letter of an East Prussian which, 
according to the paper, reflected the majority of expellee letters to the editorial board. “Should 
not more often the gruesome tragedy of the Prussian fate be recognized in all of Germany and 
move the people of Southern Germany to not disparage the Prussian people…but instead elicit 
sympathy for the cruelty of the Control Council’s decision? No democracy can grow and prosper 
on earth which holds seeds of hatred.”24 Occasionally, papers covered in detail complaints of 
expellees and printed their demands and recriminations.25  
West German journalists attempted to raise understanding by giving the refugees a 
human face. Reporting introduced audiences not only to who the outsiders were and where they 
came from, but also their worries. Ilse K. Bembé for instance recounted the conversations one 
could overhear on a night train in 1946, reproducing the dialects of Sudeten Germans, Prussians, 
                                                 
23 Cited in Jandl, 135. 
24 “Schwierige Verständigung. Briefe an die Herausgeber,” Die Gegenwart, June 3, 1947, 24. 
25 “Bittere Anklagen der Flüchtlinge,” Allgemeine Zeitung, June 28, 1949, 1. 
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and Silesians who shared stories of suffering, words of advice, and encouragement.26 Another 
lengthy report humanized the inhabitants of the refugee camp in Ülzen in June 1948, providing 
biographies and descriptions of the travails of barracks life and searching for firm footing. 
Readers learned of an East Prussian woman who had but a pile of straw for a bed; it was her third 
time in the camp, she explained, as she had been snatched up by police while wandering the 
countryside looking for work. While tending to her swollen feet, she recounted her trek from 
East Prussia to the Sudetenland and her odyssey through the SBZ.  
The reporter noted with horror how the entire camp smelled of sweat, unaired clothes, 
and foul food, and that the camp staff—themselves refugees—eyed everyone with a “gaze more 
critical than some criminal detectives.” Nonetheless, they had filed a report to the government 
decrying the camp as a “crime against humanity.” The author described children who “played” 
scrounging for food, “packing bags…and departure and quarrel,” as well as “border crossing” 
and “jail.” Their clothes were tattered, and some had no shoes for years, many of the children 
could not read and had no access to school. The article closed with the tale of a young mother of 
two, whose fortune had turned to despair: Her husband had found work, but had suddenly died of 
TB, so that she was back in the camp. “Three and a half years ago the flight began. Three and 
half years ago she ended up in the mill, in the great mill of the barracks, the camps, where people 
are ground…But the war ended three years ago.”27 
Radio in particular developed into a powerful medium and did much to shape public 
perceptions of the refugee problem and the challenges that faced the expellees. Naturally, 
interviews with refugee politicians, as well as discussions over issues concerning the expellees, 
                                                 
26 Ilse K. Bembé, “Im D-Zug. Sommer 1946, nachts,” Die Gegenwart, September 24, 1946, 31-33. 
27 “Station im Strom der Menschen. Bilder aus dem Flüchtlingslager Ülzen,” Allgemeine Zeitung, June 25, 1948, 2 
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featured prominently. But perhaps more gripping and powerful were reports from refugee camps 
and interviews with refugees in which they described their experiences. In 1946, for example, 
Radio Bremen visited a herring packing plant where many refugees worked. Against the 
backdrop of the machinery and women singing, a young woman whose medical studies had been 
cut short by the expulsions professed that “she didn’t really belong there.” She needed money to 
support her family, and so “it has to be this way,” she sighed, adding that many of the other 
workers had similar stories. The reporter intervened: “The ‘what’ one does is after all not so 
important as the ‘how’ one does it. For we all live in…misery and must accept it and must bear it 
if possible, isn’t that so?”28 Demonstrations of bitterness and confidence could be heard on West 
German airwaves throughout the late 1940s, often framed by reporters as stories with happy ends 
that highlighted the diligence and hope of the new citizens now starting a new, prosperous 
existence.  
Other programming sought to bring together expellees and non-expellees, such as 
Westdeutscher Rundfunk’s series “Old and New Homeland.” Content ranged from political 
discussions over the equalization of burdens law to interviews, but perhaps the most popular 
feature were cultural pieces that entailed anecdotes, stories, and humor from the German East’s 
various regions. Often in dialect, the program intended to appeal to expellees and acoustically 
recreate a virtual homeland for an hour. But often the content explicitly addressed non-expellees 
as well. In “One Hour of Silesian Heaven,” the actors revealed the breadth of dialects of Upper 
and Lower Silesia, and expressed what the word “Silesia” means to the expellees: “For many this 
word means nothing more than the name of a region that lies somewhere in the East. Well, there 
                                                 
28 Track Nr. 2, “Flüchtlinge beim Herringsreinigen in Wesermünde” Radio Bremen, 1946, in: Flucht und 
Vertreibung im Rundfunk. Tondokumente aus den Jahren 1945 bis 1960, Alina Laura Tiews and Hans-Ulrich 
Wagner (Hamburg: Hans-Bredow-Institut, 2017). 
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may be only a few. But for thousands, yes millions of Germans, ‘Silesia’ encompasses the most 
holy that lives in a person’s heart: The love for homeland. For a land in which they took their 
first steps. And where they for the first time…saw their mother lovingly smile at them.” They 
had not lost their humor, however, and wanted to explain to listeners what their culture consisted. 
The narrator agreed, adding that the program intended to help non-expellees get to know their 
new compatriots. “The more one knows of one another, the more one can understand.”29   
Similarly, Bayerischer Rundfunk’s “For the old and new citizens” attempted to foster 
mutual understanding. A June 1951 radio play dramatized disagreements between expellees and 
non-expellees over who had suffered the most during and after the war. In a mish-mash of 
Bavarian, Silesian, and East Prussian dialects, the heated argument ended in mutual 
understanding and recognition that all had suffered, but that the expellees needed sympathy in 
order to call Bavaria home.30  Messages of reconciliation and respect were common features on 
German radio shows in the early postwar years, and the humanizing of the mass of expellees 
constituted an important milestone in the process of confirming their status as victims with 
claims to material and social support. 
That expellees found help from the radio stations can partially be attributed to the 
influence of individual staffers who pushed for greater attention on the refugee crisis. Wilhelm 
Matzel, the head of the news division of NWDR and the station’s expert for refugee matters, 
haled from Silesia, as did Radio Stuttgart’s Albrecht Baehr. There were, in other words, activists 
who in any case had an interest in the concerns of the expellees. But expellee leaders also 
                                                 
29 Track Nr. 21, “Eine Stunde Schlesisches Himmelreich” Radio Stuttgart, June 4, 1948, in: Flucht und Vertreibung 
im Rundfunk. Tondokumente aus den Jahren 1945 bis 1960, Alina Laura Tiews and Hans-Ulrich Wagner (Hamburg: 
Hans-Bredow-Institut, 2017). 
30 BArch Koblenz 150-3340, Script of program of Bayerischer Rundfunk’s “Für die alten und neuen Landsleute,” 
June 20, 1951. 
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attempted to influence programming. In December 1949, for instance, Radio Frankfurt and 
expellees entered into talks to expand programming and allocate more airtime to issues related to 
the forced migrations. “Their numbers in Hessen are so great, their concerns so pressing and 
their will for cooperation is positive,” Neue Heimat explained, that “they can make demands for 
greater consideration.” The goal was not “political propaganda” or “irredentism,” but providing a 
“forum for the German ‘problem Nr. 1’ in a sober manner and simultaneously making an 
important contribution to the understanding of the entire German culture. One cannot deny that 
hereby radio would also contribute to the further rapprochement between natives and homeland 
expellees in a most positive manner.”31 
Expellee leaders in the parties as well felt in 1947 and 1948 that they were entitled to 
greater influence in German media, and bemoaned the in their opinion general lack of coverage. 
In a 1948 confidential memo from the conference of the refugee subcommittees of the CDU and 
CSU in Braunschweig, representatives discussed the need for greater coverage and fostering of 
awareness among the population. They demanded their parties endorse their recommendation for 
refugee editors with authority to independently revise and edit all news and programming and 
who would “in every publication be granted space to present the seriousness of the problem” and 
“counteract statements which call into question the justified demands of the expellees.” 
Institutions that did not accept these demands, the attendees proclaimed, should be blacklisted as 
“papers that are not close to us and our efforts.”32 
                                                 
31 Clipping “Radio Frankfurt und die Heimatvertriebenen,” Neue Heimat, December 3, 1949, in ACDP 007-001-
3437. 
32 ACDP 001-377-01/3, Confidential “Vermerk über die in Braunschweig zur ersten Reichstagung versammelten 
Deligierten der Landesflüchtlingsausschuss der CDU und CSU,” 1948. 
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These radical demands went unheeded. But generally, after 1947 and 1948, refugees in 
the parties used their greater influence to shape a new, more earnest course of accelerating 
integration. Fostering greater understanding for expellees that would justify legislative 
considerations were one of the top agendas. An initiative of “refugee sponsorship” developed 
within the SPD in Baden-Württemberg, where every household received a form in which 
residents could indicate the number of expellees they wanted to sponsor. Materials for 
newspapers, and ads for calls for clothes and household goods “to help during the most difficult 
period of need” and to “create a comrade-like equalization” were the second part of the 
campaign. Moreover, the refugee subcommittee of the SPD drafted a brochure titled Du und 
Dein Neubürger (“You and Your New Citizen”) containing explanations of the refugee problems 
and reports from experts such as doctors on the “psychiatric dimension” of the expulsions. The 
pamphlet also included expellee testimonies of their wartime and postwar experiences. The 
purpose of the publication, the subcommittee explained, was to “interest both the new citizens 
and the native population in one another and bring them together. The concerns of both parties 
must be shown. Help from the native population is in their own interest. New citizens: Good will 
to integrate.”33  
On the eve of the founding of the Federal Republic, and with broad rejection toward 
refugees and the expellees themselves descending into apathy and anger, reporting in the 
Western Zones increasingly spoke of the refugee problem as a problem to be solved. Newspaper 
articles criticized the lack of progress frequently indicted the hard-headedness of the population 
and its refusal to show greater understanding.34 An August 1948 Allgemeine Zeitung editorial is 
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representative of much of the critical reporting: Expressing frustration with continued antipathy, 
the paper demanded that “whoever has two garments, give one to whom has none” in order to 
make good on the Christian-social ethos.35 Local papers such as the Schwäbische Zeitung often 
reproached the population more directly, calling upon readers to demonstrate greater compassion 
in their encounters with expellees: 
“For months one speaks of the refugees in our land, of the children, the 
elderly, and men who had to leave their homeland. Now they stand 
before our door and expect our help. With the dismal remnants of their 
possessions they wandered for years, from camp to camp, from city to 
city, always with the hope to find a permanent place and to build a new 
life, be it ever so humble. We cannot refuse the shielding roof, sufficient 
sustenance to the refugees who seek shelter with us. […] For two years 
they lived in the confinement of the camps until now the transport train 
brought them to the new homeland after a long journey. They are tired 
and jaded, poor and helpless. Take them in just as you would expect a 
reception if you yourself were in their situation. To meet them 
cheerfully, to help them in their plight is our duty as people and 
Christians. Who here wants to remain without pity, to close their heart 
and barricade their house door in the face of this suffering? If we 
ourselves remove the pain and barbs of this misery through support, then 
it will be able to be borne by all.”36 
 
In April 1947, the Niedersächsische Rundschau castigated the ignorance of readers and 
their refusal to acknowledge the expellees as fellow citizens. The impetus for the piece seemed to 
be a response to the question that many Germans seemed to ask of whether it was even possible 
to lift the refugees from their “hopelessness and despair.” The author chided the reader: “Who 
even knows how it is with these raped, tortured and broken people? What does the public know 
about the violence that ravaged the German people of the East!” The article confronted the 
                                                 
1948, 2; “Sie Warten,” Allgemeine Zeitung, June 30, 1949, 1; Julius Stocky, “Die Flucht vor den Flüchtlingen,” Welt 
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35 Rudolf Krämer-Badoni, “Kann man den Vertriebenen helfen?”, Allgemeine Zeitung, August 4, 1948, 2. 
36 “Flüchtlingsnot pocht an unsere Tür,” Schwäbische Zeitung, January 1, 1947, 1. 
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ignorant with an uncommonly explicit description of what had transpired with the expellees: 
“Violence of every form, existential and miserable, horrific and horrendous have for two years 
broken and smashed these homeless people.” “Has the German East lost the war alone?”, the 
author asked, reminding the audience that the expellees’ “possessions and chattels had paid the 
down payment for reparations that should be carried by the entire German people.” 37  The author 
leveraged expellee suffering into justification for policy measures, calling for a refugee law in 
the British Zone and an equalization of burdens.  
It is not a coincidence that the greater urgency in public discourse and greater effort to 
foster sympathy coincided exactly with the shift in the public mood over the future of Germany. 
And the implied subtext, and indeed often explicit exhortation, of these appeals was an argument 
for the massive fiscal sacrifices West German society needed to make in order to contend with a 
war fought and lost by the entire nation, but the consequences of which the expellees 
disproportionately bore. The West German discourse on “flight and expulsion” took on distinct 
forms by 1949. As the expellees increasingly emerged as the war’s greatest victims, they found a 
place in the collective memory of the Federal Republic where talk of “Hitler’s fault” or “errors of 
1933” slowly receded. It was this imbedding of expellee experiences with the prevailing 
collective memory of the war which emphasized German suffering that help explain why 
expellees so rapidly emerged as the most recognized victim group, and ultimately managed to 
secure their political rights. 
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Allied “Atrocities” and German “Misdeeds”: The Interweaving of German Victimhood 
and “Flight and Expulsion” 
 
On March 15, 1950, the CDU’s news service reported a “second wave” of 80,000 
German refugees arriving in West Germany from the Eastern Bloc, an ostensible “tactical” move 
of the communist regimes to destabilize the Federal Republic. “For Bolshevism the fate of 
hundreds of thousands…plays no role. He sacrifices them without scruples in order to achieve its 
goals. The West on the other hand wants to respect the laws of humanity.” As a “pauperized 
people,” however, West Germany lacked agency to withstand the “culmination of a tragedy 
decided in Yalta and Potsdam”: Waves of refugees and unwanted “ballast” of foreign DPs 
stirring trouble. “The current situation of our continent is the result of countless errors of 
European and similarly minded peoples, to which the German people has contributed its share,” 
the release explained, but the “commonly conjured dangers can only be solved through the 
greatest common action.”38 
 The remarkable statement stands out in its self-pity and obfuscation of the historic 
processes that explained forced migration and the presence of “undesirable” foreign refugees. 
Bound by a Cold War framework, 1933-1945 were now “errors” to which Germans had 
“contributed,” and the “migration of peoples [Völkerwandurung]”—invoking the barbarian 
invasions of the ancient world—which resulted from the war were a “commonly conjured 
danger” and ostensible joint responsibility of Western Europe and the United States. The press 
release, while certainly aiming to make a political point against the ideological nemesis behind 
the Iron Curtain, is nevertheless emblematic of a particular West German discourse over the past 
that emerged around 1948. The shadow of the Third Reich, persistently present in reporting 
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during the occupation period, slowly disappeared, and with it the rhetorical framework that 
required at least a nominal engagement with history and the processes that explained the present.  
The discourse on “flight and expulsion” in the Federal Republic took on new dimensions 
in a matter of a few years, where by the founding of the country the expellees went from 
marginalized figures struggling against societal ambivalence to war victims par excellence 
deserving of assistance and special rights. The arguments that expellees brought, namely that 
they were not mere “refugees” and therefore consciously rejected that designation, hit home: 
Their preferred self-understanding as “homeland expellees” (Heimatvertriebene) or “war 
expellees” (Kriegsvertriebene) prevailed, and the more emotionally loaded label that suggested 
victimhood at the hands of a foe displaced the more general term.39 Coinciding with greater press 
freedoms, the looming Cold War and diverging political tendencies in the two Germanys also 
played a significant role: The disappearance of the homeland behind an Iron Curtain that seemed 
to harden with each crisis and socialist “flight and expulsion” narratives demanded and invited 
the leveraging of a West German victimhood narrative for social and political claims. Out of 
practical and ideological reasons, the expellees needed a new homeland and greater attention.  
The more prominent stature of the refugees after 1947 in part reflects the successes of the 
expellees, who freed from coalition bans emerged as a political pressure group aiming to 
colonize public discourse and provide an interpretation of the defeat and the expulsions which 
obfuscated questions of German responsibility, stripped away the context of the Third Reich, and 
elided the possible self-inflicted nature of postwar burdens. Expellees, in other words, were the 
recognized victims of an unexpected catastrophe that had sent millions onto an Opfergang, or 
path of suffering, which now encompassed a divided Germany and all of Europe. Just as in the 
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SBZ/GDR, West German observers recognized the forced migrations as a necessary challenge to 
master, yet in the minds of many the causes of this heavy burden did not lie with Germans 
themselves but their ostensible tormentors. 
The indisputability of German victimhood also dovetailed with a “dominant victimhood 
mental state” of the early FRG.40 Oscillating between self-pity and condemnation of abstract 
metaphysical notions such as “fate,” the hypocrisy of the Western Allies, or savagery of the 
communist expelling regimes, the “selective remembering” helped constitute a West German 
“community of memory” which privileged German traumas over the suffering that the nation 
had inflected on others just a few years before.41 While this may have allowed the Federal 
Republic to acknowledge the war and aspects of the nation’s recent history, it also offered a 
distancing to the National Socialist past and rejection of collective guilt. Such a reading, 
obviously, ignored questions of responsibility for the war and explanations for the “catastrophe,” 
even as it allowed for a rejection of the explanations of the East German rival and sped up a 
reorientation of the FRG toward the Western community of values embroiled in the Cold War. 
One way in which expellees established themselves as war victims deserving of the 
nation’s support directly corresponded to the fact that discourse in 1947/48 increasingly 
amplified the emergent trend of humanizing the refugees. Expellees went from being an abstract 
mass to a people whose terrible fates received prominent attention. A January 1947 report on the 
condition of expellees arriving from Poland in Marienthal in Der Spiegel provided among the 
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first nationally circulated images and detailed descriptions of expellees arriving in Germany.42 
The image of an emaciated man clutching his identification papers, “everything else had been 
taken from him.”43 The accompanying article detailed the horrible conditions on the deportation 
transports: Of the 1,500 mostly elderly, women, and children, 65 had perished from extreme 
hunger or cold. The last victim, a 77-year-old woman, died upon arrival “at the exact moment as 
the photographer took the shot,” the caption of a skeletal figure explained. Two of the passengers 
who were doctors struggled without medication for fourteen days against frostbite, dysentery, 
three pregnancies, and two miscarriages, one of which resulted in the mother becoming frozen to 
the unheated cattle-car floor in her own blood.44 For many readers, it may have been the first 
exposure to what the fate of expellees actually looked like. 
While the assertion of German victimhood remained veiled in Spiegel, the theme 
emerged forcefully from 1948 onwards. On February 18, 1948, the Allgemeine Zeitung ran a 
short piece on the “Treck [sic] of the 14 Million,” the “migration of peoples…without equal in 
history.” Chronicling the scope and scale, the “sober numbers reveal a tragedy of devastating 
proportions” which had cast the afflicted, and with it Germany, into an “existential struggle.”45 
Even an obligatory reference to the Third Reich, which the Allgemeine Zeitung had extensively 
                                                 
42 A total of four British officers, including Harry Bohrer, a Czech national who had fled to the United Kingdom in 
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covered in the early postwar years, remained unmentioned, so that the expulsions appeared as an 
incomprehensible disaster orchestrated by the victors, but especially by Eastern European 
communists who bore the lion’s share of culpability for violent excesses. 
Erik Mauthner of the Westdeutsche Zeitung was even more pointed in his article “The 
East German Tragedy,” based on an interview with Pastor Gerhard Goebel, the director of the 
Hauptausschuss der Ostvertriebenen für die britische Zone (“Steering Committee of the Eastern 
Expellees for the British Zone”). Mauthner’s visit with the nationalist cleric focused on Goebel’s 
efforts to raise awareness of the expellee’s experiences, which seemingly were on par with more 
recent atrocities. The author referenced the indictments brought at Nuremberg against Nazi war 
criminals, which included the “methodical and planned measures to integrate [occupied] 
territories politically, culturally, socially, and economically into the German Reich” and efforts 
to “make their earlier national character disappear” through “forced deportation of non-German 
inhabitants.” Mauthner pointed out that the same exact thing had happened after the war, and 
castigated American hypocrisy of engaging in a policy for which “Nazi leaders were…indicted 
and hanged.” The expellees “suffered the hatred and vengeance of the Eastern victors for all of 
Germany,” and would spearhead the “crusade for the winning back of the homeland, fought with 
the weapon of the flaming words and in accordance with divine judgement.”46 
Goebel’s extremism was not without West German critics, and the pastor numerous times 
raised the ire of the CDU, SPD, and Allied authorities.47 His Hauptausschuss was nevertheless 
not without some influence. The first Federal Minister of Expellees Hans Lukaschek served as 
the association’s vice president. Goebel moreover translated and widely distributed CAME’s 
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Land of the Dead in an effort to turn American indictments against the victors. Throughout 1948, 
the Hauptausschuss gathered thousands of eyewitness reports and other materials and compiled 
them into one of the first collection of testimonies on the forced migrations in Die Ostdeutsche 
Tragödie (“The East German Tragedy”).48 As Goebel explained in an informational brochure, his 
educational efforts directly sought to counter notions of a German collective guilt with 
documented German suffering: “We owe it to ourselves and our people to present the 
occurrences in the East to the world, first because the belief throughout the world is that only the 
German people through a debasement through National Socialism was capable of crimes against 
humanity, and secondly because Europe will never find peace if the atrocities that happened in 
the East are not compensated through a return of East Germans to their home areas. We don’t 
want to antagonize hatred, but we must testify to the truth.”49  
Yet another expellee cleric argued in similar tones. The aforementioned Bavarian cleric 
Emmanuel Reichenberger, for example, published the hyperbolic and emotionally charged 1948 
Ostdeutsche Passion (“East German Passion”), which vociferously rejected German collective 
guilt and condemned the atrocities committed against Germans by East Europeans and their Soviet 
backers. These were “a counterpart to the barbarism of Hitler” and the culmination of age-old 
passionate hatred of Germans, Reichenberger explained.50 Barred from entering Germany for 
many years by American and British authorities for fear that the firebrand would ignite popular 
unrest among German refugees, pressure from Catholic expellees managed to secure 
                                                 
48 Hauptausschuss der Ostvertriebenen and Ostarchiv, Die ostdeutsche Tragödie: eine Frage an das Weltgewissen 
(Lippstadt i.W.: Das Ostarchiv, 1948). 
49 ACDP 001-377-09/3, Informational brochure from the chairman of the Hauptausschusses der Ostvertriebenen in 
der britischen Zone, 1948, 3. 
50 Emmanuel J. Reichenberger, Ostdeutsche Passion (München: Europa-Buchhandlung, 1948), 266. 
327 
 
Reichenberger authorization to tour the Western Zones in the summer of 1949. Speaking before 
tens of thousands at fourteen mass rallies, the cleric equated Germany’s suffering to the Holocaust 
and accused the expellers of an intentional genocide.51 A year after his journey, Reichenberger’s 
Europa in Trümmern relativized Germany’s role in World War II and accused the Allies of having 
engaged in a “crusade” against the German people and especially the expellees.52 
The direct juxtaposition of German guilt with German suffering permeated West German 
reporting in the late 1940s. A typical representation of the “flight and expulsion” framing of the 
late 1940s can be seen in the pieces of Christ und Welt, a conservative paper founded in Stuttgart 
in June 1948 by Eugen Gerstenmaier and other representatives of the Protestant Church. 
Employing a coterie of members of the propaganda department of the Third Reich’s Foreign 
Office, the regular condemnations of denazification procedures and war crimes trials repeatedly 
faced Christ und Welt with the threat of prohibition by the licensing American authorities, who 
regarded the publication as an “under cover Nazi-paper” disseminating “nationalism and 
militarism.”53 Particularly the writings of “Erbo,” the pseudonym of Heinz Bongart, ruffled 
occupation official feathers. As a founding member of Christ und Welt, Bongart’s journalistic 
career began as a propagandist in the navy, in whose service he covered the evacuation of 
refugees from the German East in the spring of 1945.54 His observations appeared in print only 
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in 1948 in Christ und Welt and focused predominantly on the sinking of passenger ships through 
a combination of news reporting and literary flourish.55 
To escape the vigilant gaze of American occupiers, Bongart adopted the pseudonym 
Jürgen Thorwald for his “East German Fate,” a series appearing in Christ und Welt from March 
until June 1949.56 Gripping illustrations of treks, sinking ships, and destroyed cities graced the 
paper’s cover, while Thorwald vividly blended news reports, testimonies, and fictionalized 
accounts into a narrative of helpless civilians caught between a heroic Wehrmacht beholden to 
the ideological obtuseness of Nazi fat cats and a savage Soviet juggernaut. The chronicle of 
evidently struck a chord: Sales of Christ und Welt, which already enjoyed among the highest 
readerships in West Germany, tripled in the first three weeks of the series’ debut.57 Responding 
to the acclaim, the editors solicited submissions from readers documenting their experiences in 
order to expand the series into a two-volume book, which appeared in 1950.58  
The blend of pop history, creatively narrated reports, and propaganda techniques 
expounded upon the themes articulated in Christ und Welt and combined the acknowledgment of 
German war guilt with mitigating circumstances. The ghastly details presumably attempted to 
balance the scales of guilt by proposing that Germany had suffered at the very least as much as 
its victims. The removal of the most outlandish claims from subsequent editions decades later 
speaks to their unsubstantiated nature, but the “symbolic aggregation” purporting to represent 
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“typical” expellee experiences shaped the narrative of “flight and expulsion” dramatically and 
remain reference guides for expellees activists today precisely because of their emotional 
power.59 The influence of Thorwald should not be underestimated, as up to 1980 his bestsellers 
sold more than fourteen million copies, making them among West Germany’s most successful 
pop histories.60 Gerstenmaier recalled seeing a copy at Adenauer’s bedside, and that the 
chancellor had confided that “he had learned much” only after having turned to it.61 Thorwald’s 
writings are therefore not only representative of the discourse on the expulsions within the FRG 
by 1950, they profoundly influenced how broad segments of the public perceived them and 
contributed to the constitution of a West German political identity as victims of the war, in which 
the expellees were a particular and prominent “community of fate.”  
The leadership of this group of victims enshrined their self-understanding before the world 
in August 1950 in the declaration of the “Charta of the Homeland Expellees,” in which thirty 
representatives of every major expellee association publically “relinquished vengeance and 
retaliation.”62 Politicians heralded the ethos of the “Charta,” which continues to be celebrated as 
crucial expression of German contrition and desire for reconciliation.63 Such a reading overlooks 
the political potency of the declaration: Just as the signatories generously forgave their oppressors, 
the responsible parties needed to acknowledge “the joint responsibility for the fate of the expellees 
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as those most affected by the misery of these times.”64 The insistence that German suffering must 
be acknowledged and that now the victors should grapple with questions of collective guilt and 
accountability reflected the “selective remembering” of the early Federal Republic, but also the 
worldview of the expellee leadership, which sought to mint their suffering into political capital. 
The decontextualized victimhood narrative which coalesced by 1949/50 made possible 
the identification of those who suffered, but culprits and responsible parties as well. Allied 
easing of press restrictions and coalition bans only augmented these efforts. Whataboutery and 
direct criticism of the Allies’ responsibility for the expulsions and obligation to intervene 
therefore featured prominently in the West German media toward the end of the 1940s. Yet bitter 
recriminations and sudden amnesia over the recent past were not the monopoly of misanthropes 
or bitter nationalists. These interpretations of German history also came to the fore in comments 
and declarations of public officials of all political stripes, who internalized and fanned the 
rhetorical flourishes. The core messages of expellee leaders had entered and dominated West 
German discourse. 
 
The West Germans Respond: Catalysts for Change 
By 1949, when the Federal Republic of Germany came into existence, a number of 
pressures forced the West German government to spring into action on the refugees. Two 
external factors in particular loomed large. On the one hand, measures passed in the SBZ and a 
seemingly more rapid integration of the refugees there put immense strain on West German 
politicians, who in 1949 continued to wrangle over legislative solutions. With the growing 
divergence of the two systems, the democratic Germany needed to respond to its ideological 
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rival, which set the benchmark in integration measures. Yet on the other hand, growing 
American impatience constituted another impetus for greater action.  
West Germans nevertheless remained adamant that they could not solve the problem 
alone. The Sudeten German Association continued to bombard the military governments with 
literature, resolutions, and demands for meetings to discuss Allied support of refugee claims to 
financial restitution and a return to the homeland.65 Official envoys of the government proved 
equally tenacious. In at least six tours of the US between 1949 and 1959, expellee ministry 
undersecretary Walter Middelmann met policymakers, public figures, academics, and journalists 
and gave dozens of presentations on the peril of the refugee crisis and need for American 
involvement.66 Middelmann’s lobbying convinced Congressman Francis E. Walter (D, PA) to 
conduct a fact-finding mission in Germany in the fall of 1949, followed by Christian Sonne of 
the Economic Cooperation Administration, which administered Marshall Plan funds, in 1951. 
Both investigations resulted from the urging of Middelmann, who provided the delegations with 
testimonials and materials reflecting West German and expellee positions.67  
German officials continued to hope that Western governments would foot the bill for the 
expellees integration, and possibly push for a revision of the peace treaty that included a return 
of the lost territories, a not entirely unrealistic expectation given American responses. German 
lobbying initiated at least two American congressional inquiries led by Congressman Francis E. 
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Walter and the Economic Cooperation Administration member Christian Sonne.68 Sonne’s report 
to Konrad Adenauer underlined that addressing the expellee matter remained a German concern, 
and urged the Chancellor to finally implement an ambitious public spending program that would 
quadruple federal expenditures yet work to provide jobs and housing for refugees.69 
West German parties crowed that American delegations had been “deeply shattered to 
have to realize that the mass of expellees were no ‘Nazis,’” and took their interest as signs of a 
“breach in the wall of silence.”70 Both the CDU and SPD interpreted foreign concern as a 
recognition that they had been “duped at Potsdam” and browbeat by Stalin, and that they 
understood their responsibility for helping “save the productive qualities of these millions of 
rootless people through the financing of a West German reconstruction program.”71 Was there 
“growing insight,” as the CDU’s organ rhetorically asked in December 1949, among the 
American public? 72 With American lawmakers voicing reservations over European recovery and 
increases in US foreign aid, it seemed as if German special pleading had worked.73 Government 
and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA), the Cooperative for American Remittance to 
Everywhere (CARE), and the Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation in Germany 
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(CRALOG) satisfied Germans that Americans were seeing the “German problem” as their 
responsibility. German politicians nevertheless overlooked that Walter recognized the need for a 
greater financial commitment, but rejected the “fallacy of the theory of American 
coresponsibility [sic] for the uprooting of German expellees and refugees.”74 Sonne’s 
conclusions, submitted to Chancellor Adenauer, also unmistakably reiterated that the issue 
remained a challenge of the Federal Republic, and urged the implementation of an ambitious 
public spending program quadrupling federal expenditures.75 
American resentment over the slow progress of integrating the refugees increased. As 
previously shown, occupation authorities and Anglo-American journalists registered growing 
social tensions and a deteriorating relationship between Germans and the newcomers. Throughout 
occupied Germany, bureaucrats and community leaders exuded a “concealed, and often even open, 
hostile disposition toward the refugees,” as an American report to the Council of States (Länderrat) 
alleged in early 1946.76 The exasperated memo lambasted the multitude of public proclamations 
and assurances of a “brotherly acceptance” and promises of “standing helpfully at their side” as 
they “founded a new home and hearth,” when the facts on the ground reflected a different reality. 
More alarmingly, other evidence pointed to disgruntled refugees becoming incubators for 
fascist resentments in the young republic. The American military government warned in 1949 that 
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the expellees constituted “the most overtly nationalistic faction” in Germany.77 The 1948 hunger 
strikes and growth of revisionist rightwing parties such as the Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP) 
raised fears that the project of democracy building had hit a wall. By 1950, authorities grew weary 
of West German dillydallying, and unnamed officials accused Bonn of deliberately stalling 
integration with the hopes that “the surplus population…would bolster the argument for German 
‘living space’” and return of the territories.78  
The Americans ordered the German agencies to implement a number of measures which 
they hoped would jumpstart economic recovery and in particular raise the living standards of 
refugees. American prodding managed to push the newly formed Bundestag to pass the 
“Immediate Aid Law” in August 1949, allocating the pittance of 100 to 200 marks per household. 
Occupation authorities also greenlighted the formation of a central refugee ministry, which opened 
its doors in 1949 and concerned itself with predominantly representing the socio-economic 
interests of refugees and other Germans who had sustained damages during the war. Because of 
its rather limited mandate, however, the agency’s greatest value lay in its symbolic importance 
which signaled integration measures.79 Financially, Allied intervention was a mixed bag. While 
portions of Marshall money went directly to refugee assistance, American decreed 1948 currency 
reform counteracted gains because it disproportionately hurt those whose assets consisted 
predominantly of cash. This therefore wiped out the savings of the majority of expellees, and 
amounted to a “last straw” for those who had suffered “an already years-long period of vegetating 
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while trapped in a daily guerilla war for a humanly decent dwelling, for an even so modest job, 
and for one’s daily bread,” as one expellee decried.80 The expellees for their part argued for a 
conversion of 1:1 as opposed to the mandated 10:1, but went empty-handed.81 
The occupation authorities and Economic Council recognized that the economic situation 
of the war damaged had become dangerously untenable and required a response. The expellees in 
particular faced grim prospects: By the end of 1949, over 35 percent were unemployed in West 
Germany; in Schleswig-Holstein, the figure was at nearly 60%.82 Despite improving economic 
performance overall, policies specifically geared toward the expellees remained in the planning 
stages. Over much of 1948, the Economic Council on pressure from the Allies drafted the “First 
Equalization of Burdens Law,” which earmarked a billion Marks raised through capital levies of 
two percent for the immediate needs of war-damaged. Instead of directing expellees, the war 
damaged, and victims of political oppression during the Third Reich to the welfare offices, the bill 
foresaw a meager 70 Marks per month for those unable to work due to age or disability, with 
additional supplements for dependents. This made the “Support Aid” more generous than general 
welfare, but it still only amounted to a drop in the bucket. 
More debilitating was that this first equalization of burdens remained tied up with Allied 
occupation authorities, who spent eight months weighing and amending the German proposal 
before them. The US secretary of the army Kenneth Royall had concerns over the bill’s name and 
the seemingly radical interventionist economic measures. Under pressure from Lucius Clay and 
the State Department, Royall relented but insisted the law be renamed “Immediate Aid Law,” 
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which was finally promulgated in August 1949. West German lawmakers were perplexed by 
American concerns after having heard so much about the need for German ownership of the 
refugee crisis. And indeed, American delay slowed German progress on formulating a second, 
more comprehensive equalization of burdens scheme, as the advisory commission suspended their 
work to gauge Allied intentions.83 The delay only increased pressure now for the first Bundestag 
to act. If German politicians could point to their limited sovereignty as the reason for missing 
legislation for the expellees before 1949, those explanations no longer rang quite as true after the 
founding of the FRG. From the perspective of the expellee organizations, who now formed into 
pressure groups, Adenauer government’s responses remained largely meaningless symbolic 
measures, and the equalization of burdens law continued to remain mired in political wrangling. 
A third source of pressure came from mounting exasperation documented in the West 
German press. Descriptions of conditions in the camps, frustrating bureaucratic hurdles, and the 
hopelessness among “streams” of refugees typically concluded with exasperation that no firm 
policies had been brought to the table.84 Pundits spoke of the “German stare” in camps, meaning 
the look refugees took on when dared to demand clear answers to clear questions but went 
wanting.85 Fears of the homo barackensis, a disillusioned nihilist created by the state of limbo, 
abounded.86 Waves of wandering refugees, their ranks swelled by those fleeing the GDR, raised 
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the “highest alarm level” and fears of rootless vagabonds.87 Reports on youths, orphaned and 
banding together, and their criminality and liberal sexual mores raised anxiety over a new amoral 
generation produced by the forced migrations.88 The inability to lay out measures constituted an 
egregious “flight before the refugees,” a 1949 editorial by Julius Stocky complained, just as the 
refugee problem was at a crucial “turning point.”89 In letters and newspaper articles, expellees 
demanded their rights as equal citizens.90 It was in a word “shameful,” Die Gegenwart declared, 
that the refugee problem still remained unresolved in 1951, reducing all talk of solidarity to 
“derision and mere talk.”91 The German parties seemed to be oblivious to Germany’s “number 
one task,” the Allgemeine Zeitung complained in September 1949.92 
A second strand of reporting voiced concern over disturbances and demonstrations of 
expellees throughout 1948 and 1949, already discussed. The press voiced concern that the 
“social atomic bomb” lobbed by Stalin at Potsdam could now explode and bring down the young 
democracy.93 Diagnoses of the “political dynamite” that could derail the political rebuilding of 
Germany abounded.94 Terrorized pundits warned of the reemergence of fascism, but equally rang 
warning bells over an imminent communist revolution. Expellee demands for the implementation 
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of seemingly successful agricultural reforms in the GDR in order to put languishing farmers on 
secure footing terrified conservative political parties, who nonetheless effectively blocked such 
initiatives from reaching state legislatures.95  
Just as alarming were “agitation,” “inflammatory speeches,” and “downright terror” in 
camps needed to be attributed undoubtedly to the “great number of functionaries with a 
schooling in tactics with origins in Moscow.”96 The CDU press service decried the Dachau 
hunger strike led by Egon Hermann, pointing out that his recent expulsion and Russian wife 
suggested some sort of affinity for communism. The upheaval clearly was the work of a 
“communist manipulator” sharing a “spiritual connection with the methods that are the daily 
course of business in the Soviet Zone.”97 A few days later DUD dispensed with innuendo, and 
labeled the strike a “planned communist action” led by “KPD functionaries” implementing 
“pronounced terror measures” dictated by Moscow.98 Suspicions were amplified by the East 
German press, which gleefully noted the disturbances as a vindication that West German refugee 
policies were a farce and encouraged expellees to continue agitating for their rights.99 
Charges of complicity with Bolshevism offended the protestors, who took it as evidence 
of the regular defamation and hostility they had to endure from non-expellees.100 It also ignored 
the assurances of expellee leaders that the expellees through their experiences in and after the 
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war wholly rejected this ideology; the Silesian Walter Rinke for instance hyperbolically spoke of 
the expellees as the “penicillin against communism” that benefited all of German society, and 
whose force was more powerful than any atomic bomb.101 Even the CDU’s own press service 
praised their “immunity against communism,” taking issue with comments from “certain parties” 
suggesting that the “expellees could lose their immunity against communism.”102  
Expellees leaders understood how to cash in on these concerns, leveraging anxiety in 
order to push for more action. Linus Kather, for instance, informed the CDU that “disgust for the 
horrors committed in the East” likely prevented a radicalization to the left, but wondered if 
continued inaction could change this.103 The Federal Minister of Expellees Hans Lukaschek 
similarly conceded that lived experience made it unlikely that expellees would join communist 
movements, but no one could tell where Germany was headed: Nihilism and material concerns 
were fertile ground for the “handiwork” of spies and agitators who could promote radicalism and 
push Germany into the arms of the Kremlin.104 The specter of communism could be invoked at 
the local level, too. For example, an expellee attempting to receive permits to start building 
“refugee communities” in Westphalia complained to the district president of bureaucratic foot-
dragging: “We expellees are indeed immune to communism, but when we are treated and 
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disenfranchised in this way, we will probably one day intentionally grasp the last straw. […] In 
the expanses of Siberia the district planner can then contemplate…whether it was a good idea to 
thwart the buildup of an existence of an eager expellee through mean-spirited measures.”105 
Whether real or cunningly feigned to lend their arguments greater import, such threats and 
prophesies certainly sent shockwaves through German society.  
Rising militancy and general mobilizing reveals a fourth source of pressure on the 
German government to finally pass an “equalization of burdens law”: The expellees themselves 
were banding together and flexing their muscles. 1947/48 seemed a breaking point between 
expellees and non-expellees. Added to this was the disastrous monetary reform and inadequate 
welfare schemed that indicated that the refugees would over the long term remain a marginalized 
and impoverished group. In response to their persisting degradation, some expellees banded 
together into “trek associations” between 1950 and 1952. As many as 32,000 families pledged to 
reproduce their wartime flight and travel in wagons across Germany from areas with a high 
percentage of refugees and therefore poor prospects to less overfilled areas in Bizonia. The move 
intended to pressure the West German government to follow through and accelerate the planned 
resettlement of refugees from overpopulated states.106 In a radio interview, Kurt Dahn, one of the 
movement’s leaders, lamented the treatment of refugees and attempted to exert political pressure 
as well as raise sympathy: “You see, we and our children must urgently get out of this misery, 
before we completely deteriorate here!”107 
                                                 
105 Quoted in Kossert, Kalte Heimat, 114. 
106  Ian Connor, Refugees and Expellees in Post-War Germany (New York: Manchester University Press, 2007), 
179–80. 




Ironically, expellee ambition to fight back received an immense leg up from the Allies, 
who over the course of 1948 lifted the coalition ban. While this seemed counterintuitive given 
fears over radicalization, the measure partially intended to accelerate integration by permitting 
expellees to make their own case. Moreover, the Allies were responding to the communist coup 
in Czechoslovakia in 1948. In the opening phase of the Cold War, the prospect of anticommunist 
refugee associations that would contribute to the stabilization of a West Germany as a frontline 
state in the ideological struggle seemed a sound strategic move.108 This opened the door then to 
refugees to form their independent organizations and even parties, severely pressuring the major 
parties to take seriously a revolt among their potential base.  
Yet a second formation that emerged after the lifting of the coalition ban, and in direct 
response to refugee rage over limited progress, was the political party Bund der 
Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (Union of Homeland Expellees and Those Deprived of 
Rights, BHE) in 1950. Founded by the former NSDAP members Waldemar Kraft and Theodor 
Oberländer in Schleswig-Holstein in 1950, the BHE generally espoused nationalist and 
conservative if not outright rightwing views. Historians nevertheless have struggled to define the 
party’s ideological tenets. While its ranks certainly disproportionately featured former Nazis, 
revanchists, and anticommunists, a balanced assessment is complicated by the fact that over its 
eleven year existence the BHE proved flexible enough to form coalitions with every major party. 
In Lower Saxony, for instance, the SPD formed a coalition with the BHE that excluded the CDU 
from the government and allowed Kurt Schumacher to dream of implementing socialist 
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reforms.109 The BHE’s opposition to neoliberal policies of the Adenauer government and 
favoring of state intervention saw some overlap with the SPD, which in any case saw the 
equalization of burdens as part of a larger campaign to gather disadvantaged Germans into one 
camp that would provide the critical mass for more radical socialist measures. For its part, the 
BHE’s willingness to work with any and all and enter into marriages of convenience reflected its 
commitment to advance its cause of representing predominantly expellees and other war victims, 
such as victims of Allied air raids and civil servants affected by denazification.  
It was precisely this focus on this core constituency that saw already in its first year of 
existence win more than 23 percent of the vote in Schleswig-Holstein, emerging as the second-
strongest party behind the SPD. In a state with the highest proportion of expellees, the other 
German parties needed to take this electoral breakthrough as a warning signal that expellee anger 
had culminated in the worst possible scenario: There now was a “refugee party.” For this reason, 
the CDU, FDP, and SPD in various states willingly joined with the BHE in order to coopt this 
demographic. While its results in Bundestag elections ultimately never surpassed the six percent 
mark and made clear by 1957 that the BHE’s appeal had waned due to a successful integration, 
in 1950 the party upended and threw into chaos the political calculations of the major parties. 
One manifestation of increased concern can be seen when one evaluates the makeup of 
the first Bundestag in 1949: Of a total of 421 delegates, around 60 had an expellee background. 
This translated to 15 percent, roughly on par with the percentage of expellees within the Federal 
Republic, and suggests a greater interest of the major parties in incorporating the expellees.110 
Party committees such as the SPD provided lengthy memos on talking points to all their 
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candidates regarding the expellee issue, as well as advising greater attention on social policies 
during campaign speeches or public talks.111 Across the board, German politicians seemingly 
discovered the crisis and need for urgent action: Konrad Adenauer declared it a “political 
question of the first order,” while Kurt Schumacher spoke of a “central question” facing the 
nation and the FDP invoked the “moral duty for the entire nation.”112 
Between GDR competition, Allied frustrations, critical press reporting, growing 
radicalization, and now expellee political factions on the rise, the CDU and SPD were finally 
forced to embrace an “equalization of burdens” law and reconsider its treatment of the refugee 
issue. At the same time, however, the parties increasingly exhibited traces of the expellee 
victimhood narrative, indicating how deeply the narrative penetrated even political discourse. 
 
The “Community of Fate” and the First Bundestag: Expellee Suffering as a National 
Concern 
 
In a pamphlet partially intended to convince expellees to vote for the SPD, in 1948 
Richard Reitzner admitted that the “brutal persecution of opponents of Hitler, Jewish pogroms, 
and the human slaughterhouses in Poland” required all Germans to reject Nazism if their cries of 
help should be expected to be heard by the world.113 Nevertheless, the majority of expellees were 
“truly innocent, but also misled fellow travelers or exploited idealists” whom, according to the 
brief description of how it came to the expulsions, the West hypocritically abandoned.114 The 
main source of the “screams of tortured people in the horror reports that let one’s blood curdle,” 
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however, was the “panslavic expulsion politics.”115 The events of 1945 placed a “tombstone on 
the many sacrificial efforts of generations” to create harmony in the region, which finally 
exploded in a “one-sided civil war…against women, children, and the elderly.”116 Reitzner’s 
party demonstrated a similar propensity for brazen self-pity: In 1950, the SPD’s news service 
publically asked the High Commissioners whether human rights applied to refugees, and accused 
the US of “closing their eyes” to the German “slavery problem” although that nation had foot a 
bloody civil war to end human bondage.117  
Konrad Adenauer, the consummate politician, equally did not shy from dramatic 
formulations when the subject of German victimhood came up. In a speech on March 3, 1949 
before the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Bern, Adenauer ranked the “German biological 
problem,” namely the 7.3 million expellees who exacerbated housing and food shortages, as one 
of the most pressing dangers facing Germany and Europe. Six million Germans had “disappeared 
from the face of the earth” during the expulsions through “misdeeds…worthy of standing next to 
those misdeeds committed by German National Socialists.”118 His speech caused a minor 
kerfuffle in the Western press, but the following month behind closed doors, Adenauer 
expounded upon his thoughts in Bern before the CDU’s refugee subcommittee:  
“And today the rest of the speech…Of course I should have said that 
because of the Potsdam Agreement and according to American estimates 
13.7 million Germans were driven out in the most frightful way from 
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their homeland, in which for hundreds of years their ancestors lived. I 
should have stated that, according to American findings, of these 13.7 
million expellees six million vanished without a trace from the earth. 
Dead, deteriorated, displaced, taken into forced labor. I should 
furthermore have explained that these atrocities that occurred…can stand 
equally next to the National Socialist misdeeds. […] I was pleased for 
once to publicly speak about this in neutral Switzerland, where one 
knows nothing about these things. The killing of so many people, the 
expulsion…and the taking away of almost half of Germany, these are the 
main reasons for the suffering and plight in Europe. If this is 
nationalistic, well then I have to run the risk of being nationalist.”119 
 
Much of Adenauer’s maudlin handwringing can be attributed to grandstanding and 
deliberate pandering to his audience. In his memoirs, the expellee leader Linus Kather dismissed 
Adenauer as “no friend of the German East and the East Germans.”120 Certainly, some of this 
emanates from Adenauer’s reputation as a fiercely proud Rhinelander with little love for Prussia, 
which in some Rhenish minds began immediately east of the city’s outskirts beyond the Rhine 
River. But whether genuinely felt or not, it reflected the rhetoric of politicians from the left as 
well as the right of the political spectrum. And, it was par for the course for the Bundestag, 
where German victimhood featured prominently in the first years of the Federal Republic. 
Due to the manifold challenges of reconstructing life for millions affected by the war 
facing the young Federal Republic, German victims unsurprisingly appeared frequently in the 
pronouncements of the first Bundestag. Not just expellees, but victims of Allied bombing, war 
cripples, and POWs still languishing in Soviet prison camps understandably were on the agenda 
and minds of elected officials.121 But the emotional manner in which they were invoked 
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contributed to the fortifying of belief in an extraordinary German victimhood. Margarete Hütter 
(FDP), for instance, proclaimed Wehrmacht POWs “along with the victims of the concentration 
camps [as] the most tragic figures of the Third Reich’s politics.”122 Maria Probst (CDU) 
concurred and spoke for “all parties” when she expressed the “debt of gratitude of the German 
people” to the prisoners of war and deportees, who “sacrificed for the entire people.”123 
 The victims themselves appeared in the Bundestag chamber as a visible reminder of the 
millions waiting on the legislature to alleviate their plight. In its seventh session, for instance, a 
POW approached KPD chairman Max Reimann during his address to the chamber, producing a 
tumult: The CDU vacated the room while conservative legislators harangued communist 
delegates to observe the man’s tattered shoes and clothing, while Reimann decried a blatantly 
prearranged scene attempting to impugn the KPD’s reputation.124 Bundestag President Erich 
Köhler (CDU) struggled to calm the chamber, clearing the loges and admonishing parties that 
they were forbidden from bringing unofficial guests.125  
But apart from their cursory appearance in the Bundestag, the expellees themselves sat in 
the seats and frequently took to the podium to speak about their own experiences, often 
employing emotional and contentious formulations. Fritz Richter of the German Conservative 
Party-German Right Party (DKP-DRP) bewailed the fact that “our East German homeland is in 
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the hands of murderous bands of a Bierut or a Gottwald or a Zapotocki.”126 In the same session, 
the Pomeranian Hans-Joachim von Merkatz (DP) recalled that in the East “things happened that 
were so terrible beyond any measure,” prompting Friedrich Rische of the KPD to ask whether he 
meant Auschwitz. Von Merkatz continued undeterred on the subject of “torture that is burned 
deep upon the soul of our people, unforgettable as a burden of sheer insurmountable despair”: 
“Rootless and without peace are all those subjected to the horrific injustice of the evisceration of 
our fatherland…Our land is eviscerated, desolated are our souls, deserted and burned out all that 
which honest toil was created there for Germany over centuries.” Rische interjected once more, 
encouraging von Merkatz to “talk about why everything ended up like that.” The speaker 
declined to discuss the question with adherents of the KPD.127  
Tensions between expellee speakers and the communist faction unsurprisingly boiled 
over at times. When speakers of the KPD voiced criticism over harsh language and insufficient 
historical awareness of how Germany’s defeat came about, the Silesian Günter Goetzendorff 
(WAV) explained that if one is “offended by the talk of Czechoslovakian Soldetska…then I want 
to ask him if he has ever heard of the Prague death march” to cheers from the middle and right of 
the chamber.128 Goetzendorff continued his denouncement: 
“I want to recall the words of the honorable Federal President [Theodor 
Heuss], when he said: ‘Homeland is not just the potato field, homeland is 
the land of all Germans.’ Perhaps we previously also did not recognize 
these values; today we however know, it is not just earthly possessions, it 
is not just the boxes and crates that we left at home, it is all that which 
once made life rich and precious. It is the streets and places. When we 
think back on these things, on the streets of misery in the Sudetenland, in 
East Prussia, in Silesia: Behind us the horror, above us death, then this 
way, trek upon trek, person upon person—and many a soul collapsed and 
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found a forgotten grave—then this path is a row of black crosses that 
were never erected. May the previous speaker perhaps think of these 
things, when he finds the term ‘Czech Soldetska’ too harshly chosen.”129 
 
But apart from these contentious moments, expellee representatives took to the floor to 
speak for their constituents and leverage their suffering into calls for recognizing the community 
of fate as fellow Germans. It was time to create equality and alleviate concerns that they were 
second-class citizens. After all, the Silesian Paul Krause (Z) argued, “those robbed of their 
homeland” were fellow citizens owed a debt by Germany: “We homeless of the German East are 
also good Germans, as our brothers and sisters in the rest of Germany. We only changed our 
postal codes, and not even through our own volition. The treatment we received here in the West 
in our bitter experiences God only knows did not always correspond to the principles of 
Christian charity, nor to the foundations of socialist activism.”130  
Numerous speakers argued, as did Günter Goetzendorff, that the expulsions were not 
merely “a deep misfortune, a crime against the expellees, it was furthermore a crime against the 
entire German people and the whole civilized world.” “The burdens of the war that Germany has 
incurred must be carried together,” Goetzendorff explained, and the expulsions were “nothing 
more than a consequence of the war.” The victims “paid” for the nation’s defeat with their 
“possessions and chattels, with homeland and their existence,” and were therefore owed aid.131 
The parliamentarian elaborated on the national community’s obligations: 
“From this it arises that the homeland expellees are the trustees of the 
West German indigenous population, and these therefore in part their 
debtors. No one has the right to remove oneself from this community of 
fate. An entire nation lost the war, and I believe an entire nation must 
also pay for it. […] It pains us when you describe us as a plague. Let us 
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instead say: The expellee question itself, the lost war and the suffering 
from the war, are a plague for the German people in the first place. […] 
No man who lives knows whether he will conclude his life in peace. It 
could be that once again the clouds form over the German fatherland, 
and it could be that those whose hearts have hardened as if they are stone 
will one day trod the same streets of misery that we also went with the 
last bundle of our belongings.”132 
 
German suffering could serve a higher moral and national purpose. For the Sudeten 
German Walter Zawadil (FDP), the expellees were “living witnesses of the crime of the brutal 
expulsion of millions of innocent Germans which is unprecedented in human history and violates 
international law,” but this made them “the champions of a new peaceful philosophy of 
humanity, in whose name never again people will be disenfranchised and expelled because of 
their ideology, their language, their nationality or their faith.133 Joachim von Merkatz on the 
other hand held that the expellees formed the heart of “a national community, seasoned through 
fate, [and] forged in the fires of a monstrous reality” which encapsulated the “right to life, our 
right to freedom and equality.” Struggling with the “malice and brutality,” West Germany could 
show how “in the hour of its deepest humiliation” it nevertheless prevailed to “defeat the powers 
of darkness.” The forced migrations, the parliamentarian argued, were the catalyst that would 
energize the Federal Republic in its struggle against communism: 
“Herein lies the dignity of the conquered, this quiet nobility and 
industriousness that is more powerful than all weapons. We live in a 
terrible century in which the incursion of barbarity, armed with the 
greatest technical means and guided by ice-cold heartlessness and 
narcotized conscience, unfolded. Let us erect embankments before the 
satanic that has set out to destroy everything that life makes worth living. 
This is the German task, task of a land in which the abyss has been laid 
bare, whose reality eclipses the visions of Dante-esque fantasies.”134 
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The suffering of the expellees was invoked in arguments for the German people to 
recognize their new neighbors as part of a “universe of obligation,” forged in a jointly waged and 
lost war.135 Concretely, this meant finally addressing their plight through legislative measures. 
Expellee representatives continuously voiced the dangers of ignoring of the desperate living 
conditions of the expellees any longer. The first Minister of Expellees, Refugees, and War 
Damaged Hans Lukaschek, for instance, on several occasions informed the parliament of the 
activities of his office and the challenges it faced. The native of Breslau used the occasion to 
relate his own experiences and arrival in the Western Zone with only 23 postal packages and 
without a single piece of furniture, since “my economic foundations had been taken from me” by 
the Soviets.136 Lukaschek embraced opportunities to “as a beggar personally…share in the fate of 
all of my homeland expellees.”137 The need for legislative action was dire, the Minister warned, 
reminding the parliament that while all Germans suffered during the war, the expellees lost their 
homeland and were victims of an “economic general and total execution.”138  
Other expellee representatives invoked the suffering of their constituents to urge their 
colleagues to adopt the equalization of burdens law still under advisement of the parties. Richard 
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Reitzner pointed to the crucial “political moment,” and chided the Bundestag that its duty was to 
“lift the millions…from their current despair” lest the “rootless people…become a deadly 
danger, yes I would say the millstone around the necks of the young German democracy.”139 The 
Sudeten German Walter Zawadil (FDP) also spoke of the expellees as the “cardinal problem” of 
the Federal Republic, and that if the expellees continued to remain the carriers West Germany’s 
misery, then “great dangers arise through which all efforts of initiating a healing of 
Germany…could be destroyed.”140 Zawadil warned of the spiritual isolation of the expellees 
created through the difficulties of integration and lack of understanding and support: “The result 
of this is a pronounced tendency of looking backwards, the constant raising of the question of 
when finally a return to the homeland can be undertaken. The miring in perpetual remembrance 
of the past…leads to embitterment and indifference, the memories of the inhumane horrors 
during the expulsions to a spiritual freezing in thoughts of revenge and vengeance…We find the 
efforts of some refugee representatives who, caught up in a psychosis bred in deprivation and the 
camps attempt to radicalizes the masses of the suffering, harmful and completely devious.”141 
Social and economic measures were the only way to create productive fellow citizens. 
The critical social and political tensions, as well as perhaps the earnest words of their 
expellee colleagues, convinced non-expellee politicians to offer ringing calls for actions. Herbert 
Kriedemann (SPD) pondered whether inaction would not be forcing them to become supporters 
of collectivism” that would seriously undermine the defenses “of those who are prepared to 
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defend that which we understand as western culture and existential and life-worthy assets.”142 
Alfred Loritz (WAV) likewise did not foresee fortuitous outcomes if expellees continued to live 
in “shabby wooden barracks” or even “under the open sky.”143 Eugen Gerstenmaier (CDU) 
expressed concern over the lethargy not just among refugees, but legislators tasked with 
formulating a “comprehensive treatment” of the expellee issue. While he lamented that the 
division of Germany prohibited “significant reparations,” the interjection from the KPD that 
“over there they long have had a social equalization of burdens” reminded the Bundestag that 
their ideological rival was leading the way on tackling the refugee crisis.144   
 Indeed, even the KPD had partially internalized the victimhood rhetoric and voiced its 
sympathies for the expellees, who simultaneously permitted a criticism of the bourgeois parties 
stymieing socialist reform. Willi Agatz confronted the Bundestag and asked “what the millions 
of elderly, the sick in need of treatment, our war damaged should say” when their elected 
officials did nothing. It had been “continuously…pointed out in what great misery they live,” but 
it was all talk, Agatz criticized, adding that it was the “duty of every German to ensure that the 
refugees are aided and that the government takes on this problem.” A parliamentarian took issue 
with the speaker’s inadequate condemnation of the expulsions: “Indeed, the refugees must be 
helped, but also the crime committed against them must be denounced!”145 The KPD’s 
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unwillingness to engage with the expulsion’s nature in the same emotional tenor as their 
parliamentary rivals did not prevent them from echoing elements of the victimhood discourse: 
Paul Harig’s criticism of the government’s inadequate response in formulating an equalization of 
burdens law while the “poorest of the poor among our people…who saved and suffered want for 
generations in order to acquire something that they then lost through the war and its 
consequences” partially recognized the uniqueness of the “community of fate.”146 
 The suffering of the expellees was, in other words, accepted by all in principle, even if 
the causes of their hardship remained a point of contention. Most parliamentarians moreover 
agreed that the time had come to act decisively on the equalization of burdens law. All it took, 
Bernhard Reismann (Z) pleaded with the Bundestag, was a little contemplation of what the 
afflicted had gone through:  
“One must first, if one has not oneself been afflicted, put oneself into the 
position of the people who at the end of the war stood before the rubble 
of their estates…that had been built through generations of hard work 
and thrift; in the situation of the person who needed to leave their 
homeland and with a little package of rags and torn clothes arrived in 
foreign lands, in which not the minimal preparations had been made for 
them; one must put oneself into the situation of people who lost 
everything, even personal mementos, and who have again gained a 
foothold only under tremendous difficulties.”147 
 
By 1949 a particular West German discourse emerged which increasingly privileged 
German suffering during the war that simultaneously obfuscated the role of the Third Reich. The 
flights into self-pitying and stubborn defiance to account for the past emerged in the late 1940s 
and permeated the culture of the early Federal Republic. Yet even the young democracy’s 
political elite were not free of the “selective remembering” gripping West German society, 
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creating a political culture rooted in a sense of aggrievement over suffered injustices and 
eagerness to sweep the recent past under the carpet.  
Already in his first government declaration on September 20, 1949, Adenauer took to the 
podium on the floor of the Bundestag to offer his interpretation of how it had come to the 
precarious peace. After chronicling the myriad challenges facing the nation, he turned to the 
expellees, whose “lot…is especially difficult.” Their “future fate cannot alone be solved by 
Germany,” Adenauer explained to shouts of approval from parliamentarians. The problem “lies 
close to the heart for us in Germany and is an existential question [Lebensfrage] for our entire 
people.” “We cannot under any circumstances accept the one-sided amputation carried out by 
Soviet Russia and Poland,” Adenauer announced to “enthusiastic applause” from the parties 
seated to the right, middle, and left side of the chamber. The chancellor’s vow that his 
government “will never cease to pursue our claims in an orderly judicial manner” was met with 
jubilation, with parliamentarian Fritz Richter shouting that the chancellor should not forget the 
Sudetenland.148 Adenauer was not finished, assuring the nation that he struggled to “speak with 
the necessary passionless restraint…when I think of the fate of the expellees, who have perished 
in the millions.” Shouts of “five million” from the chamber’s center briefly interrupted the 
address. Without dwelling on Nazi barbarism, Adenauer quoted Western criticisms of the violent 
methods applied during the expulsions and promised that the federal government would publish 
“judicial and eyewitness materials” in order to underpin demands for a “respect of the law that 
we are owed.” Once more, the chamber erupted in shouts of approval.149 
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The chancellor, along with most parliamentarians of the first Bundestag, did not deny 
German war crimes. Yet packaging them in a passive voice that obscured the identities of 
perpetrators and victims alike—“nameless victims, faceless criminals,” as the historian Robert 
Moeller phrased it—muddied historical understandings of the causality of a disastrous war that 
cost millions of lives: A dictatorial regime with broad pillars of popular support.150 Adenauer 
spoke of West Germany’s “serious and holy obligation” to Wiedergutmachung (“making good 
again”), as “through misuse of the name of the German people the misdeeds were committed,” 
even if it “demands sacrifices, perhaps heavy sacrifices, of us who do not personally feel guilt.” 
Acknowledging that Europe’s Jews “needed to endure the most gruesome persecution,” 
Adenauer took care to point out that “by far” most Germans were not National Socialists, and 
that many Nazis disagreed with the “horrors that were committed.” 151 In fact, “we all only were 
made aware of this full horrific scope afterwards,” the leader of West Germany explained.  
With so many caveats, one may have been forgiven for pondering whether the Federal 
Republic even owed the victims of Nazi Germany anything at all. Indeed, Adenauer warned of 
limits to reparations due to the “necessary caring for the countless war victims and the aid for the 
refugees and expellees.”152 Not all agreed with the chancellor’s assessment, citing German 
suffering as one predominant reason why no reparations could be offered at all. Von Merkatz, a 
vociferous proponent of a general amnesty for Nazi crimes, acknowledged German atrocities, but 
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restitution would “unfortunately cause renewed injustice” since it would come at the expense of 
the expellees who continued to await financial support.153 
As the Bundestag contemplated compensation for the victims of the Third Reich, West 
German lawmakers simultaneously discussed the victimhood of Germans. Indeed, the crimes 
“worthy of standing next to those misdeeds committed by German National Socialists” were set 
side by side one another.154 Lawmakers borrowed from images of Nazi war crimes anchored in 
the postwar consciousness and appropriated them to describe German suffering, thereby crafting 
an understanding where all wartime fates as equally deplorable. For instance, Hans-Christoph 
Seebohm, the Minister of Transportation, directly brought Germans and Jews into a shared fate 
with his observation that “the methods that were used by the National Socialist leaders against 
the Jews and that we most vehemently condemn are on a par with the methods that were used 
against the German expellees.”155 Justice Minister Thomas Dehler in an address to Jewish jurists 
in December 1951 reminded that everything that had been perpetrated against Jews had also been 
suffered by Germans, so that both groups could demand and expect compensation.156 
Caught between acknowledging a genocidal dictatorship while attempting to elide the 
broad pillars of support upon which it rested, West German politicians across parties ended up 
contributing to a confusing historical panorama in which suddenly all groups were equal victims. 
This glaringly came to the fore on March 18, 1953 in a Bundestag debate on the reparations 
treaty with Israel. Eugen Gerstenmaier (CDU) supported the measure, and lectured colleagues on 
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the “most frightful things” that had occurred during the Third Reich.157 The “outbreak of 
insanity” culminated in the “sending of citizens of Jewish race into ghettos and from there into 
exile or into the gas ovens.”158 The speaker however denied allegations of collective guilt; 
“hundreds of thousands of horrified in Germany…attempted to struggle with help” and “risked 
their necks,” becoming the “blood witnesses of humanity.” Moreover, the Germans at the end of 
the war were now the “witnesses” who saw what the Nazis had done: “Germany, all of Germany, 
was transformed into one giant ghetto. More insurmountable than the walls of an oriental ghetto 
were the walls of hatred, contempt, and renunciation for us Germans, which already before the 
war were drawn around us and which after the war continued to hold us captive.”159  
Richard Reitzner had also taken to the floor that day, not in order to “cultivate 
sympathy,” but instead remind the chamber of the fate of “20 million” Germans that still waited 
on financial assistance. “The expellee fate is the fate of a group that was held accountable 
because of their ethnicity [Volkszugehörigkeit] and the lost Hitler war,” Reitzner argued.160 On a 
day in which compensation for persecution based on race or ethnicity was on the parliamentary 
agenda, the comments of the Sudeten German may very well have reminded listeners that 
Germans had faced comparable fates, and that those persecuted during the Third Reich were a 
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victim group among many that together had experienced the same hardships equally in an 
“insane” or merciless war perpetrated by a small clique of criminals. 
One may forgive German lawmakers their rhetorical flourishes and attribute the 
problematic perspective and insufficient nuances to inadequate historical awareness. Moreover, 
the vocabulary used to describe wartime atrocities and which featured pervasively in the press 
offered gripping language to draw from. It is relatively easy to castigate “white spots” with the 
benefit of entire libraries dedicated to the history of the Second World War, so that undeniably 
tone-deaf comparisons nevertheless may seem understandable. Additionally, the very human 
reaction to feel one’s own suffering more intensely than that of others may explain the 
hyperbolic flourishes of German politicians. 
Less excusable were rather deliberate attempts to balance German war crimes with 
German suffering. Many West German politicians maintained the moral right to not only mourn 
the deceased, but insist that the nation had an equal number of dead to bemoan as other victim 
groups. Adenauer’s claim of six million Germans having “disappeared from the face of the 
earth” suspiciously equaled the number of Shoah victims.161 A few months later, the chancellor’s 
invocation of “millions” lacked a tangible total; members of the Bundestag offered an unsolicited 
correction of “five million.”162 In a 1951 Bundestag session, the parliamentarian and Sudeten 
German expellee Konrad Wittmann (WAV) reminded his colleagues that “the carriers of the 
burdens were we 18 million [expelled] people…of whom 6 million disappeared.”163 The 
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unaffiliated rightwing parliamentarian Adolf von Thadden in March 1953 contributed to the 
numbers game by lowering the figure of Nazi Germany’s victims: While acknowledging that the 
Holocaust could not “be whitewashed or atoned for by any person,” von Thadden maintained 
that “German offices” had killed one million Jews of the 5.6 million living in Europe. Carlo 
Schmid of the SPD interjected that the speaker had forgotten “a couple million.”164 Clearly, final 
tallies remained in doubt, yet in any case the talk of unattributed and wildly fluctuating 
“millions” of expellee dead seemingly tipped the moral scales and ostensibly balanced out Nazi 
war crimes. 
Whatever the number of dead, apart from representatives of the KPD, Bundestag 
members were quite willing to endorse the expulsions as a cataclysmic event, and indeed the 
greatest tragedy of the war. For Richard Reitzner, the expellees embodied the “currents of our 
time,” yet while he “did not want to overdramatize and blow things out of proportion,” he 
nevertheless held that “no catastrophe has been so profound as the catastrophe of the year 1945,” 
a fact that had “not yet penetrated the consciousness” of all Germans or Europeans.165 The 
Sudeten German Ernst Kuntscher (CDU) noted that the world had in fact recognized the “fate 
and bitter injustice” perpetrated against Germany, but hoped that the “cries of help are not in 
vain” and would admonish the world to recognize its egregious error.166  
More brazen were attempts to leverage German victimhood as an indictment against the 
hypocrisy of the victors. Hans-Joachim von Merkatz ruminated that the disaster was deliberate: 
Germany had been turned into “a conquered land under foreign rule…placed outside of the law, 
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declared as outlawed and surrendered to capriciousness” by “unforgiving individuals amongst 
our opponents.”167 From there it was a short jump to instrumentalizing German suffering as a 
riposte to wartime crimes for which Germans were still being unnecessarily held accountable. 
During his pontifications, Konrad Wittmann argued that an equalization of burdens law would 
have been unnecessary if the victors had “implemented their democratic promises” or avoided 
deeming the expulsions a purely German problem. These issues, Wittmann declared to audible 
approval from the right side of the chamber, were only a German problem “insofar that they 
were made on the backs of Germans.” The speaker voiced his fatigue with reminders that the 
“German misfortune” had started before Potsdam or Yalta, or “even earlier…under the Nazis.” 
“Why constantly does one say: Hitler is at fault for everything! […] With this philosophy of 
history, in which we place it on others, we will in the end wind up at Cain’s murder of his 
brother.”168 Franz Richter was even more explicit in pressing the issue of using German suffering 
to offset condemnations of German crimes:  
“In the last few years one did not shy away from presenting the German 
people with large outstanding debts for the offenses that isolated 
individuals…committed, as they can occur with any nation. But only 
individuals! For I maintain that one never could or should find the entire 
people guilty for the offenses of individuals. While one is already 
speaking of crimes against humanity, then I think…we could present an 
offsetting bill, which for all I care begins in Hamburg, Cologne, 
Mannheim, Munich, Stuttgart, Hannover and ends in Dresden, and which 
would not be altogether inconsequential. When one speaks at all of 
crimes against humanity, then…one must highlight last of all the greatest 
crime that has ever been perpetrated against humanity, namely the bestial 
expulsion of millions of Germans from the ancient German Eastern 
territories.”169 
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The former Nazi’s recriminations were met with applause from the centrist and 
conservative parties, indicating that many elected lawmakers were comfortable with demanding 
that the world needed to acknowledge what it had done or allowed to transpire to Germany.170 As 
Chancellor Adenauer lamented in the Bundestag in October 1950, “any apology for these 
procedures remains outstanding.”171 The German people were owed statements of contrition, 
particularly from the USSR and Poland, for whom there would be no “danger involved” if they 
admitted to wrongdoing. “I have just pointed out that the perhaps understandable emotions of 
agitation and vengeance in the first few years [after the war] can no longer persist and be allowed 
to govern. No, ladies and gentlemen, here we are dealing with measures of cold cruelty…which 
imposed suffering, pain, and desolation” upon millions of Germans.”172 Hans-Joachim von 
Merkatz similarly lamented that “we continue to wait on any real sign of willingness to make 
amends for the…injustices perpetrated against the expellees.” Their suffering was moreover due 
to “the same totalitarian degeneration of state power” as National Socialism; since Nazism was 
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rightwing radical Socialist Reich Party of Germany (SRP), which he joined and represented in the Bundestag before 
his arrest for falsification of records during a plenary session in 1952. Rösler garnered contacts to numerous 
European fascist organizations. See Sven Felix Kellerhoff, “Untergetauchte Nazis: Als Ein NS-Funktionär 
Bundestagsabgeordneter Wurde,” Die Welt, February 20, 2012, 
https://www.welt.de/kultur/history/article13871943/Als-ein-NS-Funktionaer-Bundestagsabgeordneter-wurde.html. 
171 German Bundestag, 1/94, October 26, 1950, 3495. 
172 German Bundestag, 1/94, October 26, 1950, 3495. 
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the same as communism, von Merkatz implied, why should only West Germans be held 
accountable?173 Günter Goetzendorff made similar overtures:  
“It would be futile to want to educate the homeland expellees or the 
Germans in democracy when this democracy allows the violation of the 
most primitive human rights. Every people, the English, the Americans, 
are proud of loving their nation. Well then: We Germans as well demand 
to love our fatherland, in fact every part of it. Justice cannot be 
determined merely as the means of a nation. Justice is indivisible, as 
should be the communal suffering of all people. One cannot shrug the 
shoulders and look away simply because it concerns German suffering. 
We have recognized with shame that it was possible to bring thousands 
of people to their deaths in the concentration camp of Auschwitz. But I 
do not know whether it is more humane when the politicians of the 
victorious powers place themselves above divine and earthly law with 
the stroke of a pen, when they drive out people from their ancestral 
homeland, to along the way murder and rape them or let them die slowly 
but surely in an overfilled West Germany.”174  
 
 Goetzendorff’s diatribe culminated in a declaration to the world: “Yalta and Potsdam 
were crimes against humanity!” Demanding that the Federal Government recognize the 
anniversary of the Potsdam Conference as a national day of mourning, Goetzendorff declared 
that Germans “demand of the world that it be ashamed for the expulsion, just as we were 
ashamed of the deeds of those who did evil things in the name of the German people. We 
however also call upon the world to make atone, as much as one can atone for the unheard of 
violence and horrors that we carried out in the name of supposed humanity.”175  
As some of the comments suggest, West German lawmakers held that not only had the 
“other side” exhibited the same brutality as the Nazis, their continued refusal to recognize this 
paled in comparison to Germany’s model atonement. Adenauer’s cryptic reference to justifiable 
“emotions” caused by unspecified crimes was a demand for an atonement that Germany already 
                                                 
173 German Bundestag Nr. 01/254, March 18, 1953, 12279.  
174 German Bundestag, 01/07, September 22, 1949, 128. 
175 German Bundestag, 01/07, September 22, 1949, 129. 
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had continually demonstrated.176 Moreover, while the question of German traumas remained an 
unaddressed injustice, West German reparations had “drawn a line” under Germany’s “darkest 
chapter,” as Walther Hasemann pointed out. “The German people even while rejecting collective 
guilt…are called upon and are willing to make amends for suffered injustice and suffered 
damages,” but less than a decade after the war, that chapter was now closed.177 West German 
magnanimity seemingly provided closure on what Germany had done, even as it continued to 
wait on similar generous gestures from the victors for what Germany had endured.   
Not all so readily accepted sweeping the shadow of the Third Reich under the carpet. 
Responding to Adenauer’s first government address, Kurt Schumacher criticized the chancellor’s 
insufficient attention on the German resistance in the war and victims of fascism, and called for 
more explicit acknowledgment of the “horrible tragedy of the Jews in the Third Reich” and the 
shameful “extermination of six million Jews by Hitler’s barbarism.”178 Perusing the protocols of 
the parliamentary debates, the SPD generally showed a greater willingness to discuss the Third 
Reich’s legacy than their conservative colleagues. Unsurprisingly, the KPD most energetically 
confronted the parliamentarians with the nation’s past, often to the chagrin of the parties who 
argued that “we communists didn’t even have the right to represent certain groups of people,” as 
the KPD delegate Heinz Renner complained. “I want to explain why we and only we have the 
right to fight for these groups of people. It was us communists who led the fight against…the war 
provoked by Hitler, with the result that more than half of the functionaries paid with their lives in 
this fight against the war,” Renner reminded the chamber. “We have the right to represent this 
                                                 
176 German Bundestag, 1/94, October 26, 1950, 3495. 
177 German Bundestag Nr. 01/254, March 18, 1953, 12278. 
178 German Bundestag Nr. 01/6, September 21, 1949, 36. 
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group of people, because in the past and today we alone were the force which led the struggle 
against the source of the misery, against the war. That is why we here speak, why we speak as 
elected representatives of those whom you misguided and deceived.”179 
For many members of the Bundestag, the suffering the nation continued to struggle with 
was not induced by fascism. Rather, it had been the enemy, and particularly the communist 
victors, who had brought on the calamity. The important political lessons were not be found in a 
closer examination of the past, nor in careful soul-searching: They were embodied in the millions 
who had lost homes, who continued to wait on husbands and sons to return home from captivity, 
but above all in the expellee. The forced migrations and their brutality were so painful, their 
affects so widespread and readily apparent on the street, their details so widely discussed in daily 
conversation, in the press, or in the parliament, that they seemed an apt metaphor to describe the 
fate of Germany generally. Once again, no other than Chancellor Adenauer sums up the 
predominant thinking within West Germany: On October 26, 1950, the chancellor reminded the 
Bundestag and nation of the “measures of cold cruelty” that Germany had endured and continued 
to suffer. “I do not know,” Adenauer continued to shouts of approval, “if ever in history a verdict 
of misery and misfortune has been felled against millions of people with such chilling 
heartlessness.” For a government in the midst of finalizing a reparations treaty with Israel, the 
West German chancellor and his audience may have known the answer.180 
                                                 
179 German Bundestag, 1/58, April 26, 1950, 2156. Renner’s speech, interrupted several times by objections, sent the 
Bundestag into a frenzy after the speaker attacked his colleagues: “Many of you cheered as long as the church bells 
in Germany heralded Hitler’s victory. […] Many of you supported Hitler and his war because you demanded, just 
like Hitler, the petrol in Baku and the grain in the Ukraine. Don’t delude us! Your ‘antifascist struggle’—the 
colleague Mr. Adenauer is not here—consisted of slipping with gritted teeth pensions that the fascist state paid you 
into the pocket.” Ibid. 
180 German Bundestag, 1/94, October 26, 1950, 3495-3496. Adenauer went on: “I believe, ladies and gentlemen, that 




 In May 1951, the Federal Government promulgated a law securing special benefits to 
civil servants who had lost their positions through the defeat of the Third Reich. Among the so-
called “131er” beneficiaries were a high number of expellees, as well as former NSDAP 
members. In August 1952, the equalization of burdens law followed, opening a flow of payments 
over which reached their highpoint in the 1960s and had by 2001 allocated over 145 billion 
DMs; by 1970, 71 percent of the 7.1 million applications were accepted.181 The law did not 
fundamentally alter West German social structures, which disappointed leftist factions. 
Moreover, the emphasis on a social equalization, as opposed to the individual favored by the 
FDP, left some expellee elites and refugees with substantial wealth before the expulsions 
disappointed that not enough had been done.  
Yet while the financial aid did not constitute a full compensation for a lost business or 
estate, and certainly could not offset the psychological pain of losing a homeland, the law paved 
the way for millions of refugees who after seven years could now financially manage to start a 
new life. In May 1953, moreover, the Bundestag passed a final central piece of legislation, the 
Bundesvertriebenengesetz (“Federal Expellee Law”), which legally defined “expellees” and 
spelled out the government’s obligations to support their continued social integration and 
promote their culture through financing of expellee organizations. The law represented an 
immense victory for expellees, as not only did it guarantee that expulsion status could be 
inherited and thus preserve the size and influence of the refugees over the next decade, it 
provided a moral and fiscal support line which buoyed the surging expellee organizations over 
the 1950s, not coincidentally the apex of their power. 
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These measures were a response to the mounting pressures on the Federal Republic. 
Indeed, during contemplation of the laws, expellee associations mobilized demonstrations and 
protests throughout West Germany, and expellee politicians threated to withhold their support 
for military spending which would come at the cost of the war damaged.182 But perhaps most 
remarkable of all is the utter lack of partisanship in principle to these legal measures: Apart from 
squabbling over details or scale, every major party except for the KPD supported some sort of 
equalization of burdens.183  
One may interpret the consensus that emerges in the Bundestag protocols as responsible 
lawmakers recognizing the practical need for measures. But of equal, and perhaps greater, 
importance was the degree to which the victimhood narrative of the expellees had been 
internalized by lawmakers and the public alike. The massive media coverage and discursive 
framework guaranteed that the “community of fate” dominated the thoughts and minds of West 
Germans, who not only mustered sympathy for the expellees but saw them as an allegory for 
German suffering, and thus a central component of German collective memory of the war. The 
shift in the discourse after 1947/48 had a large hand in fulfilling the material demands of the 
expellees.   
Nevertheless, more than changing discourses and laws transformed the 
Heimatvertriebene from a marginalized figure into a one of the pillars of West German political 
culture. The escalation of Cold War tensions played an immense role in the trajectory of the 
“community of fate,” whose influential leaders managed to imbed themselves within the political 
fabric of the Federal Republic. The short-term goal of financial support achieved, the main 
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objective of revising the postwar order now beckoned.184  With the hardening of the Iron Curtain, 
the expellee lobby sought to recommend itself as the vanguard of an ideological struggle to get 
the homeland back. If expellee victimhood narratives lent themselves to underpinning material 
and social demands, they were equally as potent when instrumentalized for the “homeland 
politics” during the Cold War era.  
 
                                                 
184 Walter Rinke, the speaker of the Silesian Homeland Association, in 1949 pointed out that material aid and 
integration constituted merely a “short-term” goal, the primary objective remaining a “return to the old homeland.” 





CONSTRUCTING A POLITICALLY USEFUL PAST: EXPELLEE VICTIMHOOD IN 
THE COLD WAR 
 
On July 5, 1953, Walter von Keudell, spokesperson of the Landsmannschaft Berlin-Mark 
Brandenburg, addressed compatriots at their federation’s summit in Braunschweig. The worker’s 
uprising in the GDR the month before, Keudell began, focused world attention on Germany and 
raised hopes for an imminent reunification. The upheaval revealed German “democratic values” 
which expellees, themselves victims of communism, shared.1 The world should not fear the 
growing power of their associations, Keudell pleaded, but recognize that they rejected “every 
form of radicalism.” Germans could counter allegations of a “supposed danger of the Neo-Nazi 
plague” with “an unparalleled operation in history”: The “[f]rightful experience of the treks,” the 
“bestial evacuation prohibitions during which the party functionaries mostly reached safety,” in 
addition to “the deliberate misleading of the population and [their] planned sacrifice…before the 
vengeance from the East.” All this, Keudell explained, “inevitably resulted in expellees and 
refugees only being able to recall Nazism with humiliation and contempt.”2  
 The former National Socialist’s history lesson, in which expellees were victims of the 
Third Reich, not only legitimated an end to “Nazi snoopery.” It underpinned the demands of a 
                                                 
1 Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP) 07-001-114, Speech of v. Keudell at the Bundestreffen der 
Landsmannschaft Berlin-Mark-Brandenburg in Braunschweig, July 5, 1953, 2. 
2 Ibid, 6. 
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people “abundant in suffering and blessings, in sacrifices and promises, in duties, confidence and 
hope, and blessed with the awareness that we do not act as the representatives of a dying era, but 
as champions of a better and more noble Germany, spiritually bound with all the downtrodden 
peoples of Eastern Europe who gaze upon our efforts…and yearn with us to secure freedom 
through the tireless peaceful struggle for our homeland, for a free Europe and free world.”3 The 
implication that common suffering under fascism and Bolshevism forged the peoples of Europe 
into a community struggling for freedom provided a means for engaging with Germany’s recent 
past while simultaneously breaking with it. The demand for a “return of the homeland” and the 
particularism of German victimhood transformed into a call for an international struggle for 
reunification and Western democracy against the communist foe across the Iron Curtain. The 
expellees, their leaders asserted, were the vanguard of this contestation. 
 Keudell’s remarks and historical interpretation were not out of the ordinary for the 1950s. 
The speaker of the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft Rudolf Lodgman von Auen expressed 
similar thoughts before 150,000 attendees gathered at Munich’s Theresienwiese for the main 
address of the “Sudeten German Day” on June 6, 1954:  
“Nine years now have passed since fate fell upon us, ejecting us into a 
Germany that was at its knees. The end of our people and its history 
seemed to have come. […] It took until the 20th century for humanity to 
become presented with a politics in which genocide is one of its means. 
It is not intrinsically new, but before then it was always regarded as a 
crime and not a recognized legal means of politics, only through the 
agreements of Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam did it become such a means.”4 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 Quoted in  K. Erik Franzen, “Sudetendeutsche Tage als Gedenkstätten!? Die Erinnerung an NS-Diktatur und Krieg 
in politischen Reden von Vertretern der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft 1950-1995,” in Diktatur-Krieg-
Vertreibung: Erinnerungskulturen in Tschechien, der Slowakei und Deutschland seit 1945, by Jǐrí Pěsek, Roman 
Holec, and Christoph Cornelissen (Essen: Klartext, 2005), 211. 
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 For Lodgman von Auen, 1945 likewise represented a caesura, one where the suffering of 
non-Germans ranked behind the fate of Germans, who were victims of a genocide orchestrated 
by the Allies and needing restitution.5 1945 meant defeat and humiliation, and the start of a phase 
of personal suffering and national indignation through division and displacement. Only one path 
forward could overcome this catastrophe and assuage the pain of a “heavily tried, dejected, [and] 
destroyed” Germany: A return of the lost territories, guarantee of a right to homeland, and 
reunification of Germany. “When we speak of Germany,” von Auen declared, “we do not think 
only of this land beneath the spring heavens, of its cities, industry, its people, but also of its 
history, of the grandeur of its past and the suffering commensurate with this grandeur. May this 
Germany once again become a land of hope and faith, a land which we all can love ‘above all in 
the world.’”6 Though the Sudetenland only belonged to Germany for seven years between 1938 
and 1945, the audience could legitimately dream of that kind of future.7 The day before, State 
President Hans Ehard (CSU) proclaimed Bavaria’s aegis over the “great community of the 
Sudeten German people.” Bavaria shared their “burning desire for the preservation of peace and 
                                                 
5 Indeed, May 8 for many Germans did not connote liberation. Instead, it was an ambivalent date that led to 
“political irritations and diplomatic disgruntlement” in the early Federal Republic. Peter Reichel, Politik mit 
Erinnerung Gedächtnisorte mit Streit um die nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-
Taschenbuch-Verl., 1999), 233. 
6 Cited in Franzen, “Sudetendeutsche Tage als Gedenkstätten!? Die Erinnerung an NS-Diktatur und Krieg in 
politischen Reden von Vertretern der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft 1950-1995,” 212. 
7 The Sudeten German claims conflicted with reunification demands of the Federal Republic, which called for a 
reconstitution of Germany within the borders of 1937. The Potsdam Agreement nominally continued to uphold the 
existence of the German Reich, with the lost territories under Polish and Soviet administration until a final peace 
settlement. This therefore excluded the Sudetenland, which had never been part of the German Empire until its 
annexation through Nazi Germany in 1938. Nevertheless, Sudeten German demands fluctuated between calls for a 
return of expellees to Czechoslovakia and autonomy guaranteed through international protections, and more 
commonly the application of self-determination and joining with the Federal Republic. 
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the solution of all world problems, as well as their return to their ancestral homeland.”8 The 
suffering of expellees concerned Bavarians and Germans, and their cause—reversing the forced 
migrations—was in the vital interest of the entire nation. 
The declarations reveal yet another layer in the discourse over “flight and expulsion.” 
The sentiments reflect the victimhood discourse that emerged in the Federal Republic after 1948, 
as the previous chapter demonstrated. “Sympathy narratives” further conjoined with the Federal 
Republic’s amnesia over the past and demands for reparations. Yet 1950s political identities 
focused on victimhood are but a point of departure for the next stage in the instrumentalization of 
expellee memory: The “Right to the Homeland.” Growing into a powerful pressure group, the 
expellee associations developed a historical narrative of their experiences which supported their 
“homeland politics.” They moreover effectively imposed these interpretations upon the West 
German government, making the struggle to win back the German East an all-German concern. 
 This chapter investigates three interconnected issues. First, it asks how the discourse on 
“flight and expulsion” changed in the 1950s. With social integration initiated by 1952, the 
narrative shifted from arousing sympathy to arguing for a return of the homeland and revision of 
the postwar order. The expulsions now appeared as not just a mere injustice and historic error, 
but as having irrevocably taken something from Germany. The painful “amputation,” as 
Adenauer called it, of lands rich in resources and central to German culture, moreover prevented 
reunification. 9 The struggle for the Heimat was a problem for all of Germany, and the Western 
world. Argumentative strategies therefore increasingly emphasized the need for a return of the 
                                                 
8 Quoted in Franzen, “Sudetendeutsche Tage als Gedenkstätten!? Die Erinnerung an NS-Diktatur und Krieg in 
politischen Reden von Vertretern der Sudetendeutschen Landsmannschaft 1950-1995,” 211. 
9 German Bundestag Nr. 01/5, September 20, 1949, 28.  
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German East in order to guarantee European stability, as the blow that Germany suffered could 
not be endured economically over the long term and threatened peace.  
A central element of this layer of “flight and expulsion” memory was the continued 
cultivation of blank spots in the prehistory of the German East and which produced the 
ostensible powder keg of postwar European order. The context of National Socialism in the 
destruction of ethnic and cultural landscapes of Europe frequently received only superficial 
treatment, if at all. Because they brought claims to domestic and international audiences, 
sanitized or reframed histories needed to eliminate a causation rooted in the German role in the 
conflagration that consumed the continent. Many yearned to think of National Socialism as a 
“catastrophe,” an aberration and incomprehensible “traffic accident.”10 It had little bearing on 
postwar developments, and undermined claims of German victimhood. Narratives therefore 
routinely romanticized the German East’s history and celebrated the achievements of Teutonic 
industry and culture since the Middle Ages. Communist aggression and economic 
mismanagement destroyed this vibrant region. Walter von Keudell preferred to interpret expellee 
suffering as caused by Hitler’s megalomania, which left Germans as passive victims on equal 
standing with victims of Nazism. Alternately, Lodgman von Auen’s comments reflect a tendency 
of relativizing Nazi war crimes in attempts to balance the scales of moral guilt with atrocities 
committed by outside aggressors. The homeland, in short, emerged as an idealized utopia set 
aflame in 1944/45, where 1933-1945 held little explanatory value for its destruction.  
This chapter secondly examines why the narrative of “flight and expulsion” took on new 
forms. Postwar recovery opened doors for expellees. The equalization of burdens and federal 
                                                 
10 Friedrich Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe. (Wiesbaden: Eberhard Brockhaus, 1946); Fritz Fischer, Hitler war 
kein Betriebsunfall: Aufsätze (München: Beck, 1998). 
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expellee laws legally and socially acknowledged the new citizens as part of the national 
community, thereby fulfilling a “short-term” goal, as the Silesian leader Walter Rinke extolled. 
With secure footing and immediate concerns of prosperity addressed, the primary agenda of a 
“return to the old homeland” now loomed.11 Despite the stark contradiction between carving out 
a new home and demanding a return to the old, the narrative’s evolution in the 1950s in large 
part stems from the campaign waged by expellee organizations and representatives to fight for a 
“right to the homeland,” which in their minds continued to be a real and physical place. 
Their “homeland politics,” and a further reason that the narrative changed and took hold 
in the FRG, stems from political context. The demands of expellees fell upon fertile ground in 
the Bundestag and in government offices, as apart from the KPD every West German party 
called for a reunification of Germany within the borders of 1937. Constitutionally enshrined in 
Article 23 of the Basic Law, the FRG committed itself to obtaining the lost territories and 
acknowledging revisionist demands. This provided inroads for expellee organizations, who 
received ample moral and financial support from the federal government, to bill themselves as 
the national avant garde of the struggle for a Gesamtdeutschland, or “Greater Germany.”12  
Above all, the escalation of the Cold War explains the dramatic changes in “flight and 
expulsion” discourse in the 1950s. The ideological contestation created a rhetorical framework 
that profoundly influenced the discourse, imbuing it with a pronounced anticommunism and 
interpretation of the past through the lens of 1950s mentalities. The clash between democracy 
and communism also validated the struggle for the Heimat as a logical geopolitical concern, and 
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stoked the aspirations of the expellees. With a series of peace conferences, the American 
Liberation Policy professing a rollback of communism from Eastern Europe, and popular 
uprisings in the Soviet Bloc in 1953 and 1956, expellees had good reason to initially believe in a 
postwar revision despite the hardening of the Iron Curtain. With each crisis, the fight for a 
homeland that lay beyond the Oder-Neisse Line elevated the particularist “homeland politics” of 
the expellees into a feasible Cold War objective.  
Thirdly, this chapter examines who constructed and propagated 1950s expellee narratives. 
Expellee organizations, now able to operate freely and with the support of the West German 
government, and independent think-tanks of self-billed experts on the territories beyond the Iron 
Curtain worked in tandem with German offices. The relationship between these autonomous 
entities and the federal government was further strengthened by the fact that many expellee elites 
also served in state offices and in the parties, and worked to steer the political apparatus of the 
FRG toward an Ostpolitik aimed at regaining the lost territories. In the 1950s, the expellee 
organizations evolved into a unique lobby, one imbedded within the political structures of the 
Federal Republic.  
Of central focus here, however, will be the figures who attempted to mobilize history for 
political gains, and thereby created a viable narrative for expellee “homeland politics.” From the 
onset, West Germans believed that the key to winning back the German East lay in swaying 
Western Allies to recognize the expellee claims. Explaining what happened and establishing the 
injustice of the expulsions, therefore, constituted a central component of this strategy. The key to 
success for education campaigns lay in an interwar method of harnessing scholarship for political 
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purposes: The “white book.”13 Under the mantle of impartiality, a network of actors worked to 
harness history for revisionist claims. 
This chapter therefore seeks to illustrate the next phase in the trajectory of “flight and 
expulsion,” where the memories of suffering collided with memory politics and a conscious 
production and narration of history on the part of an influential interest group. For a brief time in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, when expellee organizations reached the zenith of their power, the 
forced migrations and the presence of the German East were an inexorable theme of West 
German politics and culture. As such, the “homeland politics” laid a powerful layer in the 
cultural memory of “flight and expulsion” that continues to linger today. 
 
“Bought Expertise”: Ostforscher in the Early Federal Republic14 
 
Already Konrad Adenauer’s first government declaration raised the idea of a federally 
commissioned documentation of the forced migrations. Pledging his administration to the 
publication of “judicial and eyewitness materials,” the West German chancellor intimated that 
evidence of German suffering could engender “respect of the law that we are owed” and 
underpin revisionist claims. This project at least officially counted as a prime undertaking of the 
young republic.15 In essence, the arguments leveled against the Western powers were to receive 
the weight of atrocities perpetrated against Germans under the umbrella of scholarly objectivity.  
                                                 
13 See Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, eds., Die große Politik der 
europäischen Kabinette 1871 - 1914: Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes, Im Auftrag des 
Auswärtigen Amtes, 14 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922); Max 
Montgelas and Walther Schücking, eds., Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch 1914 (Berlin: Deutsche 
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14  Manfred Max Wambach, Verbändestaat und Parteienoligopol; Macht und Ohnmacht der Vertriebenenverbände. 
(Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1971), 93. 
15 German Bundestag Nr. 01/5, September 20, 1949, 29.  
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Efforts of documenting the expulsions were already underway as the chancellor basked in 
enthusiastic applause of the Bundestag. One strand evolved in Göttingen in early 1946, when 
Herbert von Dirksen commissioned Ostforscher (“researcher on the East”) Hans Mortensen to 
draft a study of the economic importance of Silesia to Germany as an argument for territorial 
adjustments in forthcoming peace talks.16 As a former ambassador to the USSR, Japan, and 
Great Britain, Dirksen cultivated numerous contacts, including American diplomat Robert D. 
Murphy and William Strang, a British political advisor in the British Zone.17 Dirksen beseeched 
them to send the study to the ACC for review.18 Their interest encouraged Dirksen to form the 
“Working Group for Eastern Questions” in Bad Nenndorf, comprised of former Foreign Ministry 
officials and Ostforscher, to continue collecting materials on Silesia. Concurrently to Dirksen’s 
efforts, a collective of scholars predominantly from Königsberg University, among them the 
historian Theodor Schieder, formed the “Working Group for East Prussian Questions” in 
Göttingen.19 
By November 1946, these elements fused into the Göttinger Arbeitskreis (“Göttingen 
Working Group”, GA). Founded by Herbert Kraus, Wolf von Wrangel, Wilhelm Kutscher, and 
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17 On Dirksen and his career spanning from the Kaiserzeit into the Third Reich, see his memoir Herbert von Dirksen, 
Moscow, Tokyo, London. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952). 
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trek from Upper Silesia, and the Minister Presidents of the US Occupation Zone. See Walter Vogel and Weisz, eds., 




Joachim von Braun, the GA provided displaced scholars as well as former Third Reich “Eastern 
experts” a new home in postwar West Germany.20 Its advisory board included Theodor Schieder, 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Theodor Oberländer, and Herbert von Dirksen.21 Just as many 
scholars offered their expertise in service of the Nazi regime, again academics eagerly sought to 
engage in politicized scholarship.22 The GA from the onset published scholarship that would 
speak for a recovery of the lost territories at the 1947 Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow 
and subsequent meetings. By 1948, several memoranda emerged which, one contemporary 
noted, countered the “unjustified Slavic claims on our homeland…with objective evidence.”23  
Though collectives of scholars and self-purported experts on Eastern Europe abounded in 
postwar Germany, the GA developed into one of the largest and most highly regarded institutes 
dedicated to raising awareness of the “German Question,” the expulsions, and the German East. 
Though nominally independent, like many of its rivals such as the Herder Institute, it received 
funding from the government.24 By the mid-1950s, the GA operated as a “think tank” advising 
                                                 
20 Christoph Kleßmann, “Osteuropaforschung und Lebensraumpolitik im Dritten Reich,” in Wissenschaft im Dritten 
Reich, ed. Peter Lundgreen, 1985, 350–83; Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung 
in the Third Reich (London: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
21 See files in Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (BayHStA), Sudetendeutsches Archiv (SdA), SdA-Sprecherregistratur 
v. Auen 731. 
22 Proposals included transforming the network of academics into a political office that should prepare materials and 
a delegation for an expected peace conference failed. The political members to be called upon included Paul Löbe, 
Konrad Adenauer, Herbert von Dirksen, Wolfgang Jaenicke, and Kurt Schumacher. The initiative failed because 
Schumacher, who was the offered chairmanship, had concerns over the intentions and makeup of the group. 
Overesch, Gesamtdeutsche Illusion und westdeutsche Realität, 33.  
23 Quoted in Beer, “Im Spannungsfeld,” 356. 
24 BArch B150-1152, Freiherr von Braun to Hans Lukaschek, March 30, 1949. Von Braun requested funding from 
Lukaschek, pointing out that the financial committee of the State Council earmarked 18 million DMs for academic 
research projects. Von Braun lamented that translation and publication in English cost money, but was a necessary 
investment in order to counter Polish “propaganda” and ahistorical claims.  
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policy makers and government ministries on subjects relating to expellees.25 Its “predominant” 
objective was to augment the foreign policy of the Federal Republic.26 Financing from various 
government ministries allowed a rapid succession of publications arguing for a revision of the 
Potsdam Agreement, which in turn provided officials and expellee associations with reference 
materials. The GA also operated a press service that translated and disseminated newspapers 
from the Eastern Bloc and provided interpretations of developments and advice on how to 
respond to them.27 In short: Though it cultivated appearances of objectivity and nonpartisan 
expertise, the GA coordinated closely with federal agencies and expellee homeland associations. 
The GA mainly, however, produced literature arguing for a return of the German East as 
an economic necessity. Occasionally, its members published articles in the expellee press.28 By 
                                                 
25 By 1953, for instance, the Ministry for All-German Questions engaged the GA to examine all school books in 
West Germany in order to judge how they discussed the German East, as well as produce a series of brochures 
educating teachers on how to incorporate these matters into curriculum. The BMVt also approached the GA to turn 
their publications into materials for grade schools, a measure the expellee ministry brought before the Federal 
Council’s Committee for Refugee Questions. BArch B150-2360, BfgF to BMVt, December 10, 1953. 
26 BArch B150-1152, Freiherr von Braun to Hans Lukaschek, March 30, 1949. 
27 The GA operated several separate press services abroad as well. For Latin America, it distributed “Tatsachen-
Realidades,” billed as the news “from Germany, the homeland of the expellees.” Into the late 1950s, the GA 
supplied Anglo-American academics and government offices with the “Expellee Press Service,” advertised as “news 
items and comments on the problems of the uprooted millions and their home countries behind the Iron Curtain.” 
See files in BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 731. 
28 Much of this public outreach fell upon Bolko von Richthofen, a German archeologist distantly related to the 
famous WWI fighter ace Manfred von Richthofen, also known as the “Red Baron.” As part of the legal defense 
counsel at the Nuremburg Trials, the former NSDAP member and SS Ahnenerbe staffer, Richthofen as early as 1949 
took to castigating Poland relativizing German war crimes. Reprinting testimonies of witnesses of the Bromberg 
Massacre entered into the record at Nuremburg in Breslauer Nachrichten, Richthofen claimed that “all those seeking 
justice…must regard…these entire sad facts as much as the guilt of Germans during the war and the even greater 
Polish guilt from the time after the German collapse.” The piece, intended as a discussion of “objective truth” that 
would serve as a basis for reconciliation, suggested that supposed Polish atrocities in 1939 explained why they 
occurred again in 1945. See Bolko von Richthofen, “Der Todesmarsch der Deutschen nach Lowitsch,” Breslauer 
Nachrichten, November 10, 1949, 3-5. A few months later, Richthofen was even more explicit: Decrying the 
“historical misrepresentations” beyond the Iron Curtain, the author denied allegations of German crimes as 
“propaganda” and dismissed Polish experiences under German occupation as “so-called perpetual path of suffering 
of the Polish people.” Richthofen, “Geschichtsklitterung jenseits des ‘Eisernen Vorhangs’”, Breslauer Nachrichten, 
January 20, 1950. Breslauer Nachrichten, which transitioned into Der Schlesier in 1948, was an independent 
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1949, the GA’s activism convinced the Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen (“German Office for 
Questions of Peace”), the predecessor of the Foreign Ministry, that a “small private circle” would 
most effectively advance West German arguments on the German East, “one of the most 
important tasks for the future in the first place.” The GA, von Braun argued, could utilize 
personal connections to “foreign opinion-forming” figures, operating “in the same way that it 
does in Anglo-Saxon countries through committees, loose associations of interested parties.” 
This arrangement, the GA contended, would benefit the young Federal Republic immensely. 
Domestically, the GA would also “influence” West Germans. The GA’s involvement, moreover, 
would lend “scholarly qualifications” to what in essence were PR campaigns.29    
To that end, in 1950 the GA proposed a “collection of documents of humanity,” a 
counterpart to a “documents of inhumanity” in the planning stages at the Expellee Ministry. In an 
appeal in newspapers soliciting testimonies of exceptional displays of humanitarianism in the 
time of “hatred and vindictiveness, of greed and horror,” the GA explained that the publication 
would “break through the wall of silence, which still prevents the true recognition of the 
meaning, of the severity and the scope, of the mass expulsions.”30 Reports of POWs who 
“worked faithfully and often in amicable cooperation” with Germans, “accompanied” them on 
                                                 
nationalist-conservative paper that acted as the organ of the Silesian Association until the 1980s, when the expellee 
organization cut ties to the controversial publication. 
29 BArch B150-1152, von Braun to von Schönebeck, June 28, 1949, 1-2. Von Braun proposed an audacious funding 
scheme obligating every city and district to contribute 50 DM a year to the GA. The GA received government funds 
even if this plan did not come to fruition, and underlines expellee beliefs that the struggle for the German East 
included all West Germany. 
30 The occasion, the appeal explained, was the five year anniversary of when “the great treks of the East Germans 
trudged westward in ice and snow, while those who remained behind needed to endure unimaginable suffering. The 
homeland expellees think back on this terrible plight and the death of so many dear kin, friends and neighbors, who 
froze on the streets on the flight or in far off imprisonment, who hungered or were bludgeoned.” Meanwhile, the 
victors planned expulsions of the survivors from their homeland “in which their ancestors for many centuries lived 
in peaceful cohabitation [and] worked faithfully with their [East European] neighbors.” BArch B150-1152, Aufruf 
des Göttinger Arbeitskreis betreffend “Sammlung von Dokumenten der Menschlichkeit,” February 16, 1950, 1. 
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their “death march,” shielded them from excesses, or instances where “members of those peoples 
who carried out the expulsions” acted decently sought to provide a counterweight to the “voices 
of hatred” and “triumph of vengeance…expressed in the dictates of the Potsdam Agreement.”31  
Purporting to dispel “hatred amongst nations” and initiate “true understanding and a real 
reconciliation,” the appeal revealed political intentions. First, despite honoring individual acts of 
magnanimity, the “unceasing misery caused by the accords of Yalta and Potsdam must 
illuminate the background.”32 Coinciding with the five year anniversary of the expulsions, the 
publication sought to emphasize the “great misfortune that was brought upon Central Europe and 
the entire world.”33 Secondly, the compendium signaled—whether contrite or feigned—an ethos 
of reconciliation that simultaneously could deflect suspicions and allegations of purposeful 
revisionist politics. Like the Charta of the Homeland Expellees, expressions of mutual 
understanding softened the blow of recriminations. As a BMVt official commented about the 
“Documentation of Humanity,” it was “necessary to also bring positive comments” so as not to 
undermine documentation of crimes perpetrated against Germans, since litanies of atrocities 
would make the German case seem a “tendentious” and obviously propagandistic effort.34 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, documenting especially East European 
benevolence aimed to “counter every proposition of a collective guilt of any people.” “Especially 
the homeland expellees” ostensibly rejected temptations to lump all Czechs and Poles into a 
                                                 
31 Ibid, 2. The appeal, perhaps unwittingly, revealed two standards for measuring humanity: While French and 
English POW decency was praised, reports on East Europeans needed to “really demonstrate behavior of pure 
humanitarianism and not for some sort of reward or hope for advantage.” 
32 Ibid, 1. 
33 Ibid, 3. 
34 BArch B150-5630, Memo re: Diary of Frau Margarete Schell, July 10, 1958, 2. 
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single category of perpetrators, even “while leading figures of all political persuasions of those 
nations constantly seek to raise the impression that their people in their entirety desired and 
demanded the horrors of the mass expulsions.”35 The distinction between the Czechoslovakian 
and Polish people and their government undermined the thesis of collective guilt typically 
levelled against Germans. The implication seemed clear: If bereaved Germans could differentiate 
and reject desires of holding entire nations responsible, how then could the victors make all of 
Germany accountable for Nazism? And if this proved irrational, how then could twelve million 
expellees be made to suffer the expulsions? The Potsdam Conference punished an entire defeated 
nation, and claimed the entire German East as unjust restitution for the misdeeds of a minority. 
The final publication of the “Documents of Humanity” reflected the general tendencies of 
the appeal. Introduced by Albert Schweitzer, the collection of reports interpreted the war and the 
expulsions as a “terrible misfortune [Unglück].”36 The elimination of German agency and role in 
this calamity left witnesses as hapless victims exposed to waves of endless violence, surrendered 
to a “fate” ordained by higher powers. Equally as problematic as this framing was the inclusion 
of remarks such as “Polish horde” and disparaging comments over “Polish economy 
[Polenwirtschaft],” a derogatory reference to the apparently self-evident inability of Poles to 
manage the German East competently.37 Yet the greatest deficiency was the entire underpinning 
logic: The contrasting of mostly innocent Germans, who bore no responsibility for historical 
                                                 
35 BArch B150-1152, Aufruf des Göttinger Arbeitskreis betreffend “Sammlung von Dokumenten der 
Menschlichkeit,” February 16, 1950, 2. In other words, communist elites and not German victims thought in terms 
of collective guilt and approval. 
36 Karl O Kurth and Göttinger Arbeitskreis, Dokumente der Menschlichkeit aus der Zeit der Massenaustreibungen 
(Kitzingen-Main: Holzner, 1950), 8. 
37 Kurth and Göttinger Arbeitskreis, 121; Kurth and Göttinger Arbeitskreis, 149. 
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processes, with savage Slavic perpetrators who collectively committed a historic crime save for a 
minority of exceptional individuals.  
Furthermore, the reports presented slave workers and POWs as loyal “employees” 
grateful for German tutelage and the civilizing effects of their gracious overlords.38 Why 
Germans “possessed” laborers went unexplained. The behavior toward their “masters” in the 
hour of their greatest plight, however, did. Slavic workers tended toward unbelievable and 
unforgivable treachery, so that demonstrations of decency and selflessness seemed exceptional 
and uncommon for the typical Pole or Russian. Compassion and forgiveness from Jewish 
commissars in the Red Army, or gentle and kind treatment from Soviet soldiers, equally baffled 
expellees.39 Their refusal to descend into barbarism, authors suggested, signaled that they were 
not real communists and extraordinary Slavs, who arose as pillars of humanity from the horde of 
“sub-humans” created by Nazi propaganda, reinforced by wartime experiences, and widely 
popularized through postwar retelling in the anticommunist West Germany of the 1950s.40  
The French, Belgian, and English revealed no moral failings, and dutifully served and 
inspired their German compatriots with bravery and humanitarian gestures.41 As one author was 
told by another expellee upon admiring the devotion of “her” POWs: “Thank God that you have 
                                                 
38 One testimony for instance: “I offer this…as evidence of the fact that the Pole…maintains genuine devotion and 
loyalty to his just and considerate provider. […] However, the Pole easily lapses into chauvinism and barbarism if 
incited by a criminally infernal propaganda. I think fondly of my Polish people.” Quoted in Kurth and Göttinger 
Arbeitskreis, Dokumente, 131. 
39 Kurth and Göttinger Arbeitskreis, 149, 160, and 239. 
40  Albrecht Lehmann, Im Fremden ungewollt zuhaus: Flüchtlinge und Vertriebene in Westdeutschland; 1945 - 1990 
(München: Beck, 1996), 197–98. One document, titled “Humane Gestures in a Hellish Scene,” describes exactly this 
scenario: A Jewish commissar appears suddenly to “free us from a horde.” Kurth and Göttinger Arbeitskreis, 
Dokumente, 160. 
41 See the useful comments in Lehmann, Im Fremden ungewollt zuhaus, 195–96. 
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these Frenchmen, they will go through fire for you. How they have a good heart!”42 The 
testimonies insinuated an inborn humanity, forged in common values of Western culture, and a 
friendship cultivated through “humane” treatment of the POWs during the war. Between the 
lines, Albrecht Lehmann detects an “unmistakable message that they in no way wanted to stand 
with Russians, Poles, and Czechs in the camp of the victors, but instead already before the end of 
the war and the crumbling of the Allied alliance switched fronts and formed the new coalition of 
the West against the East.”43 Now Germans and French were “comrades,” as one report 
explained, where the POWs demonstrated a dogged determination to keep their German charges 
and themselves from falling into the hands of encroaching communists.44 
Whether the testimonies reflected events accurately is beside the point. The echoes of 
National Socialist racial thinking as well as Cold War dichotomies framed reports substantially. 
The premise dictating their selection was political, and an overt effort to provide an 
interpretation of the past that furthered expellee homeland politics. These interpretations and 
images moreover circulated widely. In 1955, for instance, the GA commissioned a radio episode 
“Documents of Humanity—In the Days of the Mass Expulsions” that included readings of 
reports.45 The conscious attempt to influence West German historical awareness continued into 
the 1960s, as the GA endorsed and supported expellee association’s efforts to bring out their own 
publications that ostensibly more accurately reflected their historical experiences and 
                                                 
42 Kurth and Göttinger Arbeitskreis, Dokumente, 95. 
43 Lehmann, Im Fremden ungewollt zuhaus, 196. 
44 Kurth and Göttinger Arbeitskreis, Dokumente, 74. 
45 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 200, “Ost- und Mitteldeutsche Heimatsendungen,” 1955. 
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understanding than more “scholarly” treatments.46 With an eye to receptions abroad, the GA 
moreover strove to professionalize and coordinate expellee association attempts of bringing their 
case before larger audiences and engage in more effective public relations work.  
 
Sudeten German Memory Politics in the Early FRG: A Case Study 
Homeland organizations eagerly worked with the GA, a recognized think tank with a 
favorable reputation.47 But the Landsmannschaften also developed their own campaigns. 
Working in cooperation with but not entirely within the system guaranteed a measure of leverage 
for this special interest group. Though it utilized various mechanisms to further their homeland 
politics—for instance through party and state institutions—expellee associations also recognized 
the need to base their claims on scholarship and recent history.48 During the 1950s, therefore, 
numerous homeland associations brought out their own collections in the tradition of interwar 
“white books.”49 The Sudeten Germans proved the most adept in disseminating their arguments 
                                                 
46 Karl O. Kurth, Sudetenland. Ein Hand— und Nachschlagebuch über alle Siedlungsgebiete der Sudetendeutschen 
in Böhmen und Mähren/Schlesien, ed. Göttinger Arbeitskreis (Kitzingen-Main: Holzner, 1954). RE: LAMSDORF 
47 The Sudeten German Association (SL), for instance, regularly sent press releases to the GA, which circulated 
them. In November 1953, the SL used the upcoming 1954 Berlin Conference, where “once again Germany’s fate 
will be decided,” to iterate its interpretation of history: “Once before Germany’s fate was decided on German soil by 
foreign powers. It was in Potsdam. Eight years ago. Then Morgenthau’s spirit still reigned. The accords reflected the 
wishes of the Kremlin. They meant genocide, death, the expulsions of Germans who were deprived of rights, who 
were hounded from their centuries-old homeland. Without guilt they stood there, a disenfranchised heap of a 
people.” Similarly, a January 1955 piece reminded audiences that they arrived in a Germany “ravaged by war, 
robbed completely of its sovereignty and plundered by the victors,” but expellees nevertheless persevered and built 
new homes “in the ruins of the Third Reich.” Expellees deserved credit for this, but accolades were but a start: The 
ultimate goal was the struggle for the homeland, “for the sake of the German people and the Fatherland.” See “Lasst 
die Weihnachtsglocken der Heimat, dem Recht, dem Frieden läuten,” November 26, 1953; and “Zum 
Jahreswechsel,” January 1955, in BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 1. 
48 On expellees and the political parties, see  Wambach, Verbändestaat und Parteienoligopol; Macht und Ohnmacht 
der Vertriebenenverbände.; Stickler, Ostdeutsch heisst Gesamtdeutsch; Ahonen, After the Expulsion; Matthias 
Müller, Die SPD und die Vertriebenenverbände 1949-1977: Eintracht, Entfremdung, Zwietracht (Berlin: Lit, 2012). 
49 Hans Jürgen von Wilckens and Landmannschaft Westpreussen, Die Grosse Not Danzig-Westpreussen 1945: 
Zusammengestellt Im Auftrage Der Landmannschaft Westpreussen (Sastedt: Niederdeutscher Verlag Ulrich und 
Ziss, 1957); Hans Hartl, Das Schicksal des Deutschtums in Rumänien (1938-1945-1953) (Würzburg: Holzner, 
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via networks domestically and abroad, possibly because they instinctively recognized their 
precarious legal position and the connection between the construction of a useful past and their 
political agendas. Already in July 1947, a coalition spanning the political spectrum formed the 
“Working Group for Ensuring Sudeten German Interests [Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung 
sudetendeutscher Interessen]” (AG).50 At a time when authorities carefully monitored refugee 
associations, the Sudeten leadership installed an office that it understood as a “foreign ministry 
of the Sudeten Germans,” with support of the Bavarian state.51  
Its primary interest concerned foreign policy. It aimed to gather materials for future peace 
talks, and sought to represent “a pan-German perspective…in all political, economic, and 
cultural questions” related to expellee matters and the Sudetenland.52 The SL voiced similar 
goals in its 1950 Declaration of Detmold, which affirmed that “foreign education” was the best 
foreign policy; the documentation of the suffering of the Sudeten Germans was the most 
important element of any campaign.53 With these aspirations, the self-appointed leaders of the 
Sudeten German vowed to “never again allow that we…will be bystanders of decisions made 
                                                 
1958). Hans Hartl was a staff member of the Schieder Commission tasked with gathering materials for the 
Yugoslavia volume. In 1949, Heinz Esser published a brochure on the “concentration camp” of Lamsdorf, possibly 
with support of the GA. This was turned into a documentation by the Upper Silesian Association in 1969. See Heinz 
Esser and Landsmannschaft der Oberschlesier, Die Hölle von Lamsdorf: Dokumentation über ein polnisches 
Vernichtungslager (Dülmen: Laumann-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1969).  
50 Walter Becher proposed the working group, which Richard Reitzner then realized through the Bavarian refugee 
ministry. Its founding board were Richard Reitzner (SPD), Hans Schütz (CSU), Franz Ziegler (CSU), and the 
völkisch activists and publishers Walter Becher and Emil Franzel. See Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende, 87. 
51 “Das ‘Auswärtige Amt’ der Sudetendeutsschen Volksgruppe,” Egerer Zeitung 6/4, 1955, 31. See also Wambach, 
Verbändestaat und Parteienoligopol; Macht und Ohnmacht der Vertriebenenverbände., 121. 
52 BayHSta NL Becher 107, “Aufzeichnung Bechers,” July 16, 1947. In other words, the Sudeten Germans needed 
to imbed their agenda within larger foreign policy goals, and work toward creating an understanding and context for 
West Germans to accept these positions. 
53 Ahonen, After the Expulsion, 48. 
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against us behind our backs.”54 Much of their activities for the next decades must be understood 
with these objectives in mind, as well as the worldview steeped in a profound sense of timeless 
victimization of the Sudetenland stretching back into the 19th century. 
The AG immediately started work on fulfilling its goals. Before the 1947 London Foreign 
Minister Conference, Emil Franzel drafted a memo in the name of the AG detailing the “political 
and legal situation of the Sudeten Germans.” Addressed to US Secretary of State George C. 
Marshall, Franzel passed the memorandum to Robert D. Murphy, an advisor to the American 
military government.55 In 1949 as well, the AG organized numerous demonstrations attended by 
several thousands, in which they read appeals to the US Senate and the UN and demanded a just 
settlement to the expulsions.56 Lastly, the AG gathered protocols and eyewitness testimonies 
from various institutions that ultimately culminated in the Sudeten German Archive in 1955.57 
These sources allowed for a breadth of publications, though two in particular stand out in 
the importance attributed to them by the AG. The flagship publication irrefutably detailing the 
suffering of Sudeten Germans were the Dokumente zur Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen 
                                                 
54 Walter Becher captured the guiding ethos of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft: “It shall never again be allowed that at 
international conferences we Sudeten Germans will be bystanders of decisions made against us behind our backs 
and it which only those circles…participate who pursue the criminal, undemocratic goals in the tradition of Beneš 
and are interested in the elimination of our ethnic group [Volksgruppe] as a factor of European harmony.” Walter 
Becher, “Im Dienste der Volksgruppe, Über die Aufgaben der Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutscher 
Interessen,” Der Sudetendeutsche, January 20, 1951, quoted in Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende, 88. 
55 There is no clear evidence on whether Marshall read the materials; he did, however, point to the tentativeness of 
the Potsdam Agreement and even raised the issue of a revision of postwar borders in the course of the conference.  
56 Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende, 92–93. 
57 As Tobias Weger notes, the logic behind the archive was less the conservation of materials, but rather the 
“historical-political documentation of self-produced sources.” More of a documentation center than an archive, it 
strove to provide “academic” underpinning of fundamentally political claims of the SL. Weger, 279. The Sudeten 
German archive, as Weger correctly finds, validates Aleida Assmann’s observation of archives as legitimizing 
instruments of the “control of memory.” Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des 
kulturellen Gedächtnisses (München: C.H. Beck, 1999), 343f. 
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(Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans), the so-called “White Book of 
Expulsion.”58 The project received clandestine support from notables: Hugo Prinz von Thurn und 
Taxis, who knew Lodgman von Auen personally, solicited donations to finance the “white book” 
from a number of dignitaries, including Justice Minister Thomas Dehler.59 As for the content, the 
Sudeten leadership entrusted AG member Heinrich Zinke with the editing process. Zinke already 
by late 1945 amassed more than 700 protocols himself, a “bloodcurdling panorama of crimes, 
horrors, plight and despair,” as Spiegel reported in a profile of the “historian of horror.”60  
The work did not progress smoothly, as Zinke and the AG shared contrary visions of 
what the “white book” should entail. Zinke wanted a “handbook of historical worth” and legal 
basis for future criminal proceedings against expellers, while the AG imagined a reference guide 
capable of augmenting the homeland politics of the SL.61 In a 1950 conference, the AG 
demanded that the “white book” be shorter yet beyond reproach, meaning that charges of 
collective Soviet and Czechoslovakian guilt needed to remain muted so as to not “raise the 
slightest inkling” of attempts to engage in “atrocity propaganda.” Despite this, von Auen felt that 
                                                 
58 Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung Sudetendeutscher Interessen and Turnwald, Dokumente zur Austreibung. The 
partially federally supported documentation predated Schieder’s efforts and made use of the same materials of the 
federal project, publishing even more sensational reports that the historians had deemed salacious and unverifiable, 
and therefore open to accusations of propaganda. 
59 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 456, Prinz von Thurn und Taxis to von Auen, December 3, 1949. Von 
Thurn und Taxis requested SL “propaganda materials” that he sought to funnel into “proper channels that can help 
our cause” both domestically and abroad. 
60 “Damit sie weinen können,” Der Spiegel, January 19, 1950, 9. See also files in BayHStA, SdA-
Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 456. Walter Becher since 1945 gathered reports while working with the 
Sudetendeutschen Hilfstelle. Maier and Sudetendeutscher Rat, 40 Jahre Sudetendeutscher Rechtskampf, 43. These 
together with Wenzel Jaksch’s statements gathered for his UN petition, as well as materials sent on by Schieder 
Commission staffer and AG member Wilhelm Turnwald, the Sudeten Germans collected some 1,000 testimonies by 
1950.  
61 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 456, Zinke’s memo on the Dokumentation, August 6, 1950. In an 
interview with Spiegel, for instance, Zinke commented that “there may one day after all be a Czech Nuremburg.” 
“Damit sie weinen können,” 9. 
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the brutality needed to be clearer and more accessible. Wenzel Jaksch reminded attendees of the 
intended foreign audience, and emphasized the greater need for refuting assumptions of a 
“humane transfer” and proving that excesses were centrally directed by Beneš and Stalin. Jaksch 
furthermore raised the idea of noting that Nazis also persecuted Sudeten Germans, while Czechs 
“did not do all that badly” in the Third Reich, where they enjoyed equal citizenship. After art 
historian Wilhelm Turnwald warned that many testimonies lacked verification, the AG 
concluded that another call for materials needed to be issued in order to produce a 
“documentation of truth” that would not “raise hatred or serve cheap propaganda.”62 
 In the summer of 1950, the AG sacked Zinke for lack of progress and unwillingness to 
work with the leadership, replacing him with Turnwald.63 In October 1951, the AG officially 
presented the 369 testimonies to the public, though Spiegel printed excerpts the previous year.64 
In a foreword written by Hans Schütz, von Auen, and Richard Reitzner, the editors declared that 
the reports documented a “genocide” and violation of “the most crucial laws of morality and 
ethics, of ethnic and natural rights.” This injustice legitimized claims to “the ancestral homeland 
of nearly a thousand years,” reparations, and punishment of the guilty.65 Turnwald’s introduction 
reiterated these themes and decried the “mass crimes” and “genocide.”66 The politically charged 
                                                 
62 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 456, Protocol der AG, Kommissionssitzung, April 15, 1950. Zinke 
drafted his own memo that reveals some insight into some of the issues plaguing the “white book.” Zinke for 
instance lamented that no one read the manuscript: Von Auen had perused about a third but preferred a “journalistic 
tone,” while Hans Schütz admitted to reading a few pages before concluding that the “maudlin” tone made the work 
“unusable.” BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 456, Zinke’s memo on the Dokumentation, August 6, 1950. 
63 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 456, Becher to Zinke, August 10, 1950. In other words, Zinke did not 
bend to the will of the AG, and needed to be replaced. 
64 “Damit sie weinen können.” Selected reports gathered by Zinke were included in newsletters sent by Sudeten 
leaders to constituents. BahHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 1, Rundschreiben Nr. 1, September 17, 1948. 
65 Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung Sudetendeutscher Interessen and Turnwald, Dokumente zur Austreibung, V. 
66 Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung Sudetendeutscher Interessen and Turnwald, VII. 
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statements eschewed any form of Sudeten German involvement or complicity in the course of 
events of the immediate past. Indeed, Turnwald framed the testimonies within the context of a 
reading of history which amounted to a summary of the AG’s völksch-tinged perceptions, 
already enshrined in its 1950 historical overview of Bohemia and Moravia.67  
The work amounted to a “politically motivated indictment against Potsdam” intended to 
instrumentalize the expulsions.68 The Allies allegedly destroyed a culturally rich community, 
thereby irrationally terminating the “historical mission of the Germans” in a region marked by 
the “power play between the ‘civilized’ and the ‘barbaric’ world.”69 Notions of cultural or racial 
superiority were widely shared across expellee factions. That such thoughts echoed the 
worldview of völkisch nationalists and Nazi racial ideology seemed to go unnoticed by German 
authors. In the context of the Cold War, however, visions of historic German dominance, which 
formed a bulwark against Asiatic barbarism, resonated powerfully. Indeed, just as since the 
Middle Ages Germans defended Western Civilization against the threats from the Orient, 
expellees maintained that they deserved a leading role in the struggle against Bolshevism.  
To drive home the cataclysmic error that Anglo-Americans committed in Potsdam, the 
AG offered its interpretation of history that emphasized Slavic aggression and expellee 
innocence. Not only were the expulsions the “[t]riumph of the Slavic-nationalist movement,” 
                                                 
67 Helmut Preidel, ed., Die Deutschen in Böhmen und Mähren: ein historischer Überblick (Gräfelfing bei München: 
E. Gans, 1950). 
68 Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende, 328. 
69 Preidel, Die Deutschen in Böhmen und Mähren, 8. The historian Wilhelm Weizsäcker put it similarly in 1949: 
The Sudeten Germans engaged in a “historical program” of transporting “Western culture” to the East, “in order to 
promulgate the lessons of the cross in desolate areas and to tame the crude manners of still half-pagan tribes through 
hard work.” Wilhelm Weizsäcker, “Die geschichtliche Sendung des Sudetendeutschtums,” Sudetendeutsche Blätter 
für Kunst und Wissenschaft, vol. 1 nr. 1 (1949), 5; and Ibid, vol. 1 nr. 3 (1949), 10. The Sudeten Germans were not 
alone in their belief that Germans first brought Christianity and culture to the East through peaceful missionary, as 
these themes were common among all expellee associations. 
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they “equaled German National Socialism.”70 Germans suffered from Slavic antagonism for 
centuries, but the true plight of the Sudetenland began in 1918 with the thwarted right to self-
determination promised by Woodrow Wilson. The Sudeten Germans were objects, not subjects 
of history, betrayed in 1918, 1938, and in 1945. Turnwald continued these themes in the “white 
book,” reframing support of Sudeten Germans for Hitler as misguided enthusiasm over being 
freed from Czechoslovakian mistreatment and hope for the “overcoming of all perceived 
problems in economic and political areas” which Hitler ostensibly accomplished in Germany.71 
That the affinity could be explained by the overlap of National Socialist ideology with the ethno-
nationalism of broad segments of the Sudeten German population went unmentioned, as did the 
role of the Sudetenland in the expansionary foreign policy of Nazi Germany.  
The offsetting of German war crimes with the expulsions and relativizing of National 
Socialism and Sudeten German responsibility for events before 1945 did not significantly differ 
from similar attempts of authors loosely associated with the Sudeten German elite. The AG 
instead painted a grim picture of brutalities cast as aggression going back centuries. Hussitsm as 
an age-old proto-nationalism which tormented the peaceful German carriers of culture, now 
fused with communist decrees, fulfilled the ancient Slavic objective of driving into the heart of 
Europe. Emotionally charged language filled the “white book”: Reports of stoning, women 
pulled apart by horses, human torches to honor Beneš, in addition to countless instances of 
humiliation and degrading chicanery, constituted the “typical” Sudeten German experiences that 
made the case for astonishing suffering. Though many of the reports emanated from second-hand 
                                                 
70 Preidel, 7. 
71 Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung Sudetendeutscher Interessen and Turnwald, Dokumente zur Austreibung, XII. 
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or third-hand sources, Turnwald nevertheless declared them “beyond reproach.”72 In either case, 
the “white book” unmistakably reflected the historical understanding of the Sudeten leadership, 
leveraging expellee suffering under the mantle of “objectivity.” In reality, the selective 
interpretation of recent history was a blatant “self-stylization of the in-group into victims and 
refraining from any individual responsibility for the historical processes before 1918 or 1945.”73 
While the “white book” outlined the historical understanding of the Sudeten German 
leadership and presented their suffering that supported their demands, the Sudetendeutsche Atlas 
established the geographic claims and boundaries of the Sudetenland.74 Partially financed by the 
Foreign Ministry, the atlas’ scenic countryside images and cityscapes presented an idealized 
Sudetenland. As a brochure advertising the publication announced, the “scholarly…work 
provides future conferences an atlas of the geographic-historical realities of the Sudetenland.”75 
The Süddeutsche Zeitung heralded its contribution to the “detoxification of…national 
antagonism.”76 The captions in German, French, and English indeed signaled desires to guide 
international audiences through the AG’s Sudetenland, but declining Czech text hardly suggested 
a reconciliatory discussion over these linguistic borderlands in the heart of Europe. 
The inclusion of Czech would have implicitly weakened claims of centuries of German 
influence in the region. Its absence therefore reflected not “geographic-historical realities,” but 
political ambitions and nationalist imaginations of the AG. That the atlas entailed a continuation 
                                                 
72 “Sudetendeutsche schildern Austreibung aus der CSR,” Die Welt, October 24, 1951, 8. 
73 Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende, 89. 
74 Emil Meynen and Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutscher Interessen, eds., Sudetendeutscher Atlas 
(München: Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung sudetendeutscher Interessen, 1954).  
75 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 456, Brochure for Sudetendeutscher Atlas, circa 1954/55. 
76 Press clipping from March 6, 1954, in BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 456. 
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of interwar and National Socialist Volkstumskampf (“ethnic struggle”) becomes clear when one 
considers the editors. Initially, the AG entrusted the völkisch geographer Gustav Fochler-Hauke 
with the project until his 1948 departure to Argentina in order to evade denazification 
procedures.77 The AG next turned to the geographer Emil Meynen, a scholar also implicated in 
the academic legitimation of ethnic and nationalist claims.78 He was assisted by Ernst Schwarz, a 
professor of German language and literature at Prague University who fled Czechoslovakia in 
1945 with ethno-cartographic maps that would serve as the basis for much of the atlas’ proposed 
linguistic boundaries.79 The tendentious extent of German linguistic areas did not reflect realities, 
and dismissed the fluidity of identity and national belonging that prevailed in the region into the 
early 20th century.80 In other words, the Sudetendeutsche Atlas amounted to outright ethno-
nationalist geography, a symbolic Sudeten German occupation of large swaths of Bohemia and 
Moravia tenuously masked by a “scholarly” veneer endorsed by “experts.”  
For hardliners, the already generous demarcations of Meynen did not go far enough. SL 
member Rudolf Staffen proposed that for the second edition, territories with more than fifty 
                                                 
77 Fochler-Hauke studied under Karl Haushofer, an early theoretician of “Lebensraum.” Just who exactly the AG 
turned to and what philosophy they admired emerges in Fochler-Hauke’s 1937 thoughts on the “Sudeten German 
Volksboden [ethnic land]”: “The struggle for the further advancement and pushing back of the linguistic border…has 
since the time of the emigration of the Germanic tribes from Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia and subsequent Slavic 
infiltration and opposing German medieval re-conquest…never come to a standstill. Nowhere in the world has the 
struggle for national ownership been bitterer than in Bohemia, and nowhere is the fight for the claim on the one hand 
and further advancement of power on the other been more doggedly carried out than in the Sudeten lands.” Quoted 
in Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende, 96.   
78 Between 1937 and 1944, Meynen co-edited an Ostforschung publication, and during the war directed the 
Pulblikationsstelle Ost (Eastern Publication Office) in Berlin, an institution within the Ministry for Eastern 
Territories and disseminator of Nazi racial studies. For more see Michael Fahlbusch et al., Handbuch der völkischen 
Wissenschaften: Akteure, Netzwerke, Forschungsprogramme (Munich: Saur, 2008), 422–28. 
79 Schwarz spent the interwar and Nazi period attempting to prove German supremacy in the Bohemian lands by 
documenting substantial reaches of German culture in Czechoslovakia. Weger, “Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende, 98. 
80 Pieter M Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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percent German language simply appear as German outright, as in “Western democracies 51% is 
a majority.” Moreover, maps documenting pan-Slavism, and how this menace had become a 
reality, would provide evidence of historic Slavic aggression. While he acknowledged the benefit 
of “exact” measurements that prevented Czechoslovakian criticisms, Staffen pointed out that the 
appearance of a more contiguous Sudetenland appear and removal of unsightly linguistic islands 
would mitigate against foreigners feeling that it would not be worth “fighting” these areas and 
increase the “propagandistic effectiveness” of the publication.81 Similarly, Reinhard Pozorny—
an editor of Sudetendeutsche Zeitung and staffer at Bayerischer Rundfunk, as well as the SL’s 
reviewer of publications covering the Sudeten question—advised against the inclusion of Czech 
language islands. “Since the language borders…can never be drawn 100% accurately,” Pozorny 
counseled, “I would recommend for purely propagandistic purposes that certain changes be made 
in the future” to reflect a more favorable picture for the SL.82 While Sudeten leaders grappled 
with the multiethnic composition of the former Hapsburg domains that they themselves so often 
praised, maximizing the extant of Sudeten culture opportunely supported postwar claims of a 
return of territories that ostensibly belonged to the Germanic realm since time immemorial.  
 
Between a “Documents of Inhumanity” and Contemporary History: Federal Efforts of 
Constructing “Flight and Expulsion” 
 
While independent entities began their efforts of documenting the expulsions, refugee 
offices in the American Zone likewise saw the need for a systematic securing of testimonies. In 
                                                 
81 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 456, Staffen to Walter Becher, June 24, 1954. Walter Becher 
welcomed Staffen’s ideas, but expected that Meynen would rejected “any political-propagandistic tendencies” 
because they would undermine the “value” of the atlas. “One can be of differing opinions about this,” Becher added. 
Ibid, Becher to Staffen, June 28, 1954. 




1947, gathering of materials with emphasis on atrocities and violent excesses perpetrated against 
Germans began in earnest. The intention, as guidelines for the endeavor explained, was a record 
of the “actual contexts and occurrences” which would “create irreproachable material for a future 
German government.”83 Acknowledging its political ramifications, an August 1949 resolution of 
the Minister-Presidents of Bizonia entrusted the project and all materials to the Friedensbüro, 
explicitly founded to coordinate efforts for eventual peace talks.84 The anticipated product, which 
received a mention in Adenauer’s first government declaration, became a crucial agenda of the 
young Federal Republic: A “White Book” that would arm a German delegation with irrefutable 
proof of the injustice and economic irrationality of the forced migrations and territorial 
truncation of Germany. 
Beginning in late 1949, appeals for testimonies circulated throughout Germany in press, 
radio, and letters. In the refugee camp in Friedland, a small staff instituted an office interviewing 
arrivals from the SBZ with an expulsion background.85 The Büro commissioned Wilhelm 
Turnwald to gather materials to the Sudetenland, while Prof. Fritz Valjavec focused on German 
minorities from southeastern Europe. The Büro turned to the circle of scholars in the north as 
well, engaging Hans von Spaeth-Meyken, a collaborator of Dirksen’s, to gather evidence relating 
to the territories east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers. The federal efforts therefore constituted a 
fusion of elements of the various strands discussed above. 
                                                 
83 Cited in Beer, “Im Spannungsfeld,” 357–58. This strategy paralleled interwar stratagems of providing evidence to 
strengthen the defeated Reich’s position at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and mitigate against a harsh peace. 
84 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BArch) B150-4187 vol. 1, Note on file re: “Refugee Documentation,” November 21, 
1949. 
85 Beer, “Im Spannungsfeld,” 360. 
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The researchers never developed a uniform methodology for documenting testimonies. 
The case of Spaeth-Meyken exemplifies the process. In addition to identifying source bases of 
private persons or church organizations, starting in late 1949 Spaeth-Meyken appealed for 
assistance to homeland associations, who put him in touch with selected witnesses. Spaeth-
Meyken solicited their cooperation in order to “prove to world public opinion the crimes 
committed against us.” His directed questions encouraged answers with only limited value for 
ascertaining context or an objective overview of historical processes: The chronological focus 
began with the Soviet incursion, with special attention on “especially great atrocities” and 
experiences after capitulation in “work, concentration or extermination camps.”86 The 
questionnaire moreover invited respondents to contemplate whether witnessed crimes “were 
merely excesses of undisciplined enemy soldiers” or evidence of a “deliberate program for the 
extermination of Germandom.”87  
Spaeth-Meyken not only directed respondents to answers that would support a 
documentation of Soviet barbarity, the solicitations left little doubt as to the political intentions. 
The political stakes became clear with exhortations that the Büro’s involvement should remain 
unmentioned in public statements or in letters going to the SBZ.88 Spaeth-Meyken furthermore 
cajoled respondents with emotional assurances that their experiences were of “decisive value in 
the struggle…for our homeland,” reminding that “it depends on all of us if eternal silence…will 
                                                 
86 BArch B150-4187 vol. 1, undated form letter (c. late 1949 or early 1950) from Hans von Spaeth Meyken 
(Attachment No. 8). For a similar appeal, see Ibid, “Aufruf zur Sammlung von Erlebnisberichten,” undated (c. late 
1949 or early 1950) (Attachment No. 3) 
87 BArch Bayreuth, Finding aid “Ost-Dokumentation 1” (Fragenbogenberichte zur Dokumentation der Vertreibung 
der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa), 8. 
88 References in the expellee press and in the responses in the archive in Bayreuth refer to various calls, such as the 
“Aktion Ostpreussen,” which seemed to be the cover for the collection of materials. 
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reign over our expulsion, over the plight and death of our kin, or if the world will one day revise 
the injustice of Potsdam and Yalta.”89  By invoking expellees’  “personal duty to the homeland,” 
the mawkish overtures complicated the securing of sober testimonies that would form the basis 
of an ostensibly objective study of the war and its consequences.90  
With the founding of the Federal Republic, the production of the “White Book” now fell 
to the Ministry for Expellees (BMVt). This office intended to turn the roughly 1,000 collected 
testimonies into a “documentation of the crimes against humanity” in order to “educate the world 
about the terrible fate of these people.”91 Foreign audiences needed particular education, as 
BMVt officials feared that communist regimes had gained an advantage in propagating historical 
interpretations that emphasized brutal German occupation policies and genocidal extermination. 
Mitigation of German guilt aimed to counteract the “opponents’ propaganda that has created the 
false impression that with the National Socialist invasion a large number of ‘Nazis’ arrived in the 
later liberated European lands,” where they “ostensibly raped the population, robbed, terrorized, 
and butchered the population as long as Hitler was in power.”92 A counter-narrative needed to 
                                                 
89 BArch B150-4187 vol. 1, Undated form letter (c. late 1949 or early 1950) from Hans von Spaeth Meyken 
(Attachment No. 8). For insight into the worldview of another staffer, see the extensive letter from Dr. Hoppenrath 
in which he addresses his fears of the effectiveness of “mendacious” Polish propaganda, which ostensibly during 
WWI laid the groundwork for territorial gains at the expense of Germany. Hoppenrath felt it important to emphasize 
the investment and infrastructure improvements made by Germany in the East between 1939 and 1945, and voiced 
concerns over “unpleasant and bad stupidity” on the part of Germans in WWII that may present a “dangerous 
weapon in the hands of the political opponent.” BArch N1709-3, Hoppenrath to Diestelkamp, October 29, 1953. 
90 Indeed, upon taking over the project, Schieder dismissed roughly 65% of von Spaeth-Meyken’s materials as “not 
useable.” BArch N17903-3, von Keudell to Spaeth-Meyken, February 16, 1954. 
91 BArch B150-4188 vol. 2, “Bericht über den augenblicklichen Stand und die Weiterführung der Arbeiten,” 
October 7, 1950, 2. 
92 BArch B150 4171 vol. 1, Memo of von Wilpert re: Dokumentationen der Unmenschlichkeit, April 20, 1951, 2. 
The “propaganda” of the Eastern Bloc furthermore ostensibly emphasized that the “freed people justifiably rose up 
against their tormentors,” and that it was “unfortunate but understandable” that they didn’t “wear velvet gloves and 
the odd brutality transpired.” 
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make clear that the ancestors of expellees “possessed the right to the homeland…at a time when 
America was not even discovered yet, that they were not robbers and plunderers but carriers of 
culture, who for hundreds of years lived together with other peoples and…contributed 
substantially to the well-being” of the inhabitants of the region. Such a corrective would make 
“the inhumanity [perpetrated against Germans] appear all the more crassly.”93 
A number of issues complicated progress. Many reports, particularly gathered by Sudeten 
German groups, lacked “necessary objectivity” even for researchers eager to collect descriptions 
of atrocities.94 The “propagandistic exaggeration or tendentious depiction” clearly undermined 
the value of the final product.95 Source gaps to certain regions persisted as well, as the “hell of 
Soviet excesses and Polish sadistic torture” fragmented communities. Moreover, the struggle for 
survival left inadequate time for expellees to record a thorough report, and many did not provide 
precise details or shunned contemplating a painful past: The “experiences [were] so gruesome” 
that they defied description, and women remained silent in “justified shame.”96 At other times, 
the BMVt dismissed testimonies altogether: In July 1951, an expellee wishing to have her 
recollections preserved for posterity received a rejection which pointed to the abundance of 
                                                 
93 The BMVt noted that the focus should not just begin with the arrival of Soviet forces, but earlier. Several 
testimonies “continuously point to the events of 1939 (Blood Sunday in Bromberg, death march to Lowitsch, etc.) as 
the start of all crimes against humanity.” In other words, Polish aggression toward Germans needed to be 
emphasized, while the context of the Nazi occupation of Poland mitigated. The Büro engaged Otto Heike, a member 
of the Weichsel/Wartheland expellee association and editor of its organ Stimmen aus den Osten, to compile 
materials to acts of Polish brutalities before 1944/45. BArch B150-4188 vol. 2, “Bericht über den augenblicklichen 
Stand und die Weiterführung der Arbeiten,” October 7, 1950, 16. 
94 Many of these reports were however used by the AG in its “White Book.” 
95 BArch B150-4188 vol. 2, “Bericht über den augenblicklichen Stand und die Weiterführung der Arbeiten,” 
October 7, 1950, 9-10. The author of the report specifically mentioned the “White Book of 1939,” whose clearly 
propagandistic intentions left the project a failure. The BMVt did not desire a “litany of many…crimes and 
atrocities” that would disgust the reader, but instead “gripping” material that reflected the “historical truth.” 
96 Ibid, 12-13. 
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materials and explained that “the fate and the experiences of the eastern expellees are after all the 
same, even if each individual may think their own experience as especially indicative.”97 
Administrative decisions raised a second set of problems. Ottomar Schreiber, the 
undersecretary of the BMVt and nominal director of the project, ardently insisted upon a speedy 
publication by summer of 1951. Yet another challenge emanated from difficulties of finding a 
suitable editor capable of towing the designated political course. BMVt officials emphasized the 
need for an uncompromised background in order to thwart allegations particularly from the 
Eastern Bloc of the “White Book” being nothing more than propaganda.98 Several editorial and 
publication options fell through. Lack of financing, however, proved the greatest hurdle, and by 
the spring of 1951 staff members feared that the “White Book” faced termination.99  
 Hearing of the project’s impending discontinuation from Spaeth-Meyken, former Stettin 
State Archive director Adolf Diestelkamp lobbied the federal government for continued support. 
In an extensive memorandum, he outlined the current state of research and potential.100 The 
                                                 
97 BArch 150-4171 vol. 2, Bruno Maurach to Marianne Weber, July 27, 1951. 
98 The historian Walter Recke initially seemed an ideal candidate given his ostensible standing as a “designated 
expert on the East.”  In a letter soliciting Recke’s engagement on a project intending to “counter the notion of Nazis 
pouring into Eastern Europe,” BMVt officials warned of the potential that the documentation could face allegations 
of a “fallback into Nazi propaganda” if collaborators were not objective and with a “clean past.” The BMVt seemed 
confident of Recke’s credentials, yet desired to know if in all candor Recke considered himself “politically untainted 
[unbelastet]” and capable of withstanding public scrutiny. In the end, Recke’s NSDAP membership and scholarship 
during the Third Reich proved a liability. BArch B150-4171 vol 2, von Wilpert to Recke, April 20, 1951, 2.   
99 Several researchers started to jump ship with materials they had gathered. Von Witzendorff-Rehdiger, a 
collaborator who provided reports from Silesia, shipped materials to personal contacts in the United States who 
approached Senators Walter Langer and Guy Gabrielson, the Republican National Committee chairman. The 
Americans expressed interest in the material and its publication in the US. BArch B150-4188 vol. 2, “Bericht über 
den augenblicklichen Stand und die Weiterführung der Arbeiten,” October 7, 1950, 26. Turnwald also used portions 
of his testimonies for the Sudeten German “White Book.”  
100 BArch N 1539, “Denkschrift zur ‘Dokumentation der Vertreibung aus den Ostgebieten,” May 22, 1951. 
Diestelkamp noted the political potency of scholarship of the Reich Archive in the interwar period. Noting the “hard 
and unequivocal lessons of the peace negotiations” in 1919, he argued that only a rigorous scholarly publication 
could avoid the “German failure and omissions that…had a substantial share in the [1919] territorial losses.” 
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venture represented a “national-political duty with far-reaching significance” upon which “the 
future fate of these German territories may one day significantly depend.” Particularly in the 
United States, testimonies could play “a decisive factor in our struggle for the winning back of 
the German East.”101 The memo explicitly revealed foreign policy concerns, but also tensions 
between German suffering and the Nazi Past: Diestelkamp lauded federal financing of research 
on National Socialism, but claimed that “events in the East” should receive priority.102 Moreover, 
the Polish government understood the power of propagating a historical narrative in line with 
Warsaw’s politics and which underpinned its legitimacy.103 The memo warned of the urgent 
necessity of a West German response grounded on evidence, and more comprehensive than a 
collection of testimonies speaking to atrocities envisioned by the BMVt.104  
As the “national duty” did not just concern expellees, representatives of the BMVt, the 
Foreign Ministry (AA), the Ministry of the Interior (BMI), and the Ministry for All-German 
Affairs (BMfgF) convened on July 13, 1951 in order to discuss the memo’s content.105 The AA 
called for continuation, as a “great possibility [exists] that such a documentation will one day be 
of acute foreign policy interest.” Pointing to limited funds, the BMVt demurred and pleaded for a 
                                                 
101 BArch N 1539, “Denkschrift zur ‘Dokumentation der Vertreibung aus den Ostgebieten,” May 22, 1951, 4-5. 
102 Diestelkamp presumably referred to the “Institute for Research on the National Socialist Period,” renamed into 
the Institute for Contemporary History (Institut für Zeitgeschichte) in Munich. 
103 This likely refers to the Documenta occupationis Teutonicae, a multivolume documentation put out by the 
Institut Zachodni (Western Institute) in Posen between 1945 and 1949, which outlined historic German aggression 
and supported Poland’s legitimate claims to the “Recovered Territories.”  
104 Indeed, in October 1950, Spaeth-Meyken reported that Diestelkamp’s contacts at the American Library of 
Congress warned of a “flood” of Eastern Bloc publications intended to influence American policymakers. BArch 
B150 4188, “Bericht über den augenblicklichen Stand und die Weiterführung der Arbeiten,” October 7, 1950, 26. 
105 BArch B150-4171, vol. 2, “Aufzeichnung über die Besprechung über die Fortführung der Dokumentation im 
Bundesministerium für Vertriebene am 13.7.51,” July 16, 1951. The Ministry of All-German affairs, whom 
Diestelkamp initially approached with the memorandum, arranged the meeting. 
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simple “documentation of inhumanity,” a compilation of atrocity reports that “should serve to 
educate foreign audiences about this pivotal chapter of the history of the German refugee 
problem.”106 The BMfgF offered to appropriate funds from its budget, as the project “must by all 
means continue in order to secure materials for a defense against the documents already collected 
by the opposition, which are incriminating for us Germans.”107  
The offer of cobbling together funding from various ministries with a stake in a 
Dokumentation as proposed by Diestelkamp extended a lifeline to the project. The expanded 
scope, however, required new personnel. Schreiber and Diestelkamp turned to the conservative 
historian Hans Rothfels, who fortuitously returned to West Germany in 1951 after having fled in 
1939. Rothfels welcomed the overtures, but recommended former University of Königsberg 
colleague Theodor Schieder to head the commission. His engagement with the Göttinger 
Arbeitskreis and the Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen made him an ideal candidate. Moreover, 
his research during the interwar period on the repercussions of WWI on East Prussia provided 
useful methodological templates for the Dokumentation.108  
Despite “mixed feelings,” Schieder felt obligated to take the reins to prevent the 
publication of a “thriller” that would lead to “problematic effects.”109 He insisted on qualified 
staffers capable of producing a study that could withstand critical scrutiny. Schieder argued for 
an account of the expulsions that included their sources and phases, and adhered to rigorous 
                                                 
106 Ibid, 2. 
107 Ibid, 4. The BMVt also received letters from expellee leaders and organizations pushing for a continuation. See 
the letters of Axel de Vries, the federal chairman of the VOL, to the BMVt in BArch B150-4171 vol. 2. 
108 Schieder directed the Landesstelle Ostpreussen für Nachkriegsgeschichte, an institute engaging in documenting 
the consequences of the war on the province. The revisionist historical enterprise was closely associated with the 
Zentrallstelle für Nachkriegsgeschichte in Berlin, led by the Ostforscher Albert Brackmann.  
109 BArch N1188-5, Theodor Schieder to Hans Rotfhels, September 26, 1951. 
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academic standards.110 This stood at odds with the explicit propagandistic ambitions in the 
BMVt, which still desired a “documents of inhumanity.” Schieder acknowledged the “political 
usefulness” of influencing public opinion abroad, and that an official “white book” of the “most 
consequential incident in European history” could demonstrate that the expulsions had not 
occurred under “humane and orderly conditions.”111 He emphasized that success depended on 
going beyond a litany of atrocities, and instead emphasize the centuries of German settlement in 
these territories and “Bolshevik origin of the expulsion program.” Only authoritative scholarship 
could moreover “from the outset eliminate all suspicions of propagandistic intentions.”112  
Though it did not conform entirely to the expectations of the BMVt, the proposal 
contained enough common ground that Schreiber acceded turning the “documentation of 
inhumanity” into a “documentation of the expulsions.”113 The BMVt also approved suggested 
candidates who would join Schieder and Rothfels. Noted legal scholar Rudolf Laun and historian 
Peter Rassow joined the commission. Diestelkamp joined as well, and was replaced after his 
unexpected death by Werner Conze in 1956. Several young researchers assisted the doyens: 
Martin Broszat and Hans-Ulrich Wehler would go on to deeply influence the field of modern 
German history in their own right. 
                                                 
110 BArch B106-27733, Memo from October 1, 1951. See also BArch B150-4171 vol. 1, “Gutachten über eine 
Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus den Ostgebieten für das Bundesministerium für die 
Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen,” October 1, 1951. 
111 BArch B106 27733, 130. 
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27733, Protocol of Meeting, October 15, 1951. For his part, Schieder expressed relief in a letter to Rothfels that he 
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not for example just the ‘inhumanities’ by themselves.” BArch N1188-5, Schieder to Rothfels, November 17, 1951.  
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Promised full independence, the commission immediately convened and resolved to 
secure and carefully evaluate testimonies based on their scholarly merits, and not political 
considerations.114 Rothfels emphasized that sources should not be misappropriated for 
propagandistic purposes.115 The researchers quickly recognized that despite thousands of 
testimonies, there remained large gaps. Yet the bigger issue regarded the methodological 
blunders of the initial gathering of reports, which had been narrowly compiled with a focus on a 
documentation of atrocities. Schieder was appalled to learn that the BMVt remunerated staffers 
collecting testimonies based on the frequency of excesses such as murder or rape in reports.116 
The project required additional gathering of testimonies, which by 1953 included around 20,000 
responses to questionnaires, and 11,000 narrative-driven “reports of experience.”117  
The researchers developed a methodology by which materials were evaluated for their 
authenticity, believability, and suitability.118 Schieder insisted upon eliminating uncorroborated 
testimonies or those which contained “obvious exaggeration,” “unfounded speculation,” 
“polemical” statements, or expressions of “resentment.”119 Moreover, instead of presenting a 
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collection of individual fates, the commission sought to offer typical experiences representative 
of aspects of wartime experiences.120 The historians desired a record that fulfilled political 
objectives and would “emphatically make the world public aware of things that until now have 
been for the most part hushed up.” As Schieder explained, at stake was the assessment of “one of 
the most momentous events in all of European history and one of the great catastrophes in the 
development of the German people.”121 But the commission also earnestly considered their 
professional obligations, and insisted to BMVt officials that they would investigate the “entire 
fate of the East German population in the end stage of the war in all of its various phases,” 
including developments beforehand.122 In short, this brought Schieder and his colleagues into 
“conflict between politics and contemporary history,” as Mathias Beer aptly assesses.123 
Some staffers on the project who predated Schieder’s arrival, such as Spaeth-Meyken, 
continued to live up to the political expectations of the BMVt and assured officials that the 
documents “prove that the extermination of Germandom in the territories east of the Oder-Neisse 
was planned and methodically carried out.”124 Schieder however asserted himself by 1952 
against tendencies to deliver a mere catalogue of horrors, ensuring selections that conformed to 
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standards of historical objectivity, at least as the commission understood it. The team proposed 
two volumes each for the Recovered Territories, Southeastern Europe, and the Sudetenland, with 
several more accessible testimonies as special publications for a broad audience.125  
By August 1953, the commission submitted a draft of the first two volumes to the 
Foreign Ministry, which foresaw no political issues with the content.126 Armed with 400 editions, 
Hans Lukaschek travelled to the 1953 West German Association of Historians, where the 
expellee minister distributed copies free of charge.127 A press release on the initiative explained 
that the Dokumentation represented a corrective to “constant foreign publications…with a 
tendentious anti-German content,” and sought to “secure the facts…and bring them to the 
world’s attention.”128 Internally, some staffers were blunter: The work acted as a counterweight 
to Nazi crimes, as especially “[t]he Poles have understood how to influence world opinion 
through comprehensive, tendentious, and dishonest literature and propaganda since 1945.”129   
In September 1953, the BMVt officially released the Dokumentation on the territories 
beyond the Oder-Neiße Rivers. Schieder’s introduction invited readers to understand the content 
as the “final act of a war, in which written and unwritten laws…were violated a thousand fold, 
and the annihilation of entire peoples was not merely proclaimed as a goal, but indeed carried 
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out.”130 Guided by “incorruptible love for the truth and not by the desire for denouncements or 
justification,” Schieder expressed confidence that the volume avoided a “presentation of isolated 
facts pulled from their context or a mere collection of…excesses and atrocities,” but instead a 
nuanced overview of the forced migrations that represented the diverse fates of expellees.131 If 
one policy influenced the work, the introduction assured, then it was the obligation to the 
“Charta of the Homeland Expellees” and its “explicit renouncement of vengeance and 
retribution”: The testimonies did not intend to cultivate hatred or incite feelings of self-pity, as 
the historians were “all too aware of the German share in the destinies of the last decades.” 
A press release announcing the publication explained that the “especially representative” 
testimonies contained valuable information for all seeking to understand political developments 
since 1945. “A devastating series of images roll past our mind’s eye, violence that remains 
unatoned for because those who could have prevented them left their subordinates a free hand or 
even ordered the excesses, the plundering and the rapes.” When “letting the unfathomable scale 
of atrocities and barbarism sink in,” the reader could not forget one key thing, however: “That 
the Charta of the East German homeland associations solemnly declared the relinquishment of 
vengeance and retribution.”132 If audiences recognized this ethos even after learning the reality of 
“flight and expulsion,” then the Dokumentation will have contributed to the prevention of future 
forced migrations, the unification of all Europeans, and a return of expellees to their homeland. 
Or as the introduction pleaded: Not an “overlooking,” but a “responsible confrontation with the 
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most recent past” could foster “new moral strength” that ensured the reconciliation of Europeans, 
thereby assuring that “the unspeakable suffering of our generation is not entirely in vain.”133 
The humanist appeals and invocation of the Charta cannot obscure the volumes’ strategic 
purpose, namely the documentation of German victimhood that permitted a balancing of moral 
scales and underpinned revisionist claims. In a press conference the following spring the 
intentions seemed clearer: The West German government had no intention to “wake new feelings 
of revenge,” but rather desired to “present the proof that in this war, unfortunately on both sides 
the same measure of injustice was done.”134   
 
Good Germans, Bad Russians: Framing “Flight and Expulsion” for Foreign Audiences 
The contention that “both sides” perpetrated injustices signaled the underlying objectives: 
Tipping moral scales. Informing foreign audiences that outside forces bore the blame lay at the 
heart of the Dokumentation, and permeate the testimonies that the commission selected. The 
Schieder Commission strategically constructed a victimhood narrative populated with victims 
and perpetrators in order to underpin claims of egregious suffering and demands for postwar 
restitution and winning back the German East. This framing unsurprisingly entailed a particular 
reading of the past with selective silences and memories.   
First, the Dokumentation attempted to maximalize German losses by proffering an 
estimated 2.2 million dead in the territories east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers alone.135 This 
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stood in contrast to expellee responses: Remarkably, when perusing responses in the archival 
materials, nearly half explicitly denied seeing or knowing of violent excesses perpetrated in their 
community.136 Even a conservative acceptance estimates in the testimonies falls well short of 
purported millions of deaths. The Schieder Commission worried that endorsing a “too low” 
figure could lead to “politically undesirable conclusions…abroad,” yet rejected BMVt preference 
for the specious 3.1 million deaths calculated by historian Gotthold Rhode.137  
The West German government ultimately endorsed the commission’s estimation of some 
two million deaths for decades. Yet it continued to pressure scholars to increase their estimates: 
In 1954, the Federal Statistical Office encouraged Friedrich Burgdörfer—engaged by the BMVt 
to compile statistical information for the Schieder Commission—to add 100,000 to his estimate 
of 250,000 deaths in the Sudetenland, thereby bringing them closer to Rhode’s calculation of 
450,000. The office furthermore warned the BMVt to prevent the publication of “confusing” 
material in a government publication.138 The effort to move Burgdörfer to tout the political line 
failed, and the Schieder Commission stuck to his more conservative yet nevertheless inflated 
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figure of 225,600 deaths.139 Only in 1958 did the Statistical Office reduce its estimates to 1.39 
million dead in the Oder-Neisse territories, and 225,000 for Czechoslovakia.140  
Even these figures are too high, and their continued use ignores detailed investigations 
such as the one conducted by the Munich Tracing Service in 1964, which found 473,013 deaths 
through murder or deprivation by consulting “homeland registries.”141 In either case, historians 
together with government offices engaged in a concerted effort to push the number of expellee 
victims as high as possible in order to presumably lend greater moral gravity to West German 
political claims.142 The radical revisionist Sudeten German historian Heinz Nawratil made this 
cynical calculus explicit: “When one adds all the…figures and the expulsion victims, then one 
finds that in 1945 and afterward 6 to 10 million innocent people perished. The postwar losses 
therefore eclipse even the victims of German dictatorship and war between 1933 and 1945.”143 
Beyond engaging in a numbers game, the Dokumentation secondly sought to present the 
expulsions as an unjust historic error. Reports reminded that the territories had been German for 
centuries and not, as ill-informed audiences might assume, conquered through Nazi aggression. 
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They were the ancestral homelands of millions, where “families had been born, lived, and died, 
which [they] had loved, on which [they] had worked, and which [they] had defended against 
enemies,” as one West Prussian nobleman explained.144 The population transfers marked the 
destruction of a “multinational community unlike any other in the world,” an expellee from 
Yugoslavia lamented.145 Despite the 1938 annexation of the Sudetenland and 1939 occupation of 
Czechoslovakia, another testimony mourned the disappearance of a unique region only in 1945: 
A “land with a rich nature, an old culture, and a modern civilization…blessed with children, a 
peasantry, a working class, a middle class, intellectuals, a vibrant, vital nation in a bountiful 
homeland.” Since the dictates of Potsdam, Sudeten Germans were “a people no more, it is a 
chaotic mass of refugees, expellees, homeless, beggars” cast into a “distant uncertain fate.”146 A 
report from Troppau (Opava) similarly grieved the dissolution of “unwritten solidarity among the 
unpolitical people of both nations…who had lived together here for years.”147 
Scholarship on the linguistic borderlands of Central Europe emphasizes the region’s 
multicultural composition, arguing that national identities and ethnic tensions arose only in the 
late 19th century.148 By alluding to a romanticized and harmonious past stretching to the Middle 
Ages and simultaneously papering over political developments in 1933 and 1938/39, the editors 
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underscored injustices perpetrated against Germans after 1945.149 Culprits other than Germans 
bore responsibility for the destruction of the German East. Reports expressed disbelief over how 
“British and Americans, Christian people who lived according to the law, would tolerate the 
complete evacuation of Germans from entire provinces where those Germans had lived for 
centuries.” The outcome shook their “faith in the Anglo-American sense of justice.”150 Another 
testimony voiced the hope that “this country was always German, thus the British and Americans 
are not suddenly going to allow it to become Polish.” Refugees felt confident that when “Asia 
has washed over us, the west will save us….With this knowledge and confidence, we quite 
consciously constructed the last wall of humanity in the east.”151 The Allies betrayed these 
convictions, and watched as the bulwark against Asian barbarism descended into flames. 
Allegations of Allied short-sightedness reflected a common theme of “flight and 
expulsion” of the 1950s. Yet for all of Western imprudence, there existed a greater cause of 
German misfortune: Bolshevism, as opposed to the preceding twelve years of dictatorship and 
war of annihilation, explained the panorama of horrific testimonies that bore witness to the 
demise of Central European culture. For the editors, the key events that explained how millions 
unjustifiably lost their homeland started in 1944/45, with the arrival of Soviet forces. The driving 
impetus of the Dokumentation, namely providing evidence that would “prove to world public 
opinion the crimes committed against us,” created the main criteria for the selection of 
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testimonials.152 Objectively documenting the “deliberate program for the extermination of 
Germandom” constituted a central pillar upon which the “white book” built its case.153 
Unsurprisingly, Soviet savagery emerged as the most persistent theme of the collection. 
 Establishing intentions mattered for the historians commissioned by the FRG. Horrific 
mass rape or murder purported to demonstrate an agenda of, as one testimony purported, 
“exterminating us Germans.”154 The driving brutality of this process—evinced in reports 
describing notorious incidents such as the Nemmersdorf massacre or the sinking of the Wilhelm 
Gustloff—was Bolshevism and Slavic aggression. Spurred on by propaganda such as the writings 
of Ilya Ehrenburg exhorting to murder and rape, the wave of excesses revealed the Kremlin’s 
sinister plan to culturally and physically annihilate German influence in Eastern and Central 
Europe. The means, as the introduction to the Dokumentation authoritatively clarified, were “the 
expression of a manner of behavior and mentality which for European sensibilities is 
inconceivable and repulsive” and reflected “particular boundlessness and savagery.”155  
The savagery of the invasion and occupation of the USSR that did not justify but would 
have helped clarify Red Army behavior did not factor into the “driving forces and 
tendencies…that could offer an explanation of the often unthinkable atrocities and inhumane 
actions.”156 Fleeting references to vengeance went unparsed, so that desires for retribution were 
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unclear. Instead, “flight and expulsion” were rooted in communist and Slavic barbarism, where 
events between 1933 and 1945 were hardly worth mentioning.157 Such a framing naturally 
required a counterpart to the enemy’s cruelty, and explains why the Dokumentation contributed 
to the erection of the second pillar of the narrative of “flight and expulsion”: Innocent Germans 
unjustly enveloped by the storm that swept through the German East. 
While Soviet soldiers and Polish and Czech militia ranked as the most prominent 
tormentors of expellees in the Dokumentation, the editors needed to deal with the National 
Socialist past, opting to distinguish between “good” and “bad” Germans. Nazi officials 
consistently appeared in the testimonies as corrupt and crazed tyrants, caricatures clinging to 
final victory and brutally suppressing “defeatism.”158 Few genuine Nazis appear in the 
Dokumentation apart from those who harangue the beleaguered population. Yet in the eastern 
regions of the Reich, the NSDAP celebrated impressive electoral successes before 1933.159 
Indeed, accounts reveal faint clues that many a past now threatened to become the author’s 
undoing. A civil servant recounted how he “feverishly” destroyed incriminating papers and 
“anything that could remind one of the party” as Soviet forces besieged the town.160 Burying or 
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burning uniforms seemed common.161 Apart from implying that witnesses knew enough of the 
nature of the Nazi dictatorship to fear retribution, the historians did not utilize such frank 
accounts, preferring to leave the issue of regime support unparsed and imbedded within litanies 
of seemingly inexplicable Soviet brutalities.  
Careful framings and omissions manifest themselves when German misery explicitly 
collides with Nazi crimes. While the collapse of the Third Reich tore many of its citizens into 
abject hardship, its dissolution also meant that the horrendous suffering of Germany’s victims 
continued unabated. Resolute to continue and finish the extermination of Europe’s last remaining 
Jews, the SS evacuated its concentration camps and drove emaciated prisoners westward in 
thousands of death marches, frequently right through German cities and villages in plain sight.162 
Sharing the very same roads as refugees, the columns would have been a common sight and 
irrefutably confronted the populace with the murderous reality of National Socialism.  
There are expellee accounts which describe ghastly scenes that unfolded throughout the 
German East. “Everything heads westward,” a report from Kanth (Kąty Wrocławskie) explains, 
and “among the column of evacuees the SS drive great numbers of prisoners, among them a 
tremendous amount of Jews.” The brutality unfolded in plain sight: “The people were totally 
exhausted, fell to the ground, and were then yanked up by the SS, beaten, and forced onward. 
These endless columns of people on the flight moved a whole three weeks through Kanth.”163 A 
Red Cross nurse in Schweidnitz (Świdnica), shocked by the “cluster of ghosts” that confirmed 
                                                 
161 Henke, “Exodus aus Ostpreußen und Schlesien,” 121. 
162  Daniel Blatman, The death marches: the final phase of Nazi genocide (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2011). 
163 BArch Ost-Dok 2/174, 194. Despite witnessing a death march, the author curiously conflates the end stage of the 
Holocaust with the fate of German civilians by referring to their violent forced evacuation as a “flight.”  
414 
 
“rumors of Jews, foreigners, and political ‘criminals’ in horrendous camps,” described prisoners 
“dropping like flies” in front of her house in her diary: “All of it is madness, these people, these 
refugees, accompanied with the howl of sirens”164 Others discovered grisly remnants of the death 
marches: Near Pillau, a child investigating the “large, dark ‘objects’ in the moonshine as far as 
one could see” was horrified to find “dead people, frozen stiff.” “On the left side of the jackets 
they have a badge: Stars. The first dead of my life, for a long time. Back on the wagon my 
questions only receive the answer: those are the Jews.”165 
Such open and emotional responses to the Holocaust are rarely found in the 
Dokumentation.166 Accounts in which expellee suffering and the Nazi regime intersect typically 
remain ambivalent, and the nature of who is suffering and why appears murky. On numerous 
occasions, reports upend the hierarchy of victimhood, casting Germany’s victims as threats or 
sources of distress. An officer encountering evacuated prisoners recalled that the survivors 
requested rations and transport along with German refugees. After overcoming a “psychological 
resistance,” he prioritized the prisoner evacuation, as otherwise Germans would face “an 
extremely unreliable element.”167 Yet another testimony transformed Germany’s victims into 
sinister figures, even in the hour of intense suffering: Stumbling upon thousands of Soviet 
POWs, an East Prussian woman noted the “ragged and pitiful, many Mongolian types” reduced 
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to eating raw morsels cut from horse cadavers. Nevertheless, the SS guard admonished her to 
“take cover,” as “one does not know what could happen in the next few minutes. The forest road 
is narrow and lonely, and if the prisoners now fall upon the treks, no one can help.”168  
When not terrified of the survivors of Nazi annihilationist policies, authors demonstrate 
an unwillingness to recognize them as victims, instead voicing irritation over the haughtiness of 
“grinning” and jubilant POWs expecting eminent liberation.169 Refugees bitterly recall the 
indignities of having to tolerate “Poles standing on the street and grinning insolently” or in a 
refugee camp suffering “dressing-downs from the foreign, mostly Polish kitchen personnel!”170 
In addition to being subjected to perceived arrogance, respondents resented prisoner evacuees 
who kept forlorn refugees out in the cold: Herding them into confiscated barns, the SS forbade 
refugees from approaching the shelters, relegating them to the frigid outdoors.171 In another 
account, it is unclear at whom the author directs his bitterness: The police who closed the road, 
or the Soviet POWs driven westward while Germans sat in the cold, surrendered to the 
approaching Red Army.172  
Other testimonies suggested that erstwhile victims now emerged as tormentors. A woman 
from Transylvania discerned Jews among the Hungarians and communists exercising a 
“regime…of terror” after German surrender.173 Elsewhere, Jews commanded camps holding 
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German civilians or, as in Budapest, allegedly orchestrated the anti-German press campaign.174 
Liberated prisoners from Theresienstadt “overran the towns” and stole alcohol, after which they 
perpetrated “the usual excesses, and women were seized.”175 When slave workers saw that their 
liberation was at hand, their sudden betrayal of their former masters—through plundering, 
denunciations, or any sort of cooperation and sign of affinity “of these Polacks” with the Red 
Army—astounded and infuriated authors.176 The settling of scores, such as when a farmer was 
shot “by his own Pole,” seemed utterly random and unfathomable, though such acts very well 
had their root in the nature of the relationship between 1939 and 1945.177 According to the 
testimonies, Germans now suddenly fell victim to inexplicable rage, made only all the more 
incomprehensible due to the missing context of the Holocaust and Nazi occupation policy. 
The psychological reactions to the sudden cataclysmic disintegration of Nazi rule and 
role reversals are perhaps understandable. Moreover, civilians caught in the maelstrom of a 
disintegrating Eastern Front could not fully parse the causal events and privileging of 
evacuations of the regime’s prisoners. Postwar historians, on the other hand, eschewed their 
responsibilities for making sense of the material, and ultimately preferred accounts that left the 
Third Reich’s genocidal policies appearing incomprehensible. That the prioritization of 
evacuations of prisoners reflected a defined policy remains unmentioned: A directive of May 31, 
1944 instructed the army and police to ensure the evacuation of industrial goods, foreign 
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“workers,” and prisoners before German civilians.178 German refugees observing death marches 
and glumly standing by as these figures rolled onward witnessed a deliberate effort to continue 
the destruction of the Third Reich’s racial victims, even at the expense of German civilians. In 
the last days of the war, numerous fates intersected, and the disintegration of the German East 
simultaneously spelled the coda to the Holocaust and fanatical effort to create a racial utopia.  
The ambivalent treatment of the relationship between Nazism and the expulsions fulfilled 
three strategic aims intended to amplify the political potency of the Dokumentation. First, while 
digressions into genocide and the extermination policies may have gone beyond the project’s 
scope, the remarkable absence of the war of annihilation eliminated a factor that explained the 
rage and excesses perpetrated against Germans, and reason for the forced migrations as a whole. 
The utter lack of context made Red Army or liberated prisoner behavior incomprehensible. The 
barbarity of the past twelve years that now boomeranged in full force instead appeared as an 
inscrutable orgy of “hatred,” where those emotions received no explanation or commentaries 
from editors. Moreover, prominent attention on the murderous zealousness of the Third Reich 
would have undermined claims of unprecedented suffering of Germans, and thereby 
compromised a publication seeking to enshrine a particular victimhood narrative. Instead, the 
historians subordinated the anguish of Germany’s victims to that of the expellees and erected 
curious framings that left German victimization unquestioned and German culpability ignored.  
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Secondly, numerous selections suggested that expellee agony equaled that of the regime’s 
victims and that all suffered alike. The wave of violence and collective punishment through 
forced migration was irrational and heavy-handed. But since the expellees’ “only offense is that 
they have a German name and German is their mother tongue,” and that they were “born 
Germans,” the expulsions seemingly had the same sinister and maniacal criminal logic as Nazi 
persecution of entire groups due to their “blood.”179 A Sudeten German’s made the equivalency 
explicit: “What a bad comedy all this is: nothing is original, a copy of the Hitler regime, again 
and again we have to hear: ‘Just as you have treated the Jews.’”180  
German and Jewish fates, suggested several testimonies, did not differ and in fact had 
much in common. In one of the only references to Auschwitz, a Silesian recalls the “pitiful 
procession…of fleeing farmers, English, French, and Russian prisoners, and Jews accompanied 
by SS soldiers. The Jews had come from Auschwitz and crept with frozen feet wrapped in rags.” 
Curiously, after reporting that “[w]hoever broke down was shot and left lying there,” the author 
asserts confidently: “But all were driven by the same thought: onwards to the West and don’t fall 
into the hands of the Russians.”181 That survivors of genocide, days away from liberation, 
preferred to flee with their tormentors amounts to an absurd interpretation that nevertheless 
underscores the ostensible boundless horror of the Red Army. In the Dokumentation, the 
marauding Soviet military equally tortures Germans and Jews desperate to escape, forging them 
into a community equally afflicted by the vagaries of war and the barbarism of totalitarian 
                                                 
179 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Ungarn), 2:175; Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Jugoslavien), 1:226. 
180 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Tschechoslowakei), 1984, 2:439. 
181 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:406. A report concerning slave laborers, ostensibly just as eager 
as the Germans to flee from the Red Army, echoes this sentiment: “They too had only one wish, not to fall into the 
hands of the Russians.” Schieder, 1:292. Schieder, 1:84. 
419 
 
regimes. When Hans Graf von Lehndorff commented that Germans were “experiencing nothing 
unusual, nothing different from what millions of people have experienced in the past years,” the 
tacit recognition of the enormity of the Third Reich’s crimes nevertheless compares the fates of 
Germany and the victims of Nazi genocidal policies.182 Such comparisons emphasized 
Bolshevist savagery and simultaneously acted as an implied proposition to include innocent 
Germans in the community of recognized victims after 1945.  
Invoking the Holocaust moreover provided useful language to describe the enormity of 
what expellees endured and a powerful analogy. Robert Moeller identifies “unmistakable 
parallels in the descriptions of German experience at the hands of Communists and Jewish 
experience at the hands of Germans” which remained implicit in many postwar “war stories.” At 
the risk of reading too much into reports and asking “whose hell [they] described,” numerous 
descriptions nevertheless remain striking: Germans digging their own graves, camps ruled by 
facetious maxims, wearing of armbands, “Jewish” starvation rations, “death marches,” selections 
between men and women, mounds of naked corpses, and the harvesting of gold teeth evoked 
familiar memories.183 There was “no difference between the Germans and German Jews,” as a 
Breslau native explained, at the hands of the savage victors.184  
Despite superficial similarities and conscious efforts of Polish or Czech militias to 
replicate Nazi terror methods, reporting of atrocities perpetrated by Germany offered categories 
for measuring and articulating German trauma after 1945. In that sense, testimonies reflected a 
postwar discourse shaped by Allied occupation policy. The vociferous campaigns of Western 
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and Soviet officials to confront Germans with their misdeeds may not have succeeded in making 
the case for collective guilt, but they circulated images and articulated a language to describe the 
experiences of an ostensible nation of innocent victims. As such, postwar references to expellee 
“death marches” very well may be understood as an unconscious attempt to describe what had 
happened in familiar terms, even if it appropriated imagery associated with Nazi atrocities. 
Similarly, avowals that life in the German East “could not have been worse [than] a 
concentration camp” sought to make German suffering comprehensible.185 This additionally 
made it possible to emphasize Germany’s suffering before international audiences. 
Thirdly, the selections allowed Germans to distance themselves from war crimes and 
National Socialism. Reports assured readers that they “intensely hated the Nazi regime from the 
very beginning.”186 Another author, caught in an interrogation led by “[his] Pole whom [he] had 
employed many years,” needed to explain his NSDAP membership: He only joined in 1937 
because “things had gone so well” and that he didn’t know war would happen. In any case, he 
treated all of his “workers” well, which got him off the hook.187 Indeed, the magnanimous 
treatment of slaves proved an essential way of communicating decency and innocence. A 
Pomeranian master butcher who treated “[his] foreign workers in a humane fashion,” and “like 
anyone who thought and behaved decently” rejected “widespread reports…of the Russian acts of 
terror” as propaganda, believed he had nothing to fear. He was “bitterly disappointed.”188 
Another woman also was “always tolerant of Poles—no one hated us.” In fact, her husband 
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purportedly toiled as a sharecropper for a known Polish partisan, whose family they treated well 
while he was in hiding. Despite this, the mistreatment after the war from those “who in all those 
years had worked for us” forced the woman to flee in order to be “saved from the Pollacks.”189 
Casting the exploitative relationship as a benign employer-employee relationship was made 
easier with comments such as those of an East Prussian estate manager, who assured readers that 
Poles “had nearly the same rights as a German worker.”190  
Testimonies similarly carefully framed atrocities in order to eschew German culpability. 
In a report from Hungary, a refugee recalled the “endless columns of Jews” as “quite well 
dressed, with raincoats and rucksacks.” Those who could not go on were not shot, but helpfully 
lifted onto carts by a soldier who declared that “he was no murderer.”191 The memory of the 
humane gesture and implication that death marches did not seem so terrible aside, the account 
certainly described an atypical scene. A 1952 report from the Sambian Peninsula, written as a 
diary, similarly distinguished between “good” and “bad” Germans: “A few days before a larger 
transport of Jews found its end here,” the reader learns, after which “many of the hundreds…died 
from exhaustion, hunger, and maltreatment and remained unburied in the snow drifts.” The 
survivors were “driven…into the sea or shot by [foreign] guards.” Locals could not “prevent this 
insane act, which the population justifiably saw as an inhumane atrocity.”192  
                                                 
189 Schieder, 1:340–41. Generally, Poles frequently appeared as loyal and gracious subordinates, as a Pomeranian 
farm leader recalled: “As during five years of war, the comportment of the district was exemplary.” The preparations 
for flight were “optimally” supported by “our 6-7,000 prisoners and Eastern workers,” and “nowhere…did any sort 
of problems emerge from these people” until the arrival of the Soviets. Schieder, 1:292. See also Schieder, 1:84. 
190 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 2:185. 
191 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Ungarn), 2:15. 
192 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:136. 
422 
 
The massacre of Palmnicken (Yantarny) in fact elicited a range of responses from 
civilians, some of whom risked their lives to aid survivors.193 Despite acknowledging a ghastly 
crime, the report exposed readers to an expellee condemning Nazi crimes as “insanity” while 
setting up clear roles: German guards “had higher orders,” innocent bystanders expressed 
dismay, and “foreign guards” ultimately pulled the triggers. Many of the authors clearly 
internalized and repeated justifications for wartime behavior consistently heard in the early 
Federal Republic. Once again, however, one cannot overlook that historians strategically 
employed evidence that supported the political intentions of the Dokumentation. In this case and 
others, the testimonies offer a useful mitigation of German collective guilt and evidence of the 
decency of “ordinary Germans,” a key objective of the project.  
When testimonies did not blur the lines of responsibility for war crimes, others expressed 
a willingness to atone for what “other” Germans had done. Forced by Polish militia to exhume 
Jewish victims for reburial, a woman in Lower Silesia was left “smelling like a corpse” and 
crying tears “that you couldn’t wash away.” The only way forward, the author professed, was to 
“stop crying, be brave, and thus assist in atoning for the crimes that were committed among our 
people.”194 Helpfully, in some testimonies, survivors of the Holocaust performed acts of 
kindness and offered absolution and forgiveness to expellees. They did not demand “an eye for 
an eye,” and instead reminded that “we all have one God” and a shared humanity.195  
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When confrontation with unspeakable horrors did not elicit introspection, readers 
received declarations of ignorance. An expellee recalled an American officer—a “tall…blonde 
with blue eyes”—who offered condolences upon learning that the author’s son died in the war. A 
second officer, however, berated and “tortured” him with insults of “Hitlerschwein [Hitler 
swine]” and reminders that his son would still be alive had it not been for the father’s support of 
National Socialism. When the conversation turned to concentration camps, the officer flew into a 
rage when the German pleaded ignorance, stating that he only heard of Dachau. “In America, 
every child knows about it, and you pig, you claim not to know about Buchenwald?” Without 
indicating how he knew, the author easily determined “[h]e was a Jew.”196  
The encounter, portrayed as an unfair and bellicose browbeating, allowed victims of the 
forced migrations to disavow knowledge of Nazi crimes. When a witness to a massacre of 
Germans “asked the Russian why they had done this,” the explanation that “German soldiers had 
also shot dead women and children” stunned the author: “I responded that I did not believe this, 
as a soldier I would not have been able to carry it out.”197 The confrontation and conversation, 
held in the immediate aftermath of a bloodbath, once again contrasted the Wehrmacht with the 
Red Army.198 Disavowal of Nazi atrocities can also be seen in a 1951 report from Posen, one of 
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the longest in the volume. Incarcerated in a camp, an expellee petitioned the commandant to 
attend Majdanek, a Soviet documentary on the liberation of the extermination camp that included 
grisly details and interviews with survivors and guards. Asked by the commandant what she 
thought, the author dismissed the film as “propaganda,” suffering a stern and forceful rebuke.  
In this case, the editors helpfully intervened to provide the reader with necessary context. 
Defending the author’s and all of Germany’s ignorance, the editors explained that the reaction 
“can be understood as a response to the enormity of the horrors with which she had just been 
presented, which were unknown to the German people under the National Socialist regime until 
the end of the war.”199 Responses of disbelief indeed may not have been uncommon.200 Yet 
reading between the lines of testimonies, knowledge of crimes perpetrated by Germans was 
widespread, so that the exoneration of the historians seemed generous.201  
The lament of a police officer upon finding his murdered cousin seemed to capture the 
overall subtext of the Dokumentation: “Why does God allow that life and fortune of people is 
dependent on coincidence, on the delusions of a madman like Hitler, on the beast within men, on 
the lust for power of others?”202 Despite burning his incriminating documents, the cousin could 
not escape the retribution of incensed Red Army soldiers, and the bereaved author had no answer 
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for the catastrophe that had befallen him and Germany. Yet the editors eagerly rendered a verdict 
for the twelve million expellees, and with them the nation: “Without a doubt innocent.”203  
 
Leveraging Expellee Suffering: German Victimhood on the International Stage 
Taken as a whole, the efforts of the think-tanks, expellee organizations, and federal 
ministries produced a historical record that reflected and shaped the mindsets of broad segments 
of West German society. The expellees moreoever politically cemented their standing as an 
influential pressure group into the early 1950s, so that the Federal Republic could not overlook 
their demands for a foreign policy aimed at negotiating a return of the homeland and revision of 
the Potsdam Agreement. Through financial and moral support, in the nation’s constitution, and in 
virtually every party platform, West Germany unmistakably insisted upon the borders of 1937 in 
future unification negotiations.204 These positions were consistently impressed upon American 
and British audiences, from whom West Germany expected sympathy and alleviation. 
 The hardening geopolitical fronts forced a change in thinking among American officials 
that opened doors to German delegates. Increasingly, they referred to displaced Germans as 
“political refugees” and victims of the “Godless dictatorship” of communism.205 Western 
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governments eagerly placed the blame for European turmoil at the feet of Moscow, so that 
German victimhood narratives, despite their transparent political subtext, found receptive 
audiences.206 German conversation partners recognized the new opportunities that European 
crises created.207 While they continued to speak of injustices and violations of democratic 
principles, expellee activists gradually backed away from strongly worded allegations of Western 
machinations, instead emphasizing Soviet duplicity in negotiations on the postwar European 
order that had misled their British and American comrades.208 As Walter Becher reflected: “The 
awareness that one commanded a moral balance sheet [Schuldkonto] with the expellers and their 
backers that was now also recognized by the United States assured me that I represented a just 
cause and could openly address our claims.”209 
Recognizing the realities and opportunities of the Cold War, expellee indictments against 
the British and Americans partners therefore predictably tapered off.210 Already in February 
1949, West German expellee leaders such as Wenzel Jaksch advised colleagues to back down 
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from aggressive criticisms of American authorities, as these were crucial partners in the struggle 
to roll back communism and once again secure the lost homeland.211 Federal officials echoed 
these words of advice, admonishing expellee spokesmen that their condemnations eroded foreign 
and domestic faith in West German commitment to the Western integration.212 Expellees 
continued to speak of violations of democratic principles, yet backed away from pointed 
allegations of Western machinations and instead emphasized Soviet and communist treachery. 
Anglo-American culpability increasingly appeared as naiveté in the face of “Stalin and his 
henchmen,” as a flier published by the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) formulated it in May 
1952.213 As the anticommunist tenor increased with each crisis of the early Cold War, “flight and 
expulsion” provided a powerful morality tale on the stakes of the ideological conflict and menace 
of Bolshevism now threatening the very heart of Europe. Expellee experiences were the proof, 
and their voices the authoritative reminder of the existential struggle at hand.  
In short, the various documentations of expellee suffering served as one of the primary 
pieces of evidence for expellee political claims within a new political context. To lend arguments 
emotional significance and simultaneously imbed them within the Cold War, expellees sought to 
leverage the politically useful history contained within the “white books,” many of which were 
translated into multiple languages by the 1950s. In 1953, for instance, the AG published an 
English translation of its “White Book,” in which readers learned that the “perilous state of the 
world” resulted largely from the expulsions and communist aggression.214 Only an alleviation of 
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German hardship through a return of the homeland and combatting of Bolshevik barbarism, as 
revealed in the reports, could ensure the stability of Europe. Billed as a history lesson on the 
“consequences of radical nationalism,” the background of National Socialism remained absent. 
The introduction to the English translation of the Dokumentation communicated similar 
messages, explaining that the testimonies documented a viciousness “Asiatic in origin” and 
“inconceivable and abhorrent for the European mind.”215 The “Documents of Humanity,” 
meanwhile, preached the message of German desires for reconciliation and forgiveness.216 
In other words, West Germans presented a framing which argued that the sources of 
German wartime and postwar anguish needed to be found in questions related to the Cold War, 
where anticommunism held more explanatory value than fascism. This Europeanization of the 
expulsions and imbedding in the Cold War and the greater “German Question” transformed 
German travails into political capital for “homeland politics.”217 Moreover, narratives of German 
suffering at the hands of Soviets and Eastern Europeans provided concrete illustrations of the 
danger of Bolshevism, and reconfigured expellee experiences into a warning bell to the West of 
the stakes in the ideological struggle: Western Civilization. The confrontation between Christian 
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civilization and the Asiatic East was an existential struggle, expellees argued, but Europe had 
lost its important historical bulwark against this threat through the expulsions.  
 The FRG’s various federal agencies with mandates that touched upon foreign policy 
directly and indirectly funded and disseminated literature intended to exert influence on world 
public opinion.218 The Foreign Ministry distributed the Dokumentation particularly aggressively: 
German politicians, journalists, and universities received German copies, while German 
delegations presented similar foreign figures, international organizations, church leaders, and 
public intellectuals throughout the world with translations. From Vienna to Addis Ababa, from 
La Paz to New Delhi, the FRG sent thousands of editions to every conceivable address. Public 
libraries, universities, and even remote community colleges received the volumes as well; to this 
day, the spines of these bequests sit on most university library bookshelves.219 
 Expellee associations also attempted to distribute their literature widely. The Sudeten 
German “White Book,” for instance, acted as a “Sudeten German calling card,” thrust into the 
hand of any notable that representatives of the Sudeten Germans encountered.220 Presented to 
German parliamentarians, journalists, and occupation officials, the “White Book” was already in 
its fourth edition a year after its publication.221 In January 1951, the SL presented the United 
                                                 
218 Some works did raise flags. For instance, the Foreign Office agreed to distribute Johanness Kaps’s “Martyrium 
und Heldentum ostdeutscher Frauen” to its missions, who then individually could decide whether to distribute it to 
local universities, organizations, or personalities. There were reservations for a broader dissemination, as the work 
contained “almost exclusively atrocity reports,” Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA-AA), B 12, 288, 
“Vermerk,” September 30, 1955, 1. Johannes Kaps, Martyrium und Heldentum ostdeutscher Frauen: ein Ausschnitt 
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Nations with a copy.222 Walter Becher meanwhile distributed the English translation to select 
American politicians and known anticommunists.223 In his autobiography, Becher claimed that 
especially among American politicians of the Republican Party the study had been “met with 
open ears” and opened doors.224 Even Pandit Nehru, who in the course of his attempts to 
internationalize the Indian freedom movement in the 1920s and 30s had visited the Sudetenland, 
received a copy from Richard Reitzner, in the hopes that the Indian Prime Minister would see 
similarities between the fate of the Sudeten Germans and the Indian people.225  
Expellees also sought to distribute films and documentaries that would impress their 
political messages and historical interpretations upon foreign audiences. In October 1953, 
Wenzel Jaksch proposed a series of films “in service of European-American rapprochement.” 
“The current East-West conflict will not be won through force of arms alone,” Jaksch reasoned, 
noting that “[i]n the Cold War of ideologies, it depends on the force of historical consciousness 
as well.” Jaksch felt it imperative to overcome the “disunity of Europe” through a “common 
European historical awareness engendered.” To foster “spiritual assertiveness” in the face of 
Bolshevism, the films needed to focus on the role of Hellenism and Roman law, Christianity that 
“tamed” the disintegrating Roman Imperium, and the “birth of a European consciousness 
through the defense of eastern invasions and through the crusades.” The Whiggish history, 
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Jaksch warned could not be a “propaganda enterprise of the Cold War.”226 The films, envisioned 
as teaching materials in classrooms on both sides of the Atlantic, never came to fruition, yet 
reveal the historical understand and worldview of the Sudeten German leadership.  
To what degree expellees influenced the FRG’s foreign policy remains questionable.227 
Matthias Stickler ultimately evaluates their activism as a resounding failure, since they 
constantly clashed with experts in the Foreign Ministry over frequent undiplomatic statements. 
The ultimate goal of establishing an outpost of the Verband der Landsmannschaften (VdL) in 
Washington D.C. never materialized due to intense rivalries between homeland associations, 
personal feuds, and latent resistance from the German Embassy in the United States, which 
worried that pompous and brusque comportment would undermine German diplomacy.228 
Generally, Foreign Office State Secretary Walter Hallstein assured von Auen governmental 
support for expellee PR work abroad, even contemplating an “eastern propaganda radio station” 
conforming to their positions. Moreover, he nominally welcomed more engagement of “Eastern 
experts” from expellee circles, and endorsed efforts of the homeland associations to cultivate 
contacts to East European anticommunist exiles.229 But these gestures never allowed for the 
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hijacking of state offices by expellee organizations, despite great ideological conformity between 
them and government representatives. 
Unable to colonize official institutions, expellee representatives nevertheless entered into 
the service of the government or worked with it indirectly. Though the Foreign Ministry 
successfully opposed domination of its Eastern European section by expellees, the pressure of 
homeland associations secured a position for Wilhelm Turnwald, the editor of the “White Book,” 
as a liaison officer and Eastern Bloc expert between the German Embassy and the State 
Department in 1955.230 From there he cultivated contacts to William Jackson, the special 
assistant to President Eisenhower, and his memos on Central European developments circulated 
as high as the desk of Allen Dulles, the longtime CIA Director, architect of the American 
Liberation Policy, and driving force behind US foreign policy in the postwar period.231  
Several lobbyists championed by expellee organizations also received tentative support. 
For instance, the Foreign Ministry argued in May 1953 that Richard Sallet, a former press 
secretary at the German Embassy in the US during the 1930s, should receive funding for his trip 
to attend the 25th Harvard reunion.232 Indeed, Sallet used his friendship to Paul Nitze, a high-
                                                 
230 AdsD, NL Jaksch, J2, Letter from Hans Krüger, Wenzel Jaksch, and Georg Manteuffel-Szoege to Heinrich von 
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ranking State Department official and friend from his studies at Harvard, to set up meetings with 
Allen Dulles and American lawmakers, and coordinated with FRG officials during his travels.233 
The hope that the trip would translate into Sallet’s appointment as the fixed expellee 
representative in Washington D.C., however, never materialized due homeland association 
infighting.234 However, the government continued to support lobbying activities: In 1954 the 
Foreign Ministry committed to financing three to four trips lasting between six and eight weeks 
for VdL representatives.235 Federal funds also financed expellee contacts such as Hans Froehlich, 
an Upper Silesian Holocaust survivor and attorney who monitored Czech activities in the US for 
the Sudeten Germans. The Foreign Ministry funneled $24,000 a year to Froehlich through the 
VdL in order to conceal the involvement of official offices.236  
In addition to generous monetary assistance, the West German government expended 
considerable energy in helping expellees shape and propagate a specific interpretation of the 
outcome of World War II, as well as undermining competing narratives. In August 1956, Walter 
Hallstein convened a meeting between various ministries to consult on how to counter the theses 
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put forth in the English historian Elizabeth Wiskemann’s book, Germany’s Eastern Neighbors, 
which struck at the heart of expellee homeland politics and the West German legal position on 
the German East. Wiskemann decried the “strong taste of nationalism” in expellee utterances, 
rejected their claims as dangerous revisionism, and argued that Germany’s historic aggression 
validated the expulsions.237 The protocols, classified as “secret,” document the concerted effort 
of the government to coordinate with a wide network of German scholars and newspapers to 
respond to critics, while keeping the government’s influence in the background. 238 
Whatever qualms officials may have had over the comportment and domineering attitude 
of homeland associations, expellees and officials were in fundamental agreement over how 
“flight and expulsion” should be discussed with foreign audiences. As the protocols of a 
February 1955 meeting between representatives of various ministries, the VdL and the 
Federation of Expelled Germans (BvD) discussing public speeches demonstrate, the attendees 
agreed that the expulsions and division of Germany “emanated virtually only in the East, from 
the Soviet sphere.” 239 It was a question of optics, but not a fundamental difference of opinion on 
how West Germans needed to approach Western conversation partners. 
The federal and expellee lobbying reveals a curious dynamic of West German foreign 
policy in the mid-1950s. It in part relied on the expellee associations, who enjoyed greater 
latitude in their indictments and exploitation of German suffering than official representatives of 
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the FRG. They therefore functioned in some regards as an “ancillary foreign policy” of West 
Germany.240 As Lodgman von Auen described in a 1952 memo, Sudeten German initiatives 
abroad offered a “division of labor between the Federal Republic and the expellees,” who could 
act as “helpers in areas of foreign policy in which [the government] at the moment cannot or 
does not wish to become active, but nevertheless under no circumstances should neglect.”241 
Elsewhere, von Auen argued that the homeland associations could educate uninformed 
foreigners and push back against East European propaganda in a more uninhibited manner than 
West German offices, who remained constrained by the niceties of diplomacy.242 
Expellees therefore acted as unofficial communicators of positions that touched upon 
diplomatically delicate subjects. By not openly backing them, the government granted broad 
freedoms to these actors, who made surprising inroads into the American political elite. On 
numerous trips to the US between the early 1950s and late 1960s, the Sudeten German expellee 
politicians Walter Becher and Albert Karl Simon related the position of the SL in conversations 
with representatives of the State Department, politicians, and public intellectuals.243 The future 
director of the Sudeten German archive and SL “embassy” in Bonn, Anton Wuschek, used a 
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1951 scholarship to the University of Ohio to forge contacts with American Congressmen, 
members of anticommunist Eastern European exile groups, and State Department officials.244  
Through these ties, Sudeten Germans successfully disseminated and received American 
recognition of their interpretation of the Second World War. On August 1, 1953, Representative 
Usher Burdick (R, ND) read a letter of Walter Becher introducing the “White Book,” with an 
overview of the forced migrations and excerpts of testimonies, into the extended remarks of the 
Congressional Record.245 The following year, Burdick again introduced a letter of Becher’s 
making the “Sudeten German Case,” a distillation of the Sudeten leadership’s interpretation of 
history from the Middle Ages to the present.246 Burdick on three separate occasions read 
materials and correspondence from his Sudeten German contacts in Germany into the record in 
1957 alone.247 In extended remarks in July 1959, Representative Albert H. Bosch (R, NY) read 
speeches from the Sudeten German Day held in Vienna in May of that year, in which the 
congressman reiterated German cultural achievements in Bohemia and contemplated the tragedy 
that had befallen them in 1945.248 Representative Brazilia Carroll Reece (R, TN) was so 
convinced by arguments provided by the expellees that he unleashed minor international 
                                                 
244 See correspondence in Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, SdA-Sprecherregistratur Lodgman v. Auen 205. 
245 Usher L. Burdick, Walter Becher, and Association for the Protection of Sudeten German Interests, Sudeten 
German Expellees (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1953). Becher’s letter, along with other reports, 
formed part of an official condemnation by the US Congress of communist excesses committed during the 
expulsions. 
246 Usher L. Burdick, Walter Becher, and Association for the Protection of Sudeten German Interests, The Sudeten 
German Case (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1954). 
247 Bernd Stöver, Die Befreiung vom Kommunismus: amerikanische Liberation Policy im Kalten Krieg 1947-1991 
(Köln: Böhlau, 2002), 711.  
248 105th Congressional Record-Appendix (July 21, 1959), A6313-14. 
437 
 
controversy with statements that the citizens of Danzig had always been German.249 Reece also 
organized his own advisory committee on the expulsions, and drafted reports in support of the 
expellee’s claims.250 
German wartime suffering and evidence of communist atrocities served as powerful 
evidence for American Cold Warriors, who saw in the reports a confirmation of the menace of 
the Soviet Union that vindicated American moral superiority in the ideological struggle against 
communism. The numerous letters from Becher—in which he pontificated over European 
history, the nature of the forced migrations, and the SL’s visions of a Central Europe free from 
communist tyranny—provided useful talking points for American hawks. Lawmakers quoted and 
relied on Becher’s arguments debates over the Cold War foreign policy of the United States.251 
On May 14, 1955, for example, Congressman T.P. Sheehan (R, IL) relied on Becher’s letter 
marking the tenth anniversary of the expulsions to make extensive remarks on the “true face of 
communism” and its enslavement of captive nations behind the Iron Curtain.252  
The inquests of McCarthy ally and chairman of the House Select Committee on 
Communist Aggression, Senator Charles Kersten, also benefited from expellee memories of their 
experiences. Together with Brazilia Carroll Reece, Kersten travelled to Munich in 1954 to 
interview victims of the forced migrations as part of a fact-finding tour on Soviet wartime 
violence. Chaperoned by Glaser, the delegation met with witnesses recommended by the SL and 
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who comprised its political elite, some of whom like Wenzel Jaksch had not themselves 
experienced the expulsions. The West German government consented to the initiative but feared 
East European protests, and therefore urged that the interviews take place in the American 
consulate in order to disguise official involvement.253 Kersten found the evidence immensely 
helpful in documenting the nature of Bolshevik terror and helping form a basis for his foreign 
policy views, adding that the expulsions in his estimation constituted a “political catastrophe” 
that only a liberation of Czechoslovakia from communist tyranny and a reconstruction of the 
German homeland could overcome. Von Auen noted with satisfaction that “our efforts to present 
the Sudeten German story along these lines has in a measure been successful.”254 Kersten’s 
observations in Munich provided the foundation for a report presented to Congress in August 
1954, which elaborated on the experiences of the suppressed behind the Iron Curtain and warned 
of co-existence with the Soviet Union.255 
Wenzel Jaksch for his part travelled to the US on several occasions, meeting with 
academics, labor representatives, and anticommunist associations, and even gave an invited talks 
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at the Yale Political Science Department.256 The thrust of his arguments came to the fore at a 
speech before an assembly at Southern Illinois University on May 8, 1960, where Jaksch used 
the anniversary of V-E Day to contemplate how European history had come off the rails so 
tragically.257 Without dwelling on details on what American troops may have encountered in 
Germany, the speaker assured the audience that the liberators surprisingly “discovered that 
Germans had not been poisoned by Nazism,” and doubtlessly learned that “Stalinism is no 
different from Hitler’s methods, that totalitarianism is the enemy.” In a sweeping historical 
overview of German struggles for freedom going back to the 30 Years War, Jaksch concluded 
that Germany ultimately fell victim to unfortunate geography, which did not allow liberty to 
emerge until American and British forces transplanted it.  
Above all, the speaker spoke at length on the “15 million expelled from their homes” and 
death of two million that underpinned the right to a homeland. The “terrible losses on many 
battlefields, 500,000 German civilians [who] perished in burning cities, [and] 800,000…dragged 
off by the Russians…somewhere in Siberia or in the Arctic region” needed to be atoned for. A 
peaceful Europe depended on a unified Germany, Jaksch added, whose “moral convalescence” 
since 1945 should allay fears of German belligerence.258 Two years later, Jaksch organized a 
high profile European-American conference in Chicago through the Foundation for Foreign 
Affairs.259 The “moral convalescence” seemed complete: In addition to covering topics related to 
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the expulsions, Jaksch crowed that it had fulfilled the purpose of counteracting “communist 
propaganda” that continually aimed at “keeping the memory of the crimes of Hitler fresh.”260 
 
Conclusions 
 West German activism in the United States constituted what today we would regard as 
“soft power.” The fledgling democracy possessed good reason to present itself as a rehabilitated 
nation, reliable partner, and devotee of liberty. Yearly publications such as Germany Reports or 
Germany Today attempted to familiarize the transatlantic partner with their crucial ally in 
Central Europe.261 Promotional materials beckoning tourists, academic exchanges to foster 
mutual understanding, and hosting of cultural foundations remain an important dimension of the 
Berlin Republic’s foreign policy today. Yet into the 1960s, the official materials of West 
Germany emphasized the continued existence of a Germany within the borders of 1937, and 
described the “flight and expulsion” endured by millions of its citizens which continued to 
represent a substantial financial and political burden on the Federal Republic. 
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 A politically viable history, German officials and expellees believed, offered a potent 
legitimation of their positions and key to achieving reunification and at least a partial return of 
the lost territories. For this reason, they resuscitated interwar strategies of attempting to harness 
scholarship for political purposes, and invested substantial energies into the Dokumentation and 
Weissbuch. The background and intentions call into question claims of an “incorruptible love for 
the truth” and eschewal of recriminations in narratives of “flight and expulsion.” From the outset, 
the West German government attempted to “denounce one’s own suffering and those responsible 
for it and capitalize politically upon it.”262  
The surprising transatlantic dimensions of “flight and expulsion” widen the perspective 
on the history and cultural memory of “flight and expulsion,” revealing an evolution of the 
communicative memory of the deportations and argumentative strategies of the expellees. These 
underwent a rapid development in the first fifteen years after 1945, exposing a dynamism of how 
German suffering was articulated and leveraged, and allowing several conclusions. 
First, the founding of the FRG, and with it the entry of the expellee associations into 
politics, and context of the Cold War saw the instrumentalization of German suffering shift from 
alleviating humanitarian concerns to the long-term agenda of winning back the homeland. This 
inflected narratives with the “right to homeland” tenor, and saw the crystallization of a 
revanchist narrative that remained stagnant for decades. Yet another consequence of this 
evolution in the discourse was that overt denouncement of Western governments for their role in 
                                                 
262 Mathias Beer, “Die Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. Hintergründe – 
Entstehung – Ergebnis – Wirkung,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 50 (1999): 113. These agendas 
tempted scholars to focus on the Schieder Commission’s deficiencies and dismiss achievements. For this tendency, 
see Moeller, War Stories; Hahn and Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern. For a journalistic criticism, see 
Otto Köhler, “Zweierlei Erinnerung - Die Deutschen machten sich ihre Vertreibung selber,” Der Freitag, May 6, 
2005, https://www.freitag.de/autoren/der-freitag/die-deutschen-machten-sich-ihre-vertreibung-selber. Such an 




the expulsions gradually disappeared. Instead, anticommunism emerged as a dominant theme, 
more than in the immediate postwar years.263 The twin pillars of innocent Germans and barbaric 
Soviets that constitute typical “flight and expulsion” narratives, moreover, emerged during the 
1950s, and was lent credence by scholarly objectivity harnessed by the German government and 
expellee organizations. 
Second, the agenda of dispelling “false impressions,” as a BMVt official explained, that 
all Germans “ostensibly raped the population, robbed, terrorized, and butchered” in Central and 
Eastern Europe attempted to obfuscate German war crimes, and offset these with German 
victimhood.264 This framing pushed back against the “constant reporting in the newspapers of the 
unbelievable charges that are raised against us,” as one testimony bemoaned. The author may 
have spoken for the curators of expellee memory that it was “high time that our case was brought 
to the public, just like that of the German concentration camps.”265 The Dokumentation’s 
selective portrayal unsurprisingly sought to “denounce suffered victimization and those 
responsible for it, and thereby gain political capital” among international audiences.266 The litany 
                                                 
263 As Matthias Stickler aptly summarizes: “Anticommunism indeed played an important, maybe even the decisive 
role in the ideological integration of the expellees, especially its right wing, into the Western-democratic community 
of values….The animus against the Western Allies was redirected against the Soviet Union, upon which completely 
ahistorically the entire blame for the loss of the homeland was placed. This simultaneously permanently prevented 
the reemergence of anti-Western resentments of the old German Right, in fact ‘Europe,’ understood as Europe of the 
Fatherlands in the Gaullist sense, was rebuilt as the new hope for the future, and democracy as a bulwark against 
Bolshevism was made attractive.” Stickler, Ostdeutsch heisst Gesamtdeutsch, 361. 
264 BArch B150 4171 vol. 1, Memo of von Wilpert re: Dokumentationen der Unmenschlichkeit, April 20, 1951, 2.  
265 Quoted in Moeller, War Stories, 81. 
266 Beer, “Die Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. Hintergründe – Entstehung – 
Ergebnis – Wirkung,” 113. 
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of horrors contained within its pages served as the “moral coin for settling accounts” and 
demanding justice.267 
This was not a mere underlinging of the innocence of not just the victims of “flight and 
expulsion,” however. Their experiences represented the entire nation, which suffered unduly 
through no fault of its own. If Germans were innocent, the testimonies implicitly asked, then how 
could they continue to face the wrath of the victors? With no relationship to National Socialism, 
German traumas and continued plight constituted a grave and historic injustice, bolstering claims 
to a recognition of victimhood and, therefore, restitution. The distancing to the Nazi past in the 
testimonies cleaved it from the history of forced migration, which continues to this day.  
Lastly, while the homeland failed to come back, attempting to construct a narrative that 
would appeal to foreign and particularly American audiences proved an integrative exercise. 
Expellees recording their testimonies undoubtedly experienced a sense of closure, entrusting 
their memories to the stewardship of the government and thereby receiving recognition of their 
victimhood. Furthermore, framing Germany as a victim of communist aggression, and the strong 
anticommunist undertones of the documentations, show how immensely integrative the Cold 
War was for the integration of the Federal Republic into the Western Alliance.  
The ideological contest reconfigured National Socialist racism and anti-Bolshevism, and 
redirected it in a new struggle against the continued nemesis of the Soviet Union. Narratives of 
victimhood and suffering therefore enjoyed great political resonance, as dissolution of the 
victors’ alliance created a bridge for certain Nazi ideologies to seamlessly carry over past 1945 
and thereby provided a path to the West. By seeking a partnership with the United States, the 
FRG successfully shed an “occupied mentality” that made cooperation with the US attractive, 
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especially for nationalist-conservatives turned into Cold Warriors seeking to revise the postwar 
order, however misplaced these hopes were. The continued antipathy and struggle against the 
Soviet Union and reinterpretation of National Socialist principles, in other words, helped the 
Federal Republic become an important postwar ally and constructor of an anticommunist 






AT THE NEXUS OF HISTORY, MEMORY, AND MYTH: THE MASTER NARRATIVE 
TAKES HOLD 
 
In the fall of 1953, the Federal Ministry of Expellees (BMVt) presented the first volumes 
of the authoritative account of the chaos that enveloped the German East in 1944 and afterward. 
Based 382 “especially representative” reports, the press release announcing the publication 
warned that a “devastating series of images roll past our mind’s eye.” Besides inviting readers to 
relive the events through the eyes of the expellees, the release simultaneously summarized the 
master narrative of “flight and expulsion”: 
“We learn, in the words of those who went through it, the fate of fleeing 
East Prussians. We…see the long columns of the fleeing on the ice of the 
Vistula Lagoon, we follow the lonely road…that now becomes a terrible 
street of death. Then the firestorm of the encroaching front envelopes 
West Prussia and Pomerania, until finally Soviet breakthroughs…make a 
westward escape impossible and tens of thousands attempt…escape the 
closing trap via the sea. Devastated, we read the testimonies of the 
sinking of the ‘Wilhelm Gustloff’ and the ‘Goja,’ we learn from those 
who suffered overrunning Soviet tanks and needed to return in order to 
do slave work with completely inadequate nourishment. […] We learn of 
the various Polish and Russian methods of treatment in territories 
surrendered to their mercy and ruthlessness, and understand why so 
many could no longer stand the abuses and ended their lives. […] In 
unceasing waves the Germans…were deported to the West, on the way 
robbed of their last possessions, plundered, vilified, raped.”1  
 
                                                 




Two years later, the ten year anniversary of the end of the Second World War provided a 
moment to look back on the bitter days of the catastrophic defeat, as well as the progress made 
toward recovery. Months before, newspapers started to mark the occasion of the demise of the 
German East.2 Neutral outlets such as Die Welt refrained from emotional outbursts, printing 
maps of trek paths and simple statistics of the “11.9 million Germans… [who] descended into the 
whirlpool of flight and expulsion.”3 Local presses tended to focus on individual expellee groups, 
and granted space to voices from the community. The Gießener Anzeiger, for instance, printed 
an account of an expellee who lost his parents, two siblings, and a grandmother through 
“deliberate murder” decreed by “Stalin’s orders,” despite the fact that his family 
“verifiably…suffered terribly under the Nazi regime.”4 The expellee press similarly used the 
anniversary to reflect on the war, largely using personal testimonies to “relive” the horrors of 
“flight and expulsion”: Treks, evacuation by sea, and desperation in “fortress cities.”5 
What emerges from the flood of retrospections and “typical” experiences? Ten years after 
the events, a streamlined master narrative with highly stylized tropes and turns of phrase already 
                                                 
2 For an overview, see Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, ed., 10 Jahre nach der Vertreibung: Äusserungen des In- 
und Auslandes und eine Zeittafel (Bonn, 1956). It is noteworthy that by 1955, the start of “flight and expulsion” was 
associated with January 1945 and the Soviet offensive; the preceding mass movements which started in the summer 
of 1944 ranked as a mere footnote. 
3 “Vor zehn Jahren,” Die Welt, February 1, 1955, newspaper clipping in Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik 
(ACDP) 07-001-3440. The report noted that only half of the population successfully fled, and erroneously noted that 
1.6 million—nearly 16% of the German East’s population—perished during the forced migrations. 
4 The testimony was a reprint of a telegram of Gerhard Bahr to Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, whose 
assurances to Adenauer during the chancellor’s 1955 Moscow visit that the Red Army had behaved correctly during 
the war “required [him] out of obligation to historical truth to pass along the…facts.” The missive was reproduced 
under the headline of “merely an example of many…” in Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 10 Jahre nach der 
Vertreibung, 96.  
5 See the analysis of the expellee press’ treatment of “flight and expulsion” in Hans-Jürgen Gaida, Die offiziellen 
Organe der ostdeutschen Landsmannschaften: ein Beitrag zur Publizistik der Heimatvertriebenen in Deutschland. 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1973), 218ff. 
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dominated public discourse of “flight and expulsion.” When expellees in the CDU contemplated 
the “harsh winter” a decade before and yearned to remind the nation “precisely of those days,” 
their recounting undoubtedly evoked familiar images for West Germans: The days “when cities 
and villages descended into the flames of war, when massive swarms of people were driven from 
home and hearth, crammed into camps, and expelled from the homeland in endless columns of 
misery”; the “millions…of dead through hunger, exhaustion, disease, or unjustified violence”; as 
well as obligatory pleading to cast aside thoughts of vengeance were a common component of 
West German victimhood and fixture of the postwar republic’s collective memory.6   
Because these formulations and stereotypical images continue to echo in the Federal 
Republic today, they require analysis, as well as an assessment of what experiences did not 
survive the streamlining process and disappeared to the margins of postwar collective memory. 
The Dokumentation and its counterparts produced by expellee organizations offer a useful point 
of departure for this task. As the previous chapter argued, these publications specifically 
emerged as materials for West German foreign policy and revisionist claims, and as such 
provided an interpretation and framing of Germany’s immediate past. Expellee activists and the 
Federal Republic sought to impress a politicized history upon foreigners, and establish a 
revisionist historiography that served West German political agendas. 
Yet the works also addressed domestic audiences. While attempts of casting the 
expulsions in a politicized framework certainly intended to speak to German readers and shaped 
historiography, the “big picture” likely mattered little to the average West German. Of particular 
concern in this chapter are specific tropes and themes associated with “flight and expulsion” 
                                                 
6 ACDP 07-001-3440, “Das große Leid…10 Jahre Austreibung,” Stimmen der Heimat. Organ des Landesverbandes 
Oder-Neiße der CDU/CSU, January 2, 1955. 
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which dominated public discourse. The way the expulsions appeared in the media or in 
conversations profoundly impacted how expellees recounted their past, as well as how West 
Germans came to think about the war and German victimhood. In other words, historians and 
authors constructed a narrative from interpretations and “representative” voices that left indelible 
traces in the historical consciousness of the Federal Republic in the form of ideas or images. 
 In addition to the question of what images emerged in the 1950s, one must ask how and 
why they imbedded themselves in German collective memory. Historians have already noted the 
Dokumentation’s contribution to the forging of a “useable past.”7 The provocative and 
illuminating queries tell us much about how Germans viewed their history and constructed a 
victimhood narrative, but do not adequately explain their broader resonance and impact. The 
documentations did not spontaneously by osmosis enter into German consciousness. Strictly 
speaking, the tomes indirectly influenced public discourse, and must be brought into relation to 
other, more popular media portrayals of “flight and expulsion” that had greater bearing, yet 
continue to remain overlooked and represent a lacuna in the scholarship.8 
If one wishes to comprehend how Germans communicated their traumata after 1945, one 
must begin with an interrogation of which memories remained buried in the archive and those 
that entered the historical record to create a history with emotional and political potency. The 
horrors suffered needed explanation and meaning, and postwar curators of memory provided the 
interpretations. By examining the gulf between memories in the archive and postwar iterations 
                                                 
7 Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003). 
8 An attempt to provide a broad overview has been made in Stephan Scholz, Maren Röger, and Bill Niven, eds., Die 
Erinnerung an Flucht und Vertreibung: ein Handbuch der Medien und Praktiken (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2015). 
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and assessing how these framings entered literature, print media, radio and movies, one can trace 
how the “flight and expulsion” narrative formed and imbedded itself in public discourse.  
The Dokumentation provides a useful point of departure for considering how certain 
narratives formed and took hold. Firstly, it ranks as a bellwether of the collective memory and 
mentalities of 1950s West Germany. The “blank spots,” problematic language, and self-
understanding are an important factor in explaining how West Germans perceived the war and its 
outcomes, and why German victimhood narratives reverberated so powerfully. Secondly, the 
academic treatment of the forced migrations interacted with and combined with other media 
portrayals. This combination of scholarship and pulp media fused with and influenced expellee 
memories, creating a confusing panorama of recollections where the boundaries between history 
and myth, fact and fiction blurred and often became indiscernible. Yet it was precisely this 
inscrutable mass of voices that considerably influenced the historical consciousness of postwar 
West German society and constituted a master narrative of “flight and expulsion” that crystalized 
by the mid-1950s. What notions cemented themselves depended on the dense layering of genuine 
experiences, memory politics, and Cold War culture that continue to echo in the historical 
consciousness and cultural memory of the Federal Republic to this day. 
 
Sinnwelten of 1950s West Germany: Marking the Boundaries of Public Discourse 
 
Understanding how expellee narratives made inroads requires an examination of West 
German society and its attitudes. The “moving tragedies” of expellee experiences struck a chord 
with broad segments of society, so that hopes that “atrocities and barbarism sink in” could expect 
success.9 The streamlining and cementing of “flight and expulsion” narratives succeeded because 
                                                 
9 BArch B106-27734, Press release re: Dokumentation der Vertreibung, circa September 1953, 2-3. 
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of receptive audiences. Wartime suffering constituted a common denominator in postwar West 
Germany. Expellees, nearly twenty percent of the population of the Federal Republic, witnessed 
unimaginable traumata. The accounts of their suffering however must not have struck Germans 
as incomprehensible, as terrifying air raids, the fear of combat, tension of enemy occupation, and 
chaos of the collapse of a murderous regime affected the majority of the population.10  
Even those with limited lived experience could relate, as the war dominated 
conversations on the street, the pub, or the dinner table. Germans knew of the conflagration in 
the German East through reporting, rumor, or interaction with refugees, as has been shown. 
Scholars noted pervasive “new citizen narratives,” that revolved around the war and the 
expulsions.11 Reality and interpretation soon fused into an inextricable blend of experiences, 
rumor, fear, yearning, and ideology. A confounded Theodor Schieder concluded: “Nowhere does 
legend grow more uncontrollably than exactly here, and the horrific becomes ever more horrific 
when it is told from one to the other.”12 In short, widespread discussion of expellee suffering in 
the private and public sphere provided familiar images that a majority of Germans could identify 
with emotionally in one way or another. 
                                                 
10 Ian Kershaw, The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler’s Germany, 1944-1945 (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2012). 
11 Hermann Bausinger, “Lebendiges Erzählen. Volkskundliche Gegenwartsuntersuchungen im schwäbischen Dorf” 
(PhD Thesis, Tübingen, 1952), 71. Frequent talk of divine retribution, processes steered by God or demonic forces, 
and a “terrible misfortune” shared not only a desire for understanding the bitter defeat, often as driven not by 
German failures but higher powers and “fate.” For the first decade after 1945, these narratives frequently resembled 
modern fairy tales, with themes of miraculous rescues, divine punishment for tormentors, supernatural spirits 
protecting the homeland and graves of the deceased, and prophesies of imminent return. See Heinke Kalinke, 
“Gerüchte, Prophezeiungen und Wunder. Zur Konjunktur sagenhafter Erzählungen in der unmittelbaren 
Nachkriegszeit,” in Zur Ikonographie des Heimwehs - Erinnerungskultur von Heimatvertriebenen, by Elisabeth 
Fendl (Freiburg i. Br.: Johannes-Künzig-Inst. für Ostdt. Volkskunde, 2002), 159–74. 
12 Theodor Schieder, “Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten als wissenschaftliches Problem,” 
Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, no. 8 (1960): 9. 
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 Secondly, “flight and expulsion” narratives easily cemented themselves into postwar 
collective memory because they conformed to mentalities and validated worldviews prominent 
in the 1950s. Particularly avowals of innocence and ignorance over aspects of the Third Reich 
reflected the “selective remembering” and “dominant victimhood mental state” of the early 
Federal Republic.13 In “war stories” of the 1950s, there were few Nazis apart from archetypes 
who tormented apolitical compatriots; “Nazis” were everywhere and nowhere, appearing as alien 
figures in comparison to “ordinary” Germans.14  
Certainly, testimonies of suffering rarely suggested individual guilt, and instead often 
expressed innocence that absolved the “good” Germany, the primary victims of the war who had 
no need to ponder culpability or the chain of events that produced their suffering. After a costly 
conflict and perceived victor’s justice, the nation had nothing to answer for. As one expellee 
bemoaned: “We are the poor victims,” yet the world “did not want to believe that we did not 
know anything about it.” In any case, innocent Germans “are not responsible for such things.”15 
Indeed, for some expellees, non-Germans were victims of a different sort. As a memo presented 
to the mayor of Munich argued in April 1947, the “national characteristic of the Czechs has 
always been thieving,” and there were “only very few genuine political victims.”16 Accounts of 
                                                 
13 Moeller, War Stories; Peter Reichel, “Nach dem Verbrechen: nationale Erinnerungen an Weltkrieg und 
Judenmord,” in Holocaust : der nationalsozialistische Völkermord und die Motive seiner Erinnerung, ed. Burkhard 
Asmuss, 2002, 215–37. 
14 See for instance Harald Welzer and Sabine Moller, “Opa war kein Nazi” Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im 
Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002). 
15 BArch BArch Ost-Dok 2/5, 19. In a January 6, 1950 letter from a German who remained in Frauenberg 
(Frombork), the author lamented to former neighbors in the FRG that “[w]e here are poor victims”: “A man from 
Warsaw told us that on orders of Hitler 6.5 million Jews were cooked into soap! He also knew the places and camps, 
but did not want to believe that I did not know anything about it. We after all are not responsible for such things.”  
16 “The national characteristic of the Czechs has always been thieving. During the bombardment of German cit ies, 
they plundered homes and robbed corpses. The Czech victims of fascism often are constituted from such and similar 
crimes. There were only very few genuine political victims, but many war profiteers.” Quoted in Tobias Weger, 
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unspeakable misery and propensity for self-pity resonated because many West Germans 
experienced hardships during the war, and postwar special pleading insisted upon a leading 
position in the pantheon of war victims.  
 Furthermore, the humiliation of losing territory, as after the First World War, inculcated 
widespread indignation and dismay. Notions of a historic civilizing mission in Eastern Europe, 
as expellee literature frequently argued, corresponded to widely held convictions of German 
superiority and ascendency now arbitrarily destroyed with strokes of Allied pens.17 Teutonic, 
Saxon, and Marcomanni settlers brought industry and culture to the East, and Slav achievements 
could only be explained by the influence of the vastly more sophisticated Germans. As a letter to 
the editor in an expellee paper argued in 1953, “our Slavic neighbors absorbed much German 
blood and thereby German characteristics and abilities.” Particularly in the “exalted, stalwart, 
and leading strata of the Czech people, the German impact is especially pronounced.”18 An 
ethno-nationalist reading of the past, and implicit demand for a restoration of German hegemony 
in the East, reflected the thinking of not just expellees, but many West Germans as well: In a 
1946 letter, Konrad Adenauer mused that “the task of western Germany must be to one day win 
back the East through peaceful means and to colonize it,” as in centuries before.19 
 What appeared as self-evident fact in the FRG of the 1950s revealed beliefs of an innate 
German superiority and ingrained disdain for Slavs stretching back into the 19th century and 
                                                 
“Volkstumskampf” ohne Ende?: sudetendeutsche Organisationen, 1945-1955 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2008), 
329. 
17 For an expression of the type of sentiments, see Harald von Koenigswald, Was wir Mitbrachten; Eine Rückschäu 
über Kräfte und Leistungen der Heimätvertriebenen und Flüchtlinge 1945-1955. (Troisdorf: Der Wegweiser, 1955). 
18 “Vom Wesen des tschechischen Volkes,” Hoam! Volume 7, Nr. 9 (1953), 10. 
19 Hans Peter Mensing, ed., Adenauer. Briefe 1945-1947 (Berlin: Siedler, 1983), 263.  
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radically amplified by National Socialism. The prevalence of lingering beliefs in a “master race” 
become apparent in expellee testimonies, frequently written in a language that betrayed the 
racism and bigotries of the authors. For instance, as has previously been argued, expellees almost 
universally referred to “their” slave workers.20 The absent-minded phrasing made clear the grim 
reality of National Socialist rule in Europe, even as the nature of the relationship remained 
unnoticed and uncommented. Derogatory remarks of “Polish broads” and “Pollacks” only 
underlined the racially-tinged testimonies.21  
On the subject of Jews, reports demonstrated decidedly more careful phrasing, though 
elements of antisemitism and racial stereotypes linger. Nazi propaganda images of Jews as 
vermin responsible for infestations echo in reports from Stutthof. With the concentration camp 
emptied of prisoners, authorities turned the barracks over to refugees. Testimonies did not note 
the significance of the largest camp in East Prussia, nor comment on the former inhabitants, who 
in any case left a “very unclean camp” and “indescribably filthy” barracks for refugees.22 Silence 
over the camp’s nature is as remarkable as the incredulity over its sanitary conditions. Jewish 
greed similarly reverberates in the record. “[W]ho knows where they came from,” a Sudeten 
German pondered, but the sudden appearance of liberated Jews purportedly explained the 
exploitative black market that quickly arose.23 A report from Breslau clarified that crime 
                                                 
20 BArch Ost-Dok 2/174, 11. Doku 159, 199, 200,  
21 Theodor Schieder, ed., Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung  aus den Gebieten östlich der Oder-Neiße, 
vol. 1 (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984), 337. See also BArch Ost-Dok 1/146, 189: “My God 
already, how did it look in that city [Bütow]! Everwhere on the street one saw Polish broads wearing colorful 
headscarves. The city’s character had completely changed. One felt as if one were in a Congress Polish, degenerate 
country town a la Czernowice! One would not think it possible. Almost solely Polish rabble.”  
22 Josef Henke, “Exodus aus Ostpreußen und Schlesien,” in Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: 
Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 119; and Schieder, Die 
Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:97. 
23 Quoted in Moeller, War Stories, 77. 
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syndicates were led by ringleaders who were “all Jews,” while in Pressburg “Jewish owners were 
all once again in their businesses” and responsible for exorbitantly high prices.24 The specter of 
Judeo-Bolshevism also echoes: Authors explicitly emphasized that many Soviets, particularly 
commissars, were “Jews” without any indication of how they knew.25 A blasphemous female 
officer haughtily pacing through a church during Sunday mass with a lit cigarette could only 
have been a “Communist Jewess” in the estimation of a refugee from Posen.26 
Soviet soldiers who defiled churches and Christian images or exhibited their atheism by 
turning Bibles into cigarette papers confirmed expectations of the godless profanity of 
Bolsheviks.27 Despite a supposed disdain for Christianity, when church services continued and 
Soviet troops attended, expellees assumed they were acting as spies as opposed to satisfying their 
curiosity or spiritual needs.28 The Red Army not only perverted wholesome Christian customs, it 
also corrupted gender roles with their inclusion of women in the military, further underlining the 
depravity of communism: Numerous references to Flintenweiber (battle-axes)—at once 
terrifying and “comical”—reveal the disdain for the seemingly unnatural Soviet social order.29 
Women in uniform particularly spread horror as “true beasts in the shape of humans.”30 
                                                 
24 Quoted in Moeller, 77. 
25 Schieder, 1:196, 212.  
26 Schieder, 1:372–74. 
27 Moeller, War Stories, 68. Surprisingly, despite their alleged godlessness, numerous “miraculous” accounts of how 
Red Army soldiers were turned away by crucifixes seem to suggest that not all Soviet soldiers disregarded Christian 
images. 
28 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:491. 
29 Moeller, War Stories, 68; Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:28. 
30 Moeller, War Stories, 68. 
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Sometimes authors were unsure whether to attribute wanton destruction to the communist 
system, or some underlying biological trait. For one expellee, the “disregard, indeed, disdain, for 
human life” and “disregard for every form of personal property” were “characteristic of the 
mentality of the Russians.”31 Soviet soldiers appear easily confused and child-like in their 
demeanor.32 Others overcame their fear to laugh over the “cultured soldiers” perplexed by simple 
items such as bedpans.33 When Red Army officers could not speak German or translators 
struggled for words, it was regarded as a sign of immense ineptitude. Alternately, when 
expectations of facing dimwitted dolts were shattered by troops speaking excellent German, 
witnesses expressed profound incredulity.34 Just as how individual soldiers typically proved 
unimpressive, the Red Army as a whole validated low opinions and made the defeat all the more 
shocking: The mighty Wehrmacht had inexplicably been defeated by “this rabble in rags with 
crooked insignias on deteriorated vehicles, rattling and stinking…So these were the victors!”35  
Soviet soldiers generally confirmed Nazi images of primitive sub-humans. To Hans von 
Lehndorff, the Soviet onslaught resembled a “flood of rats that exceeded all of the Egyptian 
plagues.”36 Numerous reports express horror over the realization that the Soviet military was 
                                                 
31 Moeller, 68. 
32 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:340. 
33 Walter Kempowski, Fuga Furiosa. Ein Kollektives Tagebuch (29.1-5.2.1945), vol. 3 (München: btb Verlag, 
2004), 472. 
34 BArch BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 127. 
35 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:408. 
36 Moeller, War Stories, 64. 
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filled with “Jews”37 and “Mongols.”38 While “Asiatic” troops were not over-represented in the 
Red Army or in the violent excesses of the last months of the war, they ostensibly overran the 
German East.39 The recruits from Central Asia stoked particular horror, as “their faces did not 
move, only the eyes were alive” and they generally looked “unbelievably wild.”40 Elsewhere one 
encounters descriptions of an inscrutable mass, “stupid faces, one just like the next, all uniform 
people.”41 Others reported “the devilish Mongoloid grimaces”42 or the “primitive faces [and] 
rounded skulls” with “hideous faces.”43 Still other expellees described Soviets as “dirty cave 
creatures.”44 Even when they did not live up to their terrible reputation, witnesses found the 
explanation in questions of race: When they had “a face like a German man,” one refugee 
assured, one could expect better treatment.45 With such widespread prejudice and dread, 
memories ran wild: With “Asians” who “rode camels [and] wore high, spiked, white fur hats and 
                                                 
37 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:196; Schieder, 1:212. 
38 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:181; Schieder, 1:201; Schieder, 1:206; Schieder, 1:212; 
Schieder, 1:266; Schieder, 1:277; Schieder, 1:444. 
39 Manfred Zeidler, Kriegsende im Osten: die Rote Armee und die Besetzung Deutschlands östlich von Oder und 
Neisse 1944/45 (München: Oldenbourg, 1996), 150. 
40 Quoted in Moeller, War Stories, 66. 
41 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:397. 
42 Schieder, 1:338. 
43 Schieder, 1:28. 
44 Schieder, 1:394. 
45 Schieder, 1:338. How the various above sentiments could combine into a single assessment is revealed in the 
testimony from Silesia: “Russians upon Russians, large, handsome [and] strong, sympathetic looking, small and 
bow-legged, Kalmyk and Kyrgyz with slant-eyes, women as soldiers, battle-axes with poisonous eyes and hatred 
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white fur coats,” it was easy to attribute all manner of unbridled savagery to the horrifyingly 
exotic riders who sexually assaulted “even…children, animals, and old people.”46  
The racialized language of the Third Reich therefore permeated many “flight and 
expulsion” accounts of the 1950s. One could exert tremendous energy in chronicling the 
problematic language in expellee testimonies. A mere handful of years after the collapse of the 
Third Reich, it should not surprise that Nazi racial thinking remained strongly entrenched. 
Understanding the reports, along with their deficiencies, as a useful indicator of West German 
mentalities provides greater explanatory power, however, as it reveals why the awkward 
phrasings and glaring blind spots did not strike historians, witnesses, or the public as odd. The 
mixture of Nazi ideology, wartime experiences, rumors, and imaginations meant that narratives 
of brutalities found receptive audiences: They spoke in a language that all understood and 
affirmed postwar worldviews, such as for example widespread contemptuous attitudes toward 
East Europeans and the Soviet Union. The content of expellee testimonies were not out of place, 
and seamlessly dovetailed with postwar collective memory of dictatorship, the war, and defeat.  
In addition to shared wartime experiences and worldviews, “flight and expulsion” 
narratives successfully popularized particular images because they were a pervasive fixture of 
the media landscape and daily life. Accounts of civilian suffering, Mongolian hordes, or heroic 
struggles of soldiers attempting to thwart the deluge of misery dominated West German media in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Through radio, newspapers, movies, and pop literature, the public could 
hardly escape exposure to expellee experiences and references to the German East. The 
expulsions were a permanent fixture of West German memories of the war that consumed their 
lives only a few years before, and continued to cast their shadow on postwar lives. 
                                                 




“The Russian is Coming!” War and Forced Migration in the Media Landscape 
 
How did the documentations resonate among the West German public, and how did 
“flight and expulsion” reach domestic audiences and shape how West German society viewed 
and remembered the war? In and of themselves, the studies had limited impact: Few readers 
streamed to bookstores to acquire copies of the dreary tomes with drab binding. The dry 
collection and exorbitant cost of 20 DM undoubtedly proved unappealing.47 Intended as 
materials for expellee and West German foreign policy, the voluminous Dokumentation never 
intended to reach a popular audience, and sales were predictably dismal.48  
The content reached the public audiences through indirect avenues, however. One way in 
which the dense documentations filtered into the mainstream is through generally enthusiastic 
reviews.49 Contemplating the Sudeten German “white book,” Die Welt explained that the 
unimpeachable reports did not intend to “tear open old wounds or allege collective 
[Czechoslovakian] guilt,” before summarizing testimonies chronicling mass executions, 
stonings, human torches to honor Beneš, and gruesome torture.50 The Salzburger Nachrichten 
placed news of the “white book’s” publication on the front page, and also lifted passages of some 
of the most ghastly atrocities.51 The press lauded the Dokumentation as well, recounting 
                                                 
47 BArch B106-27734, Press release re: Dokumentation der Vertreibung, circa September 1953, 1. 
48 Mathias Beer, “Die Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. Hintergründe – 
Entstehung – Ergebnis – Wirkung,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 50 (1999): 116. 
49 Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Wahrung Sudetendeutscher Interessen and Wilhelm Turnwald, eds., Dokumente zur 
Austreibung der Sudetendeutschen (München, 1951). 
50 “Sudetendeutsche schildern Austreibung aus der CSR,” Die Welt, October 24, 1951, 8. 
51 “Symbol der europäischen Krise. Eine mitteleuropäische Tragödie in Dokumenten,” Salzburger Nachrichten, 
October 31, 1951, 1-2. See also “Der Blutrausch der Tschechen 1945. Weitere Dokumente aus der deutschen 
Passion in Böhmen und Mähren,” Landshuter Zeitung, November 9, 1951, 4. The paper reprinted entire reports, 
focused particularly on acts of humiliation such as insults, shaving of heads, and being forced to clean toilets.  
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particularly striking passages.52 Expellee leaders expressed general approval: Herbert Hupka, a 
SPD parliamentarian active in the Silesian Association, praised that expellees could relate to the 
reports, which ultimately demonstrated that Soviet behavior was “foreign to Europeans and 
rooted in Asiatic traditions and communist propaganda encouraging soldiers to seek revenge.”53  
The reviews not only placed a stamp of approval on expellee experiences and applauded 
their authenticity, they simultaneously articulated an abridged narrative of “flight and 
expulsion.” On an August 24, 1954 broadcast of “The Book of the Day” on Nordwestdeutscher 
Rundfunk, reviewers described the reports on an event “exceptional in world history”:  
“What was done to millions of innocent people has absolutely no 
parallels in all of history. Tortured, abused and raped, exposed to hunger, 
robbed of everything, finally rounded up like livestock and literally 
penned up in cattle cars, here the inhabitants of entire provinces were 
driven from the land of their parents and grandparents, expelled from the 
graves of their kin, expelled from territories that in large part were 
entirely German for almost a millennium.”54 
 
No “seeker of truth” reading these “documents of inhumanity” could avoid being filled 
with “deep pity,” and concluding that “if great new injustices could make up for previous 
injustices, then the sinful debt [Schuldkonto] of Hitler’s Germany will have been paid in full.”55 
                                                 
52 See newspaper clippings in BArch B150-5641, especially “Chronik des Grauens,” Rheinischer Merkur (c. 1954); 
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examples of German war crimes within the volumes, and criticized that the Dokumentation did not render adequate 
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55 Ibid. The reviewer acknowledged that the expulsions were a consequence of “Hitler’s politics,” but warned that 
one could not see them as a compensation: Hitler’s crimes remained crimes, and the forced migrations—even if 
viewed as reprisals, remained crimes. 
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A July 16, 1958 broadcast on Süddeutscher Rundfunk went into more detail, reading a 
“representative” testimony from the “catalogue of the demonic nature” while noting that 
“whether it was in East Prussia or Wartheland, in Silesia or in the Sudetenland: more or less the 
terrors took on the same contours everywhere.”56 With descriptions of Nazi functionaries 
extolling the “certainty of victory,” drunken Soviet soldiers that “spread fear and horror 
everywhere,” and rapes and plundering, the excerpts “contained elements that are found 
continuously in the rest of the statements in various…forms.”57 Listeners heard a condensed 
narrative of “flight and expulsion,” complete with the obligatory invocation of the “Charta of the 
Homeland Expellees” and reminder that contemplation of German victimhood should promote 
reconciliation and dispel notions of vengeance or hatred.58 
A second way in which the documentations entered the mainstream is when writers 
utilized testimonies to recount specific scenes—for instance the situation in the Heiligenbeil 
pocket or the infamous flight across the frozen Vistula Lagoon—that frequently coincided with 
anniversaries of the start of the forced migrations.59 On the 1958 Volkstrauertag, the “National 
Day of Mourning,” Süddeutscher Rundfunk read passages of the Dokumentation related to the 
sinking of the Goya. As many Germans remained unaware of the “horrors” and basked in the 
                                                 
56 BArch B150-5642, Transcript of Albrecht Bähr, “Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus 
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57 Ibid, 6.  
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glow of the “Economic Miracle,” the expellee intendant Albrecht Bähr felt it “especially wise on 
this day to remember a particularly harrowing episode from the German Passion: the fates of 
those large ships, filled to the brim with people.”60 Naturally, the expellee presses continuously 
returned to descriptions of expellee experiences.61 A myriad of amateur documentations cherry-
picked particularly gripping reports, often altering them to make them more literary and 
“realistic.”62 Similarly, Günter Karweina’s Der Grosse Trek (“The Big Trek”) combined the 
styles of documentation with fictionalized testimonies—for instance adding dialogue, internal 
thought processes, and more dramatic language—and thereby popularized the Schieder 
Commission’s reports on some of the more iconic scenes that unfolded in the German East, such 
as Nemmersdorf, treks crossing the Vistula Lagoon, sinking ships, and fortress cities.63 The 
works naturally also served as handy reference materials for TV documentaries.64 
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A third way that the Dokumentation influenced public discourse was through 
supplemental publications of particularly evocative and gripping reports specifically intended to 
bring the academic work to broader audiences.65 Hans von Lehndorff’s accounts enjoyed 
unexpected success: Instantly a bestseller, within six months it sold over 100,000 copies.66 
Between December 7, 1961 and January 13, 1962, the popular tabloid Bild printed excerpts 
complete with idyllic prewar images of the German East.67 Readers read the account of a 
“sufferer among the suffering,” whose diary “reads as if a report from another world. Appalling, 
harrowing—and also fascinating, because it is our fate that he describes.”68 Die Zeit also 
enthusiastically discussed the book, adding that it “ranks as the most harrowing that one can 
read.”69 For twenty weeks, it topped Spiegel’s bestseller list thanks to the “literary finesse” of the 
author and the public’s demand for such chronicles.70 By 2015, Lehndorff’s diaries appeared in 
their 32nd edition, cementing its place as the most well-read “flight and expulsion” account.71 
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The West German government’s efforts to create a massive record of the expulsions 
therefore generated a deep well to draw from. The “painstaking objectivity…banishes from the 
start any doubt of the absolute historical accuracy,” providing unimpeachable evidence of 
expellee suffering; when relying on the testimonies of profound suffering, few could dare to call 
the depictions into question.72 Indeed, as one reviewer of the Dokumentation surmised, the 
meticulous scholarship sanctioned the “irrefutable proof of the accuracy of those descriptions” 
found in more well-read popular literature, but which may have lacked academic credentials.73 
This plight moreover beseeched Germans whether they “really want to forget…far and away the 
most horrifying event of the last war?”74 Judging from the prevalence of “flight and expulsion” 
in the media landscape, the answer was an emphatic and resounding “no.” 
In addition to Lehndorff’s diaries, numerous autobiographical or semi-autobiographical 
books dealt with the forced migrations or used the expulsions as a backdrop.75 Already at the 
time, commentators noted the “conspicuous abundance” of expulsion novels.76 Several achieved 
notable sales successes, particularly Günter Grass’ “Danzig trilogy.”77 Focused primarily on the 
suffering during and immediately after the war and romanticizing the German East, prominent 
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themes included the emotional pains of leaving the homeland, treks, Soviet excesses and sexual 
violence, and deprivation through hunger or cold.78 Generally, most expulsion novels of the 
1950s and early 1960s reflected West German reluctance to contemplate guilt or responsibility 
for the war.79 Other works discussed the war in abstract, often religious terms, and cast expellee 
fates as divine judgement.80 
 Accessibility and entertainment value promised large readerships, and in the 1950s no 
medium proved more popular than illustrated magazines. By the end of the decade, Hör zu! 
claimed a readership of 3.5 million, while Quick and Stern sold over a million copies each.81 The 
focus on consumers meant that stories corresponded to the worldview and “zeitgeist” of 
readers.82 Lackluster responses brought a swift end to series, and favorable responses not only 
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measured success, they dictated content.83 The medium ranked as a “consciousness 
seismograph” of West German society.84 Moreover, unlike traditional news reporting, pop 
culture possessed the ability to “create a special tenor or…cement an existing attitude into a 
reality.”85 One genre dominated above all: The 1950s were the decade of the Dokumentation, but 
also the heyday of the Tatsachenbericht, the “report based on facts” that recounted “how it was” 
during the war based loosely on testimonies and infused with emotional drama.86  
As the dissertation of Michael Schornstheimer compellingly argues, the tone of the 
stories was one of “terrific atmosphere and caterwauling [Bombenstimmung und 
Katzenjammer],” oscillating between adventure stories and handwringing over victimization 
during the war, captivity, or the postwar period.87 Far from a discernable effort to elide the Third 
Reich, readers obsessed over the immediate past and yearned to come to terms with it. While few 
necessarily desired a return of the National Socialism, the content and letters from the public 
“spoke with vim, verve, and enthusiasm of the bygone, adventurous time” that for many “was the 
most important time in their lives, and certainly not (only) in the negative sense.”88 The language 
and thinking reflected the lingering ideology, racism, and antidemocratic tendencies of the 
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defunct dictatorship. Predictably, if discussed at all, war crimes were blamed on a small circle of 
perpetrators, and the selective amnesia of the FRG framed the dialogue.  
Because editors attempted to conform to expectations of readers, stories unsurprisingly 
painted the majority of the population as “good” Germans who knew nothing of the regime’s 
criminal dimensions, or only did their duty and attempted to muddle through. Replete with 
photographs, reporting fell into several broad categories. One of the most common were war 
stories that lionized apolitical soldiers, and recounted their daring and brave exploits in desperate 
circumstances.89 This left most of Germany as victims, a theme reiterated in the numerous 
reports of POWs and their bitter struggles behind Soviet barbed wire.90 Included in the category 
of victims were defendants of Allied war crimes trials, and their supposed persecution featured 
prominently.91 The ostensible litigiousness of the victors, who unjustifiably oppressed Germany 
and clung to punitive notions of collective guilt, prompted many illustrated magazines to criticize 
occupation policy and level charges of ostensible plans to destroy and humiliate the destroyed 
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nation.92 All of these Tatsachenberichte appeared under the rubric of “historical truth,” and 
offered readers a political lesson that reinforced 1950s victimhood mentalities. 
Given the tenor of the magazines, it is somewhat surprising that “flight and expulsion” 
emerged only marginally, second to the more intensely discussed returning POWs or “victims” 
of postwar Allied justice.93 Protagonists in serialized novels haled from the German East, but 
incidents during the war or the forced migrations were only vaguely alluded to.94 Expellees also 
themselves contributed to the voices speaking to broken lives in postwar West Germany. 
Through letters, such as to Hör Zu!’s “Questions for Ms. Irene,” they described their lives as 
destitute refugees.95 Occasionally, they provided explicit descriptions of what occurred. In 1950 
for example, a woman recounted her rape and the marital problems that ensued after her husband 
accused her of having “betrayed their love” and surrendering too easily.96 With these 
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Nachkriegszeit,” Quick Nr. 52, 1951; Thorwald, “Wie Deutschland der Vernichtung entging,” Quick Nr. 3, 1952; 
Thorwald, “Der unbequeme Christ,” Quick Nr. 4, 1952; Thorwald, “Der unbequeme Christ,” Quick Nr. 5, 1952; 
Thorwald, “In der Mühle der Kollektiv-Schuld,” Quick Nr. 6, 1952; Thorwald, “Hühnerfutter,” Quick Nr. 11, 1952. 
93 This is also the conclusion of Jan Albroscheit, who analyzed publications of the 1950s. See Albroscheit, “Die 
Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen aus den ehemaligen Ostgebieten in der deutschen Belletristik, Illustrierten 
und der Geschichtswissenschaft der 1950er Jahre”; Jan Albroscheit, “‘Die Zeiten der Mongolenzüge kehrten 
wieder!’ ‘Flucht und Vertreibung’ in den Illustrierten ‘Hör Zu!’, ‘Quick’ und ‘Stern’ der 50er Jahre,” Beiträge zur 
Geschichte Westpreußens 20/21 (2006): 351–73. Albroscheit argues that the expulsions were “not absorbed by 
broad segments of society” based on their limited discussion in the magazines of the 1950s. Albroscheit, 372. 
94 Albroscheit, “‘Die Zeiten der Mongolenzüge kehrten wieder!’ ‘Flucht und Vertreibung’ in den Illustrierten ‘Hör 
Zu!’, ‘Quick’ und ‘Stern’ der 50er Jahre,” 371. 
95 For example “Wir müssen wohl Zaungäste des Lebens bleiben!”, Hör zu! Nr. 46, 20; and “Ich finde keinen 
Anschluß mehr,” Hör zu! Nr. 31, 13. The letters attest to hardship into the late 1950s, as an expellee testified: “We 
are both in our early 40s and have five kids. Since the war took from us our homeland and destroyed our existence 
we have been unable to succeed at a new start. […] Into this misery our daughter was born. It is very healthy and 
happy. But I am at the end of my strength. Therefore we would decide to have our little one be adopted.” “Uns geht 
es so schlecht, dass wir unser Kind abgeben müssen!”, Hör zu! Nr. 37, 45. 
96 “Ich habe meine Liebe nicht verraten!”, Hör zu! Nr. 22, 13. “It was during the Russian invasion in May 1945. 
Most of the women of the town in which I lived fell prey to the soldiers. I was also among the victims. My situation 
was especially terrible, because my husband—released from the field hospital as a heavily wounded—was with us. I 
knew from the neighboring town that all the men who attempted to protect their women were put down. We had to 
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submissions, expellees joined a community of victims, such as POWs and widows, who 
continued to suffer hardships and familial strife more than a decade after 1945.97  
Readers also encountered expellees in coverage of their homeland gatherings, such as the 
1951 Silesian meeting in Munich.98 Photos of beaming visitors among the 200,000 attendees 
revealed jovial scenes, but editorial comments reminded audiences of the injustice of the 
expulsions and the “thousand-year legal claim” of Germany, and forbade a forgetting of the 
German East.99  Reports from journalists who travelled to Poland or Czechoslovakia also drove 
home the point of a terrible loss for Germany.100 At certain moments, the authors were able to 
recall what occurred after 1945, such as when on their stop in Aussig they reported that the 
lampposts from which “two thousand Germans hung” still stood.101 Overall, the past only 
                                                 
suffer the worst that a woman can. But we accepted it and survived. That which happened to us after all did not 
concern us. The husbands of other women took it as a terrible fate for their women and attempted to prop them up. 
My husband however says that he cannot forget it. I supposedly submitted too easily and therefore betrayed him. I 
supposedly betrayed our love. What do you say?” 
97 See “Mein Mann ist völlig gefühlskalt…”, Hör zu! Nr. 7, 1950, 13; “Mein Mann ist völlig verstört”, Hör zu! Nr. 
10, 16; “Ich muß meinem Herzen Luft machen,” Hör zu! Nr. 15, 13; and “Mein ehemaliger Verlobter ist wieder da 
und fordert mich zurück!,” Hör zu! Nr. 15, 1955, 31;  
98 “Nicht durch einen Krieg,” Quick Nr. 39, 1951, 1305ff. 
99 Readers were reminded of the fact that “[n]o authority in the world can ignore the ‘thousand-year legal claim’ of 
fifteen million expellees to their homeland in the East.” A photo of an expellee who saved a handful of “homeland 
earth” meanwhile served as the “most valuable reminder” of what had been lost during the “invasion of the 
Russians” and the Poles who followed and behaved “even more terribly.” A photo of a couple gave pause to 
remember that there was “joy and bliss—but even more tears: Everyone lost the homeland, but many also beloved 
kin.” Another attendee explained: “We had nothing anymore. They [the Poles] fell upon us like wolves.” “Nicht 
durch einen Krieg,” Quick Nr. 39, 1951 1305ff. 
100 See the travel diary of the Canadian journalist Charles Wassermann, in Wassermann, “Unter polnischer 
Verwaltung,” Stern Nr. 14, 1958, 22ff. and subsequent editions. See also Günther Dahl, “Damals gab es hier nur 
Haß,” Stern Nr. 35, 1955, 8ff and Dahl, “Heimaterde unter fremden Stiefeln, Stern Nr. 36, 12ff. 
101 Dahl interviewed Czech police officers, who showed him a site of the crime. “‘Here,’ says the oldest of the three 
policemen earnestly. ‘It was here. Two thousand Germans hanged from the lampposts. It was grotesque. No one can 
probably forget it. But could we not stop, all of us stop, hating one another?’” Dahl, “Heimaterde unter fremden 
Stiefeln, Stern Nr. 36, 42. No other reports spoke of victims hung from lampposts during the Aussig massacre. 
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vaguely came to the fore.102 The emphasis remained on dilapidated conditions and poor 
stewardship of the erstwhile blooming German landscapes.103 Xenophobic language moreover 
generally portrayed current inhabitants as backward, unclean, and indolent.104 Other reports 
painted them as childishly superstitious, driven from their properties by ghosts of the murdered 
inhabitants: “Horror has gripped the trespassers! They cannot enjoy their booty!”105 
The political messages articulated in Quick and Stern conformed to the homeland politics 
of the expellee organizations, and helped contribute to a cementing of the expellees as German 
victims of the war, anchoring them and the lost territories in the collective memory of West 
Germany. Judging by reader responses, these messages at least partially hit home with 
audiences.106 “No report has impressed me as much as your article on my hometown of Eger,” a 
reader raved. “I believe that these photos jolt not only homeland expellees, but all those who 
                                                 
102 As Wassermann noted, he “would like to say farewell to the war, but its horrendous face glares at us continuously 
on this journey through East Prussia. Wherever we arrive: The core of most of the cities is mostly destroyed—and 
reconstruction efforts have not yet begun.” Wassermann, “Unter polnischer Verwaltung,” Stern Nr. 17, 1958, 17. 
103 An exception is a brief observation that Wassermann does not elaborate on: “It is also true that the retreating 
German military contributed much to the current conditions in the German territories under Polish administration 
and turned cities…into ‘fortresses,’ which certainly could have been spared.” Wassermann, “Unter polnischer 
Verwaltung,” Stern Nr. 23, 1958, 54. A critical letter to Quick noted the inadequate treatment of the destruction and 
the impression that the Red Army was responsible for the majority of it. She also complained that Wassermann 
greatly exaggerated conditions and ignored Polish reconstruction. Letters to the Editor, Stern Nr. 21, 1958, 30. 
104 Wassermann quotes a German woman who remained in Poland: “But you know, one thing we Germans will 
never accept: We are accostumed to order, and with the Poles that does not exist—at least not that which we 
understand as order. And the drunks! […] This is the worst: No order, no discipline!” Wassermann, “Unter 
polnischer Verwaltung,” Stern Nr. 18, 1958, 40. Dahl’s report from Eger described a city center that the expellers 
reduced into a “desert.” “Only the memories enliven the dark holes that once were windows and doors. What the 
grenades left unscathed, gypsies plundered.” Dahl, “Damals gab es hier nur Haß,” Stern Nr. 35, 1955, 9.   
105 “Der Fluch der bösen Tat,” Quick Nr. 39, 1306. 
106 Many readers reacted positively, particularly representatives of the expellee associations. See letters to the editor 
in Stern Nr. 19, 1958, 74 and Stern Nr. 21, 1958, 30. 
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were spared the bitter lot of the expulsion. From these images the senselessness of the expulsion 
becomes clear.”107 A travel diary from East Prussia elicited similar responses:  
“This report opens readers’ eyes. […] Kolberg: once famous and beloved 
Baltic spa—now only a haunted ruin. Treptow: the most dirty and 
impoverished city, more wasteland than fertile fields. In other words, in 
the heart of Europe there are German lands which the ‘current 
administrator’ is incapable of managing and preserving. What the war did 
not destroy decays and turns into steppe.”108 
  
 The understandable rage many expellees might feel when seeing the images of their 
homeland could, one reader explained, “perhaps indeed once again tear open already scarred 
wounds among many older people, since there will be no return.” But this was “negligible in the 
face of the monstrosities that this travel diary unsparingly uncovered. The entire world needs to 
know what one perpetrated through the expulsion of countless German carriers of culture. I wish 
that one would write hundreds of these reports.”109 
The magazines certainly helped illuminate expellee plight. Already in 1950, Stern 
published “photographs that one cannot forget” of treks, destroyed wagons, and dead horses on 
the frozen Vistula Lagoon, “where hounded people attempted to save that which blind 
capriciousness smashed.”110 The magazine provided a narrative of “flight and expulsion” that 
                                                 
107 Damals gab es hier nur Haß,” Stern Nr. 37, 1955, 21. 
108 Letters to the editor, Stern Nr. 18, 1958, 59. 
109 Letters to the editor, Stern Nr. 28, 1958, 51. The author responded to a critical letter of another reader questioning 
the entire premise of the piece: “The title of the travel report should not be ‘under Polish administration,’ but instead 
“in the lost German eastern territories.’ […] For us expellees the report is not a surprise; […] What does one achieve 
with this? While reading this report, the older generation of expellees will be most painfully reminded of their lost 
homeland and existence, and will once again contemplate a possible return. In other words, already scarred wounds 
are torn open once more, even though there will no longer be a return.” Letters to the editor, Stern Nr. 25, 1958, 48. 
110 “Flucht über das Haff,” Stern Nr. 4, 1950, 7. “Exactly five years ago, as the Russian bulldozer inexorably rolled 
onward…a fate unfolded which in its deep tragedy will remain unforgettable….Hundreds of thousands have been 
crowded together into the narrowest of space. They feverishly wait for the moment for when the only flight path to 
the west becomes navigable….The cold gets worse. Again and again the strength of the ice is measured, until 
finally, first for those on foot and then for the heavy treks, the path is opened. Now the stream of refugees, which in 
unending columns pours over the…lagoon, does not end. On the open, snow-covered surface the bombs and 
machine guns of the enemy planes find easy targets. The pandemonium that they unleash is indescribable. Animals 
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typically focused on the “conspicuous treks of hounded refugees” which “know only one goal: to 
the West, to the West!”111 Those who could not flee with treks joined “hundreds of thousands 
surging into the Baltic ports seeking their salvation from a horrific fate.”112 Accompanying text 
described the perilous crossing dramatically, yet more or less accurately captured the experiences 
of survivors, which nevertheless did not represent the representative refugee experience. 
A 1959 Stern serialized story, which combined factual and fictional components, 
expounded upon these themes.113 Revolving around a love triangle that culminates in the sinking 
of the Wilhelm Gustloff, the plot used the German East’s “murder, destruction and defilement” as 
a backdrop. By recounting how a brutal enemy mercilessly swept up German civilians and the 
Wehrmacht, the piece defined the roles of victim and perpetrator.114 It was a time of “horrific 
atrocities,” a “return of the Mongolian invasions.”115 The Red Army’s demonic nature stood out 
even more dramatically with the description of the fall of Königsberg, which in 1945 continued 
to be “clean” and “esteemed”: “They did not come like a clap of thunder like elsewhere, they 
came sneaking like the black death; Königsberg died for 13 weeks. It started with bombs; 
grenades followed bombs—it ended with the occupation of the Russians.”116 This narrative was 
                                                 
and humans hurry out of the way, break through thinner ice and drown. For a long time corpses and ruins line the 
icy street of suffering, until the spring takes mercy and the heaving water drags the victims into the depths.”  
111 “Die letzten 23 Tage,” Quick Nr. 19, 1958, 5. 
112 “Die letzten 23 Tage,” Quick Nr. 19, 1958, 8. 
113 “Das nackte Leben,” Stern Nr. 10, March 7, 1959. The series ran until April 25, 1959, or Stern Nr. 17, 1959. 
114 “Das nackte Leben,” Stern Nr. 15, 44. 
115 “Das nackte Leben,” Stern Nr. 10, 27. Concretely, Stern pointed to an incident in East Prussia that stood for what 
refugees faced: “In Nemmersdorf women were nailed to barn doors alive, all women and girls were defiled 
countless times, men and the elderly were martyred to death, forty French POWs bludgeoned.” 
116 “Das nackte Leben,” Stern Nr. 15, 44. 
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buttressed by moving and evocative illustrations and photographs of mostly women and children, 
and concerned soldiers attempting to alleviate their plight. 
The role reversal of victim and perpetrator, and glossing over the sources of how the war 
came to the German East, was as misleading as positing that the disaster was unforeseen and 
arbitrary. The suggestion of a universal panicked flight from a brutal enemy was also a 
distortion, as this ignored millions who chose to remain at home. The gripping tropes that 
magazines suggested as “typical” flight experiences did not speak for the majority of expellees. 
However, more importantly, these stories contributed to a master narrative of flight in which 
treks, the crossing of the brittle frozen Vistula Lagoon, and sinking ships emerged as iconic 
symbols of universal experiences, and offered images that seared themselves into the cultural 
memory of West Germany.117 Perhaps the first exposure to “flight and expulsion” for many West 
Germans, the Tatsachenberichte reached millions, and left indelible impressions. 
One person in particular found the 1959 Stern piece compelling: The West German 
director Frank Wisbar. Following his 1958 epic on the catastrophic fate of the 6th Army in 
Stalingrad, Wisbar continued to tackle tragic subjects from the lost war.118 He credited the 
inspiration for his next project on the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff to the 1959 Stern article, 
and adopted major elements of the plot, such as the love triangle.119 Nacht fiel über Gotenhafen 
(“Darkness Fell on Gotenhafen”) insisted upon stark realism, and seamlessly blended National 
Socialist Wochenschau footage with the film’s scenes. Spiegel credited the “technical brilliance” 
                                                 
117 On the iconic stature of the trek, see Paul, “Der Flüchtlingstrek.” 
118 Frank Wisbar, Hunde, wollt ihr ewig leben (Deutsche Film Hansa, 1958). 
119 Michael J Ennis, The M.S. Wilhelm Gustloff in German Memory Culture: A Case Study on Competing Discourses 
(Cincinnati, Ohio: University of Cincinnati, 2014), 23. 
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of the final production, and praised the “astounding vitality” of the actors.120 Like other films by 
Wisbar, who spent the war in exile, it addressed German victimhood and used it to reinforce anti-
war messages. However, the director made clear that his work, “dedicated to the German 
women,” was intended as an “anti-Bolshevik film.”121 In either case, the style of docudrama 
presented the public with unforgettable scenes of suffering.122  
Nacht fiel über Gotenhafen represented an anomaly when it came to “flight in expulsion” 
in the other growing popular medium: Film and television. Expellees here were, like in other 
mediums, ubiquitous. But while the sappy Heimatfilme often featured characters with an 
expulsion background, plots revolved around issues of integration and mutual understanding, as 
previous chapters examined.123 Scenes from the war seldom confronted audiences, who in any 
case preferred to escape the past and the hardships of postwar recovery with lighthearted 
entertainment. The 1955 adaptation of Suchkind 312, for instance, abstractly alluded to the chaos 
of the treks that separated the protagonist from her mother. Critics panned the “overcooked” and 
“sloppy” tone, but praised that the still relevant problem of “homeless children lost on the flight, 
carried off by strangers, left waiting for father and mother in hygienic but hapless institutional 
homes, without names or birthdates.” Another reviewer noted that it told the story of nearly 
100,000 children whom the Red Cross reunited since 1945, and as such delivered a “timely 
protest on behalf of all children who were left over as victims of the last war.”124 
                                                 
120 “Nacht fiel über Gotenhafen (Deutschland),” Der Spiegel Nr. 11, March 9, 1960, 70. 
121 “Nacht fiel über Gotenhafen (Deutschland),” Der Spiegel Nr. 11, March 9, 1960, 70. 
122 After sinking the ship on a West German sound stage in 1960, Frank Wisbar returned to the tragedy in his 1967 
TV film, Flucht über die Ostsee. 
123 For a more detailed analysis of the Heimatfilme, see Moeller, War Stories, 123–70.  
124 Quoted in Moeller, 146–47. 
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The war as such, and the accompanying experiences of refugees, seldom made an 
appearance in film or radio. There were notable exceptions, however. The 1951 anticommunist 
film Kreuzweg der Freiheit (“Crossroads of Freedom”), for example, heavily focused on the 
“German Passion” and the “right to homeland.” Utilizing scenes of the treks gleaned from Nazi 
propaganda unit shots, the film pursued a documentary style and reenacted scenes not captured 
by cameras, including the rape of a woman by Red Army soldiers in front of her children. In 
1955, a radio episode titled “Documents of Humanity—In the Days of the Mass Expulsions” 
included readings of reports from the Göttinger Arbeitskreis’ publication.125 
Lastly, it must be noted that the media of 1950s did not merely reflect West German 
mentalities, they also contributed to a streamlining of expellee memories. The historical context, 
diverse phases, and myriad experiences were reduced to a handful of “representative” scenes, 
such as the trek, ship evacuations, or bloody massacres. An eye toward sensationalism and 
marketability may have innocently driven this process. But, as two case studies demonstrate, 
certain actors consciously engaged in memory politics in order to render an interpretation of 
“flight and expulsion.” In the process, they established prominent mental images that profoundly 
shaped the master narrative of the forced migrations and how Germans continue to think of them.  
 
Architects of West German Collective Memory 
 
A veritable flood of fictional or semi-fictional accounts of “flight and expulsion” 
confronted West Germans with an accounting of the war and German victimhood into the 1960s. 
The degree to which they shaped memory of the recent past naturally varied, but some authors 
proved more influential than others. The amateur historian Heinz Schön, for instance, left lasting 
                                                 
125 BayHStA, Sudetendeutsches Archiv (SdA), SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 200, “Ost- und Mitteldeutsche 
Heimatsendungen,” 1955. Kurth and Göttinger Arbeitskreis, Dokumente. 
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and powerful impressions of one of the most notorious chapters of “flight and expulsion”: The 
sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff. As a member of the German merchant marine during the war, 
Schön survived the largest maritime disaster in human history and dedicated the rest of his life to 
documenting the event. Already in 1949, Schön issued a three part account of the disaster for 
Heim und Welt.126 After receiving more than 1,500 letters to the editor, including from survivors 
and other witnesses, the paper tasked Schön with expanding the chronicle and incorporating new 
material into a twelve part series that appeared in 1951.127 
Schön’s interwove his personal experiences onboard the ship with the memories of others 
that spoke for the nearly 10,000 victims. The narrative predominantly revolved around the 
central protagonists Hermann Freymüller, who booked passage for his wife, daughter and infant 
son on the ship but never saw them again, and the titillating “Gustloff foundling,” an unidentified 
newborn found in a life raft by Werner Frick, who adopted the youngest survivor of the sinking. 
The rescued child captivated imaginations, as it seemingly spoke of the fate of many young 
separated from their families in posters and broadcasts in the postwar period. Freymüller himself 
became convinced that Schön described his lost son Frank-Michael, and waged a custody battle 
against the German Democratic Republic.128 As a West German public clamored for the 
                                                 
126 Heinz Schön, “Die Wilhelm Gustloff Katastrophe. Wie sie wirklich war,” Heim und Welt 7, February 20, 1949. 
The second and third parts appeared on February 27 and March 6.  
127 Heinz Schön, “Tot—und doch am Leben—Das Schicksal des Gustloff-Findlings,” Heim und Welt 42, 1951, 1. 
The series ran each week until the 53rd number of Heim und Welt. 
128 On the controversy, see Peter Sandmeyer, “‘Wilhelm Gustloff’: ‘Seid still, wir müssen alle sterben,’” Stern, 
February 25, 2008, https://www.stern.de/politik/geschichte/-wilhelm-gustloff---seid-still--wir-muessen-alle-sterben--
3083234.html. The Fricks refused to relinquish their adopted son and forbade blood testing, and the East German 
government opted to allow Peter to decide for himself whether he wanted to pursue the investigation after his 21st 
birthday. Freymüller passed away in 1964, a year before Peter’s 21st birthday. Unaware of the controversy for many 
years, Peter Frick published his memoirs under a pseudonym. See Peter Weise, Hürdenlauf: Erinnerungen eines 
Findlings (Rostock: Büro + Service Rostock, 2006). 
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reunification of a bereaved father with his son caught behind the Iron Curtain, the struggle 
embodied the division and suffering of the German nation. 
Schön emerged as the Gustloff’s foremost chronicler, writing popular accounts that 
combined personal memories with the recollections of others into a literary narrative that 
appealed to a broad audience.129 The Schieder Commission’s footnotes reveal that they relied on 
Schön’s sleuthing for their research, for instance.130 For his 1960 film Nacht fiel über 
Gotenhafen, director Frank Wisbar consulted and hired Schön as a technical advisor. Scenes 
from Schön’s writing—such as the heroics of the radio operator who risked his life to send an 
SOS signal as the ship sank—featured as gripping plot points of the film. Schön’s stature as one 
of the founders of cultural memory on “flight and expulsion” cannot be underestimated. Yet 
more than the author himself, the tragedy he helped illuminate animated West German 
imaginations. For instance, several of the Dokumentation’s testimonies invoked the sinking in 
their reports. Largely recorded in the early 1950s, the maritime disaster shaped expellee 
memories, which incorporated the sinking into their personal narratives without firsthand 
knowledge.131 Rumors of the Gustloff’s fate may indeed have spread like wildfire already during 
the wartime evacuations, but the testimonies suggest that postwar reports left deep impressions 
                                                 
129 Heinz Schön, Der Untergang der “Wilhelm Gustloff” (Göttingen: Karina-Goltze-Verl., 1952); Heinz Schön, Die 
“Gustloff”-Katastrophe: Bericht eines Überlebenden über die größte Schiffskatastrophe im Zweiten Weltkrieg 
(Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1984); Heinz Schön, Rettung über die Ostsee: die Flucht aus den Ostseehäfen 1944/45 
(Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1985); Heinz Schön, SOS Wilhelm Gustloff: die grösste Schiffskatastrophe der Geschichte 
(Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1998); Heinz Schön, Die letzte Fahrt der “Gustloff” Tatsachenbericht eines Überlebenden 
(Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 2008). Schön also has lent his pen to general works on “flight and expulsion.” See Heinz 
Schön, Tragödie Ostpreußen 1944-1945 ; als die Rote Armee das Land besetzte (Kiel: Arndt, 1999); Heinz Schön, 
Königsberger Schicksalstage: der Untergang der Hauptstadt Ostpreussens ; 1944-48 (Kiel: Arndt, 2002); Heinz 
Schön, Flucht aus Ostpreußen 1945 die Menschenjagd der Roten Armee (Kiel: Arndt, 2001); Heinz Schön, 
Ostpreussen 1944,45 im Bild: Endkampf - Flucht - Vertreibung (Kiel: Arndt, 2007). 
130 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:48E. 
131 Schieder, 1:71, 146, 147, 250, 282, 306, 307, 323–24. 
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on expellees that retroactively colored the memory of their own suffering. By the time the 
witnesses recorded their experiences, the Gustloff already served as shorthand to convey the 
dangers and suffering of fleeing civilians. 
The writer Heinz Bongartz, better known as Jürgen Thorwald, also profoundly influenced 
how West Germans would come to recall the war. Bongartz’s journalistic career began as a 
propagandist for the German military. In the spring of 1945, the navy charged him with drafting 
laudatory pieces of the evacuation of refugees from the German East.132 His observations did not 
appear in print until after the war in the conservative Christ und Welt. As a founding editor, 
Bongartz together with Eugen Gerstenmaier and other representatives of the Protestant Church 
formed the publication in June 1948 around a coterie of former employees of the propaganda 
department of the Third Reich’s Foreign Office. Habitual condemnations of denazification 
procedures and war crimes trials repeatedly drew the ire of American authorities, who threatened 
revoking the publishing license of what it considered an “under cover Nazi-paper” espousing 
“nationalism and militarism.”133  
Particularly several pieces of Bongartz, who adopted the pseudonym of “Erbo,” ruffled 
the feathers of occupation officials.134 With considerable literary flourish, Bongartz sought to 
chronicle the “gruesome dance of death” that included treks, Soviet tanks rolling over fleeing 
refugees, and overloaded ships sinking in icy seas that “still remains shrouded in silence.”135 The 
author fleetingly acknowledged “partially legitimate, but often artificially stimulated hatred” 
                                                 
132 Oels, “Vertreibung”; Ennis, The M.S. Wilhelm Gustloff in German Memory Culture, 171. 
133 Oels, “Dieses Buch ist kein Roman,” 384. 
134 Erbo, “Die Katastrophe der Flüchtlingsschiffe 1945,” Christ und Welt, November 12, 1948, 1; and Erbo, “Der 
Untergang der ‘Wilhelm Gustloff,’” Christ und Welt, November 19, 1948, 4. 
135 Erbo, “Die Katastrophe der Flüchtlingsschiffe 1945,” Christ und Welt, November 12, 1948, 4. 
478 
 
against Germany, but quickly moved to casting light on “the tragedy…that was far more terrible 
and destructive than the indisputable suffering of Soviet millions.”136 Lamenting the “odium of 
political intentions” demonstrated by the victors who judged Germany “ex post facto,” Bongartz 
argued that no German should feel confident to pontificate over “justice, guilt, and sins.”137 A 
careful and truthful examination of expellee misery was necessary, however, in order to avoid a 
“new wave of propaganda that may appropriate these events as a political instrument.”138    
Bongartz’s rhetorical strategy—briefly acknowledging German guilt before transitioning 
to descriptions of ostensibly greater suffering that offset it—remained carefully worded to 
survive the vigilant gaze of the American occupiers. It nevertheless revealed an agenda that 
Bongartz would return to more forcefully. Already a few months later, under the nom de plume 
Jürgen Thorwald to evade occupation oversight, Bongartz authored a weekly running series for 
Christ und Welt titled “East German Fate” that expanded on his earlier articles.139 From March 
until June 1949, dramatic illustrations and photos of treks, sinking ships, and destroyed cities 
graced the paper’s cover. Vividly blending news reports, testimonies, and fictionalized accounts 
into a narrative of helpless civilians caught between a heroic Wehrmacht beholden to the 
ideological obtuseness of Nazi fat cats and a savage Soviet juggernaut, Thorwald’s account 
struck a chord: Sales of Christ und Welt, already boasting among the highest readerships in West 
Germany, tripled in the first three weeks of the series’ debut from 17,000 to 68,000.140  
                                                 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Erbo, “Der Untergang der ‘Wilhelm Gustloff,’” Christ und Welt, November 19, 1948, 4. 
139 Jürgen Thorwald, “Ostdeutsches Schicksal,” Christ und Welt, March 24, 1949, 1. 
140 Oels, “Dieses Buch ist kein Roman,” 384.  
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The unexpected acclaim prompted the paper’s editors to solicit submissions of 
experiences. These flooded in, and together with thousands of testimonies gathered by 
Gerstenmaier’s Evangelisches Hilfswerk and Thorwald’s access to 55,000 Nazi news reports and 
former generals, produced a massive source base.141 The materials provided an ideal collection 
for Thorwald’s next project of turning the series into a two-volume book, which appeared in 
1950 and instantly became a financial success.142 The content expounded upon the themes 
articulated in Christ und Welt. Given his military background, Thorwald’s writing focused on the 
Wehrmacht, whose soldiers often appeared as rational and sober actors compelled to fulfill their 
oaths of duty despite the megalomania and insanity of Hitler and the Nazi regime. Yet in 
addition to the stoicism and heroic suffering of the military, another major theme is the misery of 
the civilian population. David Oels underlines that much of Thorwald’s writing purports to rely 
on evidence, yet the archival materials reveal outright fabrications. For instance, the account of 
an East Prussian woman who fled across the Vistula Lagoon on a trek, which Thorwald later 
identified as the symbolic core of his book, provides a glaring case of the author’s methods.143 
The closest corresponding report in Thorwald’s materials that could have served as the basis 
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made no mention of rapes or Red Army tanks flattening a trek.144 Indeed, the materials reveal 
substantial deviations, including stylistic editing that is then reproduced as verbatim quotes.145  
Oels not only identifies inconsistencies, he astutely observes Thorwald’s fusion of fact, 
“emotionally-subjective” reports, and fiction: “Front developments and tactical considerations 
stand next to dreams and character studies, documentation finds itself beside blatant literary 
construction.”146 Thorwald’s background as a propagandist likely served him well, providing a 
template for compelling writing that effectively blended testimonies, wartime reports, and 
interviews—all inflected with gripping literary style—into one of the first histories of the final 
days of the war accessible and palatable for the West German public. There is an element of 
artistic license, yet more than book sales influenced how Thorwald chronicled the war. 
Thorwald’s writing reflected the worldview of a former Nazi propagandist, and member 
of a reconstituted circle of fellow travelers at Christ und Welt engaged in a campaign of 
interpreting the recent past. They had a vested interest in establishing guilt and innocence. The 
blatant partisanship certainly was not lost on foreign readers, who found Thorwald’s arguments 
unconvincing and unseemly.147 In West Germany, where the dominant discourse focused on 
German victimhood, rehabilitating “ordinary” Germans and the Wehrmacht, ending “Nazi 
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snoopery,” and denouncing denazification excesses and perceived litigious and unjust trials, 
Thorwald delivered a magisterial historical account.148 German reviewers praised the criticism of 
the generals’ misguided and disastrous acquiescence to Hitler and the “damning 
denouncement…of brown Gauleiter.” More importantly, Thorwald delivered the “harshest 
indictment against the Poles and the Red Army,” whose crimes let the “unspeakable atrocities of 
the Hitler people” pale in comparison.149 The messages obviously struck a chord. 
Reviewers praised that Thorwald delivered a “shattering picture, whose effect no one can 
withdraw from.”150 It was precisely the popular style that made the work so accessible and 
effective. As Spiegel noted, Thorwald mastered “historic novels, only that his novels’ heroes 
overwhelmingly still live today, and every reader experienced this epoch depicted in the 
novels.”151 The blurred lines between truthfulness and “authentic” fiction did not bother critics. It 
also did not trouble Thorwald: The author explained that “this book is no novel, but instead a 
report of historical events, even in the few passages that utilize the literary form. It is historical 
truth, insofar that such truth can be ascertained by a single person seeking it.”152 Thorwald 
seemingly powerfully captured the experiences and feeling of an entire nation.  
The postwar author ranks as a central shaper of German collective memory of the war. 
The “authentic” Tatsachenberichte (“reports based on facts”) counted as among the first 
published descriptions of “flight and expulsion” that many West Germans encountered. In the 
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process, he constructed a narrative with themes that profoundly influenced public discourse over 
“flight and expulsion”: Notions of a small minority of Germans as criminals, let alone Nazis; a 
miniscule circle of delusional figures propping up an insane and increasingly erratic Hitler as the 
craven regime crumbled and dragged the real Germany into the flames; the Wehrmacht as valiant 
yet hapless heroes struggling to uphold their duties to their compatriots. But above all, the 
collapse of the regime and its desperate radicalism turned the majority of Germans into innocent 
victims, their misery unimaginably compounded by the brutality of a cruel enemy.  
Despite assurances that he did not intend to write “about the guilt of the others or about 
one’s own innocence,” Thorwald in fact delivered what for many West Germans was a 
convincing and powerful accounting of historical truth, and of guilt and innocence.153 The editors 
of the Dokumentation recognized Thorwald as an authoritative source, citing him numerous 
times and thereby validating his accounts.154 The gripping volumes moreover enjoyed immense 
success, and the content reached a large audience: Before 1980, they sold more than fourteen 
million copies, making them among West Germany’s most successful pop histories.155 
Gerstenmaier recalled seeing a copy at Adenauer’s bedside, and that the chancellor confided that 
“he had learned much” only after having turned to it.156  
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Thorwald’s juxtaposition of German guilt and suffering contributed immensely to the 
constitution of a West German political identity as victims of the war, in which the expellees 
were a particular and prominent “community of fate.” His writings are representative of the 
discourse on the expulsions within the FRG by 1950. Yet they also profoundly influenced how 
the forced migrations were discussed: His style proved highly popular, and pulp authors and 
German tabloids attempted to emulate Thorwald’s methods. Above all, Thorwald unquestionably 
shaped how broad segments of the public perceived “flight and expulsion.” The “symbolic 
aggregation” purporting to represent “typical” expellee experiences shaped the narrative of 
“flight and expulsion,” and articulated a narrative that dominated discourse into the 1960s. 
Lastly, as we shall see, Thorwald’s images appeared frequently elsewhere, and proved the source 
of many a memory of the expulsions. 
 
The Red Flood and the Heroic Wehrmacht: Two Pillars of “Flight and Expulsion” 
 
As has already been argued, authors like Thorwald or the Schieder Commission engaged 
in a streamlining of experiences at odds with the historical record. The comparison between 
narratives and sources cast a different light on two of the main actors who populated “flight and 
expulsion” scenes in West Germany. In popular histories, newspaper articles, and other media of 
the 1950s and 1960s, an apolitical and heroic Wehrmacht sacrificing itself to buy precious time 
for fleeing civilians and opposing a seemingly heartless and barbaric Red Army constituted the 
most consistent themes. The myth of the Wehrmacht as savior of refugees and salacious claims 
about Soviet savagery remain powerfully entrenched, yet archival testimonies question this 
powerful element of German memory of the war.  
Soviet cruelty permeated nearly every iteration of “flight and expulsion.” As has been 
explained, racialized notions of “Mongolian” hordes underlined assumptions of unspeakable 
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horror that unfolded wherever the Red Army arrived. “An Asiatic storm of violence cast Silesia 
into apocalyptic darkness in 1945,” Johannes Kaps explained.157 Readers of Stern learned of 
when “the times of the Mongolian invasions returned.”158 Imagery of a “red flood” or “red 
bulldozer” impressed the unprecedented ferocity and scale of suffering upon audiences.159 
Narratives emphasized cruelty and bloodlust, and even when highlighting acts of 
humanitarianism, the magnanimity seemed a drop in the bucket that validated the rule of Slavic 
barbarism.160 Postwar literature suggested unparalleled atrocities that a majority of expellees 
experienced, yet testimonies and a critical reading require a more nuanced understanding of Red 
Army and German civilian interactions that stand at odds with popular assumptions. 
The behavior of Soviet soldiers has found analysis elsewhere already. Of concern here is 
the framing of Red Army actions and their behavior. To begin with, sources reveal an enemy 
capable of extreme violence, but not intent on perpetrating a genocide or deliberate murder 
campaign, as postwar commentators frequently asserted.161 Furthermore, expellee narratives 
typically stripped away context that did not justify, but certainly could explain the enemy’s 
behavior. This can be illustrated by one concrete example of the report of a police officer. By his 
own admission, he and his cousin spent the moments before the Red Army’s arrival destroying 
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incriminating documents. Moreover, the policeman’s basement contained supplies for an entire 
Volksturm company. Enemy soldiers also discovered photo albums that revealed that four sons 
were in the military, with one being in the SS. During the course of ransacking the house, the 
“carrying-on was so comical, that I could not help laughing” at the troopers, who flew into a 
rage. Lastly, the policeman intervened in an execution and claimed to have grabbed the gun. The 
policeman survived all these infractions, but “for some reason” soldiers ultimately shot his 
cousin. “That night I quarreled with the dear Lord. How could, why did something like this have 
to happen?” Accounting for self-aggrandizement, and the tragedy of his cousin’s death 
notwithstanding, the testimony made the case of Red Army soldiers as indiscriminate murderers, 
yet a careful reading could also support a more nuanced picture: Even when encountering a 
belligerent Nazi with weapons and sense of superiority, it did not warrant the use of the gun.162    
Presented as a case of inexplicable cruelty to readers, the particular account revealed the 
tendency of postwar narrations to elide motivations—particularly when they broached the 
subject of Nazism—of the murderers and portray scenes of irrational bloodlust. The catalysts for 
violence, however, were numerous. As Norman Naimark found, the Red Army frequently 
encountered a defeated yet nevertheless conceited foe, and the perceived arrogance and airs of 
superiority infuriated and goaded the victors into degrading and humiliating the “master race” 
that viciously ravaged the Soviet Union.163 In letters home, they contemplated avenging lost 
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family members and compatriots.164 Fliers such as the one distributed before the January 12, 
1945 offensive, which recalled the “corpses of all the innocent from the mass graves” that now 
marched with them toward Berlin, heightened emotions. The “boots and shoes of those men, 
women, and children shot or gassed in Maidanek” inspired soldiers for the last assault on the 
fascist foe.165 The thought of the enemy’s crimes, which many soldiers witnessed or close family 
members fell victim to, undoubtedly lingered on many a mind as they entered into Germany. 
Expellees themselves sometimes fleetingly mentioned receiving explanations from their 
tormentors. Soviet troops cited their Jewish heritage or other horrors perpetrated by Germans 
against their families as the reason for their retribution.166 Asked for the reason why he opened 
fire on fleeing refugees, a Soviet officer explained that “German soldiers also shot dead [Soviet] 
women and children.”167 Atina Grossman found that “[a]gain and again in German recollections 
of what Russian occupiers told them, the vengeful memory summoned was not a parallel 
violation by a German raping a Russian woman, but of a horror on a different order: it was the 
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image of a German soldier swinging a baby, torn from its mother’s arms, against a wall—the 
mother screams, the baby’s brains splatter against the wall, the soldier laughs.”168  
Rationales—whether motivated by vengeance, hatred, greed, combat fatigue, or human 
error—never matter to the dead. They are of incisive importance for interpreting events, 
however. Explanations of the 1950s remained influenced by Nazi commentators, for whom the 
enemy’s intentions seemed obvious: The violence stemmed from “the desire to annihilate which 
has resulted from the years of hate propaganda against the Germans,” as Wehrmacht intelligence 
argued in early 1945.169 The regime cajoled the public into rabid resistance by attributing enemy 
crimes as the work of vile propagandists such as “the Jew Ehrenburg.”170 The press attributed the 
waves of refugees that presaged the looming catastrophe to the “onslaught of the Bolsheviks.”171 
Minister of Finance Ludwig Graf Schwerin von Krosigk took to the radio on May 2, 1945 to 
discuss the “stream of desperate, starving people chased by dive bombers fleeing westward from 
unspeakable terror, from murder and defilement” and condemn the “iron curtain” that obscured 
the Bolshevist crimes from the world.172 By blaming the regime’s death throes on communist 
forces, the Nazi leadership absolved itself from responsibility for suffering civilians while 
cultivating a narrative of fear that would hopefully inspire all to fight to the last bullet. 
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Notions that the inferno in the German East was but the natural outcome of communist 
sub-humans plotting to annihilate Germany therefore resonated profoundly after 1945, and 
formed a basis for subsequent memories of Soviet and Slavic violence. For postwar 
commentators attempting to interpret the enemy’s intentions, wartime narratives provided a 
helpful framing. Whether consciously or unwittingly, they adopted tropes proffered by Nazi 
propaganda, and framed the violence as evidence of communist directives that drove the 
brutality, as the previous chapter argued. The combination of supposed historic Slavic aggression 
and primitiveness—expressed in “destructive Magyar nationalism,” Czechoslovakian Hussitism, 
or “pan-Slavic-imperialism”— with Bolshevism explained German victimhood.173 These 
explanations reflected and further reinforced assessments of individual witnesses of violence 
ostensibly aimed at “exterminating us Germans.”174 But unexpected benevolent gestures, briefly 
touched upon above, call into question the simplified and widely believed narrative of 
bloodthirsty Bolsheviks created by Nazi propaganda and reified in postwar accounts.175 
Moreover, the discernable shock when the enemy did not live up to the terrifying images reflects 
understandable immense fears, as well as the effectiveness of Goebbels’s propaganda.176 These 
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images, entrenched in German minds, colored memories of the enemy and carried into the 
postwar period, as testimonies reveal with their descriptions and racialized language. 
The Red Army and callous Nazi ideologues habitually contrasted sharply with those 
ostensibly easing civilian suffering: The Wehrmacht. Frequently, the literature depicted the army 
valiantly struggling to save the population from a cruel fate.177 Based solely on the fact that the 
navy ferried 1.5 million refugees to safety, or that thousands of desperate civilians managed to 
catch rides with retreating army units, the notion of the Wehrmacht’s final months as an 
elaborate rescue operation seem compelling. No standing policy, however, prioritized civilians. 
In early March, the Nazi Party issued five priority levels for train transport, where transportation 
of civilians ranked last; in parentheses, the document noted that there “practically were no more 
refugee trains.”178 That same month, Hitler decreed that the evacuation of civilians should come 
second to military priorities.179 The 1.5-2 million evacuees who found salvation on trains or ships 
were fortunate beneficiaries only after military personnel and material loaded up. 
West German collective memory seemingly overlooked the reality that no official order 
counselled the Wehrmacht to sacrifice itself for the wellbeing of the population, and instead 
elevated its final stand into a heroic act. Numerous testimonies testify that the military did 
intervene to help, praising dutiful officers who for instance stopped fleeing trucks and ordered 
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them to take on women and children.180 As one refugee attested, the Wehrmacht “did their 
utmost to help refugees.”181 The collapsing front provided enough examples of individual 
Wehrmacht members casting a protective hand over beleaguered civilians, so that postwar 
celebrations of unparalleled selflessness ring true. 
But altruism and bravery appear rather exceptional when examining archival sources 
even superficially. Since much of the population refused to leave, the regime with assistance of 
the military often implemented coercive evacuation measures. Furthermore, the disintegration of 
military order in the face of the enemy’s irresistible onslaught enveloped noncombatants as well: 
Capriciousness, indifference, outright violence against civilians, and actions that prevented or 
complicated flight are among the most consistent themes in the mountain of sources. 
Condemnations and recollections of party and military officials as tormentors of expellees 
permeate the thousands of testimonies collected by the Schieder Commission. The historians did 
little, however, to refute popular notions that the military acted as a savior of refugees, fighting 
steadfastly to the last in order to buy the fleeing population precious time.  
Unsurprisingly, a shattering military fighting to the death frequently failed to live up to 
such images, and the conduct of soldiers often stoked resentment. Witnesses complained of 
military personnel occupying houses, evicting families, and destroying property.182 Already 
during the Soviet summer offensive of 1944, the Nazi Party received daily “complaints over the 
unheard of manner in which these soldiers are behaving,” which included theft and destruction of 
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private property throughout the eastern borderlands the province.183 An East Prussian judge 
protested the poor comportment of soldiers during the October counteroffensive that freed parts 
of the region from Soviet occupation, stating that most returning refugees found their shops 
plundered and wardrobes kicked in. The enemy appropriated very little, he noted, and instead the 
Wehrmacht “acted like vandals,” adding that “conspicuous quantities of luxury goods [were] 
sent to relatives via mail.”184 Not all appropriation was for personal gain, yet it rankled civilians 
and had serious consequences nonetheless. In the fall of 1944, the military increasingly 
confiscated horses, wagons, and vehicles to compensate for enormous losses incurred between 
June and October, which meant that thousands could not flee in early 1945.185 Farmers watched 
furiously as their livestock ended up in field kitchens, with no compensation.186  
That the Wehrmacht proved equally as capable of exhibiting the debauchery and 
corruption typically reserved for descriptions of Nazi Party apparatchiks found little attention 
after 1945. The same can be said of the increasing displays of fatalism which alarmed and 
disgusted civilians. With the frontlines now running through German soil, civilians got a close 
look at the demoralization of the common soldiery, expressed in open drunkenness and defeatist 
comments.187 With discipline shattering, the Wehrmacht frequently presented itself as a defeated 
force rather than a bulwark. One East Prussian recalled her shock when soldiers “making 
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themselves at home” in her house declared the war to be over.188 Others were dismayed by 
panicked soldiers forcing their way into homes to “hole up behind luggage, between chair and 
table legs,” and hide from roaming military police searching for deserters.189 In Pillau, where 
tens of thousands hoped to escape on ships, soldiers bypassed blockades by tearing children from 
their mothers to pass them off as their own, while others donned women’s clothing.190 The sight 
of shattered, fleeing units forced expellees to realize that they misplaced their hopes in their 
military, an anguished insight continuously coming to the fore in testimonies.191 
In addition to these psychological blows, numerous accounts testified to the brutality of 
authorities. Heavy-handed measures to force civilians to depart against their will “destroyed the 
last link between the Party and the population.”192 Soldiers forcibly threw civilians from homes 
or threatened with executions if they remained.193 Refugees complained of “military police 
[who] constantly came” and harangued inhabitants.194 Seeing flight as “hopeless,” some took to 
hiding from patrols to avoid being “captured” and evicted.195 Contemporaries condemned 
sending women and children into subzero conditions and combat zones as “one of the worst acts 
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of madness of National Socialism”196 Efforts of the regime to use propaganda of Red Army 
atrocities to encourage departures did not convince all, who instead dismissed the “horror 
stories” as exaggerations.197 As pervasive as fear of Soviet soldiers may have been, many viewed 
compulsory evacuation “with all means” as a pointlessly cruel policy that exposed civilians to 
“the greatest dangers and challenges” and subjected them “to every air attack, every volley from 
planes.”198 It was, as one Breslau priest noted in his diary, a “crime against the German people, a 
rush into death,” but one which authorities accepted.199 The author went even further: The forced 
evacuation amounted to “one of the worst acts of madness of National Socialism.”200 
 “Instead of the warrior helping the refugee, the refugee had to help the warrior save his 
life,” a refugee summarized.201 Logically, a fighting force must maintain its operational 
capabilities, and no military could be expected to curtail its movements. But this had serious 
ramifications for millions of civilians caught in the maelstrom. Moreover, it became apparent 
that some movement was not bound by dictates of combat, but the catastrophic collapse of the 
Wehrmacht. Civilians observed cars filled with officers and their baggage race past.202 Soldiers 
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cursed and threatened their countrymen who hindered their retreat.203 One soldier recalled 
encountering a trek stuck in the snow: “’Soldiers, help us!’ they beg of us. But it is pointless, and 
we continue. The floodgates have opened, and everyone now fights for their own survival.”204  
Even the regime noted the “hardly pleasant reports of refugees over the dishonorable 
comportment of members of the Wehrmacht.”205 A trek leader arriving in Landsberg decried 
how the only representatives of the state he had seen were ones who “fled past us at full 
speed…and ruthlessly shoved our trek wagons to the side. For hours sometimes we had to stand 
on the street, so that the armed forces could tear out quicker. They did not care what happens to 
women and children. The scene at the end looked thus, that the police formed the vanguard, the 
Wehrmacht the middle guard, and the trek with women and children the rearguard.”206 With such 
ignominious displays, it hardly surprises that refugees recalled the trek as “probably the most 
horrific crime ever perpetrated upon the German people.”207 
Self-preservation explains the callousness of some retreating units, yet ideological zeal 
proved just as harmful.  In March, Hitler directed the military to destroy anything of value that 
could not be saved from the enemy.208 The demolition of bridges could serve strategic purposes, 
yet doomed refugees on the other side of the river. The destructive will compounded civilian 
suffering in other ways as well. In Braunsberg, where many thousands resolved to remain, the 
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Wehrmacht’s targeted detonation and burning of churches and other public buildings, including 
the water and gas works, left the city a desolate moonscape that made postwar life difficult.209 In 
the interest of preventing supplies from “falling into enemy hands,” a commander in East Prussia 
ordered his men to run over a herd of cattle with their tanks and machinegun.210 Elsewhere, 
authorities destroyed mounds of food, preventing Red Army soldiers as well as Germans from 
profiting.211 Given the wave of mass starvation after occupation, such wanton destruction proved 
especially disastrous for those who remained in the German East. The scorched earth policies 
carried out by the Wehrmacht did not benefit the population in the slightest. 
Perhaps nowhere does the gulf between myth and reality become more evident than in 
testimonies describing the so-called “fortress cities,” where Hitler demanded that “every square 
meter…be defended vehemently.”212 Breslau, the most notorious, withstood the onslaught of the 
Soviets for nearly three months, capitulating on May 6, 1945. The defense of these cities was led 
by fanatical National Socialists who ignored the suffering and petitions of the beleaguered 
civilians; in Elbing, women and children marched on the commandant’s headquarters to demand 
he heed Soviet calls for surrender for the sake of the civilian population, repeatedly announced 
via loudspeakers.213 Civilians did not just suffer through combat, however. Soldiers plundered 
warehouses, seizing alcohol that fueled bouts of drinking.214 Witnesses recall troops and even 
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officers plundering homes.215 In Breslau, pastor Peikert’s diaries testify to the city’s fury over the 
fanaticism and corruption of not just the party, but military as well. Soldiers forcibly evicted 
civilians at gunpoint, plundered, methodically burnt down entire streets to create defensive 
positions, and dismantled graveyards to build barricades. “These soldiers no longer have the 
faintest feeling of responsibility for their own people, instead they are their greatest enemies and 
oppressors,” Peikert recorded, noting that nearly every person he spoke with longed for surrender 
and desired the arrival of Soviet forces that would end their misery.216 
Considering the ferocity of the Soviet onslaught, the radicalism of a collapsing genocidal 
regime, and disintegration of the Wehrmacht that was losing 300-400,000 men a month in the 
final stages of the war, the recollections of the witnesses unsurprisingly reflect the Third Reich’s 
death throes, aspects of which moreover would be found in any military facing cataclysmic 
defeat.217 The fact that not just “the Nazis” fanatically clung to notions of a miraculous final 
victory and zealously struggled at all costs to prolong the war nevertheless remains hidden 
between the lines, or is reduced to fleeting remarks, in postwar accounts. That many expellees 
did not view Soviet barbarism as the sole or predominant source of their misery, or that coerced 
flight sealed the fate of thousands, also remains muted and absent from popular memory.   
Despite the avalanche of evidence to the contrary, why do the indifference of the military 
and its ideological fervor fail to register in collective memory? Why does the Wehrmacht as 
savior continue to enjoy currency? Jürgen Thorwald emerged as a decisive purveyor of these 
notions, as his books habitually exonerated the military: Depictions of rational and incorruptible 
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soldiers and a lionization of their sacrificial duty permeated Thorwald’s works.218 Not only did 
he differentiate between the sober military and the fanatical and delusional regime leadership 
through an evocative literary style, Thorwald based his writing on extensive interviews with 
generals who had a strong interest in presenting themselves in a heroic light. Heinz Schön also 
played a role: Recruited by the Forschungsstelle Ostsee (Baltic Sea Research Center) in 1963, 
the author helped propagate positive narratives of the navy as a savior of refugees on behalf of 
the institute’s staff, many of whom directly participated in Operation Hannibal.219 
Indeed, military luminaries themselves successfully construed their roles as heroes, and 
manicured their image in the early Federal Republic. Hans Dieter Berenbrok, a former officer in 
the navy, adopted a pseudonym to recount the perspective of veterans and contribute to the 
glorification of the navy and its role in rescuing refugees.220 Berenbrok painted a picture of the 
German military resisting Nazi calls for a battle to the last man, dedicated instead to the defense 
of civilians in spite of certain defeat. “Operation Hannibal” thus transformed into a deliberate—
and largely successful—valiant effort that constituted the “greatest rescue action in history.”221 
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Wehrmacht generals also eagerly justified their service.222 Between 1951 and 1961, four 
separate self-serving accounts appeared from commanders who served in the German East.223 
Friedrich Hoßbach assured audiences that first and foremost in his mind was the “moral 
obligation” toward civilians, and that the “deliberations for the conduct of the struggle” 
prioritized their fate.224 His January 1945 memos complaining of treks blocking roads and 
observation that “the civilian population has to remain behind…That sounds cruel, but 
unfortunately it cannot be helped” went unmentioned.225 Similarly, Otto Lasch, commandant of 
the fortress city Königsberg, attested that he realized immediately that “all efforts to save this 
wonderful land and its inhabitants would be in vain if a miracle didn’t happen.”226 He could not 
prevent the “horrific fate” that befell East Prussia and its capital, despite personal trips to the 
frontlines to oversee the transport of civilians to the port city of Pillau.227 Lasch even suggested 
that he was a sort of hero, vigorously asserting that he alone reached the decision to capitulate on 
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April 9th in the face of vehement protests of “prominent people of the party.”228 Overall, Lasch 
wanted to counter allegations of a “panicked flight” of units under his command and illustrate 
that “even in a hopeless situation there were still men who true to their sense of duty were 
prepared up to the last engagement.”229 The combination of regret over the catastrophe and 
solemn pride in the prowess of his fighting force—and that the two might be interconnected—
went unnoticed, as did the fact that waiting on a miracle cost some 50,000 lives.  
Perhaps the most successful propagator of notions of holding actions to save civilians 
was Hitler’s successor, Admiral Karl Dönitz. With Hitler dead and the war lost, the Führer’s 
successor exhorted his forces on April 30, 1945 to continue fighting to “save German blood in 
the East” from “Russian despotism.”230 The “blood and soil” connotations that revealed his 
National Socialist worldview disappeared the following day, when Dönitz justified the 
continuation of the war to “save hundreds of thousands…from enslavement and 
extermination.”231  In his war diary, Dönitz acknowledged that “Russian behavior toward the 
civilian population…is measured and reserved,” so that his public appeals concealed ideological 
motivations to continue the desperate struggle.232 After capitulation on May 9, 1945, Dönitz sang 
hymns of praise: “What the German Wehrmacht in fighting and the German people in suffering 
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achieved in these six years is unprecedented in history and in the world. It is an unparalleled act 
of heroism. We soldiers stand without stains on our honor.”233  
Dönitz echoed these themes in postwar efforts of portraying the delayed capitulation as a 
humanitarian gesture and spinning fables of personally ordering evacuations of millions of 
civilians via the sea. Far from battling to the last out of ideological convictions, Dönitz 
“surmised the saving of the East German population as the first duty that the German soldier 
could yet fulfill. If we soldiers already were pained that we could not save the homeland of the 
East Germans, we could under no circumstances leave them in the lurch. It was 
therefore…necessary that the soldier…continue to fight in order to save the German population 
of the East”234 His ruminations enjoyed broad appeal: In 1958, the illustrated newspaper Quick 
serialized excerpts of his autobiography under the title “I render an account.”235 For the 
remainder of his life, Dönitz engaged in mythmaking endeavors: “The German people fearfully 
fled westward from the encroaching Russian army in order to find safety there, and the German 
soldier, who no longer wanted to struggle against the West, continued to fight in the East in the 
belief that he thereby could still save the lives of women and children.”236  
Indeed, popular magazines of the 1950s particularly uncritically accepted avowals of 
faithful, duty-bound soldiers defending their fatherland in the face of the Soviet horde, as we 
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have seen. “Sad and embittered,” Stern readers learned, the soldiers witnessed the suffering of 
refugees; “they too become refugees and attempt, pursued by the enemy, to save themselves.”237 
Brave officers—often with a love story connection to a refugee—selflessly threw themselves 
into the breach, charging with machine gun in hand against Soviet soldiers about to rape 
refugees.238 Expulsion novels also featured stalwart officers as protagonists working 
“continuously under the propagandistic bluster of criminal Gauleiter” in the face of hopeless 
odds to buy fleeing civilians precious time.239 Even national newspapers featured reports, usually 
coinciding with anniversaries of the last months of the German East, decried the “insanity” of the 
final struggle, as seen in Christ und Welt’s May 1949 “Did Breslau Have to Die.” The blame for 
the destruction nevertheless remained at the feet of the Soviet beleaguers and Nazi Party.240  
 Remarkably, expellee papers echoed these themes and even exceeded themselves in 
praise of the military, despite a readership consisting overwhelmingly of eyewitnesses whose 
experiences fundamentally challenged the neat black-and-white dichotomies drawn in the 
Federal Republic. On the five year anniversary of the flight, Wir Ostpreuβen informed readers of 
how “General Hoβbach wanted to fight free the way westward for the East Prussian 
population…and how Hitler and Koch foiled these intentions.”241 Basing the article on 
Thorwald’s descriptions of the general’s inner dialogues, the article alleged that Hoβbach 
contemplated ignoring higher orders prohibiting a breakout attempt, and interpreted his 
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acquiescence as a tragic deference to “obedience” to his oath.242 While sitting in his plane to 
Berlin, the editors speculated, Hoβbach was “followed by the shadows and voices of those who 
would have cheered his determination” to carry out a great rescue operation.243 All of this, the 
paper added in bold words, was prevented by Hitler and Koch. Instead of condemning 
Hoßbach’s moral failings, the hapless general should “go down in history.”244 
 The Silesian press issued similar plaudits. In July 1949, Breslauer Nachrichten printed a 
lengthy report on the defense of Breslau which was not intended to “affix wreaths of glory or 
raise questions of guilt.”245 Despite professed objectivity, the report attributed much of the city’s 
destruction to the general, faceless havoc of war, failing to mention that the Wehrmacht carried 
out much of the wholesale demolition of entire districts to create defensive positions. Moreover, 
while lamenting the futility of the hold-out, the paper surmised that the ultimate intention was a 
breakout attempt in which 200,000 civilians could escape. Why this never materialized, or why 
the fortress did not surrender until two days before Germany’s capitulation, were due to fears of 
radical elements within the party that would obstruct these efforts. Less than a year later, the 
paper ran yet another feature on Breslau’s “last days” reiterating these themes, casting repeated 
Soviet calls for surrender as “lovely promises” that left the inhabitants unmoved.246  
Nowhere were the contradictions between handwringing over irrational fighting and 
justifications for bitter defense starkest than in the nationalist Der Schlesier, which in its ten year 
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anniversary of the “Silesian Passion” vocalized a solemn pride in the Wehrmacht.247 The fight 
for Breslau was simultaneously “senseless” and “pointless,” as well as “heroic.” The population, 
however, did not lose hope, even as they cowered in basements while the defenders fought “in 
bitter street battles.” Any blame lay at the feet of the Gauleier Hanke, who absconded at the last 
moment from an airfield he forced civilians to build after demolishing entire city blocks, as well 
as the cruel enemy. The Wehrmacht frequently appeared in the paper’s pages as a force which 
“lastly did not believe in the ‘Final Victory,’ but to the last man knew that German earth was 
being defended and with complete sacrifice for German women and children, as if they were 
their own, applied himself in order to protect them from the Red flood.”248 
Later that month, the paper published an account of how “ragtag bands of troops 
accomplished the miracle of contesting the fortress up to the day of the general capitulation of 
Germany in the face of a far superior enemy.”249 The author reprinted a supposed speech of the 
first commandant, General von Ahlfen—portrayed as a calm, objective father-like figure—in 
which he insisted that the priority was “the protection of women and children for as long as we 
can still carry a weapon.” “That the siege is short and tolerable for all” was the general’s 
innermost wish, the reader was assured. Later that year, an article titled “Defended Against 
Fivefold Advantage” once again reminded readers of the “heroic fight for the fortress of 
Breslau.”250 Occasion for the piece was the release of the last commandant, Hermann Niehoff, 
from Soviet captivity, who after ten years informed Silesians that he surrendered in order to 
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prevent further “useless bloodshed”; that this decision, by his own admission, came only “at the 
moment that Adolf Hitler was dead, the Eastern Front had collapsed, and the continuation of a 
successful fight was hopeless” went without criticism. Indeed, “no objections about the fighting 
leadership” could be raised: “May all stand politically to the events of the last months of the war 
as he wishes: the greatness of the humane service of the soldiers of the German Empire and the 
tragedy that lies in all the occurrences will for all times remain recorded in the annals of history.”  
Why have the annals of history been so kind to the Wehrmacht’s role in the flight of the 
East German population? For decades, the exculpating accounts of the generals and media 
images from authors such as Schön or Thorwald cemented the view of an ennobled Wehrmacht 
in the West German collective memory of the war. Added to this were filmic treatments such as 
Hunde, wollt ihr ewig leben, Des Teufels General, Der Arzt von Stalingrad, or Die Brücke, 
which reiterated themes of the common soldiery fighting for Germany and not National 
Socialism and provided powerful images of a true German military man fighting against 
overwhelming odds while attempting to outwit crazed Nazi zealots. Partially this reflected the 
spirit of the 1950s, yet the distancing from National Socialist ideology and questions of 
responsibility also aided in the formation of democratic institutions and Western integration. It is 
no surprise that portrayals which rehabilitated the regular army and notions of a heroic stands for 
Western values coincided with West German rearmament and joining of NATO in 1955.251 Cold 
War battle lines made narratives of heroics in the face of the Soviet flood fit within the postwar 
societal consensus. Moreover, because 17 million men served in the military, it should hardly 
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surprise that such notions resonated broadly. Casting the German military’s final struggle as a 
humanitarian mission offset the shadow of participation in a genocidal war, and offered a 
palliative that gave the conflict and suffering the semblance of meaning. The human need for 
venerated heroes is only amplified in “flight and expulsion” accounts of miraculous escapes from 
death or danger, where villains and champions give the narrative coherence and significance.252  
The hospitable incubator of 1950s West German culture and society may explain a 
natural emergence of notions of Soviet barbarism and Wehrmacht valor. But how can one 
account for the voices buried in the archive that did not make it into the narrative and which 
would have questioned these framings?  Voices that undermined these assumptions did not fit 
into this framework, and faded into obscurity: They served no purpose politically, and detracted 
from a West German victimhood discourse. Partially, this happened organically. The efforts of 
Wehrmacht generals and regime elites to rehabilitate themselves reveals that memory politics 
also must be taken into account. The same can be said of expellee authors, who—sometimes 
against the views of many of their constituents who lived through the conflagration—not only 
endorsed the Manichean portrayals of cruel Soviets, fanatical Nazis, and victimized Germans: 
They actively worked to construct and disseminate them.  
 
Memory, History, and Myth: Nemmersdorf, Aussig, and Ilja Ehrenburg 
 
While it remains difficult to parse what aspects of the “flight and expulsion” narrative 
emerged organically because they reflected psychological truths, and which arose due to willful 
distortion, three case studies grant insight into how the layering of memory and construction of 
history looked in practice. In order to excavate the powerful narrative of merciless Soviet 
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soldiers, one must examine the lingering memory of Nazi propaganda in postwar West Germany 
that echoed in the testimonies largely recorded in the early 1950s. As mentioned above, estimates 
of the number of dead in expellee reports yielded surprisingly mixed results. Authors’ estimates 
curiously tended to skyrocket depending on notoriety: In communities surrounding 
Nemmersdorf, where Soviet troops ostensibly massacred 26 Germans and 50 French POWs in 
October of 1944, numerous respondents specifically cited Nazi press reports as the source of 
their knowledge and typically alleged scores of deaths.253 Headlines such as “The Blood Bath of 
Nemmersdorf,” one respondent recounted and underlined for emphasis, continued to reverberate 
in expellee memory.254 Despite frequently admitting that they had not witnessed atrocities 
themselves, the knowledge of brutal excesses and self-evidence of Soviet barbarism translated 
into authoritative testimonies on what had transpired in East Prussia. 
The toxic mixture of racism, terrifying imaginations enflamed by propaganda, 
recollections profoundly shaped by wartime trauma, and postwar discourse unsurprisingly 
formed into a dizzying mosaic of memories after 1945. Nowhere does this become more evident, 
and the postwar streamlining and construction of expellee narratives more tangible, than with 
Nemmersdorf. Already detailed in the first chapter, the focus here is not what happened in the 
East Prussian hamlet, but what happened with the massacre. The first stage of myth-making 
began with Joseph Goebbels, who used the grisly discovery for a “massive press campaign” 
warning of the consequences should Bolshevism prevail in the war.255 On October 27, the Nazi 
                                                 
253 One respondent estimated that of the 600 inhabitants of Nemmersdorf, at least 40% had been murdered. Though 
she was not there, the author assured that her brother could attest to the “atrocities” and at least 60 victims. BArch 
Ost-Dok 1/19, 411. In neighboring Schweizertal, a respondent claimed to know of more than one hundred who were 
shot in Nemmersdorf. BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 584. 
254 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 191.  
255 Elke Fröhlich, ed., Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. 15 (München: K.G. Saur Verlag, 1993), 110. 
507 
 
Party organ Völkischer Beobachter shocked readers with news of “The Raging of the Soviet 
Beasts,” while regional headlines warned of “Bolshevik Bloodlust” and “Bestial Murderous 
Terror.”256 Press reports of “people nailed to walls alive,” grounded on a single corpse found in a 
nearby village with wounds to the hands, counted as among the most heinous discoveries made 
by the soldiers retaking the town.257 
The expectedly lurid Nazi press did not mention grotesque postwar claims of Soviet 
soldiers crucifying six naked women to barn doors. Witnesses reported conflicting sights as well. 
The diary of General Werner Kreipe, who arrived hours after Nemmersdorf’s recapture, noted 
women and children nailed to barn doors and ordered photographs to document the horror. None 
have ever been found.258 Colonel-General Georg-Hans Reinhardt, also present afterward, wrote 
to his wife that “Bolsheviks had ravaged like wild beasts, including murder of children, not to 
mention acts of violence against women and girls, whom they had also murdered.”259 The journal 
of a soldier who participated in the recapture of the hamlet recorded an old man pierced with a 
pitchfork and left hanging on a barn door, and sights “so terrible that some of our recruits run out 
in panic and vomit.”260 A Wehrmacht intelligence report with interviews of witnesses confirm 
the grim discovery of 26 corpses with shots to the head, but made no mention of any crucifixions 
                                                 
256 “Das Wüten der Sowjetischen Bestien,” Völkischer Beobachter, October 27th, 1944, 1; and Kershaw, The End, 
115. See also Kurt-Lothar Tank, “Das Grauen von Nemmersdorf,” Völkischer Beobachter, October 28th, 1944, 1. 
With salacious descriptions of rapes and murdered infants, Tanks warned readers that these atrocities were part of a 
program of annihilation based on orders of the reviled “Jew Ehrenburg.”  
257 Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944, 50–51. 
258 Kershaw, The End, 113. 
259 Kershaw, 114. 
260 Günter Koschorrek, Blood Red Snow: The Memoirs of a German Soldier on the Eastern Front (London: 
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or similar mutilations.261 The entries, witnessed within 48 hours of Soviet withdrawal and 
predating the corrupting influence of Nazi press reports, substantiate a grisly scene.  
But how did the horrors grow ever more salacious and why did the number of dead 
continue to soar after 1945, until the events in East Prussia transformed into a myth which 
inflamed imaginations and anchored itself in German cultural memory? The first postwar 
mention of Nemmersdorf came during the Nuremburg Trials, when defense attorneys introduced 
materials to turn the tables on the accusers. The testimony of a soldier confirmed witnessing 
executed civilians, and at least one crucifixion of a man.262 Testimony from General Dethlefson, 
which largely outlined the Wehrmacht’s exemplary behavior in the Soviet Union, in passing 
mentioned the “martyrdom” of multiple civilians through nailing to barn doors.263 By his own 
admission, he gleaned this information from reports and did not observe them himself.  
It was Dethlefson’s account that likely produced the first public reference to the massacre 
in the 1949 Thorwald series, as the general served as a source for a number of the author’s 
portrayals.264 Thorwald’s subsequent 1950 bestseller recounted the “terrible devastation” in 
Nemmersdorf, where “women were nailed alive to barn doors” and all “women and girls were 
defiled countless times, men and elderly were tortured to death, 40 French prisoners of war 
bludgeoned.”265 A year later, an article in Quick included an illustration of a terrified man 
                                                 
261 Kershaw, The End, 113. 
262 BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 9. The soldier admitted that combat prevented him from “making further observations,” but 
that “afterward I heard from comrades who discovered countless similar cases, and in fact not just in Nemmersdorf 
itself, but also in the neighboring…communities.” 
263 BArch Ost-Dok 2/13, 32. 
264 Jürgen Thorwald, “Ostdeutsches Schicksal,” Christ und Welt, March 24, 1949, 1. 
265 Thorwald, Die grosse Flucht, 18. Elsewhere, Thorwald describes how Red Army troops castrated and crucified 
victims. Thorwald, 63. 
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running from a figure crucified to a barn door which, though it did not mention Nemmersdorf, 
indicated “terrible deeds” that occurred in the German East and introduced the crucifixion motif 
in a widely read magazine.266 
The Nuremburg testimonies were sent on to the Schieder Commission, and ended up in 
its source base. Added to them were postwar reports of inhabitants of the region recorded in the 
1950s, which however could not confirm crucifixions. Many could not even cite violence that 
they themselves witnessed. Instead, they advised the historians to consult Nazi press reports.267  
Clearly, the majority learned of the events and gleaned the necessary information to 
authoritatively speak of atrocities from third parties. Solely one testimony provided meaningful 
details, including that slain Soviet soldiers “all completely had Asiatic facial features”; the author 
did not see them himself, as he arrived days later.268 A 1963 memo presented the most 
convincing impressions of the massacre: An inhabitant who was on the scene and asked by 
authorities to help identify the deceased denied allegations of crucifixions, noting that “there was 
talk of this,” but that victims had perished through gunshots.269  
                                                 
266 “Der Fluch der bösen Tat,” Quick Nr. 39, 1306. The fleeing man was a Pole, and the article described how Polish 
residents encountered ghosts and spirits of murdered Germans that made it “unable for them to enjoy their booty!”  
267 A sample of responses: “The case of ‘Nemmersdorf’…known from the daily press.” BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 586. 
“The known atrocities.” BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 49. “My witnesses [corroborating Nemmersdorf] have died. A report 
about this was in all the papers.” BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 69. “Serious crimes did not occur in the community, but in 
Nemmersdorf mass shootings took place on 20 October. Witnesses were probably present.” BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 
89. “In our community as far as I know there were not many shootings. Terrible crimes…were committed in 
Nemmersdorf. I cannot name witnesses.” BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 94. “In our Kirchdorf many people were shot. 
Nemmersdorf is the name of the place.” BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 140. “Not known in community. In the district the 
notorious atrocities around Nemmersdorf.” BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 189. “I don’t know in my community, but in the 
community of Nemmersdorf…there much blood flowed.” BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 191. “According to testimony the 
crimes in Nemmersdorf are known to me. I can’t name eyewitnesses.” BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 66. 
268 BArch Ost-Dok 1/19, 421. 




The impressions of local inhabitants seemingly provided little useful information for the 
historians, who utilized the 1953 account of the Volkssturm trooper Karl Potrek, who counted 72 
corpses and six women crucified women.270 Both accounts suggest a conflation of witnessed or 
overheard scenes with Nazi propaganda. Another report referencing 62 deaths very well might 
stem from Nazi news reports of 61 total murdered civilians in the region.271 The same might also 
hold true for Potrek, whose emergence as an eyewitness nine years after the massacre shows 
contours of witnessed and confirmed scenes and Nazi propaganda. One must also take into 
account the collective memory of East Prussia: Tales of real and exaggerated atrocities 
perpetrated by Tsarist forces during the First World War were imbedded deeply within the 
memory of the region, and some of the most salacious brutalities centered particularly on 
Nemmersdorf’s district of Gumbinnen.272 The “introduction of Asiatic barbarism onto German 
soil” in 1914/15 received prominent attention from the German press.273 Claims of heinous 
crucifixions emerged as well. 
No villagers corroborated crucifixions; some witnesses alluded to mutilations, but 
Wehrmacht reports did not confirm the worst excesses; Nazi newspapers, which had no reason to 
cover up heinous details in its effort to shock readers into rabid resistance, made one fleeting 
suggestion of a single crucifixion in a nearby town; postwar testimonies and bestsellers, written 
in the midst of reporting of the atrocities, established crucifixions to barn doors and specifically 
                                                 
270 Schieder, Die Vertreibung (Oder-Neiße), 1984, 1:8. 
271 “Lebend an die Wand genagelt—Bisher 61 Opfer des bolschewistischen Mordterrors,” Völkischer Beobachter, 
October 28th, 1944, 1. 
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273 “Russische Greuel,” Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt [Evening Edition], September 12, 1914, 1. 
511 
 
named Nemmersdorf; and by 1953 a historical commission, ostensibly utilizing a methodology 
that weeded out embellished and unsubstantiated reports, accepted the most dubious account as 
accurate and representative of expellee experiences.274 From there, the massacre took on a life of 
its own. In a running series in Stern in 1959, readers learned of Nemmersdorf and “the times 
when the Mongolian invasions returned.”275 Between 1964 and 1993, at least ten publications 
helped cement the notorious atrocity in the public’s mind; eight relied on Potrek’s testimony.276 
The constructors of “flight and expulsion” narratives engaged in outright fabrications as 
well. In a 1949 letter responding to the call for testimonies in Christ und Welt following 
Thorwald’s popular “East German Fate” series, Fritz Leimbach wanted to clarify what happened 
in Nemmersdorf.277 Explaining that Soviet troops announced that civilians should not flee and no 
harm would come to them—a detail nowhere else corroborated—Leimbach claimed that “those 
who believed this announcement can no longer testify,” as they were “all murdered in the most 
                                                 
274 A note in the file earmarked the report, advising that “despite certain exaggerated and lofty sections,” the remarks 
over Nemmersdorf were “useful” for publication. BArch BArch Ost-Dok 2/21, 713. 
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Consequences (London; Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1977); Böddeker, Die Flüchtlinge; Arndt, Ostpreussen, 
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gruesome manner” by a “devil in wild bloodlust.”278 However, Leimbach described an encounter 
between a mother with two children attempting to flee Nemmersdorf and Soviet soldiers that 
ranked as a remarkable “humane gesture”: Unable to flag down a retreating German tank, the 
family was overtaken by an armored car that took them on. Relief turned to dismay as the 
woman realized that she entered a Soviet vehicle. A young officer told her “in good German” 
that she need not despair, indicating on a map where he would bring her. Upon arrival at the 
location, he gave her directions to the German lines with a warning: “You were fortunate to fall 
into my hands. Take care not to generalize this case, as you will suffer. I am an exception.”279 
Leimbach’s letter to “help [Christ und Welt] in its effort to portray for the German people 
and the world the path of suffering of a nation” did not make it into Thorwald’s subsequent 
publications. It also apparently offered little value to the Schieder Commission, to whom the 
account was forwarded and into whose collection it was ultimately filed. Günther Lass found the 
report useful for his 1964 documentation, however, and faithfully recounted Leimbach’s horrific 
scenes and promises of humane German soldiers, albeit with a liberal literary inflection. The 
“glimmer of…humanity in this sea of blood, vengeance, and lust to murder” also found 
reiteration, though Lass suppressed the Soviet officer’s German language abilities. The alteration 
to the parting words, however, were more significant: “You were lucky, but beware, because 
behind us follow Stalin students!”280 Rudolf Grenz also quoted this version in his documentation 
                                                 
278 The mutilations and devastation angered the soldiers, and vindicated the “historical mission of the German 
people of a bulwark of the Western world against the scourge of humanity from the East.” Leimbach claims that at 
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279 Ibid, 127. 
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published by the East Prussian Association.281 The obscure reference to “Stalin students”—
presumably rabid communists fully capable of the perpetrated horrors—and reliance in both 
cases on the most salacious yet also questionable testimony of Karl Potrek, seem a rather clear 
attempt of framing expellee memories in the most dramatic and gripping light. 
The accounts in popular history books meant for broad audiences complimented the 
visual images that helped the massacre to resonate still further. The infamous photographs of 
dead children and women with skirts suggestively raised featured prominently as a terrible 
example of Soviet retribution, even though the images resulted from Nazi documentation: 
Collecting the victims and carrying them together into an open field, authorities staged a horrific 
still life that remains a jarring and notorious scene.282 It therefore was part in the tradition of Nazi 
atrocity propaganda aimed at stoking furious indignation, as when the regime published images 
of the “Bromberg Bloody Sunday” massacre of ethnic Germans at the hands of Polish brigands 
to justify the German attack on Poland. The 1939 campaign failed to remain part of German 
cultural memory because of their obvious propagandistic instrumentalization, yet were 
specifically invoked by Harry Nerad, the press secretary of the Sudeten German association, as a 
specific example of the “power of the image” which expellees should keep in mind.283  
Indeed, many of the iconic photographs of “flight and expulsion” exude powerful 
emotional qualities, although they occasionally are inaccurate. Images of slain civilians variously 
are attributed to massacres in Nemmersdorf or Metgethen, a Königsberg suburb. In many 
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instances, snapshots do not depict German refugees at all but liberated DPs or Volksdeutsche 
“returning home into the Reich,” photographed by Allied journalists or Nazi newsreels 
respectively.284 In most cases, these misrepresentations occurred through sloppy verification of 
sources and the editorial desire for compelling artwork. In other instances, the falsifications were 
more egregious: Images of slain civilians, laying in each other’s arms against the wall that they 
were executed against, in expellee and pop literature represented Sudeten German victims285; in 
reality, the image depicted Czechs murdered by the SS during the Prague Uprising.286  
If Nemmersdorf stands as a quintessential image of the “flight,” the horrific scenes in 
Prague often emerge in images of “expulsion.” Yet of even greater notoriety is the massacre of 
Aussig, a notorious symbol of Sudeten German suffering just as Nemmersdorf is for expellees 
from the German East. The massacre has already been examined in previous chapters. Of note 
here is how accounts of Sudeten German leaders cemented themselves in public discourse, and 
shaped postwar narratives. Of important influence was the 1948 account of Almar Reitzner, one 
of the first descriptions of the event.287 Commissioned by Wenzel Jaksch to depart for 
Czechoslovakia in order to “unveil the propaganda lies of the Czech rulers and educate the 
civilized world of this tragedy,” Reitzner by his own admission undertook the mission to gather 
evidence for political uses.288 Claiming to have witnessed the atrocity by happenstance from a 
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plane flying overhead, Reitzner recounted experiences from second and third hand sources and 
framed them as the conclusions of a meticulous investigation.  
Reitzner’s foundational narrative is important in two regards. First, while he 
acknowledged official estimates of around 120 dead, his arbitrary estimate of between two and 
four thousand set a standard that continued to find frequent citation. Two years later, the Sudeten 
German “white book” seemingly split the difference, and certified 800-1,000 victims. The 
Schieder Commission offered an unattributed estimate of 1,000-2,700, while the Sudeten 
German amateur historian Emil Franzel proposed the round figure of 2,500.289 The dizzying and 
confusing figures vary wildly. The exact figure indeed remains unknown, though scholarly 
consensus ranges between 100 and 150.290  
Secondly, however, Reitzner presented the massacre as a spontaneous outbreak of mob 
hysteria driven by a hatred of Germans and desires for revenge. Sources at the time already 
called this into question: The local population only marginally participated and expressed horror 
over the excesses, which were perpetrated by military and secret service units.291 Anticommunist 
exiles in London also spoke of a disgraceful act: “Lidice was a living memorial of the unholy 
‘furor teutonicus,’ and Aussig rather than anything else rehabilitated the German Nazi murderers. 
The number of victims here was almost quadrupled. Will these crimes not enter history as the 
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‘furor Czechoslovaka plebs’?”292 Perhaps more importantly than being able to point to 
Czechoslovakian condemnation, Reitzner translated and published the denunciation to support 
his thesis of Aussig as a pogrom carried out by a hysterical mob.293 Such notions were 
perpetuated by postwar authors: Jürgen Thorwald explained the source of the ghastly scenes he 
described as a “Slavic temperament” and a “people’s rage” that manifested itself numerous times 
before in European history.294 
Such violence ostensibly distinguished itself from German crimes, or at least offset them 
in the minds of many postwar authors. Comparisons between Aussig and Lidice, for instance, 
were therefore important and frequent after 1945.295 An extreme manifestation of this tendency is 
the 1950 Das andere Lidice (“The other Lidice”) by Erich Kern, who offered “a tally 
comprehensible for all”: Against the “inflated estimates of 184 shot men, 135 women 
incarcerated in concentration camps, and children deported to asylums” in Lidice stood three 
million “disenfranchised, […] debased more than any animal, robbed, plundered, mistreated into 
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insanity and finally murdered in the hundreds of thousands.”296 Whether to relativize German 
war guilt or to capitalize on Lidice’s notoriety as a recognized horrific war crime, the equating of 
Sudeten German suffering with that of Czechoslovakians under Nazi occupation provided the 
former with useful language that nevertheless obscured the relationship between the two fates.  
Nevertheless, it is precisely this narrative that dominated postwar discussions of the 
expulsions.297 Reitzner’s descriptions of the “hell of Aussig,” in which the number of victims 
ballooned and unsubstantiated dramatic “factual accounts” painted apocalyptic scenes, left a 
lasting impression on postwar accounts.298 Herbert Schober’s Jenseits der Grenze, billed as the 
first “novel of an expellee,” for instance culminated in the massacre of Aussig after litany of 
“horror scenes of the expulsions” told with “striking power.”299 Schober’s account of the “bestial 
mass murder in the streets of the city” affirmed Reitzner’s impressions, and in any case reflected 
the fates of many and the “spiritual martyrdom of a people.”300 
 Even a few dozen victims entails a tragedy, and there can be no doubt that a terrible 
atrocity unfolded on the bridge over the Elbe at Ústí nad Labem. Yet research and sources do not 
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support claims of Aussig as an expression of collective popular rage. The framings of the early 
postwar period introduced powerful images, and constructors of expellee narratives presented 
Aussig as the representative experience of Germans in Czechoslovakia. Along with the “Brünn 
death march,” Aussig ranks as a quintessential “flight and expulsion” experience. While violence 
erupted throughout Czechoslovakia in the immediate postwar months, they were far from a 
universal experience. Moreover, the proposition that one of the most heinous excesses stands as a 
“typical” event of the forced migrations fails to differentiate between the phase of the “wild 
expulsions” and the “orderly and humane” transfer. Indeed, the tendency of invoking Aussig as a 
metaphor of the entire expulsion process, and conflation of its distinct phases, left many West 
Germans with a distorted understanding of the forced migrations; the most dramatic and radical, 
yet brief and hardly universal, experiences came to represent the fate of millions. 
Just as certain places and events of “flight and expulsion” still reverberate, a number of 
“villains” particularly responsible for German suffering remain powerfully entrenched fixtures in 
expellee narratives. The dizzying array of voices and convoluted blend of distorted reports and 
political agendas that contributed to notorious boogeymen clearly emerges with Soviet 
propagandist Ilja Ehrenburg, routinely cited as the prime agitator responsible for Red Army 
crimes perpetrated against Germany. Ehrenburg’s infamy was so great that in September 1959, 
after Nikita Khrushchev announced he would travel to the United States with the author, the 
decision aroused much consternation among members of the West German public who regarded 
the former writer as a war criminal. The announcement rekindled memories of Ehrenburg’s 
wartime propaganda. An intrigued Fritz Leimbach contacted the Institute for Contemporary 
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History (IfZ) for a copy of the supposed flier exhorting Red Army soldiers to murder and rape 
German civilians, quoted in General Otto Lasch’s memoirs.301  
To what fliers were Leimbach and his correspondents referring? In the literature, two 
pieces regularly find mention. The first, typically titled Ubej! (“Kill”), called upon the Red 
Army to kill all Germans in their path. The second flier ostensibly encouraged Soviet soldiers to 
“break with violence the racial arrogance of the German women!”302 For postwar authors, the 
exhortations provided prominent evidence of the Kremlin’s extermination plans.303 The “Red 
Army was systematically incited by the propaganda of Ehrenburg…[which] stoked the lust of the 
soldiers with its propaganda of hatred.”304 Others cited it as the main causes of the worst of the 
excesses: “With the exhortations it became clear that Nemmersdorf…conformed to a 
premeditated guideline.”305 Still others felt Ehrenburg tipped the moral scales in the other 
direction: “An appeal that in its atrociousness lets all the violations of international law that the 
National Socialist regime committed…pale in comparison.”306  
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These verdicts rely on problematic sources. Jürgen Thorwald was perhaps the first to 
mention the fliers in a fictionalized account of a Soviet captain exhorting his troops with 
Ehrenburg’s words to destroy a town, burn children alive, rape the women, and castrate and 
crucify the men.307 Elsewhere, Thorwald authoritatively claimed that Ehrenburg “openly and 
hatefully promised Red Army soldiers German women as booty.”308 In 1952, reporter Walter 
Görlitz used similar formulations, yet was the first to add the phrases “violently break the racial 
arrogance” and “take them as justified booty.”309 The previously mentioned 1958 memoirs of 
Lasch reprinted Görlitz’s version, as did the autobiography of Hitler’s successor, Admiral Karl 
Dönitz, which came out in the same year.310 Subsequent publications decades later continued to 
reprint this iteration as a verbatim quotation of the infamous flier.311 As Spiegel noted in 1962, 
the International Biographical Archive—the “Munzinger Archive”—adopted Görlitz’s text; as 
many newspapers rely on the resource, it guaranteed that this version found wide circulation.312 
The incendiary piece that became such object of contempt has never been found. In his 
1959 inquiry, the IfZ directed Leimbach to Lasch, who in turn put him into contact with Kurt 
Dieckert, a collaborator on Lasch’s work and archive director of the Ministry for All-German 
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Affairs.313 Dieckert did not possess a physical copy, but referred Leimbach to the reproduction in 
Thorwald’s Es began an der Weichsel, adding that it may not have been a flier at all but a radio 
broadcast.314 Thorwald’s materials, bequeathed to the IfZ, do not contain the propaganda flier. In 
response to an inquiry from Spiegel in 1962, archivist Hildegard von Kotze explained that the 
institute “turned to all relevant institutions domestically and abroad…but to this day could not 
ascertain the provenience of the quotation.”315 Görlitz likewise could not provide answers as to 
his source.316 The BMVt could not provide evidence.317 Subsequent research in German and 
Russian archives also could not turn up the infamous source.318 Variously attributed to fliers 
found on slain enemy soldiers or intercepted radio broadcasts, only one thing remains doubtless: 
Thorwald provided the first quotation of a nonexistent flier, which Görlitz amended further, and 
since then numerous publications continued to quote this more acidic version. 
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Ehrenburg in fact penned the other contentious essay, Ubej!, but its first full reproduction 
and translation from Russian into English did not appear until 1977. Subsequent German 
publications habitually cut the first half.319 Readers not versed in Russian were therefore not 
exposed to descriptions of German crimes perpetrated in the Soviet Union. Crucially as well, 
postwar authors neglected to reveal the flier’s publication date. Written in 1942, when the Soviet 
Union faced an existential struggle against a foe who systematically starved millions of their 
compatriots and that year initiated the Holocaust, qualms over Ehrenburg’s harsh dehumanizing 
language seem contrived. It moreover seems farfetched that a 1942 appeal could have provoked 
such fury in the Soviet soldiery already hardened by a war of annihilation and firsthand 
knowledge of German crimes three years later. 
Besides removing the context and eliding the reasons for Ehrenburg’s outrage, the 
demands to “kill the Germans” could hardly have applied at the time to civilians in East Prussia. 
Meant were the only Germans Soviet soldiers could strike dead, namely those invaders in 
Wehrmacht and SS uniforms. It is unclear how specifically this exhortation differed from the 
task of British or American forces, who similarly struggled with all means against a regime 
orchestrating murder on an unequaled scale.320 The consistent ignoring, whether willful or 
innocent, of the context of Ubej!—namely the date of its creation and the sources of Soviet 
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indignation and fury—left the propaganda piece a useful document that underlined German 
victimhood, and thereby helped ensure Ehrenburg’s place in German cultural memory. 
There can be no question that Ehrenburg authored emotionally charged appeals to steel 
the Red Army’s fighting spirit.321 Yet what maxims did he pass on to comrades standing at 
Germany’s doorsteps as triumphant conquerors three years later? In Krasnaja Zvezda in 
November 1944, the propagandist reminded that the “Red Army does not go to Germany in order 
to rape women.”322 In a subsequent piece in February 1945, Ehrenburg chided readers who 
imagined that vengeance for “the fascist two-legged animals who…publically raped our women 
requires us in turn to do the same to them. That has never happened and can never happen. Our 
fighters will never let something like this happen.” Wishful thinking cannot change the fact that 
members of the Red Army perpetrated crimes on a large scale. Once historicized, however, the 
essay hardly supports the image of Ehrenburg as a demagogue instigating brutalities in occupied 
Germany. Instead, Ehrenburg called for “order among the troops,” warning those who “violate 
military discipline are committing grave crimes against the homeland.”323 Ehrenburg in fact 
registered dismay over rapes and other excesses he witnessed in the drive toward Berlin.324  
For his part, Ehrenburg vehemently denied the allegations and “was prepared to fall to 
my knees…even before the remains of Hitler” in order to swear that he did not compose the 
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racially charged exhortations.325 For decades, Ehrenburg challenged critics to produce evidence, 
and lamented that the “legend completely invented by a Hitler general survived…all these 
years.”326 Ehrenburg attested that he “knew already during the war that Dr. Goebbels had the 
outright devilish idea to fabricate such an appeal and to sign it with my name.”327 By 1965, and 
in response Ehrenburg’s public disavowals, Thorwald’s editions conceded that Nazi fabrications 
were not unthinkable, but continued to vow that he had himself seen the flier.328  
The former Nazi propagandist was not alone: Many former Wehrmacht members swore 
to have read Ehrenburg’s comments during the war or having heard them from Soviet 
loudspeakers. A staff officer of Army Group Center wrote to the Federal Archive in 1960 that he 
“remembered precisely that…we received various fliers written by Ilja Ehrenburg. There is no 
doubt that in them there was talk of ‘flaxen-haired women as booty.’”329 Klaus von Bismarck—a 
relative of the Iron Chancellor, speaker of the Pomeranian Homeland Association, director of the 
Westdeutscher Rundfunk, and president of the Goethe Institute—recalled that the text was 
distributed among his troops in Danzig.330 The unlikelihood of Soviet broadcasts in German 
appealing to Soviet soldiers aside, if the recollections of German translations circulated on the 
Eastern Front are accurate, they imply at the very least a distillation of Red Army materials by 
Third Reich offices. In 1994, Bismarck revealed that he had come to believe that what he thought 
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as authentic Soviet propaganda materials for decades were in his estimation Nazi fabrications. It 
had been the Soviet dissident and war veteran Lev Kopelev who convinced him: Puzzled by the 
numerous appearances of Ehrenburg in West German “volumes and newspapers,” Kopelev 
found that the “primitive construction” in “very bad Russian” did not correspond to Ehrenburg’s 
style, and suggested an “attempt of the Goebbels-cadre to…strengthen the spirit of resistance.”331  
No evidence points to an outright fabrication of Ehrenburg’s inflammatory writings by 
the propaganda machinery of the Third Reich. This in either case is secondary to the greater 
point: The conviction of having heard or read the murderous declarations point to a cementation 
of Ehrenburg in the narrative of “flight and expulsion.” As Bismarck confided, even during the 
war he “knew quite a lot of Ilya Ehrenburg.”332 A frequent subject of their scorn, the Nazi press 
transformed the Jewish propagandist into a terrifying boogeyman. The National Socialist press 
immediately declared “the Jew Ehrenburg” as the instigator of the Nemmersdorf massacre.333 
Hitler himself denounced the “Stalinist house Jew” in an address to the Wehrmacht in 1945.334 
Unsurprisingly, postwar West Germans therefore contended with a caricature of Ehrenburg 
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largely fabricated by Nazi propaganda. Whether consciously or unwittingly, authors echoed 
wartime contempt when they referred to Ehrenburg as a ruthless “agitator,” the “Soviet Julius 
Streicher,” and specter possessing an “ingenious talent for stoking hatred of Germans.”335  
How ingrained the Soviet author was in German psyches can be seen by periodic public 
outrage whenever the prominent Soviet author came into contact with the Western world. An 
invitation of Ehrenburg by Hans Mandl, vice mayor of Vienna, to an East-West cultural function 
sparked a minor controversy in Austria in 1960. The Austrian People’s Party, the Education 
Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry registered their dismay, while rightwing presses denounced 
Mandl and Ehrenburg and published the Görlitz quotation. Expellees and newspapers in 
Germany joined the fray, with the Frankfurter Allgemeine commenting that the “appeal to the 
final struggle…remains unforgotten in Germany.” Mandl consulted numerous institutes and 
archives, and noted that the allegations remained based on unclear evidence.336 
Two years later, when Kindler Publishers announced a forthcoming translated first 
volume of Ehrenburg’s memoirs, public furor moved Kindler to delay their efforts and contact a 
variety of authorities to clarify the existence of Ehrenburg’s notorious flier; unable to verify its 
existence, the publisher forged ahead with its venture.337 Protestors picketed book stores, while 
other vendors refused to carry it at all. Numerous papers registered their outrage and republished 
the inflammatory appeal. Die Zeit pondered whether “we can allow ourselves” a publication of 
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Ehrenburg’s autobiography, while the radical nationalist Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung accused 
Kindler of delivering a “slap to the face of the German people” and condemned Ehrenburg as a 
“blood-drenched monster in the form of a human.”338 The Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung went so far 
as to publish a “Documentation on the greatest agitator of murder in world history: Ilja 
Ehrenburg.” With passages of authentic texts—edited and without context—and facsimiles, the 
running series also included the controversial appeal. When asked by Der Spiegel why it did not 
include a facsimile of this particular flier, the newspaper explained that limited space and a 
desire not to bore the reader led the editors to decline an original reproduction, which the paper 
nevertheless had in its possession; pressed for details, the Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung lamented 
that the flier had disappeared and could not be found located.339  
The deliberate or unwitting fabrication and distortion starting in the Third Reich and 
continuing into the postwar period cemented Ehrenburg as one of the main culprits and 
bloodthirsty firebrands in “flight and expulsion” narratives. There he joined villains such as the 
demonic Joseph Stalin, conniving Edvard Beneš, callous Winston Churchill, and thousands of 
Red Army “Mongols” and Czech “soldetska” who stood as the symbol of a politics ostensibly 
aimed at the absolute destruction of Germany. References to the Soviet propagandist and his role 
in German suffering were seemingly obligatory and reflexive, and as permanent of a fixture of a 
stylized narration of the forced migrations as the treks and crossing of the frozen Vistula Lagoon, 
the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff or Goya, the fortress cities of Breslau and Königsberg, the 
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massacres of Aussig and Nemmersdorf, and “death marches” from Brünn, and other notorious 




It is not a question of whether Soviet forces perpetrated extreme violence in 
Nemmersdorf or countless other locations in the German East, or whether Czech or Polish militia 
meted out rough justice in cruel and often deadly ways once liberation upended the social order 
in Central Europe. One cannot dismiss German suffering out of hand because of inconsistencies 
or problematic language used to describe intense personal anguish. It is naturally difficult to 
parse what aspects of expellee memories are accurate recollections or distorted reflections 
colored by Nazi and postwar discourse. Doubtlessly in many cases, the contradictions and 
rhetorical flourishes were innocent attempts of arranging intense traumas into a narrative that felt 
authentic and reflected psychological truths: Memories can, after all, remain inaccurate on 
various points of detail, but endure as absolutely true expressions of emotional states that offer 
insight into mentalities and why events are remembered in a certain way. They are 
psychologically true, even when demonstrably at odds with reality. 
At issue are postwar memory politics, and how those pains were recalled, collected, 
interpreted, and disseminated. Purporting to reveal “a true representation of the reality of what 
happened,” as Schieder Commission member Martin Broszat explained, the curators of West 
German memory of the expulsions nevertheless constructed a politicized narrative.341 These 
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authorities stamped their scholarly seal of approval on the real, ficticious, and altered expellee 
testimonies that emerged from the mass of voices. Their authentic voices in turn validated the 
narrative. As the editors of the Dokumentation declared: “We can leave it to the victims…who 
tell of their own experiences.”342 No further elaboration was needed, any doubt unnecessary and 
unseemly. This rubric of “fact” provided a powerful political tool for leveraging victimhood.  
While this layering over time and altering of testimonies to inflect them with greater 
dramatic affect and more powerful meanings may have served the homeland politics of the 
expellee associations and the West German government, they also had one significant side affect. 
Whether for dramatic license, financial gain, or political agendas, postwar actors successfully 
colonized discussions of “flight and expulsion” and framed expellee experiences in such a way 
that they profoundly left a mark on West German memory of the war for decades. Assumptions 
of criminal and brutal Soviet soldiers, as demonstrated in Nemmersdorf or bloodthirsty hysterical 
Czech mobs in Aussig, may have diminished over time, but seven decades on the 1950s 
narratives continue to reverberate. Large portions of German cultural memory remain grounded 
in politically charged constructed narratives forged during the Third Reich and the Cold War.  
Impressions gleaned from books, newspapers, or films echo in memories through the 
generations, blending family experiences and legends with media images into an inseparable 
whole.343 The impact of the postwar discourse can also be measured in the archival files of the 
BMVt. In a failed bid to commission an “expellee movie,” the ministry solicited scripts which 
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show many of the tropes examined in this chapter.344 When asked to conjure the ideal narrative 
of “flight and expulsion,” authors understandably drew from what they knew, which inevitably 
led them to blend personal traumas, overheard stories, or films and articles they consumed. 
The prevelance and saliency remained relatively shortlived, however. As the next chapter 
will examine, growing awareness of Nazi crimes and sweeping cultural changes eroded the 
pillars of support of German victimhood, and which constituted a crucial political identity of 
West Germany in the 1950s. While typically associated with the generational revolt of the late 
1960s, already in the late 1950s the “selective remembering” paradigm started to fracture in the 
face of the need to recognize the Third Reich and the victims of German persecution. The 
receding resonance of “flight and expulsion” narratives can be measured by the historical 
perspective of Schieder and his staff, which evolved substantially over the course of their work.  
Dissapointed by the poor reception abroad, the scholars came to the realization that 
deficiencies mired their work, and required a deeper examination of historical context in order to 
make the forced migrations comprehensible.345 National Socialism and its attempts to racially 
reorder Central and Eastern Europe through extermination, expulsions of “racial inferiors,” and 
the resettling of ethnic Germans needed to enter into any analysis of the war. In 1953, however, 
Schieder compromised and opted to leave out “hot potatoes,” such as the role of the outbreak of 
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war in September 1939, hoping for “necessary consideration for a future volume that will place 
the expulsion process in a larger historical context.”346 When the commission tackled the next 
volumes, the “hot potatoes” proved glaring and inescapable. The source base proved 
problematic, as quite a number of testimonies for the Hungary volume emerged as forgeries.347 
Similar concerns arose with the material for Yugoslavia, which contained contradictions, 
inaccuracies, and falsifications that “in many places raise the suspicion that…through deliberate 
influencing or subsequent corrections, testimonies were lent the appearance of accuracy and 
authenticity.”348 The sloppiness and dishonesty forced the commission to start over.349  
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The problematic testimonies the commission waded through for a decade exasperated 
Schieder.350 Of greater concern was that volumes on these countries and the Sudetenland 
required greater attention on the prehistory of the expulsions, extending to the First World War, 
the emergence of new nation-states, and the treatment of minorities to make postwar policies 
understandable.351 Nazism could no longer remain overlooked, and Schieder lamented to the 
BMVt that “obvious difficulties” would arise in the “collaboration of parties who differ over 
their aims—political on the one hand, scholarly on the other.”352 In 1955, he again urged a 
concluding volume.353 The BMVt approved a draft, yet left the question of publication open, as 
officials dreaded a sweeping treatment of forced migration in the 20th century that undermined 
claims to the unprecedented nature of the expulsions. Attention on Nazi policies furthermore 
provided potential justifications for Allied policy, weakening the FRG’s position at future peace 
negotiations. Schieder, in short, undercut the political objectives of a historical examination of 
the “flight and expulsion.”354 The proposal therefore continued to remain academic.355  
                                                 
350 The issues forced Schieder to acknowledge the crucial obstacle for contemporary historians incorporating 
eyewitnesses into their work: “Nowhere does legend grow more uncontrollably than exactly here, and the horrific 
becomes ever more horrific when it is told from one to the other.” Schieder, “Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus 
dem Osten als wissenschaftliches Problem,” 9. 
351 See BArch B150-4171, vol. 2, Protocol of meeting, January 17, 1955. One can see the commission’s greater 
attention to the historical context when comparing the first two volumes with later publications. While the former 
featured minimal commenting on the testimonies, the subsequent volumes contained longer introductions that 
focused greater attention on the prehistory and historical context for the forced migrations. 
352 Ibid. 
353 See BArch N1228-114, Memo on “Plan des sogenannten Ergebnisbandes,” July 22, 1955. Conze supported 
Schieder’s proposals for a sweeping examination, though he feared the scope and ambition would make the project 
difficult to complete. BArch N1188-4, Conze to Schieder, July 30, 1955. 
354 See BArch B150-4173, Protocol of meeting, March 7, 1958. In a meeting a few months later, Rothfels 
acknowledged that the scope would “raise political difficulties and one would need to discuss embarrassing 
occurrences.” Nevertheless, it seemed impossible to continue the Dokumentation without a rigorous examination of 
the preceding three decades and the Third Reich. BArch N1228-112, Protocol of meeting, December 6, 1958. 
355 Schieder attempted to receive a guarantee the rights to a separate publication detached from the BMVt under the 
independent authority of the commission, but the government dismissed this compromise as well. For more see 
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Undeterred, into the late 1950s Schieder pleaded his case, pointing out that since the 
project’s start, increased attention on the Third Reich and mountains of documents from the 
Nuremburg Trials made the absence of the Nazi dictatorship untenable. In 1961, Schieder argued 
for the political necessity of “seeking to understand the [expulsions] from purely historical 
causes and in some way as a reaction to the NS-politics.” “The attempt of a clarification of the 
backgrounds and interrelationships that ultimately led to the expulsions,” he contended, “are 
without doubt necessary as well as useful for the interests of the politics of the Federal Republic, 
which after all supports the elucidation of the NS-politics.”356  
Government officials continued to stonewall.357 BMVt State Secretary Peter Paul Nahm 
rejected the proposal because it trivialized the expulsions and left a one-sided impression of 
German aggression, admonishing that it spelled the “political suicide” of his ministry.358 Rothfels 
intervened, assuring that the commission noticed the importance of “National Socialist ethnic 
and resettlement and expulsion policies,” which now emerged as a “conditio sine qua non,” only 
through the course of its work. They did not intend to fabricate justifications for the forced 
migrations, but warned that ignoring the crucial historical context would leave a glaring partisan 
impression.359 The doyen of the West German historical guild also failed to move government 
officials: The concluding volume remained a draft and never appeared in print. 
                                                 
Mathias Beer, “Im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Das Großforschungsprojekt ‘Dokumentation der 
Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa,’” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 46, no. 3 (1998): 380–81. 
356 BArch B150-5630, protocol of meeting, July 29, 1961. 
357 In 1963, Schieder attempted a final compromise of reducing the more than 1,000 page manuscript, but 
maintaining a focus on the National Socialist period. BArch N1213-77, Circular Nr. 171, March 18, 1963. 
358 BArch N1188-219, Memo re: discussion from August 1, 1963. 
359 BArch N1213-3, Rofthfels to Nahm, December 11, 1963. 
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 The thwarted concluding volume illustrates a much larger point beyond the intellectual 
eminence and evolution of Theodor Schieder. Just as the Dokumentation’s beginnings reveal 
continuities between the interwar period and the Third Reich with the early Federal Republic, 
ruptures and evolutions also emerged after 1945. For the older and conservative historians who 
entered the academy when it more closely aligned with the prerogatives of the state, and who 
waged a struggle against Versailles through scholarship, the close collaboration with the 
government in the fight to overturn Potsdam did not initially pose professional or moral 
problems. Yet the researchers increasingly challenged the traditional compliance of scholarship 
with politics during the course of their work. The next generation of historians, led by the young 
staff members Martin Broszat and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, went on to break with this orthodoxy 
entirely through a critical social history that examined the issues and themes raised by Schieder 
in a far different Federal Republic of the 1960s and 1970s.360  
The changing perspectives of the commission members, through research findings and 
generational conflict, more importantly reflected a rapidly changing West German social context: 
They presaged coming tensions between German victimhood and the Nazi past which were there 
from the start, but by the 1960s loomed unavoidably. Within a project that sought to document 
expellee suffering and underpin political claims based upon them, German victimhood and the 
Nazi past emerged as indivisible. Schieder’s insights may have come prematurely and ultimately 
failed in the face of governmental opposition, but the handwriting was on the wall: It was getting 
harder to instrumentalize “flight and expulsion.
                                                 
360 To what degree the young researchers’ interpretations influenced Schieder remains uncertain. Nevertheless, he 
himself pointed out that the views of his younger colleagues diverged substantially from his generation’s. BArch 





“INTO THE LAST VILLAGE”: INSTITUTIONALIZING “FLIGHT AND EXPULSION” 
 
In June 1950, a crowd of 20,000 ascended the 550 meter high cliffs just east of the Lower 
Saxon city of Bad Harzburg, where they were greeted by a “giant beer tent…blazing flames, 
pylons, waving banners and galloping crusader knights on high horses.”1 To accommodate the 
throng of visitors, special trains of German Rail ferried attendees from across West Germany to 
the remote enclave. “A mass assembly just as the Germans have always liked them,” British 
High Commissioner Sir Brian Robertson sardonically reported to London.2 The occasion was the 
inauguration of an Ostlandkreuz, a “Cross of the German East,” “for all Germans on this side and 
that side of the zonal border” that ran just below the twenty meter tall wooden crucifix. Visible 
from the GDR during the day, the organizers of the Zentralverband der vertriebenen Deutschen 
(Central Association of Expelled Germans) theorized that the neon lights mounted to the 
structure could be seen for a hundred kilometers beyond the Iron Curtain, “as if a glowing cross 
floats somewhere high up in the heavens,” the expellee press exalted.3 
The thousands of crosses, tablets, and plaques that sprang like mushrooms from the 
ground throughout the Federal Republic in the 1950s and into the 1960s addressed the anguish of 
                                                 
1 “Gesamtdeutsche Fragen. Deutsches Kreuz in Holz,” Der Spiegel 3, January 17, 1951, 8. 
2 Quoted in Stephan Scholz, Vertriebenendenkmäler: Topographie einer deutschen Erinnerungslandschaft 
(Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2015), 192. 
3 “Heute ein Kreuz an der Grenze…”, Ostpreußenblatt, May 5, 1950, 1. 
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millions, and attempted to memorialize the German East by recognizing the experiences of 
refugees violently separated from their homeland. Yet other agendas blatantly accompanied 
somber remembering. The markers attempted to anchor the lost territories, expellee claims, and 
political messages within the psyche of the nation. They must be understood as the physical 
manifestations of the literature discussed in the previous chapter, and an outgrowth of the 
homeland political agendas of expellee associations already examined. In order to demonstrate 
their political power and cement the saliency of their demands, expellee leaders used mass 
gatherings, memorials, museums, and classroom curricula to reinforce their activism. This 
chapter therefore analyzes how expellee leaders attempted to institutionalize their narrative of 
“flight and expulsion” in the political and cultural life of West Germany, in the hopes of 
preserving the German East in the mind of the nation until the day would come that a German 
flag would fly over the lost lands in a reunited Germany once again.  
This chapter also examines, however, the diminishing relevance of the expellees, why 
their cultural activity largely failed to have its desired effect, how expellees responded, and—
most crucially—how this impacted “flight and expulsion” narratives. From the late 1950s 
onward, the homeland associations faced converging challenges that saw their influence wane, 
and with it the saliency of their narrative. Firstly, social-liberal coalition victories in state and 
federal elections ushered in new governments that while not fundamentally opposed to expellees 
certainly brought political reforms at odds with their associations’ goals. Specifically, Chancellor 
Willy Brandt’s normalization of relations with the Eastern Bloc, in which the recognition of the 
postwar order and the Oder-Neisse Border played a key role, ended West Germany’s pro-
homeland politics course. The Neue Ostpolitik (“new Eastern policy”) in effect accepted the loss 
of the German East, and delivered a crushing political blow to expellee political organizations. 
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Secondly, the expellee associations’ anachronism became more palpable with a 
diminishing interest among their own base. A more or less successful integration and secured 
economic footing eroded interest in a return to the old homeland. This meant that there existed a 
fundamental chasm between the desires of “ordinary” expellees and agendas of their self-
appointed leadership. While both shared a love for the homeland, most expellees accepted that 
this world was gone. To them, the Heimat transformed intos a virtual homeland, while for 
hardline advocates it remained a physical place to return to.4 Complicating the growing 
ambivalence were dramatic demographic changes: The Erlebnisgeneration, the generation that 
experienced the forced migrations, steadily declined. Their children, too young to remember the 
old homeland or born after the events, had little to no relationship to these incomprehensible 
territories. They could scarcely identify with the emotional appeals and victimhood narratives 
that agitated their elders. As such, the associations saw a decline of their clientele and influence. 
Lastly, the social and generational upheaval associated with the “68er” generation made 
the saliency of “flight and expulsion” narratives less tenable. Increased awareness of National 
Socialist crimes made extensive handwringing over German suffering a problematic proposition. 
Gradually, acknowledgment of German guilt and recognition of victims of Nazi persecution 
emerged as the central tenet of public commemoration and political identity. The upending of the 
hierarchy of victimhood eroded the pillars of support for the Schicksalsgemeinschaft, or 
“community of fate,” and displaced expellees and their narrative from the center of public 
discourse. Moreover, this cultural transformation left expellee rhetoric, tactics, and demands 
appearing hopelessly out of touch and nationalistic. The expellees and their resentments were ill-
                                                 
4 See Andrew Demshuk, The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945-1970, Reprint 
edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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suited for this new era, and West German politicians and the media frequently voiced their 
discomfort over alarming continuities between their political groupings and the Nazi past. 
The winds of change erupted just as expellees reached the height of their power and 
cultural significance, and demanded new strategies to maintain the gains made over the course of 
the 1950s. One reaction of the associations was to dig in their heels and become a source of what 
Minister for All-German affairs Jakob Kaiser commended as heilsame Unruhe (“beneficial 
unrest”).5 Expellee leaders weaponized their claims of standing in the vanguard of those patriotic 
Germans struggling for reunification of the divided German nation. This included the expanded 
cultivation of an identity as a bulwark against insidious currents counteracting these goals, in 
particular communism. Indeed, a critical West German society that dared to question the 
positions of the expellee leadership could only mean a treacherous and successful communist 
infiltration which undermined “healthy” German dispositions.  
Expellee associations therefore went on the attack against supposed traitors and 
Verzichtler (“relinquishers”) in the public sphere, attempting to discredit and silence their 
opponents. Criticism of their political style in turn only encouraged even more radical responses, 
so that the 1960s and 1970s saw in many respects a self-reinforcing cycle of radicalization. 
When faced with the prospect of losing in culture war, expellees frequently employed the 
strategy of waging holding actions and insisting upon legal technicalities that kept the German 
East legally on the agenda, when in reality West German politics and society had moved on. 
                                                 
5 Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BArch) B106-27372, vol 1,  Sitzungsbericht der Schlesischen Landesversammlung, 8. Und 
9. Plenarsitzung, 25/26 November, 1967, BA 106. 
539 
 
Aspects of this turn toward desperation and resentment had already been documented extensively 
elsewhere, and largely lay beyond the scope of this dissertation.6  
Of greater relevance is the inadequately assessed impact of this politics from a position 
weakness on narratives of “flight and expulsion” and their instrumentalization. One tendency 
was to double down on victimhood claims, attempting to continue to force them into a public 
discourse ostensibly overly focused on “other” victims and German guilt. This translated into an 
implied and often explicit Aufrechnung, or “offsetting,” of German fates with other victim 
groups. While some if this simply meant that the narrative of the 1950s remained stagnant in the 
face of shifting cultural trends, and thereby appeared anachronistic or revanchist, the emergence 
of the Holocaust as a central subject of public memory created a rival narrative that some 
expellee leaders felt compelled to oppose in a struggle of victimhood competition. When faced 
with a public indifferent or unmoved by expellee narratives, association leaders invoked a 
“taboo” which ostensibly shrouded German suffering, yet another layer on the master narrative 
of “flight and expulsion” that has lasted into the 21st century. Conveniently explaining to 
themselves and their constituents why they failed to win back the German East, the proposition 
of a blanket of silence over the fate of expellees created the notion of a second victimhood: First 
they were expelled from their homelands, then from the cultural memory of the nation. 
A second and more sophisticated tendency of expellee leaders was to reframe “flight and 
expulsion” in an internationalized language, imbedding the forced migration of Germans within 
                                                 
6 Manfred Max Wambach, Verbändestaat und Parteienoligopol; Macht und Ohnmacht der Vertriebenenverbände. 
(Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1971); Samuel Salzborn, Grenzenlose Heimat: Geschichte, Gegenwart und Zukunft der 
Vertriebenenverbände (Berlin: Elefanten Press, 2000); Pertti Ahonen, After the Expulsion: West Germany and 
Eastern Europe 1945-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Matthias Stickler, “Ostdeutsch heisst 
Gesamtdeutsch”: Organisation, Selbstverständnis und heimatpolitische Zielsetzungen der deutschen 
Vertriebenenverbände : 1949-1972 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2004). 
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comparable international phenomena such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the partition of 
India. Whether coinciding commemorations of the expulsions with UN “Human Rights  
Day” celebrations or increasing PR work and circulation of expellee literature such as the 
Dokumentation during the 1965 “International Year of Human Rights,” expellee advocates 
latched onto the affirmative and neutral notions of universal human rights. The emerging regime 
of human rights provided a new language that obscured German particularism and steered 
expellee arguments onto neutral ground.  
While at the height of their influence the expellee associations sought to interject their 
messages into every conceivable arena, from the 1970s onward a shift toward melancholy and 
nostalgia developed in public discourse. One discerns an attempt to preserve an idealized 
homeland, a romanticized virtual Heimat that ceased to exist in 1945, but continues to live on in 
museums and literature. While perhaps never openly admitting it, this form of institutionalization 
implicitly recognized the ultimate demise of the German East and attempted to salvage it from 
disappearing entirely in the footnotes of history. The Ostlandkreuz at Bad Harzburg and 
hundreds of other locations throughout Germany still stand on windswept hills, an easily 
overlooked and inscrutable curiosity for most hikers. Yet they also symbolize the ascendency 
and decline, indeed the entire narrative’s trajectory of “flight and expulsion.”  
 
Early Efforts: Memory Politics from a Position of Strength 
 
The forced migrations constituted a major component of West German discourse in the 
1950s, arising as a common theme in books and magazines, the silver screen, and conversation. 
However, expellee associations also aspired to enshrine their vision of the German East and their 
political claims in the minds of West Germans by energetically engaging in other forms of 
cultural work. Supported through funding guaranteed through ¶96 of the “Federal Expellee 
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Law,” expellees enjoyed ardent institutional and moral support from governmental agencies in 
their effort to “conjoin homeland expellees and the native population in understanding for their 
mutual cultural worth and common German fate.”7 The cultural work acted as more than just a 
preservation of traditions of the German East, however, and in fact functioned as a counterpart to 
expellee declarations or speeches, a sort of physical manifestation of the memory politics 
analyzed previously. It was in the 1950s, from a position of strength, that the expellee leadership 
aspired to institutionalize their conception of “flight and expulsion” within the very fabric of the 
Federal Republic, and thereby bolster their political and cultural influence well into the future.  
One primary way in which expellees hoped to cement their historical interpretations and 
political messages was through school books and Ostkundeunterricht, or “education about the 
East.” The incorporation of their messages into West German curricula encompassed a central 
demand of expellees from the 1950s onward. Combining history and cultural studies, as well as 
engagement with communism, expellees and scholars argued for incorporation of the German 
East into every subject in order to avoid “the danger that the entire problem of the ‘German East’ 
would appear as an inorganic or unwelcome appendage of an essentially more or less closed 
worldview.”8 Guidelines of the 1956 Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK), the assembly of ministers 
of education, established the mandatory incorporation of the curriculum at all schools, so that 
into the 1960s a majority of students in the Federal Republic learned of the forced migrations, 
                                                 
7 Mathias Beer, “Bundesvertriebenengesetz (BVFG),” in Lexikon der Vertreibungen: Deportation, 
Zwangsaussiedlung und ethnische Säuberung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. Detlef Brandes, Holm 
Sundhausen, and Stefan Troebst (Wien: Böhlau, 2010), 97–100. 
8 Eugen Lemberg, “Deutscher Osten im Unterricht,” Pädagogische Provinz, Nr. 8 (1954), 334-336, here 334. See 
also BArch B150-2360, Eugen Lemberg, “Thesen zu dem Thema: Der deutsche Osten im Geschichtsunterricht.”  
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their consequences, and the need for a return of the lost territories and were exposed to a uniform 
and federally sanctioned interpretation that conformed to expellee expectations.9 
Remarkably, the parliament as well as a report issued by the Ministry of Education 
emphasized a responsibility of curricula to expose National Socialist war crimes, and criticized a 
privileging of a German-centered narrative.10 The KMK’s recommendations, however, placed an 
emphasis on the latter, arguing for “education on the East” to fixate on German history in the 
region. As the historian Eugen Lemberg, explained schools needed to propagate a “pan-German 
historical view in which the fate and development of Germans living outside of the Bismarck 
Reich are treated equally and on the same footing, and the history of the German people is seen 
as a whole. This is only possible if the German nation-state created in the 19th century does not 
appear as the intention and goal of Germany history, and the supranational function of the old 
Reich of the German people becomes visible.”11   
The KMK’s endorsement reflected the lobbying efforts of expellee associations, who 
since the late 1940s pressured state governments to adopt an Ostkundeunterricht in line with 
                                                 
9 Britta Weichers, Der deutsche Osten in der Schule Institutionalisierung und Konzeption der Ostkunde in der 
Bundesrepublik in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren (Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag, 2014), 229.. The ideas conform to 
earlier proposals. Christine Teusch, Kultusminister of North Rhine-Westphalia, informed State President and school 
teachers that the division of Germany required the type of instruction that raised awareness of the “togetherness” of 
all Germans. This duty bound especially schools to propagate a “all-German and European perspective,” and include 
in all lessons the German East. This included decorating classrooms with pictures of landscapes and cityscapes of 
the German East, and notable personalities. BArch B150-2360, Christine Teusch to Regierungspräsidenten and 
educators of the state, May 24, 1954. 
10 Weichers, 320. 
11 BArch B150-2360, Eugen Lemberg, “Thesen zu dem Thema: Der deutsche Osten im Geschichtsunterricht,” 2. To 
be fair, Lemberg’s memo, which more or less served as the basis of the KMK recommendation, advocated that the 
“handling of the German East must overcome the ongoing apologetic attitude prevalent since the last phase of the 
nationalities struggle, which erects an insular catalogue of German achievements in the East and views the 
remaining peoples as national opponents and from through the lens of the dangerous thesis of a West-East cultural 
dividing point.” Ibid, 3. 
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their perspectives.12 Indeed, representatives of Ostkunde participated in the writing of the KMK’s 
report. These educators, who predominantly came from the German East and were active in 
expellee associations, even designed curricula and drafted materials and syllabi for teachers.13 
How this content was incorporated into schools depended on the individual German state. In 
Lower Saxony, for example, “East German Weeks” into the 1960s made the German East a 
central focus of classroom discussions and incorporated lectures, songs and dance, slideshows, 
and films.14 North Rhine-Westphalia implemented similar measures, and even included the 
learning of East German folk dances and field trips to the German-German border.15  
Above all, lessons exposed students to a history that glorified German settlement of the 
region, an “enormous achievement before which all adventure tales and mystery stories pale in 
comparison,” as one teaching manual explained.16 In this reading, the peaceful settlers brought 
culture and industry to fallow Slavic lands, thereby exporting civilization and conquering the 
                                                 
12 Wolfgang Protzner, “‘Kommunismus’ als Gegenstand Bayerischer Schul- und Bildungsbemühungen seit 1945.” 
(1968), 44ff.. The Ostdeusche Kulturrat (East German Cultural Council) similarly recommended an incorporation of 
the German East in all school subjects and the use of materials that would inculcate a “feeling of duty to a greater 
Germany (Gesamtdeutschland).” This was not intended to foster nationalism or imperial ambitions, but instead raise 
the political awareness of students as well as their knowledge of Eastern Europe. BArch B150-2360, 
“Recommendations to the Kultusminister of the States of the Federal Republic over the Treatment of the German 
East and the Problems Emanating from the Expulsions in Upbringing and Education,” undated [circa May 1954]. 
13 Eugen Lemberg, for instance, has been described as the “spiritual father” of Ostkunde. “Ostkundliche Rundschau: 
Zehn Jahre Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft für deutsche Ostkunde im Unterricht,” Nr. 9, vol. 4 (1963), 92-93, here 92. 
Other prominent educators included the Sudeten Germans Ernst Lehmann, Theo Keil, and Ernst Zintl. The majority 
of leading activists were active in Nazi organizations during the Third Reich and supporters of the Third Reich’s 
politics in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe. As the lessons touched on highly political topics, the Ministry 
for All-German Affairs also engaged the Göttinger Arbeitskreis to evaluate school books and compile literature for 
teachers, material that West German education ministries adopted “more and more.” BArch B150-2360, 
Bundesminister for All-German Affairs to BMVt, December 10, 1953. 
14 Weichers, Der deutsche Osten in der Schule Institutionalisierung und Konzeption der Ostkunde in der 
Bundesrepublik in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren, 318. 
15 Rolf Meinhardt, “Deutsche Ostkunde”: ein Beitrag zur Pädagogik des Kalten Krieges, 1945-1968 (Oldenburg: 
Ml Verlag, 1978), 326ff. 
16 Jochen Hoffbauer, “Ein Wort zuvor…”, in Nach Ostland wolen wir reiten…Die Besiedlung des deutschen Ostens 
(Die Brücke. Lesebogen zur Behandlung des deutschen Ostens im Untericht), February 1953, 2. 
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territories for the Occident. Moreover, this migration served the purpose of creating a bulwark 
against Asiatic disorder and savagery. The lessons made the implication clear: Germans won the 
right to these areas, and the German East constituted ancient Germanic and European lands.17 
The current Slavic inhabitants could not make any sort of similar legitimate historic claims. As 
one textbook explained: “The German East…was never and nowhere one thing—Polish. […] 
The land is German, because German achievement created it. The accomplishments extend to all 
areas of human endeavor: Economic, scientific and the arts of all sorts.”18 
“Flight and expulsion” constituted a central element of this historical education. 
Frequently written in an emotionalized language, lessons habitually elided the context of the 
Third Reich and Second World War, thereby obscuring possible motives of the forced migrations 
or their genesis. Furthermore, the interpretations streamlined the complexity of the expulsions, 
reducing them into a seemingly single phenomenon without distinct phases. Students therefore 
encountered an undifferentiated victimhood narrative that contrasted German suffering with East 
European brutality, and simultaneously enshrined expellees as the greatest victims of the war in 
West German education.19 Generally as well, however, portrayals of expellee integration praised 
a “success story” as a general and crucial part of the West German “economic miracle.” 
Moreover, the descriptions of “events that unfolded during the invasion…by Soviet 
troops” and which “without doubt represent the deepest indignity ever experienced by the East 
                                                 
17 See for instance Heinrich Wolfrum, “Die Entstehung des deutschen Ostens, sein wesen und seine Bedeutung,” in 
Ernst Lehmann, ed., Der deutsche osten im Unterricht, 2nd edition (Weilburg, 1956), 19-30. 
18 Gerhard Pohl, “Deutsches Land im Osten,” in Karl Pagel, Deutsche Heimat im Osten (Berlin 1951), 9-16, here 16. 
19 As an example, per an evaluation of Robert Maier, the treatment of the expulsions exceeded discussions of the 
Holocaust twelve-fold. Robert Maier, “Der Stellenwert des Themas ‘Zwangsmigrationen’ in deutschen 
Schulbuchdarstellungen,” in Das Thema Vertreibung und die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen in Forschung, 
Unterricht und Politik, ed. Thomas Strobel (Hannover: Hahn, 2008), 167. 
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German population,” as one textbook formulated it, cemented particular tropes in the cultural 
memory of the FRG: 
Mass rape of women and children, arbitrary murder of civilians, theft, 
plundering, arson and mistreatment from the Russians and also Poles 
transpired with such uniformity in all East German (and Sudetenland) 
areas during the arrival of the Red Army, that in remembrance of this one 
cannot avoid a description of the flight and expulsion process. […] 
[Germans] were imprisoned in ‘internment camps’ (e.g. Potulice) built 
by Poles and harassed terribly there. Because of the insufficient 




 Besides providing a streamlined narrative, the textbook’s description contains two 
peculiarities. First, it fails to differentiate between events during the war and postwar expulsions, 
taking the Red Army’s invasion as the “typical” and representative expulsion experience. 
Secondly, the suggestion that Poles built the internment camps, when in reality they often simply 
repurposed Nazi concentration and POW camps, conveniently papers over German war crimes 
that may not have excused postwar excesses, but certainly could have helped explain and 
contextualize them. In either case, it was important to communicate, Eugen Lemberg argued, that 
this process encompassed an “extermination” of Germans.21 When aspects of Nazi dictatorship 
such as the Holocaust seemed impossible to ignore, students received an interpretation that 
equated the genocide of European Jews with the expulsions: That which “Germans inflicted 
upon the Jews…now befell them” at the hands of East Europeans.22 In other words, expellees 
managed to imbed their victimhood narrative of cataclysmic and inexplicable disaster in a setting 
                                                 
20 Manfred Vollack and Georg Schmelzle, Ostdeutschland: und ehemalige deutsche Siedlungsgebiete in Ost- und 
Südosteuropa., 3rd ed. (Stade: Selbstverlag der Schülerzeitung WIR, 1960), 62. 
21 Eugen Lemberg, “Die deutsche Ostsiedlungsbewegung im Streit der beteiligten Völker,” in Eugen Lemberg, 
Ostkunde: Grundsätzliches und Kritisches zu einer deutschen Bildungsaufgabe (Hannover-Linden: Jaeger, 1964), 
11. 
22 Eugen Lemberg, Geschichte des Nationalismus in Europa (Stuttgart: Curt E. Schwab Verlag, 1950), 11. 
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that reached millions of West Germans, culling from it contesting voices and other dimensions 
that could have somehow undermined the political intentions of the Landsmannschaften.  
Beyond schools, expellees and their advocates in the federal government attempted to 
educate the public on the German East. The conspicuous radio programming and homeland 
gatherings, already analyzed previously, aimed to not simply address expellees, but all Germans. 
The same can be said of the numerous illustrated Heimatbücher, or “homeland books,” which 
presented a virtual tour of the German East and combined idyllic prewar images with 
romanticized descriptions of the Heimat. These were typically juxtaposed with pictures of the 
current dilapidated state, anticommunist condemnations of “Polish economy [Polenwirtschaft],” 
and snide asides over East European incompetence which destroyed a vibrant and blooming 
region.23 In fact, the texts habitually exhibited thinly-veiled prejudices that attributed the 
continued desolation to some inborn Slavic primitiveness or lethargy.   
The shocking level of destruction in the images certainly raised questions over the 
socialist planned economy and its shortages that paled in comparison with the speedy 
reconstruction of West German cities. Yet they also revealed the ferocity of the war and 
zealousness with which the Third Reich fought to the bitter end, a fact Heimatbücher rarely 
touched upon. For example, images of the remnants of Braunsberg’s destroyed cathedral spire, 
“stretching aloft like an admonishing finger” over the ruined city, failed to note that it was not 
the Red Army but retreating SS units that detonated the house of worship.24 Haunting photos of 
Danzig still largely in ruins similarly neglected to explain to readers that the fanatical defense of 
                                                 
23 For a typical example, see Karl Hermann Böhmer and Klaus-Eberhard Murawski, Deutschland jenseits der Oder-
Neisse-Linie (Essen: Tellus-Verlag, 1967).  
24 Bunte Illustrierte, Jenseits von Oder und Neisse. (Offenburg: Burda-Verlag, 1965), 135. 
547 
 
the fortress city produced this destruction. “On the not yet reconstructed spaces…children frolic 
between the wall remnants. Yet under these ruins lie still thousands of dead who lost their lives 
during the conquest of the city by the Red Army, the capricious arson of roving plunderers, and 
during the expulsion of the German population.”25 If the prewar images reminded of past glories 
and a carefree time, postwar images of obliteration minimized the German role in this outcome, 
and generally placed the blame on an enemy that engaged in wanton arbitrary destruction in a 
war that incomprehensively descended upon this paradise without warning. 
Similarly, thousands of slideshows of the homeland before the war and the current state 
treated audiences to pleasant memories, as well as horrifying realizations. The texts 
accompanying the images also imparted a historical lesson adhering to the viewpoint of expellee 
elites. The achievements of Germans in the region since the Middle Ages remained a constant 
theme. Even photos of exceptionally “beautiful and impressive” Krakow, a Polish city before 
1939, “clearly [showed] the German influence on its history.”26 Like in school books, however, 
the Third Reich remained largely abstract and hardly a relevant context for “flight and 
expulsion.”27 Instead, German suffering stood at the center of this story, and the organizers of the 
viewings clamored for images of the “events of the last days of the war and especially the 
treks.”28 Often used in conjunction with the reading of expellee testimonies, presentations 
                                                 
25 Bunte Illustrierte, 163. 
26 BArch B150-3374 vol. 2, Text to Slideshow “Schlesien Heute—Ein Besuch in Oberschlesien/Schlesien,” 1956, 
15. The city’s picturesque state, the text suggested, had less to do with the minimal wartime destruction, and seemed 
rooted in its Teutonic character.  
27 Even when slideshows surprisingly included images of Auschwitz, as a 1958 series did, the “bitter memories” and 
“countless innocent victims” were attributed to Germans as well as “later Polish rule.” BArch B150-3374 vol. 1, 
Text for Slideshow Nr. 35, 90 color images “Eine Reise nach Polen und die polnisch besetzten deutschen 
Ostgebiete,” 1958, 10. 
28 BArch B150-3374 vol. 2, Vorsitz BvD Ortrsgemeinschaft Assinghausen H. Christ to BMVt, November 10, 1961. 
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desired gripping images to augment the emotional scenes.29 At some presentations, survivors of 
the “great trek to the West” and the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff related their experiences 
along with images.30 
The photos of an immaculate homeland undoubtedly sparked fond recollections among 
expellees. However, scenes of contemporary conditions must also have incited dismay and fury. 
While a 1958 Expellee Ministry slideshow carefully warned that audience perceptions of Poles 
were “in many cases still influenced by the partially outdated war memories,” viewers 
encountered a narrative of Poland as a “land of contradictions” that may have done very little to 
dispel negative stereotypes. Any modern infrastructure, the text accompanying the images 
explained, could be credited to centuries of German influence and industry, though current 
inhabitants proved poor stewards. “Surprisingly good roads” needed to be credited to German 
engineering. The abundance of crosses, meanwhile, testified to the piety of Poles, though they 
were mostly “primitive” constructions.31 Other slideshows struck a similar tone.32  
Indeed, the major message of the presentations was that the Heimat had changed beyond 
recognition. As a 1956 script prepared by the Expellee Ministry formulated it, the German East 
                                                 
29 BArch B150-3374 vol. 2, Otto Müller to BMVt, March 14, 1965. See also Ibid, Alois Brauner to BMVt, May 12, 
1965. Surprisingly, the BMVt did not have many images available, and a sole official put together a “very 
impressive” collection of a handful of images to satisfy demands. BArch B150-3374 vol. 2, Elisabeth Preuschoff to 
Ada Mages, Landeskulturstelle of BvD, Landesverband Hessen, April 6, 1965. See also Ibid, Preuschoff to Brauner, 
May 25, 1965, and Ibid, Preuschoff to Müller, March 31, 1965. 
30 BArch B150-3374 vol. 2, BdV, Ortsvereinigung Oker, Veranstaltungs-Ablauf am 20. Mai in der Aula der 
Mittelschule, undated [circa 1965]. 
31 BArch B150-3374 vol. 1, Text for Slideshow Nr. 35, 90 color images “Eine Reise nach Polen und die polnisch 
besetzten deutschen Ostgebiete,” 1958. 
32 For example, yet another widely shown presentation of 60 color slides of East Prussia confronted audiences with 
images of a village pond left to turn into a swamp and Junker estates in disrepair and transformed into inefficient 
collective farms. BArch B150-3374 vol. 1, Text for Slideshow “Deutscher Osten 1958. Teil II: Ostpreussen,” 1958. 
German newspapers struck a similar tone up until the 1950s. See the clippings of diverse expellee and West German 
daily papers in Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP) 07-001-3382. 
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was “mainly destroyed,” the “cities and villages are grey and deteriorated.”33 Throughout the 
region, former German houses could be seen falling apart, and Poles even dared to “deliberately” 
tear down churches not destroyed in the war.34 In Leobschütz, charming images from 1922—
“how it looked like back then, when 99% voted for Germany [during the plebiscite]”—
contrasted sharply with how it looked today. “Of everything shown in the previous pictures, 
nothing exists: Neither the people—old or young—live in Leobschütz, nor does a single stone 
stand on another.”35 Not even remaining Germans, who ostensibly solely accounted for modest 
of reconstruction efforts, could change the “desolate scenes.”36 That grim landscapes testified to 
the ferocity of the final phase of the war—Leobschütz, for instance, was surrounded and 
fanatically held by SS units and nearly 50% destroyed in fierce fighting—rarely entered into 
explanations. Instead, blame for widespread remnants of a bitter war waged barely a decade 
previously fell upon Polish lethargy and communist incompetence. 
The slideshows therefore attempted to argue that the images proved that a disinterested 
people inhabited German lands unlawfully. “The majority of the villages show that strangers live 
in them who have not yet taken hold of it or don’t even want to,” narrators recited as projectors 
cast images of towns and cities in disrepair. “In most villages practically nothing has been done 
to rebuild since the war.”37 Another text explained that “the people living there live as strangers 
                                                 
33 BArch B150-3374 vol. 2, Text to Slideshow “Schlesien Heute—Ein Besuch in Oberschlesien/Schlesien,” 1956, 2.  
34 Ibid, 9. 
35 Ibid, 13. 
36 Ibid, 2. An image of a Silesian village with repaired houses, straight fences, and clean streets proved an exception, 
thanks to the few Germans who remained. “Here still live people who regard the land as their own.” Ibid, 9. 
37 BArch B150-3374 vol. 1, Text for Slideshow “Deutscher Osten 1958. Teil II: Ostpreussen,” 1958, 7. 
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in the area.”38 The terrible conditions were “typical,” audiences learned, because “the Pole…no 
longer wants to live in isolated houses due to the insecurity” presented by roving brigands and 
ostensible pending German return.39 They supposedly also desired an equitable solution for 
Germany, so that Poles “can go home to Wilna and Lemberg,” they too wanted to “go back to 
their Heimat” annexed by the Soviet Union after 1945.40   
The slideshow as a vehicle of communicating expellee association messages should not 
be underestimated. Particularly in an age before televisions featured in most West German 
homes, the presentations functioned as a popular medium. Expellee groups organized showings 
aggressively. From January to June of 1950, the East Prussian Association organized around 120 
screenings throughout West Germany.41 Audiences regularly included non-expellees. For 
example, an expellee representative in Heidelberg reported that the majority of visitors to a 
slideshow showing in May 1960 were “natives.”42 The chairman of the Silesian Association 
chapter of Scheinfeld, Bavaria celebrated that more than 800 students of local schools visited a 
presentation of “the unforgotten German East,” which left a “deep impression” and audiences 
praised as “excellent.”43 Even the President of West Germany, Heinrich Lübke, visited such 
                                                 
38 BArch B150-3374 vol. 2, Text to Slideshow “Schlesien Heute—Ein Besuch in Oberschlesien/Schlesien,” 1956, 2. 
39 Ibid, 9. 
40 Ibid, 7. 
41 BArch B150-3375 vol. 2, Memorandum of the Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen Veranstaltungsdienst, “Aufgaben, 
Tätigkeitsdienst und Ziele,” August 1950. 
42 BArch B150-3375 vol. 2, Hans Ratke to BMVt, May 17, 1960. 
43 BArch B150-3375 vol. 2, Chairman of the Silesian Association District Group Scheinfeld/Mfr. to Osbild, 
November 5, 1954. 
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events, and expressed his enthusiastic praise for the cityscapes and landscapes as a choir sang 
“Von der Memel bis zur Elbe” (“From the Memel to the Elbe”).44 
Establishing a link between non-expellees and the German East in fact comprised a 
central, and perhaps the most important, intention of institutionalization efforts. Indeed, the vast 
majority of homeland association cultural work unfolded through the myriad Patenschaften, a 
sister city initiative in which cities in the FRG “adopted” a community beyond the Iron Curtain. 
In this arrangement, West Germans committed themselves to the “cultural care” of expellees and 
their traditions.45 Practically, this ensured the incorporation of the German East into schools, 
libraries, and cultural life of municipalities, as well as obliged the sponsor to found museums, 
promote expellee artists, name streets or plazas after the lost territories, and act as hosts for 
homeland gatherings already discussed in previous chapters.46  
Starting off as informal agreements, the Patenschaften system expanded dramatically: By 
1962 there were over 350 communities of the German East with a partner city in the Federal 
Republic, so that—expellee leaders claimed—only a few cities and counties remained 
available.47 Remarkably, as well, while the Deutsche Städtetag (“Association of German Cities 
and Towns”) consulted the VdL on the 1952 guidelines to municipalities regarding 
Patenschaften, by the mid-1950s the expellee associations enjoyed sole control and veto 
                                                 
44 BArch B150-3376 vol. 1, Singkreis der Bundesministerien Bonn to Dr. Schlicker, January 18, 1965. 
45 For more, see Alfons Perlick, Das west-ostdeutsche Patenschaftswerk in Nordrhein-Westfalen: Geschichte, 
Berichte und kulturelle Aufgaben. (Troisdorf/Rhld: Wegweiserverl., 1961); Ute Reichert-Flögel, Ostdeutsche 
Patenschaften heute (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern, 1989); In der Obhut Bayerns: Sudeten- und ostdeutsche 
Patenschaften im Freistaat Bayern. (München: Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1989). 
46 As an example, Cologne’s sponsorship of Breslau explains why the Silesian gatherings often chose that city as the 
site for its festivals. 
47 Mathias Beer, “Patenschaften,” in Die Erinnerung an Flucht Und Vertreibung. Ein Handbuch Der Medien Und 
Praktiken (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2015), 337. 
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privileges. In other words, the treatment of the expellees stood under the supervision of the VdL, 
who insisted on the demand of remaining the exclusive representative on expellee matters. 
Memorials were an instrumental dimension of the campaign to institutionalize “flight and 
expulsion” as well. Dozens of crosses similar to the Bad Harzburg Ostlandkreuz appeared 
throughout the Federal Republic in the 1950s. The year before Bad Harzburg, local expellee 
groups raised a taller Ostlandkreuz on a bluff above Geislingen, “exhorting the entire civilized 
world to honor the dictates of humanity and atone for the bitter injustice perpetrated upon 
millions of peaceful and hardworking people.” A poem captured the memorial’s meaning: 
 
“How long was the path, since from these lands/we streamed eastward 
into dark forests/and clearing fires cast the sky red; Soon villages and 
proven cities grew/the colorful diversity of German life/until Asia 
wrested the German East with bitter shackles; With bold fortresses and 
sublime cathedrals; came German law, and German culture prevailed/as 
an eternal goal and sure omen; Soon foreign-tongued serfs were freed/but 
no one matched us in the footrace/We believed foolishly in their loyalty; 
And so after almost a thousand years/many thousands perished neither 
sick nor old/only the crosses testify that they were ours; In German earth 
their remains rest/but violence also drove us from the homeland/where 
people keep silent now only the stones speak; So heralds here, even 
when we have long faded/the looming stature of the Eastern Cross/that 
we were forced to cede our home and hearth; May you be a memorial for 
all who still come:/never shall the love to the homeland cool!/But only a 
return home can truly soothe us/When German forests bloom anew in the 
Eastern lands.” 48 
 
Often located on the edges of towns, the symbols relentlessly reminding viewers of the 
German East became focal points for commemorations. On holidays such as Pentecost, the “Day 
of the Homeland,” or the “National Day of Mourning,” expellees, sometimes clad in traditional 
garb and carrying signs, gathered in town centers. Joined by community notables and onlookers, 
the processions then snaked through the streets toward the memorials, where services honored 
                                                 
48 Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (AdsD), Seliger Archiv VII, 2087, “Festschrift zur Ostlandkreuz-Weihe am 1. 
und 2. Juli 1950, Geislingen an der Steige/Württemberg,” Landesverband der vertriebenen Deutschen in 
Württemberg, Kreisverband Göppingen”, 5.  
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the dead, attendees mourned the lost homeland, and local association representatives gave 
speeches expressing the continuing righteous demands of the gathered for a right to self-
determination in a reunified Germany and free Europe.  
Expellee associations aspired to not only claim hilltops on the edges of towns, but 
dominate central municipal spaces. Whereas inscriptions on the discreet crosses in cemeteries or 
on bluffs put the remembrance of the victims at the forefront, the markers in front of 
courthouses, schools, train stations or in marketplaces and parks—sites promising to reach the 
largest possible audience—typically emphasized the lost territories and “right to homeland.” In 
churches such as St. Mary’s in Lübeck, stained glass windows featured coats of arms of 
territories in the East.49 In the Nikolai Church in Kiel, since 1957 the “Pomeranian Chapel” and 
stained glass of a crucified Christ towering above fleeing refugees and trek wagons 
memorialized the forced migrations.50 On the exhibition hall roofs of the West Berlin trade 
grounds, the flags of the former Prussian provinces hung from 1951 until 1969.51 Another 
favorite venue for expellee memorials were towers of city walls and fortresses—such as in 
Osnabrück, Goslar, and Nuremburg—in order to impart messages of truculence and 
steadfastness in the struggle for the lost homeland.52 Streets and plazas named for cities and other 
geographical fixtures of the German East similarly served to keep memory of the ostensibly only 
                                                 
49 The emblems included states in the GDR, as well as Pomerania, West Prussia, East Prussia, East Brandenburg, 
and Lower and Upper Silesia. Territories beyond the borders of 1937 were featured as well: Posen, Siebenbürgen, 
the Sudetenland, Danzig, and Baltic states also appeared, as well as the city names of Posen, Kattowitz, Riga, and 
Tilsit. In all, the window commemorated significant areas of “Germandom” beyond strict legal definition of the 
German Reich as promulgated in the West German Basic Law. 
50 Scholz, Vertriebenendenkmäler, 288. 
51 “Furcht vor Sturm,” Der Spiegel 51, December 15, 1969, 78. 




temporarily locked away German lands behind the Iron Curtain. Markers went up throughout the 
FRG indicating the distance to far away lost German cities: In Aachen, where Federal Highway 1 
began and once ran via Berlin to Königsberg, signs informed drivers that the East Prussian 
capital was 1,170 kilometers away and that “Germany is indivisible.”53  
While the vast majority of the memorials remained discreet and at the local level, the 
biggest feathers in the cap that homeland organizations could hope for was an expression of 
West Germany’s commitment to its lost territories on a larger, more national stage. Here, too, 
they achieved astonishing successes. At the “German Corner” in Koblenz, where the Mosel and 
Rhine Rivers meet, emblems of all German states, including those “violently wrested” from the 
nation, surrounded a solitary German flag on a pedestal.54 From 1953 to 1990 they reminded of 
Germany’s division and desire for a reunification within the borders of 1937.55 The “Memorial 
of the Homeland Expellees” at the Reichskanzlerplatz (present-day Theodor-Heuss-Platz) in 
divided Berlin represented yet another coup, as its location at the epicenter of Cold War 
                                                 
53 BArch B106-27372, vol. 1, “Landsmannschaft Schlesien: Rundbrief der Bundesgeschäftsstelle,” Nr. 5, March 10, 
1963, 7. 
54 The State President of Rhineland-Palatinate, Peter Altmeier, declined Sudeten requests to have their crest 
included, stating that while he did not oppose it in principle, the Sudetenland’s exclusion from the 1937 borders 
required further review of potential legal implications. BayHStA, Sudetendeutsches Archiv (SdA), SdA-
Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 385, Altmeier to Hans-Christoph Seebohm, June 3, 1953. Lodgman von Auen wrote 
Altmeier pleading for the inclusion of the Sudetenland, as the loss of the homeland “affected Germans inside as well 
as outside of the Reich, and created a feeling of solidarity that cannot be contained by former political borders.” 
Eliminating lines of demarcation would help “enable a growing sense of the common German community of fate.” 
Ibid, von Auen to Altmeier, undated. In private, von Auen seemed less enthusiastic of including every territory, 
confiding to the head of the VdL Alfred Gille that “one cannot expect that now for example Russian Germans, 
Bessarabia Germans, Dobruja Germans, the ‘Banatian Swabians,’ all who did not exist at all before 1945, can be 
understood under German ‘territories.’ After all, one can then with justification include Alsace-Lorraine, and one 
could get the idea to include the former German colonies.” Ibid, von Auen to Gille, June 21, 1953. Von Auen 
similarly shared his exasperation with Seebohm that radical demands cannot “possibly extend the former German 
Reich to the Volga, to the Black Sea and to Swakopmund.” Ibid, von Auen to Seebohm, June 21, 1953. 
55 Once the site of a statue of Kaiser Wilhelm I commemorating the unification of Germany in 1871, the memorial 
sustained heavy damage in fighting in 1945. The monument to German division gave way in 1990 to the first 
German emperor once again, marking the reunification of the Federal Republic.  
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confrontation underlined the reunification demands of the. Inaugurated during the 1955 “Day of 
the Homeland” on September 10, which on the occasion of the ten year anniversary 
simultaneously was billed as the “Day of the Germans,” the plain block bearing the inscription 
“Freedom, Justice, Peace” emerged as the most prominent memorial, featured on expellee 
organization letterheads and other literature. Its flame was even used to light other memorials in 
West Germany with a similar design, such as an East Prussian monument in Bochum in 1951 
and a replica of the Berlin version in Hannover in 1961.56 
Remarkably, this activism went beyond dominating prominent space in the FRG’s urban 
landscape by attempting to colonize its soundscape through quasi audible memorials. 
Throughout West Germany, church bells of the German East—“themselves expellees,” as the 
Silesian leader and SPD politician Herbert Hupka explained to listeners of Bayerischer Rundfunk 
in a 1956 Christmas program of Silesian poems and songs—brought the sounds of the lost 
homeland to the Federal Republic, thereby creating a tonal connection between West Germany 
and its truncated lands beyond Cold War borders.57  
In total, more than 1,500 expellee memorials to “flight and expulsion” and the German 
East dot the Federal Republic, the vast majority having gone up in the 1950s and 1960s at the 
initiation of expellee organizations and their local chapters.58 Added to this were some 600 
Heimatstuben, or “homeland rooms,” typically housed within town halls or a municipality’s 
                                                 
56 Scholz, Vertriebenendenkmäler, 342. and Heimabend 90, August 1961, 1, newspaper clipping in BArch B106-
27372. Its fires died out in 1990. 
57 Track Nr. 17, Herbert Hupka, “Transeamus,” Bayerischer Rundfunk, December 16, 1956, in: Flucht und 
Vertreibung im Rundfunk. Tondokumente aus den Jahren 1945 bis 1960, Alina Laura Tiews and Hans-Ulrich 
Wagner (Hamburg: Hans-Bredow-Institut, 2017). 
58 The majority are documented in Heinrich Kucharczyk, Walter Stratmann, and Bund der Vertriebenen-Vereinigte 
Landsmannschaften, Mahn- und Gedenkstätten der deutschen Heimatvertriebenen (Bonn: Bund der Vertriebenen-
Vereinigte Landsmannschaften, 2008). 
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museum of local history and culture, or even in the foyer of a school.59 While they frequently 
involved the input of “ordinary” expellees who contributed materials and shared memories as 
they walked through the space, the exhibitions overwhelmingly functioned as presentation sites 
of conceptions of local expellee associations, who normally founded and designed the museums.  
Typically, the forced migrations featured abstractly: A handcart, suitcase, or Polish 
expulsion decree or items carried to West Germany stood as representative of the war and its 
immediate aftermath. Visitors could project their expectations onto the objects. Yet it was the old 
homeland which stood in central focus in virtually all Heimatstuben. Traditional costumes, 
figurines, woodcuts, and photos preserved an undestroyed, idyllic prewar homeland. Symbols of 
industriousness, such as looms or porcelain manufactured in the German East, related past 
contributions to German culture and their role in the booming postwar West German economy. 
The spaces captured a romanticized and pristine homeland, a paradise and place of yearning. The 
period between 1933 and 1945 found no place in these exhibits. The Heimatstube therefore not 
only presented a sanitized narrative of glorious roots, tragic loss, and postwar integration 
success, it preserved a mythic homeland which, so it was implied, needed to be returned to its 
former inhabitants and the nation. In short: They were sites for communal nostalgic 
contemplation and melancholic remembering of what was lost, not places for considering 
historical contexts. 
Beyond the rather simple Heimatstuben dotting the landscape, several travelling exhibits 
managed to expose large audiences to the messages of the expellee organizations. The most well-
known emerged from a 1950 proposal of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) faction within 
                                                 
59 Weichers, Der deutsche Osten in der Schule Institutionalisierung und Konzeption der Ostkunde in der 
Bundesrepublik in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren, 193. 
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Berlin’s city deputies’ assembly. Supported by the Ministry of All-German Affairs, Deutsche 
Heimat im Osten (“German Homeland in the East”) opened its doors in Berlin, Düsseldorf, 
Munich, and Landau. Its popularity led to an expansion to Stuttgart and Hanover in 1951, before 
it retired as the permanent collection of the “House of the East German Homeland” in the 
“German House” in West Berlin. By all accounts, Deutsche Heimat im Osten enjoyed large 
numbers of visitors: Special rates and extended hours of operation of the German Rail helped 
boost attendance, as did conferences of not just expellee groups but teacher’s associations and 
trade or women’s groups held on the grounds.60  
The sites’ design signaled ambitions to commemorate a lost part of the nation and the 
victims of the forced migrations: Flags of all the provinces of the German East adorned the 
entrance, while bells in a specially built clock tower tolled hourly in “remembrance of the 
victims of the expellees, who gave their lives in the old homeland or far away from it.”61 Yet 
while commemoration of suffering certainly factored into the intentions of Deutsche Heimat im 
Osten, from the start planners explicitly aimed for more than a simple “exposition of memories 
of the homeland expellees.”62 The culture and history of the German East were of central 
concern, as was communist aggression in a special section chronicling the “Bolshevization of the 
Soviet occupation zones.” Films, expellee publications, and a bookstore selling the “important 
literature” regarding “flight and expulsion” augmented the museum’s content.  
                                                 
60 See AdsD, Seliger Archiv VIII, 2235, Circular of Interior Ministry of Württemberg-Baden re: Exhibit “Deutsche 
Heimat im Osten.”  
61 Ibid, 3. 
62 Ibid, 1. The circular cited Minister for All-German Affairs Jakob Kaiser’s introduction to the exhibit catalogue to 
expound upon the intentions: “Germany today is a decisive factor for the save and reinforcement of European 
freedom. If this is the case, then the understanding needs to grow that the right to self-determination of peoples 
needs to be applied to all of Germany. […] Europe can only then be pacified when a Germany is reconstituted as an 
equal within the borders that conform to its right to self-determination.” 
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In short, the well-visited exhibit, which for decades ranked as the most coordinated and 
prominent example of “flight and expulsion” in the West German museum landscape, 
transmitted the homeland politics of the expellee associations and their federal patrons. Visitors 
were confronted with messages and a narrative that “documented the moral, political, and 
historical rights of the German people to their areas of settlement.”63 The focus should be on the 
German East before 1939, a nostalgic overview that offered “perhaps the last chance to see the 
old Heimat one last time how it was” before communism destroyed it, as a 1961 memo of the 
Ministry of the Interior (BMI) argued in a bid to turn the exhibit into a documentary. Audiences 
needed to have their “memory freshened,” and especially youths should come away with a 
notion of the “Fatherland.” The BMI reasoned that like the exhibit, the film could “show losses 
that can’t simply be written off, but instead should remain painfully tangible as an example of 
lost German greatness” without sentimentality, political overtones, or aggression.64  
 
                                                 
63 While initially limited to the legal claims of the borders of 1937, complaints from the Sudeten German 
Association saw an expansion of the Stuttgart exhibit to include the “importance of Germandom” in the Sudetenland 
and Southeastern Europe. At a Sudeten gathering in Ansbach in May 1951, Hans-Christoph Seebohm criticized the 
exhibit and the Ministry for All-German Affairs for excluding the Sudetenland, which he alleged occurred because 
American and British authorities refused to allow the exhibition to go forward if it contained material on territories 
beyond the 1937 borders. ACDP 07-001-3438, newspaper clipping “Pfingstfest der Vertriebenen,” Die Welt, May 
15, 1951. The exclusion prompted the Sudeten Association to consider designing its own travelling exhibit titled 
“We Sudeten Germans,” which would emphasize the cultural achievements of the Sudeten Germans over the last 
1,000 years, the Sudetenland’s central importance for Western Civilization, expulsion crimes, and the exemplary 
integration of Sudeten expellees and key role in West German economic prosperity. BayHStA, SdA, NL Albert Karl 
Simon 1, Memo re: “Ausbau einer sudetendeutschen Wanderausstellung,” undated [summer 1950]. 
64 BArch B106-27696, Brochure “Deutsche Heimat im Osten,” written by Gerhart Pohl. It is unclear whether the 
project went forward, though Munich-based Insel-Film Company devised a script and initiated production. The 
Expellee Ministry expressed concerns with the text and the political overtones of the movie, yet BMI officials 
dismissed these reservations as unfounded; the content was not political in their estimation, particularly since the 
attention was on the pre-war German East. Ibid, Pagel to Rothen, August 29, 1961. In either case, of relevance here 
is that it grants insights into the intentions of Deutsche Heimat im Osten, which served as the inspiration for the 
effort to turn the exhibit into a documentary. 
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“Into the last village”: Cementing “Flight and Expulsion” in the Mind of the Nation65 
Ultimately, the idea of “lost German greatness” lay at the heart of every effort to 
eternalize the German East in West German culture. The calculations that drove 1950s 
institutionalization efforts appear rather obvious at even a casual glance. The hallmarks of 
expellee argumentation have already been extensively examined elsewhere. Since memorials in 
and of themselves do not communicate narratives, but rather augment historical interpretations of 
their patrons, a brief analysis of the intentions of expellee elites and the political messages 
imbedded within their memorials is necessary.  
Whatever its form, all cultural work aimed first and foremost to tell the story of the 
injustice arbitrarily perpetrated in 1945, and which needed to be atoned for. The days used for 
commemoration ceremonies, for instance, signified far deeper meanings and underlined the 
unprecedented and historic suffering of expellees. Upper Silesians marked their ceremonies on 
March 20th, the anniversary of the 1921 plebiscites that saw portions of the region ceded to 
Poland in the interwar period. Invoking the “disgrace” of Versailles thereby framed the 
expulsions as a continuation of cruel victors’ justice perpetrated against Germany, and 
legitimized the tradition of revisionist struggle.  
The Sudeten Germans chose March 4th, the day in 1919 that Czechoslovakian military 
units violently broke up a demonstration of ethnic Germans demanding that German-majority 
territories be allowed to join Austria. The “March Dead” and “Blood Witnesses” of thwarted 
self-determination evoked the idea that the Sudeten Germans were perpetual victims, and that the 
draconian peace after 1918 paved the way for a similar travesty after 1945. The “Day of the 
                                                 
65 BArch B150-3375 vol. 2, “Veranstaltungsdienst der Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen an Geschäftsführer aller 
Landsmannschaften,” September 6, 1950, 2. 
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Homeland,” set traditionally on the first Sunday in August, meanwhile sought to organize 
gatherings as close to the August 2nd anniversary of the Potsdam Agreement, thereby becoming a 
“lively protest against Potsdam,” in the words of Minister for All-German Affairs Jakob 
Kaiser.66 The celebrations, in other words, revolved around a mythic past and injustice 
contextualized in the interwar period.67 
The memorials around which expellees gathered on those days sought to embody the 
victimhood narrative in physical form. The frequent use of Christian imagery, for instance, 
transformed expellee claims into a “divine right,” a sacred demand for a revision of unholy 
postwar treaties.68 Expellee leaders expounded upon the meaning of the markers to dispel any 
confusion. “When the hour has come,” representatives of the VdL vowed at the 1952 
inauguration of an eight meter tall wooden cross wrapped in barbed wire in Berlin-Kreuzberg’s 
Viktoriapark, expellees would carry the hallowed sign “from Berlin to the land of the homeland 
expellees.”69 The symbol of Christ’s death and resurrection seemed an apt allegory for the 
expulsions, which Expellee Minister Hans Lukaschek deemed “the historical Good Friday of our 
people.”70 He also invoked militaristic imagery associated with the cross: “In this sign we will be 
                                                 
66 Quoted in Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern: Legenden, Mythos, 
Geschichte (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2010), 480. 
67 See Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung Nr. 665/50, July 11, 1950, clipping in ACDP 07-001-
3438. The press release reported that on the 30-year anniversary of the plebiscites in West and East Prussia, 
expellees leaders handed Minister Kaiser a declaration of thousands who “renewed their oath of loyalty as they did 
on July 11, 1920. “They suffered the terrible fate of an irresponsible war. But this act of violecnes cannot become 
the foundation for a true peace; instead, it must be as it was in 1930, the self-determination right of the expellees.” 
The “dead in the graves, of our parents and grandparents, they all were German, they made the fields arable. Our 
ancestors already centuries ago built churches and chapels, villages and cities, in which every stone testifies to 
Germandom. Just as the plebiscites affirmed it, so again too one day these lands will and must return.” 
68 “Weihe des Ostlandkreuzes,” Der Südmährer, June 1950, 229. 
69 “Der Kreuzberg bekam ein neues Kreuz,” Die Neue Zeitung, August 10, 1952.  
70 “Kirche und Heimat,” Christ unterwegs 4 (1950), Nr. 12, 14. 
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victorious!”71 The reference to Emperor Constantin’s miraculous vision of a cross in the sky and 
ensuing victory on the field of battle referenced a myth of Western Civilization, and nurtured 
hopes for a similar astounding turn of fortunes for expellees.72  
Other activists revealed an even more elaborate historical subtext in the symbols. For 
instance, the Ostlandkreuz in Geislingen presented an ideal setting to reflect upon the narrative 
of suffering embedded within the nearby monument, as Adolf Hasenöhrl attempted at a 
conference of the SPD’s “Expellee Working Group” in Geislingen in July 1951: 
“Six years ago, endless treks of starving, beaten, harried, defiled people 
robbed of their homeland… arrived in German lands with their last 
strength. They were the survivors of that inhumane landslide that washed 
over large areas of Europe after the war, who with their diligence in the 
East…delivered a considerable contribution to European culture and 
civilization. Those who were the authors of this madness unleashed the 
devilish instincts of robbery and murder in a premeditated and intentional 
way; they wanted to physically and morally break millions of German-
speaking people.”73 
 
Hasenöhrl failed to recognize National Socialism or German atrocities in the rendition of 
the “tragic fate” and a “political mistake” represented by the cross on the hill. Expellee 
monuments neglected to contextualize “flight and expulsion” in the Second World War or the 
Third Reich. At yet another SPD expellee gathering in Geislingen a few years later, Bavarian 
State President Wilhelm Hoegner conjured the deep past that underpinned the “right to 
                                                 
71 “Heute ein Kreuz an der Grenze…”, Ostpreußenblatt, May 5, 1950, 1. 
72 In a more skeptical editorial of the purposes of these memorials, the SPD-oriented Neuer Vorwärts nevertheless 
also connected the Ostlandkreuz to the cross of Golgotha. The editors hoped that the crosses would symbolize the 
refusal of politics grounded in violence and “false nationalism.” In their mind, they were a sign dedicated to the 
expellees, expressing “all the thoughts, sufferings, pains, all longings and all the misery commensurate to their fate 
and their existence.” “Kreuz der Illusion,” Neuer Vorwärts, June 30, 1950, newspaper clipping in AdsD, Seliger 
Archiv VII, 2087. 
73 AdsD, Seliger Archiv VIII, 2224, “Arbeitstagung der Vertriebenengruppe in der SPD in Geislingen,” July 21, 
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homeland” represented in the Ostlandkreuz. The righteousness of expellee demands rested upon 
the fact that Germans “did not conquer the land that they lived in militarily, but through the 
diligence of their craftsmen, citizens, and farmers” who “cleared primeval forests, opened mine 
shafts, and founded cities.” Germans did not expel Slavs, but rather achieved “dominance” by 
bringing culture to a barren and primitive tabula rasa. This history moreover obligated the 
government to make the return of the territories its “primary task” in order to make up for “one 
of the greatest marks of shame of the 20th century.”74 Similarly, at the 1951 inauguration of a 
memorial in the battlement tower of Schloss Burg near Solingen, audiences learned of the 
“Teutonic Order and homelands of Germandom” that needed to be returned to Germany.75   
Above all, viewers were expected to decipher one crucial reminder: The theft of the 
homeland and the struggle for its return. The memorials expressed a hope—indeed a prophesy—
that “we will one day return home under the sign of the cross up there on the hill,” as a paper 
explained in the coverage of the Bad Harzburg inauguration.76 The monuments heralded that the 
government would “never relinquish [the German East]…for as long as there are German people. 
If today it is a cross at the border, tomorrow it will be a cross in the heart of Germany, as a 
reminder of the injustice perpetrated against us, and that the injustice transformed into justice.”77 
The notion that the memorials addressed all Germans is a second message of every 
expellee memorial, museum, or homeland gathering. The cultural activities of the homeland 
associations sought to create a link between West Germany and the lost territories, and keep that 
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75 Quoted in Scholz, Vertriebenendenkmäler, 210. 




relationship at the forefront of every mind. When on August 3, 1953 the “German Youth of the 
East” (DJO) presented the mayor of Bonn a bowl of earth acquired from the Sudetenland, a clear 
message accompanied the gesture: “With this…earth we bring a piece of our homeland and a 
piece of our hearts” into the custody of West Germany. Minister of the Interior Robert Lehr 
acknowledged the gift as a reminder that “this land belongs to us.”78 The suffering of the 
expellees in their midst, and the stolen cultural heritage of the German East, exhorted every 
citizen to subscribe to demands for a return of the nation’s territories. An eternal flame of the 
“Memorial of the Homeland Expellees,” lit by uniformed members of the “Silesian Youth,” 
would burn until Germany would once again be reunited within its borders of 1937, thereby 
emphasizing the all-German dimensions of expellee homeland politics.79 At the inauguration, 
Willy Brandt, President of the Berlin Parliament and future chancellor who ironically would 
recognize the Oder-Neiße border, articulated what audiences should see when they gazed upon 
the block and its flames: Germany’s right to self-determination, a “right to the homeland,” and a 
“reunified Reich in freedom.”80 Berlin’s Mayor, Otto Suhr, likewise read in the monument a call 
for Germans to join in the “crusade for the unity of Germany.”81 
Against whom that crusade would be waged seemed obvious. Expellee 
institutionalization efforts therefore thirdly revealed the profound anticommunism of “flight and 
expulsion” narratives. The location of the Bad Harzburg cross at the border, a “trench that 
                                                 
78 “Sudetendeutsche trugen ihre Heimaterde nach Bonn,” Generalanzeiger für Bonn, August 3, 1953, newspaper 
clipping in BArch B106-27373 vol. 2. 
79 See Heimabend 90, August 1961, 1, newspaper clipping in BArch B106-27372. Its fires died out in 1990. 
80 For a copy of the speech, see Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, ed., 10 Jahre nach der Vertreibung: 
Äusserungen des In- und Auslandes und eine Zeittafel (Bonn, 1956), 120–22. 
81 Quoted in Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, 123–24.  
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foreign forces tore through our German fatherland,” was no coincidence.82 It faced East toward 
the homeland, but also against Bolshevik terror responsible for Germany’s misery. Sometimes, 
acts of commemoration culminated in torchlight processionals to make the Cold War stakes 
clear: The 1955 inauguration of the “Memorial of the Homeland Expellees” culminated in a 
torchlight processional, the torches lit by the eternal flame, through West Berlin and skirting the 
border with the GDR. The Berlin flame also lit torches in a relay lighting ceremony along the 
German-German border in 1959.83 During the 1956 homeland gathering of 300,000 “exhorting 
souls who will never find peace” in Nuremburg, several thousand uniformed youths marched 
through the city before setting a “sea of fire” along the Bavarian-Czechoslovakian border.84  
Dramatic demonstrations surrounding memorials intended to draw attention of onlookers 
to Cold War divisions, reminding the “entire cultivated world” and “all who once stood against 
us” of the German lands that remained under the yoke of “violent, brutal tyranny.”85 The handful 
of dirt of the German East received by Lehr not only exhorted Germans to recall the territories 
beyond the Iron Curtain, but represented the hope that the “day of liberation is closer than some 
today would like to think.”86 The monuments also articulated the aspiration of expellee 
associations to be the national avant garde of the struggle for a Gesamtdeutschland, or “Greater 
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Germany,” and the vanguard against an ideology that inflicted upon them the suffering that now 
made them tested and true defenders of Europe against the threat posed by communism.87 
Expellee memorials therefore communicated an extensive and complex message, “all 
those things…that we expellees have to say,” as the Ostpreußenblatt remarked in its coverage of 
the Bad Harzburg cross. For that reason, the paper hoped that every community would receive a 
similar reminder. In reporting on its activities, the East Prussian Association vowed to spread its 
activism “into the last village” in West Germany.88 In other words, expellees and their federal 
backers consciously intended to sear the German East into the consciousness of the nation. This 
conspicuous insertion of the expulsions into the fabric of West German life through memorials, 
rallies, school books, or weather maps aimed to achieve several goals.  
First, expellee leaders sought to politicize every aspect of “flight and expulsion.” From 
the perspective of expellee leaders, there could be no innocent or apolitical invocation of the lost 
homeland. Even the most ordinary picture book of costumes of the Riesengebirge (Krkonoše), 
Expellee Minister Theodor Oberländer assured, not only contributed to the crucial “preservation 
of East German traditions.” These efforts as a matter of fact constituted “one of the most 
important tasks of the expellees,” namely providing evidence that “Silesia is German land since 
centuries,” so that this “memory work” needed to have “widespread effect.”89 Expellees ascribed 
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great political significance to their cultural activity, which amounted to government-supported 
memory politics aimed at augmenting and eternalizing revisionist claims, and linking memories 
of “flight and expulsion” with the political demands of the expellee organizations. 
Secondly, by erecting crosses on hilltops, gathering bowls of earth, orchestrating 
demonstrative marches, or shaping school curricula, expellee leaders yearned to keep the link 
between West Germany and the German East alive in perpetuity. This reflected the “pan-
German” aspirations of the associations, as previous chapters have already analyzed. Memorials 
in public places or attractive homeland books tried to institutionalize awareness that German 
unification could only occur through a revision of Potsdam and a return of the territories wrested 
from the Reich, and which represented a disastrous and irrevocable loss for Germany and 
Europe. While consumed predominantly by expellees yearning to keep memories alive or 
seeking to slake their curiosity over how it looked “back home,” the melancholic homeland 
books and slideshows hoped to reach and convince non-expellees of the beauty and cultural and 
historic importance of the lost territories as well.  
Endorsements for Die schlesische Bilderbibel (“The Silesian Illustrated Bibel”), for 
example, made overall intentions clear. 90 “One should give it to the inhabitants of West 
Germany,” Breslauer Nachrichten demanded, to show them “see, this was the German East!” As 
many people as possible needed to know “that this pure, occidental spirit was extinguished by 
the ‘Age of Humanity.’” 91 The Kultusminister of Bavaria, Alois Hundhammer, praised that the 
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Heimatbuch captured the “beauty of the Silesian land so strikingly, that once again and painfully 
its loss is made plain for everyone.”92 Images of picturesque cities, tree-lined country lanes, and 
crystal-clear lakes were not a escape into memory, but a documentation of “what we all have 
lost,” non-expellees realized according to organizers of a 1960 slideshow in Heidelberg.93  
The Federation of Expellees (BdV) also attempted to spread its political messages beyond 
its clientele by organizing “book campaigns” coinciding with days of commemoration. “Every 
expellee is called upon to give at least one book or record about the Heimat or…an East German 
author on the ‘Day of the Homeland’ (9/11)” particularly to non-expellees, youths, and 
foreigners, the BdV appealed in 1960. Not only would this stimulate sales of authors of the 
German East, but help “raise awareness” of the lost territories and related political issues.94 
Overall, an East Prussian Association’s characterization of its mission sums up the ultimate goal 
of what the fostering of expellee culture attempted to do: The objective was an “East German 
cultural-propagandistic penetration of the West German as well as homeland expellee 
population, and especially the youth, in order to serve as a basis for life and ideological bulwark 
of the Western world against Asia.”95 
The explicit reference to reaching out to Germany’s youth constituted the third objective 
of the institutionalization of “flight and expulsion.” Recognizing a coming generational shift, 
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proponents argued that the “entire cultural and spiritual powers of the expellees” were of 
paramount importance for “educational purposes” of adolescents organized in the homeland 
associations’ youth groups.96 The Federal Expellee Law ingeniously conferred the legal status of 
“expellee” to the second generation, thereby hoping to mitigate a sudden disappearance of this 
clientele. But beyond an inflation of numbers, the “all-German” ambitions also necessitated 
winning over non-expellees. Schools posed a crucial battleground. Here Ostkundeunterricht 
needed to be elevated into a “matter of conscience,” and deliver a particular historical 
interpretation of “flight and expulsion”97 The courting of youths attempted to tie a properly 
educated cadre of activists to the organizations.98 As a 1965 request for slides depicting the 
actual expulsions revealed, the older generation yearned to keep the “path of suffering of the 
parents” vivid for the children, and thus win them for the political cause.99 In addition to keeping 
the memories of misery intense for the next generation, the associations armed their youth 
groups with materials to help them provide proper “answers” to questions of incredulous non-
expellees perplexed by their uniforms, activities, and political demands.100 
Virtually all cultural work therefore tried to preserve the image of the homeland, as 
envisioned by the leadership, for those who never themselves lived there or experienced the 
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trauma of the forced migrations, so that they could continue the struggle. The endorsements of 
Die schlesische Bilderbibel again fittingly capture these efforts. Breslauer Nachrichten 
commanded that readers “give this volume into the hands of every Silesian child—see, this was 
your Heimat!” The St. Hedwigs-Werk, an expellee branch of the Central Committee of German 
Catholics, surmised that the “300 pictures should bring their glow into the misery of the 
barracks,” but that they had a specific “mission”: “Give this book to your children, so that they 
never forget the Heimat.” Representatives of the Silesian association for Waldorf (since 1945, 
Borek) similarly demanded that “our children must also read it with such devotion, as if they 
were reading a prayer book,” adding that it belonged in every school.101  
Expellee leaders invested their hopes in the future, as the expected return of the homeland 
depended on maintaining a base with emotional ties to the lost lands and willingness to struggle 
for their return and, finally, re-settle them. As the inauguration of Schloss Burg’s memorial made 
clear, the young “should keep themselves prepared for the great tasks of resettlement,” and 
continually remind their West German peers “so that one day there will be enough people who 
will once again be prepared to continue the German task in the territories wrested away.” 102 In 
other words, the memorials aimed in large part to inculcate dedication to something completely 
foreign, to bequeath the homeland politics of the elders to their offspring.  
Fourthly, the cultural politics during the ascendency of expellee power attempted to lend 
this pressure group continued potency and the appearance of a force to be reckoned with. As a 
former Silesian mayor explained to those who doubted the power of the organized mass of 
expellees to achieve their goals, they “should get to know our big Heimat meetings 
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sometime.”103 The omnipresence of the German East in West German politics and society, 
expellee leaders genuinely believed or convinced themselves, signaled to the world that they 
could not simply be ignored. As long as the masses continued to undertake veritable pilgrimages 
to remote memorials or homeland gatherings in far off cities, the argument could be made that 
the throngs categorically endorsed the messages of the leadership. 
The power of the associations depended largely on a continuous emotional agitation. The 
1950 recommendations of Hermann Hönig, an advisor to the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft 
and specialist in “awareness education,” captures the ulterior motives of public speakers and, by 
extension, the symbols they stood before: They were to keep discussions of the expulsions and 
their backgrounds simple, and utilize “emotional images” to provoke listeners and mobilize them 
for an “emotional politics.”104 Even the most banal cultural work needed to support the homeland 
politics of the expellee associations. Although partially billed as a means to comfort expellee 
anguish, and despite vows of not wanting to “tear open old wounds,” all expressions of “flight 
and expulsion” ultimately sought to cultivate resentments and indignation. Whether reiterating 
wartime experiences or exposing audiences to slideshows of an infuriatingly dilapidated 
homeland, the associations intended to ignite passions that could be harnessed politically.  
Cultural work such as radio programming, as the Silesian director of Südwestdeutscher 
Rundfunk explained at a 1950 conference, needed to engage with more than a “heartache 
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question,” but encompass political issues.105 For this reason, and despite incessant handwringing 
that more needed to be done to highlight their concerns, expellee leaders harbored a profound 
aversion toward “sentimental” efforts that promoted integration and “contradicted our…goals,” 
as a Sudeten German Association (SL) staffer complained to the organization’s speaker, Rudolf 
Lodgman von Auen.106 Specifically, this meant a rejection of cultural work that placed too great 
an emphasis on integration that could erode desires for a return to the homeland. Expellee 
Ministry Undersecretary Peter Paul Nahm argued that “[a]ll fostering of culture, all the homeland 
gatherings and every Patenschaft…would have lost their purpose if assimilation, and moreover 
the deliberate relinquishment of homeland thinking, would be pursued and encouraged.”107 In 
other words, the sort of cultural work expellees desired represented a double-edged sword, if it 
brought with it the danger of neglecting to politicize audiences. 
Expellee associations therefore vigorously pushed content that stressed political aims that 
mere “chumminess and relying on the joys of costumes and festivals” could not accomplish.108 A 
“cultural program from idealists is not enough,” a Sudeten German Association memo 
complained, the key needed to be political programming such as radio dramas “of our expulsion, 
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about the days of May 1945 etc.” One could not be “considerate” of sensibilities, as expellees 
needed to mobilize “before we lose momentum.”109 The deputy chairman of the Silesia 
Association, Waldemar Rumbaur, similarly bemoaned “missed opportunities”: At gatherings and 
commemorations, the “big speeches…are nice and make an impression, but they are soon 
forgotten.” What was needed was “a new style and tactics,” as expellee groups yearned to be “a 
fighting organization [Kampforganisation] with political vehemence.”110 Flights into the “virtual 
Heimat,” to use Andrew Demshuk’s term, or finding solace in cherished traditions were fruitless 
exercises if such sentimentality lacked a political purpose. 
Fifth, the activism of the expellee organizations revealed their ambition of being the sole 
arbiter of how “flight and expulsion” should be discussed. “It is really time that we actively 
intervene and thereby prevent programs that run which do not contribute to illuminating our fate 
from our standpoint,” an expellee activist illustratively wrote the Expellee Ministry.111 The 
domination of school curricula, rigid control of Patenschaften, and moves to found their own 
university underlined the ambition of the expellee leadership to function as the only entity that 
could represent expellees. The “cultural assets of the expellees from the East can only then serve 
as a source of power if it is transmitted from its own homeland atmosphere,” an expellee 
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advocate pleaded with the Bayerischer Rundfunk in 1950. Only those from there or who have 
proven “inner solidarity with the spiritual realm of the German East” should have the right to 
speak to the matter.112 For this reason, they meticulously monitored and attempted to police 
publications and the media, seeking to bend them to their absolute will.  
The associations frequently flew into fits of fury even during the 1950s, when broad 
consensus over the injustice of the expulsions meant that politicians and the media demonstrated 
sympathy and a willingness to help. For instance, writing to the publisher of a Göttinger 
Arbeitskreis (GA) guide on the Sudetenland, von Auen criticized the release of the work so close 
to the SL’s own Atlas, thereby allegedly robbing it of resonance. Von Auen castigated many 
“deficiencies,” and demanded the publisher run all publications by “experts” within the SL, or 
rely exclusively on their materials.113 Perhaps motivated to boost sales of its own literature, the 
SL also asserted the authority of its “correct” publication which depicted more extensive reaches 
of ethnic German influence in Czechoslovakia, and conformed to its expectations. However, 
control lay at the heart of the matter, as well as the belief that only expellees themselves, or 
rather their elite, could be entrusted with the writing of their own history. 
Occasionally the zealousness with which expellees decried an undermining of their 
authority took on absurd forms. Incensed listeners frequently filed complaints with the BMVt 
and broadcasting stations, taking issue with errors or exaggerated and “laughable” dialects of 
actors in radio dramas.114 On several occasions, the Minister of Expellees saw it fit to intervene, 
                                                 
112 BArch B150-3340 vol. 1, Alfons Teuber to Dr. Clemens Münster, July 11, 1950. 
113 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 80, von Auen to Holzner-Verlag, June 8, 1956. 
114 BArch B150-3348 vol. 1, von Wilpert to Hans Laleike, May 8, 1950. The BMVt took the protests seriously 
enough to initiate an investigation, urging the East Prussian Association to nominate a list of speakers who could 
provide genuine “native [heimatlich]” dialogue. See BArch B150-3348 vol. 1, von Wilpert to Krüger, May 8, 1950. 
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sitting with broadcasting officials and expellee leaders to listen to selections of programs and 
assess their authenticity.115 A case in point is a 1951 protest over a “Call of the Homeland” 
broadcast of the Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk (NWDR). Marking the 30 year anniversary of the 
Upper Silesian plebiscite, the program opened and ended with expellees singing and conversing. 
Pastor Johannes Smaczny, an editor of the prominent expellee paper Heimat und Glaube with 
close ties to Expellee Minister Lukaschek and Linus Kather, took particular offense with the use 
of Wasserpolnisch (“water Polish”), a dialect of the region heavily marked by Slavic influences. 
Smaczny’s grievances were not so much aesthetic, but instead exposed expellee fears that any 
shortcoming, however trivial, spelled a grave threat to their enterprise and authority. As an 
Upper Silesian and participant in the plebiscite, Smaczny alleged that every “upstanding Upper 
Silesian” would be dismayed by the portrayal of the “German character” of the region, which 
instead sounded like it lay “beyond the Urals.” The actors and all people associated with the 
travesty, Smaczny alleged, were “alien” and not from there, who furthermore profoundly 
endangered the “task of raising education” and endorsing expellee politics.116  
The controversy forced the BMVt to immediately initiate an investigation.117 The 
program editor, Wilhelm Matzel, demanded to be involved in the process. Himself an Upper 
Silesian, Matzel pointed out that he consulted with compatriots, including Expellee Minister 
Lukaschek, and that they even added to the script. Other expellees wrote to praise the program 
                                                 
115 BArch B150-3348 vol. 1, Hilpert to Laleike, May 24, 1950. The representative of Norddeutscher Rundfunk 
expressed proved less enthusiastic, noting that all dialects are sometimes exaggerated on radio. He added that as an 
East Prussian himself and employee of Königsberger Rundfunk from 1931 to 1945, he found no issue with the 
programming and judged the complaints to be “overly sensitive,” though from his time in Königsberger he knew to 
“expect this from [East Prussian] compatriots.” 
116 BArch B150-3348 vol. 1, Smaczny to NWDR, March 28, 1951. 
117 BArch B150-3348 vol. 1, Rothen to Lukaschek, April 2, 1951. 
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and request a repeat broadcast. In general, Matzel pointed to the region’s diversity of dialects 
“that differ from High German,” and that he did not intend to insult or contribute to a “negative 
judgment” of Upper Silesians.118 Ultimately, Matzel personally brought the recording to the 
BMVt. With the minister in attendance, sixty officials crammed into the ministry’s conference 
room to listen to the recording. Upper Silesian employees attested to the dialogue’s authenticity, 
explaining that in parts of the region people did indeed speak in this manner. A handful of critics 
backed Smaczcny: It was “superfluous to let these fellows with their Upper Silesian jargon be 
heard, since it raises the impression that Upper Silesians…did not speak a real German in their 
homeland.” The matter in the end was dropped with the explanation that “about 98% of the 
program’s Upper Silesian [actors]…sufficiently proved that they mastered High German.”119 
The comical incident reveals how the diverse goals of institutionalization efforts worked 
in tandem. The expulsions in a sense represented a process that condensed a culturally and 
linguistically diverse group into homogenous blocs, and exposed leaders to the realization that 
the region they claimed to speak for in fact contained significant diversity.120 Broad designations 
such as “Silesia” and “East Prussia” papered over variances typical to linguistic borderlands.121 
This therefore created a tension for association leaders, who regarded themselves as arbiters of 
what constituted “true” culture and who was a “real” member of the group they claimed 
authority over. The incident moreover encapsulates their reluctance to rely on “outsiders,” even 
                                                 
118 BArch B150-3348 vol. 1, “Stellungnahme des NWDR be: ‘Der Ruf der Heimat’ anlässlich der 30. Wiederkehr 
der Volksabstimmung in Oberschlesien,” March 30, 1951. 
119 BArch B150-3348 vol. 1, Memo from Rothen, July 27, 1951. 
120 In other words, this particular incident confronted Upper Silesian critics with the fact that this region was rather 
diverse. Situated along a linguistic borderland between Poland and Czechoslovakia, dialects between the urban 
centers and the rural countryside varied wildly.  
121 See for example King, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans; Judson, Guardians of the Nation. 
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those offering support for keeping the German East a firm fixture in West German public 
discourse. Additionally, the overreactions of individuals with a particular memory of the 
homeland exposed how any deviation from the leadership’s vision in their eyes amounted to an 
attack on the group itself, and more crucially, their legitimacy. Lastly, suggestions that the 
German East was not “German” enough threatened to inculcate ambivalence among West 
Germans, and undermine the struggle for the return of historic German territory.  
Associations insisted upon a monopoly of control on one point in particular: The 
depiction of their suffering. When portrayals did not conform to their interpretations, their 
leadership demonstrated an extremely thin skin. One must only think of the responses to the 
Dokumentation, already discussed in previously. When the historians and their government 
patrons denied ethnic Germans from Hungary controlling rights over the project, they decried the 
publication as “unscholarly, tendentious, and full of primitive falsehoods” that altogether “turned 
out after the fancy of the expellers.”122 The Sudeten Germans also lamented that they had 
“absolutely no influence over the final design,” not even “insight into the manuscript.”123 Georg 
Baron von Manteuffel-Szoege, President of the Union of Homeland Associations (Verband der 
Landsmannschaften, VdL), also questioned the integrity and objectivity of the commission 
because it refused to grant expellees greater control over the chronicling of their own fate.124 Any 
search for “historical truth,” they pleaded, needed to include the associations.125 
                                                 
122 Barch N1228-111, Circular Letter Nr. 93, May 23, 1957. At the heart of the dispute was the role of the context of 
National Socialism, which the German-Hungarians feared would relativize their suffering.  
123 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 662, Lodgman to Simon, February 3, 1956.  
124 BArch N1188-55, Oberländer to von Manteuffel-Szoege, August 5, 1958.  
125 BArch B150-5642, Zillich to VdL, July 9, 1958. 
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The expellee elite bemoaned the “authoritarian inadequacies” of the historians not merely 
because they dismissed the “power of judgment” of the victims over their own history. They also 
feared the “historical representations” the historians may render.126 As has been argued, into the 
1950s the Schieder Commission increasingly attempted to contextualize the forced migrations in 
the history of National Socialism and the war. Schieder himself surmised that the “entire 
spectacle after all is nothing more than the attempt to exclude the [German] ethnic groups from 
the general judgment over NS politics that we so-called Binnendeutsche [“interior Germans,” i.e. 
Reich Germans] after all face without argument.”127 Yet something more fundamental beyond 
asserting dominance in the face of perceived interlopers was at play: When it came to depicting 
expellee misery, “outsiders” failed to paint a gruesome enough picture. 
The expellee leadership consistently preferred dramatic and salacious reports, and 
resented depictions that eschewed emotional language or documented less sensational, yet 
nevertheless grim, expellee experiences. When their accounts drew criticism, they bristled and 
resorted to browbeating naysayers. For example, after Waldemar Lenz of Süddeutscher 
Rundfunk issued a glowing review of the Sudeten “White Book” and read several gripping 
passages, the station’s supervisory board chastised Lenz’s “political abstruseness” and 
“nationalist” comments. The Sudeten German Association jumped to his defense, decrying the 
critics’ “haranguing.” “How can facts be politically abstruse or nationalistic,” Rudolf Lodgman 
von Auen demanded to know, complaining how “for days and years on end only misdeeds of 
Germans are discussed, yet crimes committed against Germans are covered with the blanket of 
Christian charity.” Lentz deserved thanks from “every German and European-thinking person, 
                                                 
126 BArch B150-5642, Zillich to VdL, July 9, 1958. 
127 BArch N1188-41, Schieder to Booms, July 21, 1957. 
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who must be moved how after the terrible atrocities, the Sudeten Germans are so willing to 
rebuild Europe.”128  
Already when the first volume of the Dokumentation appeared in 1953, some expellee 
leaders lamented that the historians had not been thorough enough, as “many incidents are not 
adequately addressed or…not even mentioned.”129 These concerns escalated with the publication 
of the diary of Margarete Schell. Her account proved not horrific enough, and her assessment of 
the expellers lacked the proper vitriol and presented an entirely too nuanced interpretation at 
odds with “flight and expulsion” narratives pushed by the homeland associations. As reviews in 
the expellee press made clear, expellee elites felt that Schell raised the impression that expellee 
accounts of suffering were “all lies, since now a…published diary proves that it wasn’t so 
bad.”130 The Sudeten German Association (SL) also objected, deeming the testimony as not 
“characteristic of the suffering of the Sudeten Germans.”131 They arrived at this conclusion after 
“very thorough engagement,” which consisted of counting positive and negative remarks 
regarding Soviets, Czechs, and Germans. The results proved “catastrophic,” the SL concluded, 
                                                 
128 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 200, von Auen to Rundfunkrat of Süddeutscher Rundfunk, May 20, 
1952. 
129 BArch B150-4171 vol. 2, Guillaume to Adenauer, November 11, 1953. 
130 “Tagebuch einer Bevorzugten,” Vertriebenen-Anzeiger, July 5, 1958, unpaginated newspaper clipping in Barch 
B150-5644. Specifically, the authors lamented that Schell disproportionately mentioned encounters with helpful 
Czechs and Soviets. Moreover, descriptions of callous and crude Germans further incensed critics. For the 
Vertriebenen-Anzeiger, it was utterly “incomprehensible how the expellee ministry decided to publish such a ‘diary’ 
in a volume…on the inhumane expulsion of…Germans from their ancestral homelands.” The report worked “much 
better as a propaganda piece of Prague communists, aimed at discriminating against the expellees.” The damage the 
Schieder Commission had done, particularly abroad, could not be fathomed. 
131 BArch B150-5630, Memo of Schlicker re: “Stellungnahme des Vorstandes der SL zum Tagebuch Margarete 
Schell, October 10, 1958. The SL acceded that the diary did accurately describe life in Czechoslovakian 
“concentration camps,” however. 
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and completely “devalued” the government’s treatment of Sudeten German suffering.132 
Expellee dissatisfaction with treatments of the forced migration that did not adhere to their 
standards remained a consistent theme: When the Silesian Association sought to publish a series 
of paperbacks that promised greater resonance than the dry academic tome produced by 
Schieder, Herbert Hupka felt it necessary to “select the best” reports, as the somber scholarly 
treatment inadequately informed audiences of the “terrible crime against humanity” perpetrated 
against Germany.133 
All of this is to say that the primary goal of expellee institutionalization efforts was an 
overt attempt to monopolize all public discourse on “flight and expulsion,” and make the 
expellee elite’s interpretation binding upon the nation. Whether commissioning hundreds of 
memorials, orchestrating massive rallies, or shaping school curricula, on this front the homeland 
organizations proved immensely successful during the 1950s. They complained bitterly over rare 
slights and negative reporting, taking it as a conspiracy against them that continued the ignominy 
endured since 1945. But calls for a “purge [Säuberung]” of the “sordid, rootless and wavering 
elements” in the media eroding “national unity” were a radical minority grievance in the first 
postwar decade.134 The consensus over “flight and expulsion” prevailed, and the majority of 
West German politicians supported efforts of supporting expellee concerns. There were some 
                                                 
132 Barch B150-5630, Memo re: “Tagebuch der Frau Margarete Schell—Beurteilung der Sudetendeutschen 
Landsmannschaft,” July 10, 1958, 2. The government representatives pondered in particular whether the “article 
from a Hungarian Jew” in the Soldaten-Zeitung could be traced to the SL. Already in previous meetings with 
Schieder, BMVt workers intimated that Olga Barényi for a time worked for the SL organ Sudetendeutsche Zeitung. 
BArch B150-5630, Memo re: “Dokumentation der Vertreibung, Ein Tagebuch aus Prag von Frau Margarete Schell,” 
June 30, 1958. The editor of the Vertriebenen-Anzeiger, the Sudeten German journalist and Witiko-Bund member 
Alfred Hönig, also was closely associated with the SL. 
133 BArch B106-27733, Hupka to Bundesminister Krüger, December 9, 1963. 
134 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 199, VdL Geschäftsführung to Sprecher der Landsmannschaften, 
September 2, 1954, 2. 
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limits: Expellees for instance never received a much-wanted central national memorial, and 
sometimes endured tongue-lashings and admonishments when their homeland gatherings 
threatened to interfere with West German foreign policy.135 Nevertheless, the federal government 
consistently supported the expellees: In 1955, it issued a special postage stamp featuring fleeing 
figures marking the ten year anniversary of “flight and expulsion.”136 The flags and emblems of 
the German East also adorned the parliamentary building in Bonn, and hung in the eastern wing 
of the Reichstag until 1990. 
The West German media similarly demonstrated an eagerness to meet the expectations of 
the expellees in the 1950s. Broadcasting directors unanimously expressed sympathy, and even 
acceded to subjecting their stations to “coordination measures” issued by the BMVt and expellee 
associations.137 Even when expellee organizations continued to press for total control and veto 
rights over editorial and broadcast boards, the BMVt resisted these steps and noted the “earnest 
measures” to accommodate expellees: In May 1951, German radio stations recorded up to 4,000 
meters of magnetophon reel of expellee broadcasts per day for “critical evaluation” by the BMVt 
and expellee representatives.138 Overall, broadcasting officials consistently exhibited an 
                                                 
135 For example, government officials chided expellees to moderate their criticisms of Western governments and 
their role in the expulsions, particularly as the FRG attempted to enter into NATO and the Western Alliance. 
Officials also expressed reservations over the 1955 “Day of the Homeland” and postponed it by several months so as 
not to set a false tone during the Bonn-Paris Conventions and Adenauer’s August visit to Moscow, and President 
Heuss withdrew his initial acceptance of attending the inauguration. Stickler, Ostdeutsch heisst Gesamtdeutsch, 
162–63. 
136 Elisabeth Fendl, Zur Ikonographie des Heimwehs - Erinnerungskultur von Heimatvertriebenen: Referate der 
Tagung des Johannes-Künzig-Instituts für Ostdeutsche Volkskunde 4. bis 6. Juli 2001 (Freiburg i. Br.: Johannes-
Künzig-Inst. für Ostdt. Volkskunde, 2002), 48–53. 
137 See for example BArch B150-3333, “Referat und Aussprache bei der Rundfunktagung am 10.6.50 in Bremen 
über zweckdeinlichere Behandlung des Vertriebenenproblems im Rundfunk.”  
138 BArch B150-3343, Memo of BMVt to BMfgF, October 13, 1951. The Ministry for All-German Affairs 
concurred that the stations were meeting expectations, and did not require a special expellee referee. Ibid, BMfgF to 
BMVt, April 17, 1951. 
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accommodating if not differential demeanor during the 1950s, demonstrating an eagerness to 
apologize when expellees expressed displeasure and willingness to please this bloc.139 
Indeed, most expellee leaders themselves expressed satisfaction, underlining how from 
their perspective they successfully permeated public discourse in the first decade after 1945. 
Representatives of the Zentralverband vertriebener Deutscher (“Central Federation for Expelled 
Germans,” ZvD), for example, tolerated reporting “even if in the details some things were not 
accurate,” praising the interest and honest attempt of the German media to “keep the pan-
German homeland awareness alive.”140 The expellee press also admitted that despite “individual 
laments,” and accepting that one “can’t get enough programming concerning the homeland,” no 
one could “honestly doubt that the good will has been there.”141 Herbert Hupka, a Silesian 
Association leader engaged at the Bayerischer Rundfunk, also felt that “a lot has been done” to 
meet expellee organizations expectations, so that it was “inappropriate of individual squealers to 
make irresponsible demands.” Writing to the BMVt, Hupka advised that it would “take the wind 
out of their sails” if it could be shown what all had been accomplished.142  
In sum, in the early to mid-1950s, expellees had much reason to bask in the glory of their 
ascendency. Yet things would soon quickly change. Just as it had presaged changes in how 
intellectuals viewed German history, the Schieder Commission and its skirmishes with the 
expellee organizations anticipated political and cultural currents that rapidly pulled the rug out 
                                                 
139 See for example BArch B150-3342, Geerdes to Oberländer, August 21, 1958. In this particular case, Expellee 
Minister Theodor Oberländer wrote to Walter Geerdes, the director of Freies Berlin, on behalf of expellee leaders to 
register concern with ostensible cuts to programming concerning the expulsions. Geerdes immediately promised an 
expansion of reporting. 
140 BArch B150-3343, Pressereferat of ZvD to Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk, April 24, 1961. 
141 BArch B150-3340 vol. 1, Transcription of “Der Rundfunk und die Flüchtlinge,” Die Brücke, March 31, 1951. 
142 BArch B150-3340 vol. 1, Hupka to Lukaschek, June 5, 1951. 
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from under “flight and expulsion.” Hans Rothfels assessed the “increased radicalization” of 
expellees in their interactions with the scholars as a sign that they struggled for their very 
“existence.”143 A more rattled Theodor Schieder condemned their departure from the ethos 
enshrined in their “Charta of the Homeland Expellees,” predicting that the impracticable demand 
of seeking continuous “approval” from their political leaders could only lead to “unrest and 
strife.”144 The renowned historian felt dejected and “entirely fed up”: “I sometimes begin to 
despair because of the downright grotesque…lack of consideration. I am solely consoled by the 
fact that all these things are directed by a minority, which nevertheless apparently knows with 
which means one can exercise spiritual terror.”145 The comments from Rothfels and Schieder 
would prove prescient. The uproar and accompanying press reactions foretold a seismic shift on 
the place of “flight and expulsion” in West German public memory.  
 
“Beneficial Unrest?” The Decline of “Flight and Expulsion”146 
In hindsight, astute observers could have traced the signs of an imminent decline of 
expellee influence already in the mid-1950s. Nevertheless, toward the end of the decade this 
deterioration took on an astonishing pace. With growing distance from 1945, and basking in the 
glow of the “economic miracle,” interest in endless dwelling on the war waned. Renewed 
                                                 
143 BArch B150-5630, Memo of Schlicker re: “Kurzprotokoll der Sitzung vom 6. Dezember 1958 in Köln” 
144 BArch B150-5642, Schieder to Kleberg, May 13, 1958. Though he saw the project through to its conclusion in 
1961, Schieder’s experiences with the expellee associations left him disillusioned and dejected. In a 1955 letter to 
Hans Rothfels, Theodor Schieder privately summed up his disillusionment: “Seldom in my life has something 
brought me so much worry, trouble and aggravation as this, and for this one receives no thanks from anyone.” 
BArch N1213-158, Schieder to Rothfels, December 22, 1955. 
145 BArch N1188-5, Schieder to Rothfels, July 10, 1958. 
146 BArch B106-27372, vol 1,  Sitzungsbericht der Schlesischen Landesversammlung, 8. Und 9. Plenarsitzung, 
25/26 November, 1967, BA 106. 
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prosperity in the form of a humble home or modest vacations gradually supplanted living in the 
past. Was not longing for a bygone time and place beyond an Iron Curtain, which Cold War 
crises made all the more absolute, an absurd fantasy? Was not acceptance of reality, and 
reconciliation with Poland and Czechoslovakia, more realistic and desirable? What was the 
alternative beyond war, which after such horrendous suffering just years before now meant 
certain annihilation in the atomic age? Largely unspoken opinions too unpopular to utter openly 
before the 1960s, journalists, politicians, pundits, and average Germans pondered these questions 
more and more.  
A variety of developments contributed to this dramatic turn of events that undercut the 
expellee associations and the ascendency of “flight and expulsion.” First, for non-expellees with 
no emotional bonds to the German East, already extant ambivalence—or “scarcely believable 
indifference of most people toward the fate of these 12 million disenfranchised”—turned into 
incredulity.147 Understandable confusion over eternal protestations of events long ago was not 
just palpable among those who never experienced the forced migrations, however. Substantial 
waning of interest for an actual return to the homeland among “ordinary” expellees also 
compounded the declining influence of expellee leadership. The equalization of burdens funds 
and strengthening economy allowed for the reestablishment of homes and livelihoods that 
provided security. Grasping their second chance of a new existence, real lives in Wuppertal or 
Cologne displaced yearning for Waldenburg or Colberg; memories of an old, bygone life 
supplanted longing for a theoretical return in the indefinite future.  
                                                 
147 BArch B150-3348 vol. 2, Werner Beck, “Zum Abschluss der ostdeutschen Heimatwoche in Hamburg,” 
Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk, May 22, 1950. 
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Expellees recognized, even if they were hesitant to articulate it openly, that there was 
nothing waiting for them. The passage of time, the menacing Iron Curtain, but more importantly 
the realization that the homeland had irreversibly changed, left notions of a return seem 
improbable. Most were quite aware of the current state of their erstwhile hometowns and 
properties. Indeed, as Andrew Demshuk convincingly argues, this knowledge provided the final 
break with the homeland, and convinced most expellees to find closure. Regular reports of how 
the homeland fared under communist mismanagement—including the slideshows and 
Heimatbücher analyzed above—intended to stoke fury and indignation for continued political 
pressure to revise the Potsdam Agreement. Yet they ironically had the opposite effect, and 
confirmed nagging suspicions that the German East transformed unalterably beyond recognition, 
and was gone forever.  
The publisher Joseph Caspar Witsch openly noted these issues in a March 8, 1957 
broadcast of Stammtisch. The “majority of refugees—let’s express it carefully—are not doing 
poorly,” which did not mean that their homeland no longer existed, but that “it is no longer there 
anymore, because it really is no homeland anymore. If they returned—they would bring along 
expectations, but the expectations would not materialize in situ because it has almost become a 
different country.”148 Though it remained a contentious proposition in the 1950s, West German 
commentators and increasingly expellees themselves agreed: Few desired to give up whatever 
modest prosperity they acquired in their new communities in exchange for an unrecognizable 
homeland comprised of devastated communities and dilapidated infrastructure. Indeed, polls 
                                                 
148 ACDP 001-377-12/2, “Der Stammtisch,” Westdeutscher Rundfunk, March 8, 1957, 7-8. 
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revealed a progressive decline of expellees willing to return in the unlikely scenario that the flag 
of a reunified Germany would once again fly above the German East.149  
This meant that expellee associations claimed a mandate for a demographic that mostly 
cared little for their visions. Their constituents had little in common with the self-appointed 
leadership, a “small group of…so-called professional refugees [Berufsflüchtlige], who in fact 
live off of this function,” Witsch scathingly remarked.150 Ordinary expellees simply did not care 
for the debates over borders or political developments. In 1952, editors of a popular magazine 
astutely noted that the expellee “wants to know how it looks in his community, on his street. The 
man that looks homewards closes his eyes. The louder the fight around him becomes, the more 
firmly he clings to the eternal, unchanging, always friendly image of the Heimat: to memory!”151 
Curiosity and pining for a pristine world left behind drew large audiences to the slideshow 
evenings, homeland gatherings, and bookstores to purchase the latest Heimatbuch, but should not 
be interpreted as an explicit endorsement of the associations’ politics. This does not mean that 
they did not harbor a sense of injustice or forgave the torment suffered at the hands of expellers, 
or that they did not demand social recognition as victims. But to accept the notion of “the” 
expellees with shared desires is to overlook a profound ambivalence among the rank and file, and 
accept a construct of their leaders who continued to insist upon the right to speak for millions.  
The massive attendances at yearly homeland gatherings into the late 1960s are an ideal 
case for assessing the gulf between association authority and hubris. Orchestrated by the 
associations as a dramatic show of force to West German and foreign publics, they provided a 
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150 ACDP 001-377-12/2, “Der Stammtisch,” Westdeutscher Rundfunk, March 8, 1957, 5. 
151 Quoted in Demshuk, The Lost German East, 9. 
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measure of ostensible saliency of demands for a “right to the homeland.” The bombastic 
proclamations of speakers asserting eternal claims garnered approving nods and applause from 
an audience in complete agreement that they suffered a terrible and unprecedented injustice that 
left them the greatest victims of the war. Yet it is doubtful that the majority of expellees 
embraced the activism of their leadership as a pressing personal concern.  
Attending the festivals offered an opportunity to see old friends and relatives, to speak 
one’s dialect and eat traditional food, and relive memories in a reconstituted “virtual Heimat” 
among countrymen for an afternoon. Already in 1950, journalists noted that the agendas of 
participants differed from that of their leaders: The former came to visit with loved ones and sing 
Heimatlieder, or “songs from the homeland,” while the latter sought to impress the West German 
public with “irrefutable evidence” that the German East belonged at the start of any political 
discussion.152 While attendees tended to demonstrate closed ranks to outsiders, in reality they 
frequently only partially agreed with the political utterances.153 While the associations invested 
great meaning in the throngs, and projected their aspirations onto them, most participants 
attended to find a “surrogate Heimat spaces” and join a “collective therapy session.”154 In short: 
Most expellees showed little interest in the political agenda of their leadership beyond a shared 
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sense of victimhood that could be enflamed at the main address of a homeland gathering before 
venturing over to a beer tent and finally returning home and daily life. 
Insufficient exuberance and participation in associational functions were increasingly 
magnified by demographic trends that spelled out an inescapable dying out of Germans from the 
East. The generation that experienced the forced migrations steadily shrunk, and though the 1953 
Federal Expellee Law extended expellee status to children born after 1945, the proactive measure 
to boost membership over the long term could not prevent a dramatic dwindling of persons who 
earnestly regarded themselves as expellees and may have identified with the cause of the 
associations.155  
The second generation, raised in West Germany in a more prosperous era than their 
elders, successfully integrated. Their homeland was Landshut or Ingolstadt, not the msyterious 
Liegnitz or Insterburg their parents spoke of.  Many felt little affinity with places, customs, and a 
cause curiously rooted in the past. However exposed to family stories, the offspring possessed 
few reference points on which expellee associations could build. As the novelist Hans-Ulrich 
Treichel explained, the war generation “spoke a curious German, wore old-fashioned clothes, 
and spoke of things of which he had no idea.” For those too young to remember or, like Treichel, 
born after 1945, the East remained “completely incomprehensible, he could never unravel the 
topographical and historical jumble the adults presented to him when conversations turned to 
Silesia, East Prussia and Pomerania, to Breslau, Königsberg and Lodz, to Masuria and the 
Riesengebierge, to evacuations and resettlements, flight and expulsions.”156 
                                                 
155 ACDP 001-291-035/2, Memo of BdV to all members of the board, “Argumentation in Public,” February 10, 
1981. Herbert Czaja, the president of the BdV, internally admitted that sinking interest, the successful integration, 
and general acceptance of Neue Ostpolitik produced a decline in membership numbers. Above all, aging represented 
a major challenge. 
156 Hans Ulrich Treichel, Menschenflug: Roman (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2015), 51. 
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Political developments abroad and domestically are the second main catalyst for the 
decline of “flight and expulsion.” Recurrent hopes for peace talks, in which the fate of 
Germany’s 1937 borders could be finalized, and fluidity of the early phase of the Cold War gave 
way to realizations that postwar demarcations proved more immutable than imagined. The 
Hungarian Uprising in 1956 decisively demonstrated Soviet intentions to hang onto its sphere of 
influence with force, while also revealed Western reluctance of rolling back communism. Any 
change in status quo without conflict and nuclear Armageddon seemed unthinkable. Moreover, 
the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 symbolically heralded the unmistakable fact that the 
Eastern Bloc, and with it the German East, remained unreachably locked behind the Iron Curtain 
for the foreseeable future.  
West Germany’s allies therefore surprised only the most oblivious of optimists when they 
openly recognized reality. Before 600 journalists in March 1959 in Bonn, Charles de Gaulle 
exhorted the Federal Republic to “no longer call into question the current borders in West, East, 
North, or South.” In the fall of 1960, officials of the Kennedy administration reportedly informed 
the First Secretary of the Polish People’s Republic, Władysław Gomułka, that the United States 
echoed de Gaulle’s calls for a recognition of the postwar borders. Indeed, West German officials 
registered with “concern” a variety of American lawmakers joining the chorus calling for a de 
jure acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line. To the alarm of expellee leaders, the Foreign Ministry 
discovered that of 75 atlases published abroad in the late 1950s, only a Swiss edition indicated 
the provisional character of the German East under Polish and Soviet administration.157  
                                                 
157 See “Das grosse Tabu,” Der Spiegel 35, November 22, 1961 54-71, here 55. See also “Ohne ostdeutsche 
Ortsnamen. Blick in ausländische Atlanten,” Weser Kurier, March 15, 1957, newspaper clipping in ACDP 07-001-
3382; and “Briten sehen Oder-Neisse-Linie als Ostgrenze,” Ppp Press report from June 11, 1957, in ACDP 07-001-
3382. According to the report, the London Financial Times published a map of Germany in which the Oder-Neisse-
Line was designated as the border between Poland and the GDR. “With this the respected London financial 
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Simultaneously, West German politicians began to cautiously question the feasibility of a 
reunification of Germany within the borders of 1937. Realpolitik and pragmatism, harbored 
secretively, more and more entered into political debates. “I personally see this question [of 
German territorial claims] in connection with reunification,” Foreign Minister Heinrich Brentano 
intimated to reporters in London on May 3, 1956, “and see it as entirely possible that the German 
people will one day face the question of whether they are prepared to relinquish the territories in 
order to thereby free 17 million Germans from the Soviet Zone, or whether they—merely to 
uphold some problematic claim to the eastern territories—will not be prepared to abandon 
them.”158 The comments stoked indignation among expellees and conservative politicians, 
forcing von Brentano to clarify that the official position of the FRG remained a return of the 
German East.159 The misstep nonetheless revealed a growing camp of realists who believed that 
a “relinquishing” of the German East, rather than return, lay in the future.160  
The most prominent “relinquisher” (Verzichtler), as expellees denounced figures who 
called for accepting the status quo, was the gravedigger of their hopes: Chancellor Willy Brandt. 
Once staunch supporters of expellee claims and subscribers to the “all-German” consensus, the 
SPD and Willy Brandt changed tack over the course of the 1960s.161 When the social-liberal 
                                                 
newspaper continues the British tendency, so often already condemned in Germany, of incorporating at least 
cartographically the German territories…into the Polish state without consideration for the legal situation.” 
158 Quoted in Klaus Rehbein, “Die westdeutsche Oder/Neiße-Debatte: Hintergründe, Prozeß und das Ende des 
Bonner Tabus” (Lit-Verl., 2006), 88.  
159 See “Billigung der Regierungserklärung im Bundestag. Politische Aussprache—Eine Erklärung des 
Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Amt,” Bulletin Nr. 120, July 1956, 1198, clipping in ACDP 07-001-3382. 
160 For more on the debate around the Oder-Neisse Line, see Rehbein, “Die westdeutsche Oder/Neiße-Debatte.” 
161 See  Matthias Müller, Die SPD und die Vertriebenenverbände 1949-1977: Eintracht, Entfremdung, Zwietracht 
(Berlin: Lit, 2012). Into the 1960s, Willy Brandt regularly attended expellee gatherings and events. As late as 1963, 
Brandt declared that “Breslau, Oppeln, Gleiwitz, Hirschberg, Glogau, Grünberg: These are not just names, they are 
living memories rooted in the souls of generations and which unceasingly pulsate within our consciousness.” ACDP 
001-291-108/2, Wiltschko to Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung, September 9, 1973. Moreover, perhaps for political reasons, 
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coalition swept into power in 1969, it marked a sudden and dramatic shift in West German 
foreign policy. Recognizing realities and accepting that the only sensible German reunification 
was with the GDR, the new government pursued a Neue Ostpolitik (“new Eastern policy”) 
seeking rapprochement with West Germany’s eastern neighbors. The Ostverträge (“Eastern 
treaties”) signed between the FRG and Moscow, Warsaw, and Prague between 1970 and 1973 
pledged the states to nonviolence and normalization of relations. The inviolability of the Oder-
Neisse Border, and refusal to insist upon territorial changes, constituted a crucial component of 
these accords.  
The consequences of Brandt’s politics for expellee interests has already been analyzed 
elsewhere.162 Needless to say, 1970 marked a caesura that spelled out that now expellees played 
only a marginal role in the political life of the Federal Republic. The consensus over the German 
East disappeared, robbing expellees of social support. Of relevance here is how this gradual 
decline influenced “flight and expulsion” discourse. For despite the vanishing of pillars of 
support, culturally expellees remained an active and vocal faction thanks to continued financial 
backing enshrined in the “Federal Expellee Law.” The greater issue was that their considerable 
loss of political influence precipitated a rapid decline in cultural relevance. Their shrinking size 
and anachronism left West Germans perplexed by the expellee associations. But a third crucial 
                                                 
Brandt nevertheless took care to maintain strong contacts to expellees within the party. In December 1964, he 
reached out to Wenzel Jaksch to encourage him after a series of “bothersome” newspaper articles on the Sudeten 
German and his dispute with German broadcasting stations. “I have made clear that you as the president of the BdV 
are our most important partner, and that there is no question of ‘letting you fall.’” Brandt did not want to “throw 
stones” but offer the SPD’s support, so that it will then be “easier to stand by you in this important work.” 
Moreover, Brandt invited Jaksch to participate in meetings of the party executive, and thereby offer an opportunity 
to “evince our bonds with a man we not only feel bound to as an old social democrat, but from whom we also know 
that he today must master one of the most difficult national-political tasks.” AdsD, NL Jaksch, J1, Brandt to Jaksch, 
December 1, 1964. 
162 Ahonen, After the Expulsion; Stickler, Ostdeutsch heisst Gesamtdeutsch. 
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challenge emerged during the 1960s that placed a decisive nail in the coffin of the ascendency of 
the expellee victimhood narrative: West Germans found it increasingly difficult to uncritically 
regard this group as the greatest victims of the war. 
For all of its foreign policy implications that thwarted homeland political ambitions, Neue 
Ostpolitik also produced an emblematic image that reflected these sweeping cultural changes in 
West Germany. Visiting the memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising before signing the 
Warsaw Treaty on December 7, 1970, Chancellor Willy Brandt suddenly and apparently 
spontaneously fell to his knees after laying a wreath in honor of Nazi Germany’s victims. The 
penitent chancellor’s unexpected act of contrition acknowledged German guilt and begged 
forgiveness on behalf of the nation. Brandt’s gesture elicited surprise and praise internationally, 
but sharply divided the German public.  Expellee leaders in particular saw it as an exaggerated 
act before a Polish audience who had just as much to apologize for. The responses reflected 
generational divides: Aghast critics tended to be older, and subscribed to a political identity 
formed in the immediate postwar period and rooted in German suffering. Brandt’s genuflection 
powerfully signaled an evolving West German memory culture, and that the nation stood at the 
cusp of a new era in which acknowledgment of Nazi crimes and admission of guilt comprised an 
essential element of what it meant to be German. Vergangenheitsbewältigung, or “mastering the 
past,” ascended as the guiding ethos of the Federal Republic, thereby displacing “selective 
remembering” and cultivation of victimhood.163 
The confrontation with the Nazi past represented a seismic shift in West German public 
memory. Whereas in 1959 Willy Brandt could still declare that “not only injustice was 
                                                 
163 Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003). 
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perpetrated in our name, but the German people itself suffered injustice,” a public moral equation 
of Germany’s suffering with the misery of its victims proved problematic by 1970.164 The 
shocking revelations during the 1961 Adolf Eichmann and 1963 Auschwitz Trials initiated and 
helped accelerate this paradigm shift, as now ignored or marginalized specters of the nation’s 
past bubbled to the surface in force. In 1965, parliamentary debates over whether to extend the 
statute of limitations for unprosecuted crimes committed between 1933 and 1945 similarly 
engaged the West German public with painful discussions over its past and missed opportunities 
to provide justice to the victims of Nazi persecution.165 The social revolt instigated by the 
“68ers,” which in Germany included frequently painful interrogations of the histories of elders 
and public figures, exposed dimensions of National Socialism hitherto papered over in silence.  
Memories of the war, particularly family stories of military service, fire bombings, or 
flight and expulsion, did not disappear. Despite a general willingness to acknowledge guilt as a 
whole, apologetic framings that minimized moral failings of fathers and mothers failed to vanish 
entirely. Research suggests that stories of trauma and exculpating justifications precariously 
coexisted with awareness of dictatorial crimes, and continue to create a paradoxical disconnect 
between individual memories and public discourse to this day.166 Ironically, a more self-critical 
                                                 
164 Wenzel Jaksch, “Selbstbestimmung und Wegbestimmung,” Die Brücke, September 19, 1959, copy of newspaper 
clipping in AdsD, NL Jaksch, J5. Brandt uttered these words at a “Day of the Homeland” gathering in Berlin. 
165 Peter Reichel, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Deutschland: die Auseinandersetzung mit der NS-Diktatur von 
1945 bis heute (München: C.H. Beck, 2001), 182–98. For a prominent contemporary engagement with the subject, 
see the articles in Der Spiegel Nr. 11, March 8, 1965. The cover featured a provocative photo of smiling German 
troops in the process of executing civilian victims. 
166 See Harald Welzer and Sabine Moller, Opa war kein Nazi: Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im 
Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 2002). Investigating multiple generations of single families, Welzer 
and Moller argued that the vast majority of participants—whether the war generation, their children, or 
grandchildren—made use of “victimhood” and “heroisation” tropes to frame their family experiences. The 
generation that lived in the Third Reich typically appears as victims of social circumstances, war, captivity, and 
military occupation and simultaneously as “heroes.” The authors support their theory by citing a 2002 study of the 
Emnid-Institut in Bielefeld, which concluded that Germans between the ages of 14 and 29 had the propensity to turn 
their elders into regime opponents or even resistance fighters. 14% claimed their parents had lent active resistance, 
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history from the 1960s created increasingly introspective West Germans, yet this cut two ways: 
The growing “realization that National Socialism was a criminal system that claimed millions of 
victims required successive generations to construct a past in which their relatives appear in roles 
that have nothing to do with crimes.”167 While public memory progressively focused on the 
Holocaust and German guilt, these elements emanated from external sources such as history 
books, television programs, memorials, and museums. Germans also received historical 
education from the deeply personal narratives of their elders.168  
Of central importance to this study is West German cultural memory, and the point to be 
made is that from the 1960s onward, public discourse and political identity revolved around what 
Germans had done, not what they endured. The growing realization of the scope of criminality 
and complicity made extensive handwringing over even indisputable German misery an 
unappealing exercise, and undermined the prominence of “flight and expulsion.” From the onset, 
“flight and expulsion” narratives always needed to contend with the legacy of Nazism. The 
cultural shifts emerging in the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, dramatically upended the 
hierarchy of victimhood. Expellees could no longer count on receptive audiences beyond the 
immediate circle of their constituents.  
                                                 
and only 4% believed them to have been convinced National Socialists. Only 3% of respondents believed their 
grandparents had been directly involved in any criminal acts. Within German families, in other words, the Nazi 
dictatorship is largely understood as a system of coercion and terror leaving no room for individual agency, even if 
individuals as a whole are willing view German society’s behavior during the Third Reich more critically. See 
Walzer and Moller, Opa war kein Nazi, 247. 
167 Welzer and Moller, Opa war kein Nazi, 207. 
168 The power of these family stories cannot be understated. More than seventeen million men served in the 
Wehrmacht, ten to twelve million fled or experienced forced migration, untold millions lived through aerial 
bombardments. In other words, nearly every family experienced the war on some level, and virtually all Germans 
had access to sanitized recollections and catalogues of suffering. 
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What’s more, the worldviews of expellee elites seemed out of place after this gradual 
cultural shift toward a more introspective Federal Republic. Isolated journalists early on 
registered their concerns with the “mess of dangerous contradictions, unmistakable tensions, 
disastrous misinterpretations, and overt perplexity” on display at homeland functions and expellee 
demonstrations.169 A minority of critics even categorically condemned the fiery rhetoric and nationalist 
resentments uttered by expellee leaders with dubious pasts in the Third Reich, and expressed fear 
over the enthusiastic applause such statements elicited and that portended a dangerous political 
extremism.170 Pundits warned even in 1950 that alarming continuities with Nazi tactics, style, 
and language would ultimately harm the otherwise legitimate cause of the expellees and sow 
chaos among West Germany’s fledgling democracy in the process.171  
                                                 
169 BArch B150-3348 vol. 2, “Kommentar von Werner Bäcker, ‘Zum Abschluss der ostdeutschen Heimatwoche in 
Hamburg,” Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk, May 22, 1950. 
170 See “Misstönender Applaus,” Frankfurter Rundschau, July 3, 1951, clipping in BayHStA, SdA-
Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 345. While noting how expellees held understandable resentments, the reporter 
expressed shock over the rhetoric he heard at a VOL congress and choice of speakers who made careers in the Third 
Reich. Particularly Heinrich Zillich, the head of the Association of Transylvanian Saxons in Germany, whipped the 
crowd into a frenzy with radical statements. “No wonder that every East German heart beats faster when this man 
praises the Germans as the salt of the European East and dismisses the Slavs as a ‘deadly foe of the Occident,’ 
indeed as innate barbarians—irrespective of a Copernicus or an ancient people such as the Russians whom we know 
from the works of Tolstoy or Dostoevsky,” the reporter commented. The most embarrassing moments were the 
“applause for Zillich’s offhand remark that the partitions of Poland ‘did not harm the interests of peace’; as he 
characterized the Germans (through their sacrifices and suffering) as the ‘only cleansed of the dark earth’; and 
especially as he declared: ‘Do not let yourselves be driven into…feelings of guilt that foreigners want to saddle you 
with!” After a long history lesson that “bypassed the epoch of Hitler in an elegant arc,’ Minister Lehr echoed calls 
for a protection of Western Civilization and notions of Germans as a bulwark against “culture-destroying 
Slavendom.” Equally alarmingly, Ministers Kaiser, Lukaschek, and Seebohm were in attendance, as was Vice 
Chancellor Blücher. Theodor Heuss and Ernst Reuter also sent greetings. 
171 See E. Franzel, “Streitbarer ‘Volksgruppenführer.’ Schuhplatter nach dem Egerländer Marsch,” Die Welt am 
Sonntag (Ausgabe Nord) Nr. 25, June 18, 1950, 2. The author warned of growing Völkisch tendencies, especially 
among “dangerous elements” of the Sudeten Germans. “Here scholarly advisement, plans and exchanges of ideas, 
there demonstrations with hearty slogans, with many drums and with the…‘Egerländer March’ with which Geobbels 
began his propaganda programs…played during the official receptions of Gauleiter Konrad Henlein.” The Sudeten 
German Association also demonstrated troubling tactics. It resorted to “totalitarianism” to oust dissenting voices 
from its ranks, and at the speeches of Lodgman von Auen “raiding parties” made their way through the audience to 
“sing, scream, applaud, or strike down.” When foreigners questioned von Auen on this radicalism, the author 
claimed that the leader of the Sudeten Germans “saw things in a different light: When the German rearmament 
comes it will be uninteresting what foreigners think of us.” The “Lodgmannschaft,” the article surmised, represented 
a radicalization toward the right that would harm the expellees and ultimately lead to their decline in politics. 
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Yet what appeared as acceptable in the early Federal Republic now emerged as 
incongruous with the progressive values of 1960s West Germany. As noted above, the weariness 
with unceasing longing for a lost world now incorporated a mounting concern with the specter of 
Nazism that the expellees seemingly embraced. Rather favorable write-ups of homeland 
gatherings and sympathetic press reporting gave way to observations of radicalism, nationalist 
resentment, and revanchist agitation.172 While in fact little actually changed with content of 
Sonntagsreden (“Sunday speeches”)—polemical speeches marked by hyperbole and bombast—
the rhetoric elicited shock and criticism from the press.173 The entire program of the expellees 
seemed dubious to an increasingly professionalized and critical West German media. 
One strand of reporting chided the associations and their usefulness. Particularly Werner 
Friedmann of Süddeutsche Zeitung condemned the “grand illusions” for German reunification 
and a return of the territories.174  These were “political pipe dreams,” the purveyors of which 
abused those who have suffered enough, simply to spur unrealistic hopes for a conquest that 
could only lead to yet another war.175 The “Sunday speakers,” Friedmann alleged elsewhere, 
“abused the sentiments [of expellees] and keep hopes alive.” While the federal government 
certainly could not officially give up on the territories, legal claims and technicalities contained 
little “hopes for tomorrow.” In any case, Friedmann asserted that the question of “whether it 
                                                 
172 For a representative sampling of the favorable coverage, see the extensive coverage in Die Welt, May 15, 1951, 
newspaper clipping in ACDP 07-001-3438; and “Nicht durch einen Krieg,” Quick Nr. 39, 1305ff. 
173 Particularly Hans-Christoph Seebohm, a Silesian who so strongly identified with the Sudeten German cause that 
he arose as a prominent spokesmen for their association, ranked as a notorious firebrand. See “Wenn Seebohm 
redet,” Der Spiegel Nr. 12, March 21, 1956, 13. Already in the 1950s, the longtime Minister of Transport raised the 
ire of German politicians, the press, and foreign governments for provocative statements.  
174 Werner Friedmann, “Die grossen Illusionen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, May 8/9, 1954, cited in BayHStA, SdA-
Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 184, Georg Brada to von Auen, September 25, 1954. 
175 Friedmann, “Politische Wunschträume,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, November 6, 1953, cited in BayHStA, SdA-
Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 184, Georg Brada to von Auen, September 25, 1954. 
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would be worth it for the still living to go home to Tilsit” should be posed to the “widows and 
orphans and various victims of the last war.”176 The belief that the homeland associations 
outlived their purpose, and only kept the pain of their constituents alive for their impractical 
political goals, increasingly dictated the tone of coverage in the late 1950s and onward.177 
A second hallmark of 1960s reporting was that it took issue with the historical 
interpretations of the associations and criticized their selective reading of the past and silences 
over National Socialist crimes. Reporters openly questioned bold claims based on romanticized 
and completely ahistorical myths.178 Programming which focused on the history of Eastern 
Europe, and in particular the experiences of inhabitants under German occupation, increased at 
the height of Ostpolitik, thereby placing the expulsions into a larger context.179 Reporting also 
tended to interrogate the relationship between Nazi population policies such as Generalplan Ost 
and the forced migrations of Germans after the war.180 Journalists questioned the backgrounds of 
expellee educators and their school curricula, finding an alarming amount of Nazi ideology.181 
                                                 
176 Friedmann, “Missbrauchte Gefühle,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 14/15, 1954, cited in BayHStA, SdA-
Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 184, Georg Brada to von Auen, September 25, 1954. 
177 See also the critical tone in Cyrill von Radzibor, “Dokumentation: Die Vertriebenen-Verbände,” Themen der 
Zeit, May 16, 1975, script in ACDP 001-291-127/2; and Martensen, “Zukunft der Vertriebenen-Verbände,” Themen 
der Zeit, May 16, 1975, script in ACDP 001-291-127/2. 
178 In the spring of 1956, for instance, the Sudeten German Association launched attacks on a journalist who 
questioned their demands: The “so-called Sudetenland is and remains not a German but a Czechoslovakian territory 
to which we cannot make any claims. Whoever in spite of this wants to continue to steal foreign territory betrays 
Germany’s reunification, and incites to war.” “Die Pfingsttage in Westdeutschland waren von Demonstrationen 
geprägt,” translated newspaper clipping of Aftenposten, in AdsD, Seliger Archiv VIII, 2284 
179 See AdsD, NL Jaksch, J1, Intendant Westdeutscherrundfunk to Ernst Paul, May 6, 1965; and ACDP 001-291-
127/2, Hupka to Intendanten des 2. Deutschen Fernsehens Professor Hozamer, October 6, 1972. 
180 “Nach dem Kriege—Krieg gegen Wehrlose,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 9, 1965, clipping in BArch 
B150-5118 vol. 2. 
181 Kai Hermann, “’Nach Ostland woll’n wir reiten.’ Seltsame Empfehlungen für den Ostkunde-Unterricht,” Die 
Zeit, April 9, 1965. 
597 
 
The painful experiences of expellees were not questioned, but the West German media 
recognized that it needed to be placed in the history of the Third Reich and Second World War, 
and that German misery certainly did not eclipse that of the victims of Nazi barbarism. As one 
reporter explained, the “misery of the people who after the war needed to leave their homeland is 
constantly evoked without duly mentioning what preceded this suffering, namely the violent rule 
in the territories annexed by Germany.”182  
A third theme of media reports on the expellee associations revolved around disquieting 
continuities between their agendas and appearances and the Third Reich. In 1961, for instance, 
the journalist Jürgen Neven-du Mont—a perpetual nemesis of the associations—questioned the 
use of uniforms in expellee youth groups, noting uncanny similarities to the Hitler Youth. The 
issue was not so much with what the groups advocated, but rather “what purpose it serves.”183 
The disconcerting sight of marching uniformed Germans did not seem to concern expellee 
leaders, who denied that such practices had become infamous since 1933.184 Neither did the 
uncomfortable fact that the scenes in Berlin at the previously mentioned 1955 inauguration of the 
                                                 
182 Peter Pragal, “Protest-Kampagne gegen einen ‘Ätherguss.’ Eine Analyse der Vertriebenenorganisationen brachte 
dem Bayerischen Rundfunk eine Strafanzeige ein,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 2, 1968, clipping in ACDP 001-
377-28/5. 
183 The TV program “Wem nützt das eigentlich?” (“What purpose does it serve”) aired on June 2, 1961. Defending 
himself against attacks from the BdV, Neven-du Mont denied linking a continuity in ideologies between expellees 
and the Hitler Youth, but that the disquieting similarities in the uniforms—“the symbols and the dangerous game of 
emblems”—required a clearing up of misunderstandings. The journalist added that the press positively reviewed the 
program, and agreed that the “exaggerated wearing of uniforms hurts the cause of the associations and expellees.” 
Lastly, Neven-du Mont expressed sympathy for the BdV’s concern over the discomforting images, but added that “I 
am not responsible for these similarities. If it had not already been noticed and caused public confusion, the whole 
piece would have been unnecessary.” AdsD, NL Jaksch, J1, Neven-du Mont to President and Vice President of 
BdV, August 9, 1961. 
184 In the case of Neven-du Mont, expellee leaders bemoaned that the nefarious journalist acted in bad faith and 
misled them. They curiously asserted that not a single youth group of the twenty associations had a uniform, and that 
in any case the historic use of such attire predated 1933. The BdV also took issue with Neven-du Mont, who “in all 
seriousness claimed that torchlight processions have become infamous since 1933.” AdsD, NL Jaksch, J1, BdV to 
Director Eberhard Beckmann, August 1961. 
598 
 
memorial at the Reichskanzlerplatz, which just ten years before bore the name “Adolf-Hitler-
Platz,” recalled the torchlight processional through the capital on the night that the Führer 
attained power in 1933.185 To observers more sensitive to recent confrontations with the German 
past, the gestures seemed naively tone-deaf at best, and unnecessary nationalist provocations at 
worst. Others noted that the “cultural program [of the homeland associations]…shows that one 
searches for the actual homeland in the 1930s.” All this suggested a “blood and earth” ideology 
anchored in National Socialist thought.186  
Not just problematic symbolism gave pause for thought: Sometimes, “revanchist 
expellees and neo-Nazis” disrupted public events such as a presentation on Poland in Dortmound 
on October 1963, distributing copies of Nazi-era papers with “baiting tirades against Poles” and 
even calling in a bomb scare to cancel the event.187 While such radical incidents had no 
connections to the homeland associations, the political history of many of their leaders suddenly 
proved highly dubious. Many of the first generation of expellee elites held an NSDAP 
membership, or enjoyed careers in the Third Reich.188 BMVt Minister Theodor Oberländer’s 
membership in the SS and his scholarship that helped provide academic justifications for Nazi 
                                                 
185 Scholz, Vertriebenendenkmäler, 342. 
186 ACDP 001-291-108/2, Stefan Wiltschko to Redation Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung, September 9, 1973. 
187 “Provokatorische anti-polnische Demonstration in Dortmund,” Ost-Informationen, October 29, 1963, clipping in 
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188 Michael Schwartz et al., Funktionäre mit Vergangenheit: das Gründungspräsidium des Bundesverbandes der 
Vertriebenen und das “Dritte Reich” (München: Oldenbourg, 2013). 
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ethnic cleansing were also no secret, but his past had only become an issue in 1960: A targeted 
propaganda campaign orchestrated by the GDR and SPD efforts to investigate the embattled 
minister to resign.189 Journalists meanwhile decried the “dangerous aggression” in Rudolf 
Lodgman von Auen’s rhetoric, which reminded of the “short-circuit of 1938.” With his 
radicalism, he “stood in the shadow of Hitler” and pushed politics that could only be solved 
through war and the “devil’s cycle of violence and revenge.”190 While von Auen never joined the 
NSDAP, the Süddeutsche Zeitung and other periodicals uncovered troubling “brown colors” in 
the pasts of ranking members of the SL and the extremist Witiko-Bund faction.191 
The expellee elite naturally took issue with this litigious “snooping” in the past.192 And 
while they continuously responded with indignation and even brought lawsuits for slander, 
internally the leadership resented prying eyes because there indeed were skeletons in the closet 
that in a changed Federal Republic proved embarrassing. When a well-meaning activist 
attempted to compile a “Who’s-Who” of SL notables, association members panicked: Writing to 
                                                 
189 Ausschuss für Deutsche Einheit, ed., Die Wahrheit über Oberländer: Braunbuch über die verbrecherische 
faschistische Vergangenheit des Bonner Ministers (Berlin, 1960). While the sentence in absentia of Oberländer to 
lifelong imprisonment for participation in war crimes rested on fabricated evidence, the campaign to unveil and 
discredit the former Nazi Party member ultimately led to his resignation, and contributed to increased focus on the 
dubious pasts of West German public figures. 
190 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 80, Bittermann to von Auen, December 16, 1958. Von Auen 
unsurprisingly took issue that he was seen as standing in Hitler’s shadow merely for “denouncing the crimes against 
the Sudeten.” Regarding Bittermann’s understanding of 1938, von Auen clarified that it was no “short-circuit” or 
aggression that many Sudeten Germans embraced Hitler, but that it was regarded as “amends for the criminal 
betrayal perpetrated against the Sudeten Germans in 1918/19.” The leader of the SL closed by noting that if the 
article had been written under the “1945 occupation license” by a journalist trying to hide a Nazi past with a 
progressive attitude, he would not be surprised; he did not know if Bittermann belonged to that circle, “but in any 
case you are spiritually related.” Ibid, von Auen to Bittermann, December 22, 1958. 
191 Dieter Großherr, “Braune Farben im Flüchtlingsblätterwald,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, April 18/19, 1959, 5; and 
“Die Berufsflüchtlinge hüten ihr Geheimnis,” Plus 1, Nr. 59, November 20, 1959, 26-28; and an overview of a 
controversy surrounding Christian Wallenreiter’s investigation of the Witiko-Bund, in “Strafanzeige gegen 
Wallenreiter,” Die Welt, January 13, 1968, 3. 
192 See newspaper clipping of Sudetendeutsche Zeitung Nr. 17, April 25, 1959, 5. 
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von Auen, a SL adviser warned that there “certainly could be people that would be seriously 
harmed by the publication,” and that “all political and national enemies would receive a work 
into their hands that they could thoroughly exploit.”193 Some expellee activists such as the 
nationalist Witiko-Bund were keenly aware of their Nazi baggage, to the point that they went to 
great efforts to coordinate their stories and construct a history of 1933/38-1945 that belittled their 
roles.194 The radicalism and continued fascist ideologies proved so strong even twenty years on, 
that some activists grew weary and resigned: Franz Höller, a longtime member of the Witiko-
Bund, complained in March 1963 to Walter Brand that he “simply has no more desire to stand 
upright for the idiocies of a few. Who can guarantee me that once again a moron does not stand 
at the grave of a Witiko member with the Hitler greeting. And the directorate remains silent.” 
Fearing that the organization was pushing him out, Höller preferred resignation and insults to 
“swimming in the stream with the die-hards [Ewiggestrige].195 
Ultimately, the expellee leadership contained quite a few individuals with a troubling 
history. This was not just a peculiarity of their associations, however: Many institutions of the 
Federal Republic faced similar problems.196 The expellees were not disproportionately more 
Nazi than the rest of society. Apart from Linus Kather, who in his old age and desire for political 
relevancy briefly sought out the NPD, no significant collaboration between expellee associations 
                                                 
193 BayHStA, SdA-Sprecherregistratur v. Auen 726, Schubert to von Auen, March 20, 1956. The SL cautioned its 
members to refuse participation and ignore the questionnaires. 
194 See the Materialien zur sudetendeutschen Zeitgeschichte, a series of compiled protocols of meetings edited by 
the Sudetendeutsches Archiv. The materials clearly show a concerted effort to expunge embarrassing or 
incriminating episodes from the pasts of Sudeten German leaders. 
195 BayHStA, SdA, Nachlass Walter Brand 35, Franz Höller to Walter Brand, March 3, 1963. 
196 Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002). 
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and radical rightwing groups developed. Viewing themselves as proponents of a “positive 
national feeling” that could withstand “Soviet imperialism,” their undoubtedly nationalist 
tendencies did not equate to a support of National Socialism.197 The BdV as well regarded itself 
as the “representative a disciplined, well-understood patriotism” and contributor to “democratic 
order and a health national feeling.”198 Responding to criticisms of a pamphlet on the expulsions, 
a Silesian youth magazine took issue with the reproaches: “Does one doubt that it was like this? 
Does one not find it appropriate to continuously keep in front of the eyes of the youth the time of 
Germany’s deepest humility, so as to do in any nationalist idiocy and…contribute to an 
awakening of real national feeling among our youth?” The Silesian youth sought to ensure that 
all “learn that LOYALTY, HOMELAND, HONOR, [AND] FATHERLAND are terms that must 
take root in the heart of every German.”199  
Such rhetoric undoubtedly reveals that the bulk of politically active expellees subscribed 
to nationalist and culturally conservative values. It also should be noted that it implied that they 
claimed a monopoly over what it meant to be a “good” German; seeing critics as communist 
agents and enemies within the ranks hardly suggest a progressive mindsets. Allegations of 
National Socialist mindsets, however, were gross simplifications, as were denunciations of 
expellees being nothing more than the “foremost lay brothers of Hitler” possessing a “blatant 
appetite for vengeance” or using a “collection of quotes from the dictionary of brutes.”200 The 
                                                 
197 Wenzel Jaksch, “Selbstbestimmung und Wegbestimmung,” Die Brücke, September 19, 1959, 2, copy of 
newspaper clipping in AdsD, NL Jaksch, J5 
198 BArch B106-27361, Vorschau auf die Verbandsarbeit im Jahre 1967, March 1966, 1-2. 
199 Heimabend 90, August 1961, 12, newspaper clipping in BArch B106-27372. 
200 ACDP 001-291-127/2, Pressemitteilung des BMVt, May 30, 1969. 
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times changed, the expellee leadership did not: They were “frozen” in the worldview and 
language of the 1950s. How they would respond would add new layers to “flight and expulsion.” 
  
Conclusion 
Starting in the 1950s and gradually accelerating, a variety of political and cultural 
currents converged which categorically pushed the expellees to the margins of West German 
politics and society. There simply was no more sympathy for the tactics and demands of a vocal 
minority. Public figures who dared to go against the associations did not cave to threats of 
lawsuits or denunciations of engaging in “treason.” Unlike a decade or so before, the media 
refused to cater to the demands of the expellees, insisting that they could impossibly engage in 
“common politics” and bend to expellee association demands, as this would violate their 
professional obligations of impartiality and duty to cover political and cultural currents.201 
Disinterest in schools among pupils and educators in incorporating the stale recommendations of 
expellees into lesson plans found backing from left-leaning state governments, so that the 
German East gradually disappeared from curricula as well.202 In March of 1970, television 
stations declined to show the German territories on its weather maps. With declining interest due 
to successful integration, the Patenschaften lost significance, as cities forged partnerships with 
cities in Western European countries.203 In Berlin, the flags of the German East were unfurled 
                                                 
201 AdsD, NL Jaksch, J1, Intendant Westdeutscherrundfunk to Ernst Paul, May 6, 1965. See also BArch B150-
3345a, Press Release from Radio Bremen, October 14, 1965. 
202 Meinhardt, Deutsche Ostkunde, 221ff. 
203 Beer, “Patenschaften,” 341. 
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and taken down from the exposition halls; when expellees protested, organizers cited the fear of 
storms that could damage the flags.204  
In other words, the expellees were losing the struggle over interpreting “flight and 
expulsion” in the 1960s and 1970s, which would have enormous consequences on its master 
narrative. No longer able to control or dictate programming in order to propagate their political 
messages, the expellee organizations lamented what they perceived to be a categorical muzzling 
and persecution by the “homeless Left…who sit on secure thrones in the radio and TV stations” 
and who viewed the expellees as “the greatest potential resistance to any alignment with the 
Ulbricht-system.”205 Public discourse, and particularly the media, were an “impregnable bastion” 
and “occupation force…probably for all eternity,” Walter Becher lamented in 1968.206 The 
struggle for “freedom” in the face of ostensible indifference and antipathy produced two 
strategies of trying to combat the growing irrelevance of the expellee associations, each with 
their own impulse on “flight and expulsion.” 
First, the desperation of feeling overtaken by a competing victimhood discourse centered 
on the Holocaust fueled a radicalized argumentation and deployment of expulsion 
narratives that entered into the realm of Aufrechnung (“equating”) of the number of German dead 
against that of other victims, particularly Poles and Jews. Some expellee functionaries disavowed 
                                                 
204 “Furcht vor Sturm,” Der Spiegel 51, December 15, 1969, 78. 
205 BArch B106-27372 vol.1, “Sitzungsbericht of the Schlesische Landesversammlung, 8. und 9. Plenarsitzung, 
25/26 November 1967 in Mainz,” 25. 
206 ACDP 001-377-28/5, Becher to Kather, February 29, 1968. 
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victimhood competition, arguing that Germany’s crimes must be acknowledged but that German 
losses also deserved recognition.207  
Nevertheless, the bombastic and tone-deaf proclamations of the 1960s partially intended 
to respond to and compete with more self-critical interpretations of the recent past that implicitly 
called into question the expellee victimhood narrative. Demanding on the 30th anniversary of the 
expulsions that the federal government present to the public a historical study that would 
document the crimes committed against Germans, Heinrich Windelen (CDU) used the floor of 
the parliament to thrust German victimhood back into the public discourse.208 Other leaders went 
so far as to decry discussions of Germany’s victims as communist propaganda.209 In either case, 
the prominence of the Holocaust inspired the expellees to double-down on already discernable 
tendencies of refashioning their suffering as similar or equal to that of Germany’s victims, 
consciously linking the two fates.210 One prominent outcome of these efforts is that the German 
                                                 
207 Herbert Czaja, for instance, was a consistent proponent of openly recognizing Germany’s crimes, German 
victims of violence, as well as aide offered by Eastern Europeans during the flight and expulsion. See ACDP 001-
291-131, Vol. 1, press notice of the BdV, March 11, 1975. 
208 Hearings of the German Bundestag, 7th Legislative Period, 118th Session, September 25, 1974. Interior Minister 
Gerhard Baum (FDP) pointed to the already existing Dokumentation, but added that discussions of German 
victimhood were not in the political interest of Germany, as they threatened to open old wounds and undermine the 
course of reconciliation that the Brandt government had steered. Indeed, the political climate had shifted so 
dramatically that as early as 1965, the Federal Press Office voiced concerns that the Schieder Kommission’s works 
could raise international objections that the FRG was trying to relativize German war crimes. BArch B145-9873, 
Memo of Graf Schweinitz, Feb 3, 1965. 
209 BdV President Jaksch, decrying that German youth groups were exposed to “one-sided” propaganda during their 
trips to Czechoslovakia, felt that Prague “exhume[d] the lamentable victims of Lidice and Theresienstadt in order to 
erase the memory of the victims of communist inhumanity.” AdsD, NL Jaksch, J2, Jaksch to Kurt Mattick, Oct 8, 
1963. 
210 This is most clearly demonstrated in the assertions of the chairman of the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft 
Horst Rudolf Übelacker, who argued that the reparation strategies of the “Jewish ‘Holocaust victims’ [must] be an 
example for the victims and survivors of the Sudeten German ‘Holocaust.’” Űbelacker, “Witikobund: 
Wiedergutmachung für alle—auch für Sudetendeutsche!”, Sudetenpost Nr. 24, December 17, 1998, 8. Andreas 
Kelletat speaks of a “Holocausticization of Flucht und Vertreibung.” See Kelletat, “Von der Täter- zur Opfernation? 
Die Rückkehr des Themas ‘Flucht und Vertreibung’ in den deutschen Vergangenheitsdiskurs bei Grass und 
anderen,” www.bohemistik.de/kelletat.html, retrieved October 15, 2015. 
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death toll, according to many expellee sources more than two million, remains artificially high in 
order to presumably allow for a more favorable standing in the hierarchy of victims.211 
While the 1960s saw memory politics unwilling to depart from the discourse of the 1950s 
and even a radicalization, on the other hand an “internationalization” of Flucht und Vertreibung 
developed as well. Whether coinciding commemorations of the expulsiosn with UN “Human 
Rights Day” celebrations or increasing PR work and circulation of Dokumentationen during the 
1965 “International Year of Human Rights,” the Ministry for Expellees and BdV in particular 
used the affirmative and neutral notions of universal human rights as a means of interjecting the 
German case into international discussions. The rise of a new regime of human rights prompted 
the expellee organizations to adopt the rhetoric as a means of dispelling suspicions of 
particularism.212 Arguing based on international conventions established through the Nuremburg 
Trials or the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights freed expellees from the strictures 
of contentious histories. Moreover, by increasingly bringing the German experience into 
relationship with other widely recognized instances of unjust forced migration, such as the 
Palestinian case, the expellees promised to gain recognition from international institutions and 
governments who, presumably, would support German territorial demands or restitution claims 
at a future peace conference.213 
                                                 
211 For an analysis of why these numbers are inaccurate and politicized, see Ingo Haar, “Die deutschen 
‘Vertreibungsverluste’—Zur Enstehungsgeschichte der ‘Dokumentation der Vertreibung,’” in Tel Aviver Jahrbuch 
35 (2007): 251-272. 
212 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
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Although various legal experts had examined the German case and provided arguments 
for a Recht auf Heimat or “right to homeland” since the 1950s, in the 1970s non-German 
scholars took note of expellee proposals that their fate represented a violation of human rights to 
self-determination.214 The 1990s Balkan conflicts further brought the issue of forced population 
transfers into renewed focus of international human rights advocates.215 How much these efforts 
have influenced international standards is demonstrated by the fact that José Ayala Lasso, the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has visited and spoken at several expellee 
commemoration events. Though they have not led to a concrete return of the Heimat, the 
international acknowledgements have at the very least granted the expellees a modicum of social 
recognition of their plight, as well as allowed them to cite these sources in their argumentation 
for their demands.216 
The decline of “flight and expulsion” added new facets to its narrative, which will be 
reexamined in the conclusion of this dissertation. First, the more critical West German discourse 
substantially influenced popular memory of the forced migrations and the German East, 
displacing it to the point that it today only vaguely lingers. German youths have little 
comprehension or knowledge of this chapter of history. Additionally, the widespread assumption 
                                                 
214 See Alfred De Zayas, "International Law and Mass Population Transfers,” Harvard International Law Journal 16 
(1975): 207–258; Felix Ermacora, International Human Rights: Documents and Introductory Notes (Vienna: Law 
Books in Europe, 1993); and Dieter Blumenwitz, Internationale Schutzmechanismen zur Durchsetzung von 
Minderheiten- und Volksgruppenrechten (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1997). 
215 Alfred De Zayas, "The Right to One's Homeland, Ethnic Cleansing and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia," Criminal Law Forum (1995): 257–314; Alfred de Zayas, an American lawyer and high-
ranking UN official specializing in international law, has for decades compared the experience of Germans to 
modern postwar forced migrations. His often polemical research on the expulsions, however, have not gone without 
criticism. Alfred de Zayas, A Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of the East European Germans (New York: 
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216 See for instance the BdV’s digital guidebook to the temporary exhibit, “Angekommen.” 
www.ausstellungangekommen.de/index.php?id=46, accessed September 28, 2015. 
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that expellees are revanchists and Nazis left an indelible mark on how Germans see expellees. 
Evoking feelings of suspicion and apprehension, few associate positive qualities with the 
associations. While certainly the frozen rhetoric of the 1950s, which for the most part did not 
fade until the 2000s if at all, did little to assuage these prejudices, the over-simplification has its 
roots in the critical reporting of the 1960s and 1970s and displacement of “flight and expulsion” 
from the center of West German public discourse. 
Secondly, even in a position of weakness the expellee leadership still managed to 
influence cultural memory, in part because of their virtually complete colonization of discussions 
over the forced migrations in the 1950s. In their struggle for relevance, they also managed to add 
new layers to “flight and expulsion.” In their siege mentality and losing battle to steer the 
conversation onto their terrain, they developed the notion of a “taboo” that they frequently 
deployed in public debates both to explain their own ineffectiveness to themselves and their 
constituency. The world would not listen because of missteps or faults of the leadership, but 
because expellees were the whipping boy of history and an indifferent domestic and international 
audience.217  Moreover, the proposition of an overt silencing of their voices propped up their 
sense of martyrdom and victimhood, providing invaluable cultural capital in some circles.218 
Furthermore, the attempts of internationalizing “flight and expulsion” laid important groundwork 
for discussions of forced migration globally in the 21st century.   
The institutionalization efforts of the expellee associations ultimately failed to achieve 
their goals, though this does not mean that they remained without impact. The flurry of activity 
                                                 
217 See See Hans-Jürgen Gaida, Die offiziellen Organe der ostdeutschen Landsmannschaften: ein Beitrag zur 
Publizistik der Heimatvertriebenen in Deutschland. (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1973), 254. 
218 Martin Sabrow and Norbert Frei, Die Geburt des Zeitzeugen nach 1945 (Erscheinungsort nicht ermittelbar: 
Wallstein Verlag GmbH, 2012). 
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at the height of their power meant that certain tropes and images imbedded themselves firmly 
into the consciousness of West Germans. There can be no denying, however, that the ascendency 
of the Landsmannschaften was brief. Despite declarations to the contrary, after 1970 the self-
appointed leadership spoke for and to a small minority, and indulged in wishful thinking that 
their continued fight for the return of the German East would bear fruit. Their argumentations 
stagnated: For all of its dynamism in earlier periods, the expellees institutionalized a narrative 
rooted in the anticommunism of the Federal Republic and unwilling to adapt. When West 
Germany changed, the monuments, school books, and marches reflected a cause out of step with 
the rest of society unable to decipher or relate to the political messages.  
For the majority of the victims of the forced migrations not too punch-drunk from the 
promises of their leadership, memories was all that remained. The only meaningful pieces of the 
institutionalization campaigns for them was the “virtual Heimat” of the mind or which could be 
constituted between kin. The homeland books, the museums, the fleeting moments at festivals, or 
nostalgic novels of childhoods in East Prussia were a remnant of a lost world that could briefly 
be revisited in a daydream or an afternoon of celebration with family and friends. Melancholy 
and wistful whiling away in an idyllic Heimat increasingly marked memories of the German 
East. They held on to these recollections dearly because they were comforting, and because it “is 
the only paradise we can’t be expelled from.”219
                                                 





During my research of this dissertation, I took an afternoon off from the archives to visit 
the Haus der Geschichte (“House of History”), the massive museum of the history of the Federal 
Republic located in the former capital of Bonn.1 When it opened its doors in 1994, one of the 
first things that confronted visitors was a video depicting treks crossing the frozen Vistula 
Lagoon and navigating icy roads as they fled the encroaching Red Army. The implication 
seemed that “postwar German history begins not with Auschwitz or even with Adenauer, but 
with the expulsion of Germans.”2 Be that as it may, expellees featured prominently in the 
narrative of a CDU-governed Federal Republic. Today, one first must walk past images and 
videos of the collapse of the Third Reich and the Holocaust before one encounters newsreels of 
children searching for parents, a handcart, or reconstructed barracks telling the story of “flight 
and expulsion.” 
The rearrangement makes greater chronological sense than the 1994 exhibit, but also 
symbolizes contemporary German cultural memory of “flight and expulsion”: It is no longer a 
central pillar of political identity and prominent subject of discourse, nor is it a taboo that is 
shrouded in silence. It does, however, rank behind the Nazi dictatorship and the Holocaust in 
German historical memory, and often holds little meaning for a generation raised without the 
                                                 
1 Peter Reichel, Politik mit Erinnerung Gedächtnisorte mit Streit um die nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verl., 1999), 249–52. 
2 Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 194.  
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German East as a dominant topic of conversation. Standing before a map of the German East, a 
teenager asked his perplexed mother what all those territories were. The fact that they both had 
trouble finding Hessen may say more about their geographic knowledge than their historical 
awareness, but it doesn’t change the fact that the Königsberg and Breslau, East Prussia and 
Silesia are obscure, faint memories that few outside of a rapidly dwindling proportion of the 
population can relate to. 
Much of this hinges upon the crucial year of 1970, which marks the end of this 
dissertation’s chronology. The recognition of the borders effectively ended the dreams of 
returning to the homeland and hamstrung the relevance and influence of the expellee 
associations. Ending the study in 1970 also makes sense not only because it marked a period of 
decline, but because the expellee associations’ rhetoric and worldview remained largely stagnant 
and did not fundamentally change, even as the political and cultural climate transformed 
dramatically.3 The last chapter of this dissertation examined the emergence of a discourse 
focused on German guilt, which reached its apex in the 1980s, as the prime catalyst for the 
marginalization of expellee memory. Yet it is worthwhile to briefly examine trends afterward in 
order to complete the trajectory of this constant fixture of collective memory from the Third 
Reich, through the Cold War and into the Berlin Republic. After all, memories of the forced 
migration continue to resonate, albeit in ambivalent forms. Yet expellees no longer control the 
debate over the expulsions, as developments beyond their control dictated this master narrative 
of “flight and expulsion,” and its place in German public memory. 
                                                 
3 One must only glance through the writings of the controversial former president of the Federation of Expellees 
(BdV), Erika Steinbach, to see that romanticized histories stretching from the Middle Ages to the injustices of 1945, 
through to a remarkable recovery and willingness to integrate still hold sway in the expellee milieu. Erika Steinbach, 
Die Macht der Erinnerung (München: Universitas, 2011). 
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Not that they didn’t try to counteract this decline. Since Willy Brandt’s “betrayal,” as we 
have seen, expellee associations aspired to reverse the political course, or at the very least 
maintain their moral and legal claims in the hope for a sudden reversal of fortune. After all, Neue 
Ostpolitik did not culminate in a peace treaty, therefore allowing unrealistic yet nevertheless 
technically legitimate convictions to survive that the German East was not yet lost forever. Many 
expellee elites believed that the 1982 election of Helmut Kohl and more conservative 
government portended better prospects for their concerns. Kohl’s greater sensitivity to the 
expellees, who comprised an important part of his base, gave expellee associations reason to 
hope that a renaissance was at hand. It was during the 1970s and 1980s that the CDU/CSU built 
its reputation as the party of the expellees, predominantly because it publically opposed the 
foreign policy of Willy Brandt. With “their” man now at the helm, the Christian Democratic 
chancellor reignited dreams of a Germany reunited within its 1937 borders. 
The expellee associations’ narrative of “flight and expulsion” received another chance 
with Kohl’s vocal desire for a more affirmative German history, particularly for those who 
enjoyed the “mercy of a late birth” that exculpated them from guilt for Nazism.4 This dovetailed 
with calls from conservative historians concerned that an overly self-critical discourse reduced 
the nation’s past to Hitler and twelve years of Nazi dictatorship.5 The Historikerstreit 
(“historians’ debate”), a fiery intellectual dispute over how to interpret and recall the Nazi 
regime and the Holocaust, may have unfolded in the ivory towers of academia, but nevertheless 
reflected West German society’s ambivalence over this history. It was a past that refused to pass, 
                                                 
4 The remark, uttered in Jerusalem in January 1984 before the Knesset, sparked indignation among those who 
interpreted it as an exoneration of Kohl’s generation.  
5 Charles S Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1988). 
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the conservative historian Ernst Nolte bemoaned. Nolte’s ally in the debate, Andreas Hillgruber, 
suggested a moral equivalency between the victors’ treatment of the defeated Reich and 
Germany’s genocidal policies. In a series of essays on “two sorts of demise,” Hillgruber 
interpreted the expulsions and Holocaust as two catastrophes, two disasters caused by political 
extremism different only in degree.6 
The point is that there remained a significant proportion of the public that did not 
subscribe to the changes in West German memorial culture and historical memory that emerged 
in the last decades, and who now vocalized their disenchantment. Since the revolt of the “68ers” 
and era of social-liberal politics, conservatives lamented that the pendulum swung too 
dramatically to the left: There was inadequate space for German victims, too much belaboring of 
German guilt and crimes. Desires for a “normal” history complemented West Germany’s 
assertiveness and confidence on the international stage as well: With a booming economy and 
respectable “Made in West Germany” brand, successful soccer team, and key role in NATO 
policy and Pershing II deployment, did Germans not deserve to escape Hitler’s shadow after four 
decades? Indeed, Kohl exerted the FRG’s soft power to influence perceptions of the Holocaust 
abroad, for fear that negative depictions could harm West Germany’s image and reputation.7 The 
promised correcting course in public memory was music to the ears of the expellee associations, 
who eagerly awaited to once again take center stage in the nation’s history. 
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A series of political gaffes from Kohl, however, dispelled hopes for a return to an era of 
public memory more favorable to expellees. The first blunder occurred in the spring of 1985 
during a visit from President Ronald Reagan to West Germany. Marking the 40th anniversary of 
the end of the war, Kohl and Reagan started a day of commemoration at the Bergen-Belsen 
concentration camp, ending with a ceremony at a military cemetery in nearby Bitburg. The West 
German chancellor called for the remembrance of “infinite suffering that the war and 
totalitarianism inflicted upon nations,” while the American head of state opined that the German 
graves held “victims of Nazism also.” “They were victims,” Reagan added, “just as surely as the 
victims in the concentration camps.”8 The chancellor’s hapless attempts of bringing German 
victims prominently back into memories of the war may have struck a chord with those who saw 
May 8 as a painful reminder of national humiliation, cataclysmic defeat, and the start of 
unspeakable injustice and suffering. Yet the equating of German and Jewish suffering, before the 
graves that contained SS personnel no less, sparked outrage in the United States and West 
Germany, even as it reflected the historical understanding of some expellees and conservative 
West Germans who failed to see the fundamental difference between these two fates. 
The Bitburg fiasco unfolded parallel to yet another controversy that spring. Although he 
regularly attended homeland gatherings in order to signal that the expellees were not excluded 
from West German society and politics, Kohl suddenly withdrew his planned participation at the 
June 1985 Silesian Heimattreffen in Hanover.9 The impetus was that year’s motto: “40 Years of 
Expulsion—Silesia Remains Ours.” Nationalist rhetoric in Silesian papers and the unwillingness 
                                                 
8 Quoted in Geoffrey H. Hartman, Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1986), 256; Hartman, 240. 
9 “Unsere Schlesier,” Die Zeit, January 4, 1985, https://www.zeit.de/1985/02/unsere-schlesier. 
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of expellee leaders to moderate their tone demonstrated an “irresponsible, damaging and 
fatuous” attitude, a spokesman for Kohl lamented. The chancellor could only be persuaded to 
speak before the anticipated 100,000 attendees after the adoption of a new slogan, “Silesia 
Remains our Future in a Europe of Free Peoples.”10 Despite assurances from the Silesian 
Association that they would tone down their rhetoric, participants at the gathering raised banners 
with the original slogan at the moment that Chancellor Kohl took to the podium. 
The controversy surrounding the Hanover homeland gathering reiterated the already 
noted downward trend of expellee association standing. The debate refocused attention on the 
associations, who Der Spiegel noted continued to “wallow up until now, mostly unnoticed by the 
public, in pan-German dreams.”11 By 1985, 76% of West Germans—including a slim majority of 
expellees—had accepted the Oder-Neisse border. Most rejected the 1985 motto of the Silesians, 
and felt that it harmed the reputation of West Germany; 65% agreed with Foreign Minister Hans-
Dietrich Genscher’s assessment that a “handful of expellee functionaries are playing fast and 
loose with the peace-politics of the Federal Republic.”12 As had already become clear decades 
earlier, the purpose and politics of the expellee leadership seemed hopelessly anachronistic and 
out of step with the views of most of the rest of the population. 
                                                 
10 “Breslauer Nachrichten,” Der Spiegel 5, January 28, 1985, 21-22. Despite this, leading Silesian expellee leaders 
adamantly explained that the new motto did not negate the original slogan, and that Silesia remained German 
territory. 
11 Ibid. 
12 “‘Schindluder mit der Friedenspolitik,’” Der Spiegel 6, February 4, 1985, 93-94. Interestingly, 60% agreed that 
Kohl should participate in the gathering. Of those who rejected the original slogan, only 52% agreed outright that it 
was categorically inappropriate; 15% felt it accurate, while 33% agreed that it was “correct, but unclear.” 84% felt 
that the children of expellees could not be regarded as expellees themselves, and a majority agreed that the opinions 
of the associations differed from the ordinary rank and file. All of this suggested a rejection of the logic of the 
associations and their politics, and a dramatic shift on accepting the expulsions: In 1951, for instance, only 8% 
accepted the borders. 
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Kohl’s imbroglios at Bitburg and Hanover underlined that the shifts in West German 
public memory, which placed a recognition of the Nazi past and Germany’s victims at the center, 
could not be reversed or ignored. Yet while Kohl reaped backlash, President Richard von 
Weizsäcker’s May 8, 1985 speech in the German Bundestag offered a competing narrative that 
received acclaim: “[T]he 8th of May was a day of liberation. It liberated all of us from the 
inhumanity and tyranny of the National-Socialist regime.” While he explicitly acknowledged 
expellee suffering and praised their willingness to peacefully integrate, Weizsäcker chided the 
public to not regard the “end of the war as the cause of flight, expulsion and deprivation of 
freedom,” reminding them that one could not “separate 8 May 1945 from 30 January 1933.” 
Above all, the president cautioned against an equation of suffering: “Can we really place 
ourselves in the position of…the victims of the Warsaw ghetto or of the Lidice massacre?”13 The 
nuanced speech did not deny German misery, but contextualized it in a genocidal war unleashed 
by Germany. While the cruelty of the conflict affected millions of innocent Europeans, 
Weizsäcker carefully distinguished between the fate of the gas chamber and trek, and noted the 
fundamental differences and root causes of those horrors as well as Germany’s duty to 
acknowledge its responsibility in that history. 
Richard von Weizsäcker interpretation of contemporary history reflected an attitude 
toward the past within the Federal Republic that grew in resonance in 1970, and would prove 
dominant by the 1980s. “Flight and expulsion” did not disappear entirely from public discourse, 
but the expellee associations could no longer command the discourse. In 1981, the three-part 
documentary Flucht und Vertreibung attempted to “show how it was,” in the words of the 
producers, and address a subject that was “as good as taboo” and mired in misunderstanding due 
                                                 
13 Hartman, Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective, 263ff. 
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to “our lack of historical consciousness”.14 Expellee leaders bemoaned “shortcomings,” but 
generally praised the “first large-scale attempt” to shed light on this “hitherto neglected topic.”15 
In 1984, the voluminous Dokumentation der Vertreibung appeared in inexpensive paperback 
form. The historian Gotthold Rhode praised the compendium as a necessary “voice of 
those…whose time of suffering only really began once the weapons were silenced,” and which 
the nation needed to hear as it approached the 40th anniversary of the war’s end.16 Lastly, a 1987 
miniseries based on Arno Surminski’s Jokehnen dramatized “flight and expulsion,” emulating 
the style of the 1979 American program The Holocaust that had confronted shocked German 
audiences with the genocide and individual faces of that horror.17 
 This period also saw a number of celebrated novels and semi-biographical works that 
engaged with the German East, yet in a manner different from the expellee associations. For 
instance, Siegfried Lenz’s 1978 bestseller Heimatmuseum (“The Heritage”) shot a broadside 
against the monopoly over the homeland that radical expellee factions claimed: The protagonist, 
fearing that association functionaries were attempting to take control of his museum and take 
advantage of it for their nefarious political purposes, burns the shrine to his beloved Warmia to 
                                                 
14 Quoted in Moeller, War Stories, 182. The series consisted of three parts. Part one, “Inferno in the East,” focused 
on the prehistory going back to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and culminated in the “treks of misery.” Part two, 
“The Disenfranchised,” concentrated on the Treaty of Versailles and the “fate of those Germans who did not flee or 
could not flee: Internment, such as for example in the notorious Lambsdorf [sic] camp, deportation for forced labor, 
wild exploitation.” The last part, “Between Foreign Land and Homeland,” looked at the “‘orderly’ expulsion” and 
integration of the expellees. Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP) 001-168-018/2, Press release of 
CHRONOS-FILM, February 2, 1981. 
15 ACDP 001-168-018/2, Form letter of Stingl, March 1981. 
16 Gotthold Rhode, “Das Leid der Vertreibung. Zum Neudruck einer Dokumentation,” Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, May 14, 1985, 27. 




the ground.18 Lenz’s writings movingly preserved the world of his childhood, and forged an 
unideological concept of Heimat that allowed for an engagement with the German East without 
navigating the precarious memory politics of the homeland associations.  
He was not alone: Günter Grass, Horst Bienek, and Marion Dönhoff similarly conserved 
a nostalgic homeland and critically engaged with the Nazi past without indulging in angry calls 
for restitution or amends.19 Grass, Lenz, and Dönhoff also supported Willy Brandt’s politics, 
even if it came at the expense of their beloved homeland. These authors, despite clear affection 
for their roots and a tinge of melancholy, rejected the radicalism of the expellee organizations, 
thereby engaging in a “very different kind of memorializing of the German east…outside the 
official organizations.”20 Their coming to terms with their own pasts and moving farewell of the 
Heimat reflected the turn toward introspection that West Germany underwent as a whole, acting 
as a counter-narrative to the “flight and expulsion” constructed by the expellee associations. 
Despite several prominent iterations of “flight and expulsion” and a more sympathetic 
political administration, the 1980s did not see a resurgence of the expellee associations or their 
interpretations. Not only did the expellees’ special status evaporate, it failed its ultimate purpose 
of underpinning an argument for a return of the homeland: However sympathetic Kohl may have 
been to the expellee organizations, the Christian Democratic chancellor continued Brandt’s 
                                                 
18 Siegfried Lenz, Heimatmuseum (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1978). 
19 Günter Grass, Die Blechtrommel (Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand, 1959); Günter Grass, Katz und Maus 
(Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand, 1961); Günter Grass, Hundejahre (Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand, 1963); 
Horst Bienek, Die Erste Polka (München: Hanser, 1975); Horst Bienek, Septemberlicht (München: Hanser, 1977); 
Horst Bienek, Zeit ohne Glocken (München: Hanser, 1979); Horst Bienek, Erde und Feuer (München: Hanser 
Verlag, 1982); Marion Dönhoff, Namen, die keiner mehr nennt: Ostpreußen - Menschen u. Geschichte. (München: 
Dt. Taschenbuch-Verl., 1989). 
20 David Blackbourn, The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 2006), 314. 
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course of Neue Ostpolitik. In a demonstrative move during a visit to Poland in November 1989 
just days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki signed a joint declaration embedding the future relationship of the two nations in the 
context of European integration. The dominant tone of the talks was one of reconciliation and 
finding common ground in a post-communist Europe. An image of the heads of state embracing 
powerfully signaled the desire for mutual understanding, as did their attendance of a bilingual 
mass on the property of the Kreisau estate of the von Moltke family, located in Lower Silesia.21 
The talks thereby not only revealed the desired shape of the future of the continent, the summit 
and its venue suggested that the FRG departed from its homeland politics policy. 
The scenes of cooperation understandably alarmed expellee leaders and adherents 
unwilling to write off their legal and moral claims. Some expellees believed that a prosperous 
West Germany could “buy back” the land, as an elderly expellee explained in 1988: “Silesia will 
one day be opened as a developing nation, when it is depopulated. When it is some day run down 
economically, as one today already sees. Many don’t know how to continue and try to flee. It 
will get to the point that…Germans and others can once again go back—a new colonization.”22 
Others clung to the “option of the land once again belonging to you,” as a daughter asked her 
father. “You don’t want to ever give up the land,” she asked, even “if your children…don’t 
daydream about this option?” Admitting that a “restauration will never come into question, 
                                                 
21 Marcin Zaborowski, Germany, Poland and Europe : Conflict, Cooperation and Europeanization (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2004), 93. The last inhabitant, Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, was 
executed by the Nazi regime in January of 1945 for treason. The reconciliation talks between Kohl and Mazowiecki 
resolved to restore the property as an international youth center. Financed by the “Foundation for German-Polish 
Cooperation,” the center opened in 1998. The site today hosts as a meeting and reconciliation center, but also 
supports the building of memorials to the common cultural heritage and history of the two nations, as well as 
supporting projects that foster dialogue and the renovation and preservation of historic sites throughout Poland. 
22 Quoted in Albrecht Lehmann, “Flüchtlingserinnerungen Im Erzählen Zwischen Den Generationen,” BIOS-
Zeitschrift Für Biographieforschung Und Oral History 2, no. 2 (1989): 204. 
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nothing good will come of it,” the father nevertheless held out hope that “Poland will one day get 
a Marshall Plan, it could very well be that they then need the cooperation of the German 
neighbors. The Germans could absolutely play a role in the case of European cooperation.”23 
Yet by the end of the 1980s, only a handful of radicals continued to lay a claim to the 
physical German East. “Where are Pomerania and East Prussia,” a group of West German 
students travelling through the region asked in 1981. “Now we are here, and we know where 
they lay: they lay where our Volk is missing land.” Without personal or familial connections to 
the territories, and inspired by guidebooks that romanticized the German East’s past, the youths 
entertained alarming fantasies: “We ourselves are the ones affected, because this is our property. 
One of us could live here….We ourselves were expelled from here.”24 Progressives were ready to 
attribute such revanchist sentiments to all those who dreamed of the German East, yet in reality 
they were a minority opinion. While expellee organizations continued to expound upon a “right 
to a homeland,” most understood the slogan as a symbolic demand for recognition of suffering. 
In short, the expulsions remained a memory of the war among many others. No amount 
of lip service from conservatives could stake out a continued privileged position in the cultural 
memory of West Germany: Nazi dictatorship and barbarism and the Holocaust—as we have 
seen—eclipsed the forced migrations in media discourse, public commemoration, and education. 
German victimhood no longer provided the political influence that it did in previous decades. 
The historical perspectives of West Germans who came of age in this era differed significantly 
from their elders. In fact, it transformed into a toxic legacy for many progressives disenchanted 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Quoted in Andrew Demshuk, The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945-1970, 
Reprint edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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by the associations’ blatant nationalism and anachronistic rhetoric. The journalist Petra Reski (b. 
1958)—daughter of Silesian and East Prussian expellees—recalled how she viewed the 
homeland organizations during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Correcting her grandmother’s use 
of Danzig instead of Gdánsk, the young Reski made a solemn vow: 
“This was part of my battle against the revanchists: I regarded everyone 
who said Danzig as a clandestine Heim-ins-Reich German, everyone who 
forgot to include the word ‘former’ in front of East Prussia was an 
incorrigible Deuthscland-Deutschland-über-alles German for me. After 
all, they had started the war, and so it seemed only just that they had to 
leave their homes.”25 
 
Similarly, Silke Kleemann (b. 1976), also the granddaughter of Silesians, found the 
expellee milieu “always foreign, even suspect.” The “alienating snippets of conversation” she 
overheard left a horrifying impression: “Revisionism, no thank you.” That history 
“unequivocally belonged in the past, a bad past…connected with Germany as the guilty party for 
the war. Nothing that one could be proud of; nothing that I wanted to identify with.” 26   
When the sudden collapse of communism presented the opportunity for German 
reunification of some form, the Kohl government also did not insist upon revisionism and 
Germany’s borders of 1937. Instead, dropping maximalist claims for a reunion with 17 million 
citizens of the GDR seemed the more favorable course. The “Treaty on the Final Settlement with 
Respect to Germany” paved the way for overcoming decades of division, yet a key provision 
entailed an acceptance of the post-1945 borders and rescinding of territorial claims beyond the 
Oder-Neisse River. The “2+4 Agreement” categorically ended the political rational of the 
                                                 
25 Petra Reski, Ein Land so weit. Ostpreussische Erinnerungen (München: List, 2000), 23–24. 





associations, who up until 1990 could cling to legal technicalities to maintain their claims to the 
German East.  
On October 3, 1990—the day the two Germanys officially joined—Die Welt noted that 
while Bonn celebrated, a solitary desk lamp shone on the desk of parliamentarian and president 
of the Federation of Expellees, Herbert Czaja, in an otherwise darkened parliamentary office 
building. “No, I am not celebrating,” Czaja explained. “I share the contemplative joys over the 
achieved progress, but I cannot manage wild elation. Today is a not only a day of joy, but also 
sorrow and farewell.”27 While many West and East Germans euphorically celebrated the end of 
bitter division, Czaja worked late into the night to calm fears and anger expressed in the 
mountain of letters piling up on his desk. Filled with “strong contradictions, with indignation,” 
the mail also contained “incredibly moving letters, words of grief and deep resignation.”  
Whereas Czaja decried the “dangerous” tendency of shrouding the German East in a 
“taboo,” most of his constituents, as we have seen, already anticipated what came to pass in 1990 
decades earlier. The political course had little bearing on the “virtual Heimat” that expellees with 
a living memory of the lost homeland resided in. Their notion of “homeland” did not fixate on a 
physical place, but like most expellees arose in communion with their brethren, the familiarity of 
traditions, and freedom to commemorate and mourn. 
 
The Return of the Suppressed? 
The first key factor that impacted the discourse manifested itself in the fall of 
communism and the rapid German reunification itself. Western and German leftist observers 
                                                 
27 “Bei den Vertriebenen blieben die Lichter aus,” Die Welt, October 4, 1990, clipping in ACDP CDU Pressearchiv 
10-9. Czaja felt it particularly bitter that numerous politicians within the CDU now “suddenly celebrate German 
unity, when in the previous year they still vehemently backed the maintaining of status quo.”  
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expressed initial skepticism and even fear of a united Germany that may once again trod the path 
of dangerous nationalism.28 A spate of xenophobic attacks and debates over asylum policy 
fanned fears that Nazi specters were returning in force. As a whole however, the peaceful joining 
of West and East Germany and emergence of the Federal Republic as a staunch proponent of 
European cooperation proved alarmists incorrect.  
The challenge that reunification posed to post-1990 German identity was not so 
straightforward. Triumphalist rhetoric and domineering West German attitudes left East 
Germans feeling that reunification was not so much a joining as an annexation, famously 
creating a “wall in the head” that generates a perpetual Ossi versus Wessi conflict to this day. Yet 
an equal issue was that reunification “offered a return to and an escape from history,” where the 
“debate about the legitimacy and form of unity was saturated with references to the past.”29 
Many conservatives breathed a sigh of relief that the overcoming of the painful decades-long 
division could produce a “normal” European nation-state, with a “normal” and more positive 
history that did not center on National Socialism. In this reading, 1990 represented an 
overcoming of the burdens of war, and seemingly drew a line under the consequences of the 
Nazi dictatorship. The reunified nation required and deserved a new historical narrative.  
How the Federal Republic envisioned its story could be seen in the Haus der Geschichte 
Expellees featured prominently in memories of wartime suffering, but also in the narrative of the 
Federal Republic, which according to the Haus der Geschichte resembled a long and arduous 
tale of overcoming adversity and transforming into a normal, prosperous democracy. Indeed, this 
                                                 
28 On reunification and responses to it, see Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994). 
29 Jarausch, 182. 
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reading shaped the narrative of “flight and expulsion,” as the expellees exemplified the success 
story of the Federal Republic: Overcoming insurmountable misery and through hard work and 
willingness to forge a new future, the millions of displaced evolved into a celebrated symbol of 
postwar German history.30 
Secondly, a series of political developments after 1990 significantly impacted “flight and 
expulsion.” Whereas the collapse of communism unfolded bloodlessly in most of Europe, the 
breakup of Yugoslavia unleashed a series of conflicts which plagued the Balkans for most of the 
1990s. Reports of massacres such as Srebrenica and newsreel footage of refugees fleeing or 
standing behind barbed wire outraged the world and evoked memories of the Second World War. 
Scholars coined a new term, “ethnic cleansing,” to describe the orchestrated violence intended to 
drive populations from their ancestral homes. The provocative scholar Götz Aly noted the 
problematic legacy of population transfers exhibited in 1918, 1923, and 1945.31 The Balkans 
were the latest instance of the ostensible rational calculations intended to solve “minority 
problems,” but which in fact revealed the horrific and frequently deadly implications of 
ethnically homogenous nation-states pursued not just by National Socialists, but liberal 
democracies as well. While expellee literature noted similarities between their fate and other 
instances of population transfer, academics now readily accepted placing forced migration into 
the larger context of nationalism and state-building efforts.32 This historicizing of ethnic 
                                                 
30 See for instance the glowing praise in the introductions of the 2011 exhibit book, Katharina Klotz and Zentrum 
gegen Vertreibungen, Angekommen die Integration der Vertriebenen in Deutschland (Potsdam: Brandenburgische 
Universitätsdruckerei und Verlagsgesellschaft, 2011). 
31 Götz Aly, “Dafür Wird Die Welt Büßen. ‘Ethnische Säuberungen’, Ein Europäischer Irrweg,” in Rasse Und 
Klasse. Nachforschungen Zum Deutschen Wesen, by Götz Aly (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003), 28–41. The 
article initially appeared in May 1995 in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 
32 Norman M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001); Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak, Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central 
Europe, 1944-1948 (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Philipp Ther, Die dunkle Seite der 
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cleansing and expulsion promised to eliminate German particularism, and created a larger space 
to soberly contemplate “flight and expulsion.” 
While human rights abuses in Europe’s backyard opened a new perspective on forced 
migration, the expansion of the European Union also engendered a rethinking of the expulsions. 
The fall of the Soviet Union returned the Eastern Bloc to the mental geography of Western 
Europeans and suddenly created the prospect that the contested territories could return to the EU. 
On one level, a growing number of Germans got to know their Eastern neighbors and 
rediscovered cities and landscapes locked away behind the Iron Curtain. The re-centering of 
Germany on the continent rekindled for some Germans an appreciation for territories intimately 
tied to a common Central European history. Here, collaborative research between German and 
Polish or Czech scholars helped pave the way for the political project of seeking a reconciliatory 
shared history.33  
Expellees played a role in this process. They had long billed themselves as the “bridge 
builders” to Eastern Europe.34 The President of the Federation of the Expellees (BdV), Erika 
Steinbach, resurrected notions of expellee “intercultural competence” that would play a vital 
role: Their “eight hundred year old cultural experiences of living beside and with their Slavic, 
Magyar, Baltic or Romanian neighbors” provided a supposed the framework for the future of 
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European cooperation.35 However fanciful, expellee associations since 1970 and increasingly 
after 1990 provided the lion’s share of financial contributions to restore landmarks in their old 
homelands, and in the process cultivated contacts to the local population.36 European integration 
entailed political and economic cooperation, but also mutual understanding. West German 
politicians therefore praised expellees as the means for which to build relationships with the 
Federal Republic’s eastern neighbors, and insisted upon a wrestling of the past that would 
uncover shared histories: Not just violence and barbarism, but the rediscovery of centuries of 
cultural exchange, constituted a major aspect of “EU thinking.” 
The Balkan conflict and European Union expansion permitted a Europeanization of 
“flight and expulsion” that the expellee associations attempted to sell since the 1960s. This 
internationalizing discourse steered “flight and expulsion” onto more neutral ground, allowing 
for a contemplation of expellee suffering but at the same time significantly blunting revanchist 
sentiments. Taken together with the desire for a new historical narrative since 1990, these 
currents permitted a third major influence on the narrative of “flight and expulsion,” which in 
turn reinforced the impact of the first two trends: A series of “memory booms” that 
“rediscovered” the forced migrations. 
 Part of the interest can be attributed to a general phenomenon, not limited to Germany, of 
recognizing the eyewitness and victim as an important actor with immense social capital.37 Yet 
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the specific context of 1990s Germany—the affirming moment of reunification and apparent 
mastering of the past and approaching 50th anniversary of the end of the war—invited Germans 
to openly address their traumas, supposedly for the first time. Interviews, articles, and 
exhortations to guard “against forgetting” saturated the German press.38 The nation discovered a 
“desire for remembering” what ordinary Germans experienced during the war.39 Unlike previous 
waves of recalling in 1955 or even 1965, however, the voices and faces of Germany’s victims 
were not forgotten or marginalized. Addressing the Bundestag in the first session of a reunified 
Germany in October 1990, Helmut Kohl warned that Germans should not “suppress the dark 
chapters” of history or “forget, push aside or trivialize…crimes perpetrated by German hands.”40 
Unlike the 1950s, therefore, public memory did not privilege German suffering over that 
of others. Nevertheless, Kohl suggested an inclusion of Germans in the pantheon of victims of 
the war and totalitarianism. When the chancellor opened the first session of a unified Bundestag, 
he called for a moment of silence to honor the victims of Nazism before calling for the same 
measure for victims of communism.41 The solemn moment revealed a widespread view: There 
seemed ample room to include innocent Germans in the struggle to never forget.  
                                                 
38 “8. Mai 945—Gegen das Vergessen,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 27, 1995, 3. 
39 “Kriegsende: Lust am Erinnern,” Der Spiegel 17, April 24, 1995, 18-21. The article gave a short overview of the 
selective memory of the Federal Republic, and evaluated the sudden memory boom and fascination of both old and 
young Germans to engage with the past. See also Kinzer, “Confronting the Past, Germans Now Don’t Flinch,” New 
York Times, May 1, 1995, 6. 
40 German Bundestag, 11/228, October 4, 1990, 18020. Kohl was unequivocal: “Ladies and gentlemen, when we 
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liberty. We owe it to the victims to keep the memory of the darkest chapter of our history alive. We owe it above all 
to the victims of the Holocaust, the unprecedented genocide of the European Jews.” Ibid. 
41 James Edward Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994), 25. 
627 
 
A clear expression of this can be seen in the “Central Memorial of the Federal Republic 
for the Victims of War and Dictatorship,” located in the guardhouse on Berlin’s Unter den 
Linden and opened in 1993.42 The rather simple space and moving Käthe Kollwitz sculpture of a 
grieving mother holding her dead son sought to honor all civilian dead. Yet some critics 
questioned whether the central expression of German memory should “insist on mourning 
collective fates,” and include German victims alongside victims of Nazi terror.43 The memorial’s 
inscription lists the “innocent who lost their lives as a result of war in their homeland, in 
captivity and through expulsion” above the “millions of Jews” or those murdered for their 
“origin, homosexuality, sickness or infirmity.” By proposing that the majority of those who lived 
through the conflict were equal victims of Nazism, the official central memorial of the Federal 
Republic allocated a prominent space within the cultural memory of the reunited nation. 
Desires to expound upon what Germans endured found reflection on the silver screen as 
well. The 1992 BeFreier und Befreite (“Liberators Take Liberties”) dramatically addressed the 
experience of rape at the hands of Soviet soldiers in the final weeks of the war. “Germans as 
victims of Russians—no sane person could claim that up until now. We generally saw that as a 
taboo,” a review in Der Tagesspiegel claimed.44 The 1993 film Stalingrad, despite showing the 
suffering of Soviet soldiers and civilians, presented the desperate soldiers as apolitical victims of 
the insanity of war persecuted by the brutal winter, the unstoppable enemy, and crazed Nazi 
                                                 
42 On the memorial and the site’s past as focal point of commemoration in various regimes, see Daniela Büchten and 
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the controversy, see Reichel, Politik mit Erinnerung Gedächtnisorte mit Streit um die nationalsozialistische 
Vergangenheit, 231–46. 
44 Quoted in Moeller, War Stories, 194. 
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officers. Critics noted that the film “shows the Germans just as they most like to see themselves: 
as victims.”45 The drama of the 6th Army’s destructions likely found broad appeal: A 1995 poll 
commissioned by Der Spiegel found that only 46% of respondents, and 26% of those over 65, 
recognized that the Wehrmacht participated in war crimes.  
The 1995 travelling “Wehrmacht Exhibition” similarly divided the public, unleashing a 
controversy with the argument that the German military actively participated in the Nazi war of 
annihilation. Large sections of the public preferred to recall their own military service or the 
sacrifices of their elders as a misguided effort that in the last days of the war turned into a heroic 
sacrifice to save civilians from the encroaching Red Army.46 Whether German civilians or 
soldiers, a prevailing sentiment held them both as hapless victims of the war’s incomprehensible 
ferocity. 
The proposal of a universal victimhood of war and dictatorship—however more elegant 
than iterations in previous decades—reflected a prevalent framework for remembering the war in 
the Federal Republic with a long history. Conflicting feelings over whether May 8 was a day of 
liberation or defeat remained prevalent, as memories of personal suffering opposed awareness of 
perpetrated crimes.47 The victim/perpetrator paradox created immense tension, so that a 
paradigm of “victims of war” neatly solved the conundrum of contending with undeniable 
                                                 
45 Andreas Kilb, “Von ‘Holocaust’ bis ‘Schindlers Liste’: Hollywood bewältigt die deutsche Vergangenheit. Und 
wir?: Warten, bis Spielberg kommt,” Die Zeit, January 21, 1994, https://www.zeit.de/1994/04/warten-bis-spielberg-
kommt. 
46 On the depiction of the Wehrmacht in the press during the 50th anniversary of the war’s end, see Klaus Naumann, 
“Die Mutter, Das Pferd Und Die Juden: Flucht Und Vertreibung Als Themen Deutscher Erinnerunsgpolitik,” 
Mittelweg 36 5, no. 4 (1996): 79–80. 
47 According to a 1995 opinion poll commissioned by Der Spiegel, around 80% of respondents tended to view May 
8 as a day of liberation from Nazi terror, suggesting that public education and discourse focused on the terror of the 
Third Reich reached the vast majority of the public. On individual details such as specific knowledge of dates, the 
role of the Wehrmacht, “accomplishments” of Hitler, or the nature of the expulsions, however, the figures showed a 
generational divide and ambivalence. “Die Jungen denken anders,” Der Spiegel 19, May 8, 1995, 76-77.  
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misery that nevertheless emanated from German aggression. Indeed, Frankfurter Allgemeine’s 
warning that “every single fate deserved respect” invited readers to view the experiences of 
bombing, mass rape, and expulsion as comparable to incarceration in concentration camps, life 
under German occupation, or genocide.48 The obligatory retrospectives on 1945 in local presses 
indulged such tendencies in particular.49 Schwäbische Zeitung explained in January 1995 that a 
death march from Auschwitz and “fleeing from the onrushing Soviet soldiers” were 
“interchangeable fates”: “The young Jewish girl and East Prussian farmer did not saddle any 
personal guilt upon themselves, their suffering was similarly pointless.” A few days later, 
Münchener Merkur declared that expellees should not be “second-class” victims, and demanded 
the same “right to mourn” extended to Holocaust victims.50  
These were not the ruminations of isolated editorial boards. In a series of Die Zeit titled 
“1945 and Today,” for instance, the SPD politician and expellee Peter Glotz, condemned the 
“sickness of nationalism” that produced so much suffering. Yet the “destruction of the Jewish 
people, planned by Hitler, was not the only genocide,” Glotz explained. The “expulsions that are 
carried out against the will of the population and without the possibility that [they] may be 
resettled all together in one place” also needed to be regarded as “genocidal.”51 The issue 
                                                 
48 “Jedem einzelnen Schicksal schulden wir Achtung,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 6, 1995. 
Contemporaries noted this complicated paradox. See for instance Ralph Giordano, “Auch die Unfähigkeit zu trauern 
ist unteilbar,” Die Tageszeitung, April 18, 1995, 10. 
49 For a specific analysis of “flight and expulsion” in the press during 1995, see Naumann, “Die Mutter, Das Pferd 
Und Die Juden: Flucht Und Vertreibung Als Themen Deutscher Erinnerunsgpolitik.” 
50 Quoted in Naumann, 75. 
51 Peter Glotz, “Die Krankheit Natinalismus,” Die Zeit, March 24, 1995, 16. In the same series, the Holocaust 
survivor Elie Wiesel penned the contribution on the genocide of European Jews which followed the expulsions 
segment several weeks later. Wiesel argued that the Holocaust remained a “unique crime,” and castigated attempts 
of “watering down” its meaning. In particular, the term “genocide”—meaning the “intention to exterminate an entire 
people”—required special care: “We must be careful with words. Language is very important, we must use it with 
care.” Elie Wiesel, “Ein Volk auslöschen,” Die Zeit, April 21, 1995, 16. 
630 
 
contained an extensive account of “The Fight for East Prussia.”52 The 1995 Der Spiegel poll 
indicated that such sentiments would strike a chord: When asked whether the “expulsions were 
“just as great a crime against humanity as the Holocaust,” 36 percent of respondents 
categorically agreed.53 
The memory boom surrounding the 50th anniversary of 1945 was soon followed by yet 
another flurry of remembering “flight and expulsion” in the early 2000s. Much of the interest 
stemmed from the Nobel Laureate Günter Grass, whose lifetime engagement with his childhood 
home of Danzig culminated in the 2002 novella Im Krebsgang (“Crabwalk”). Dealing with the 
suppressed wartime traumas of flight and the sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff within three 
generations of a family, Grass sought to tell the story of something that “no one wanted to hear 
about it, not here in the West and definitely not in the East.”54 On a superficial level, the critics 
who praised the work as a long awaited breaking of a “taboo” on the expulsions missed a far 
more nuanced point Grass attempted to make. Speaking through the protagonist, Grass indicted 
the hijacking of “flight and expulsion” by nationalists and the dangers of West Germany’s 
reluctance to have contemplated German suffering: 
“[His generation] should have found words for the hardships endured by 
the Germans fleeing East Prussia. …Never…should his generation have 
kept silent about such misery, merely because its own sense of guilt was 
so overwhelming, merely because for years the need to accept 
responsibility and show remorse took precedence, with the result that 
they abandoned the topic to the right wing. This failure…was 
staggering.”55 
 
                                                 
52 Heinz Werner Hübner, “Noch siebzig Tage bis Pillau,” Die Zeit, March 24, 1995, 6-8. 
53 “Die Jungen denken anders,” Der Spiegel 19, May 8, 1995, 77. Only 27% explicitly answered with no; 35% felt 
that “one cannot compare” the fates. A slight generational split showed that 40% of Germans over 65 felt that the 
expulsions and Holocaust were equal crimes against humanity. 
54 Günter Grass, Im Krebsgang (Göttingen: Steidl Verlag, 2002), 31. 
55 Grass, 99. 
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Im Krebsgang sparked a flurry of interest in “flight and explosion.” Perhaps heeding the 
calls for Grass to process German suffering after having neglected the subject since the 1960s, a 
series of novels dealing with the forced migrations and family traumas appeared in rapid 
succession.56 Following a ZDF documentary titled “The Great Flight,” the pop historian Guido 
Knopp published an accompanying book.57 Newspapers such as Der Spiegel published running 
series on the subject.58 Witnesses and survivors appeared on television and in print to narrate 
their experiences.59 Not just expellees dominated the discourse: Victims of rape at the hands of 
the Red Army or Allied firebombing fascinated the public.60 Films such as Der Untergang (“The 
Downfall,” 2004), Dresden (2006), and Die Flucht (“March of Millions,” 2007) drew large 
audiences as well.  
What marked these treatments was the genuine attempt to discuss the expulsions and 
German suffering without shrouding German crimes in silence. Despite broad acknowledgment 
of the Nazi dictatorship and condemnation of its crimes, many Germans continue to struggle 
                                                 
56 Jörg Bernig, Niemandszeit (Stuttgart: Dt. Verl.-Anst., 2002); Reinhard Jirgl, Die Unvollendeten (München: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003); Tanja Dückers, Himmelskörper (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 2003); Olaf Müller, 
Schlesisches Wetter (Berlin: Berliner Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003); Michael Zeller, Die Reise nach Samosch 
(Cadolzburg: Ars Vivendi, 2003). 
57 Guido Knopp, Die große Flucht: das Schicksal der Vertriebenen (München: Ullstein, 2001). 
58 See for instance Der Spiegel issue 13, 2002 to Der Spiegel 16, 2002. One can trace a veritable explosion of “flight 
and expulsion” since 2000: A search for the term in the Frankfurter Allgemeine yields nearly 500 articles in the last 
twenty years, compared with less than 250 between 1949 and 1999. 
59 For instance, alone four autobiographies of survivors of the Gustloff emerged after Crabwalk. Peter Weise, 
Hürdenlauf: Erinnerungen eines Findlings (Rostock: Büro + Service Rostock, 2006); Armin Fuhrer, Die Todesfahrt 
der “Gustloff”: Porträts von Überlebenden der grössten Schiffskatastrophe aller Zeiten (München: Olzog, 2007); 
Renate Matuschka and Peggy Poles, “All unsere Lieben sind verloren”: der Untergang der “Wilhelm Gustloff” - 
zwei Überlebende erzählen (München: Knaur Taschenbuch Verlag, 2008); Lieselotte Kamper, Edith: das Schicksal 
einer Überlebenden der Wilhelm Gustloff (Oldenburg: Schardt, 2009). 
60 Anonyma, Eine Frau in Berlin: Tagebuchaufzeichnungen vom 20. April bis 22. Juni 1945 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Eichborn Verlag, 2008); Ralf Georg Reuth, “Nehmt Die Frauen Als Beute,” Die Welt, February 19, 2005, 
https://www.welt.de/print-wams/article123849/Nehmt-die-Frauen-als-Beute.html; Jörg Friedrich, Der Brand: 
Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940 - 1945 (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002). 
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squaring personal misery and memories of war with this realization, as was elaborated upon in 
the last chapter.61 Even with occasional inelegant formulations cited above, the discourse of the 
last decades generally is not an explicit and cynical attempt of Aufrechnung engaged in by some 
expellee functionaries, however. Rather, it reflects the profound ambivalences in German 
collective memory and struggle to resolve the cleavages of the past.62  
The tension between Germans as victims and awareness of them as perpetrators 
sometimes seems unsolvable, as education on the Nazi dictatorship successfully raised awareness 
of German crimes while personal and family memories of wartime traumas remain powerfully 
imbedded within psyches. The result is that German cultural memory in the 21st century is often 
schizophrenic, torn between wanting to indict and mourn the nation. The price of inclusion into 
the Berlin Republic’s self-critical memory was the shedding its revanchist tenor. Neither 
narratives have been harmed by this development. As the historian Rainer Schulze observed, 
“[r]emembering the victims of the consequences of National Socialism does not exclude 
remembering the victims of National Socialism.”63  
 
What Remains? Following the Thread 
On June 11, 2013, Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaimed that a long forgotten chapter of 
“great suffering and tremendous injustice” would be acknowledged when the Stiftung Flucht, 
Vertreibung, Versöhnung (“Foundation for Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation”) opens its doors in 
                                                 
61 See also Harald Welzer and Sabine Moller, “Opa war kein Nazi” Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im 
Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002). 
62 See Edgar Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen 
Erinnerung 1948-1990 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1999), 258–345. 
63 Rainer Schulze, “The Politics of Memory: Flight and Expulsion of the German Populations after the Second 
World War and German Collective Memory,” National Identities 8, no. 4 (2006): 378. 
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Berlin in 2016, thereby “filling a vacancy in our country’s museum and memory landscape.”64 
Merkel’s comments overlooked that the expulsions were, as this dissertation has argued, never 
excluded from Germany’s memory landscape. The Stiftung’s very existence demonstrates that 
expellee organizations still had some influence in the 21st century. The reactions to it, moreover, 
reveal that “flight and expulsion” continues to remain a painful memory for the rapidly declining 
group of those who experienced them, as well as a lightning rod for criticism primarily because 
critics take issue with the homeland associations’ politics. 
With backing from prominent citizens and politicians from across the political spectrum, 
in 1999 the BdV proposed a Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen (“Center Against Expulsions”) to 
document the history of forced migrations in international perspective. Despite a broad 
framework, the Zentrum nonetheless represented the culmination of decades of expellee 
advocacy to secure a prominent presentation site for their narrative of “flight and expulsion.” 
Based on a series of exhibits on German history in Eastern Europe, the forced migrations, and 
integration, it was clear that the content of the museum foresaw an enshrinement of this interest 
group’s understanding and collective memory of the expulsions.65 Supporters celebrated an 
overdue commemoration of the forced migration, while critics decried the privileging of German 
victims and the insufficient focus on the Second World War and Nazi war crimes that caused the 
                                                 
64 “Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel bei Baubeginn eines Dokumentationszentrums der Stiftung Flucht, 
Vertreibung, Versöhnung im Deutschlandhaus,” Federal Republic of Germany, accessed September 23, 2013, 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Rede/2013/06/2013-06-11-rede-merkel-stiftung-vertreibung.html. The 
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65 See the exhibit books Katharina Klotz and Zentrum Gegen Vertreibungen, Erzwungene Wege: Flucht und 
Vertreibung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts ; [Ausstellung im Kronprinzenpalais, Berlin ; 11. August - 29. Oktober 
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border and population shifts in Central Europe.66 Because of the backlash and concerns over the 
incorporation of expellee arguments, the Federal Republic rejected the BdV’s proposal in 2008, 
transforming the project instead into a federal foundation.  
 The Zentrum/Stiftung affair demonstrated that the expellee associations no longer could 
control the terms of the discourse like they did in the 1950s. This dissertation has traced the 
evolution of a narrative, from its ascendency to its decline. Yet even though they seem politically 
powerless and their preferred victimhood narrative proves problematic, their impact on German 
cultural memory remains strong: Many of the tropes, themes, and images established by Nazi 
propaganda, incorporated and expanded upon in the 1950s, and diverse layering since then 
continue to shape how Germans recall and discuss “flight and expulsion.” Like a red thread, they 
wind themselves through collective and cultural memory, from 1944 to today. 
When contemplating the literature since the memory boom of 2002, the prevailing 
framing of the start of the mass exodus seems to conform to the interpretations of panicked flight 
before the “onslaught of the Bolsheviks” that forced millions to abandon all “goods and land 
[Hab und Gut].” The mental images of “treks that stretch from morning to night, thousands of 
wagons and vehicles [that] drag themselves over the ice toward the safety of the Reich” emerged 
in Nazi press reports, and firmly imbedded themselves as the “typical” experience of all 
expellees.67 This reflected a real experience, but Germans reading Der Spiegel in 2002 likely 
failed to learn that less than half of the 10-12 million opted to flee to begin with.68Whether in the 
                                                 
66 On the debate, see the contributions in Jürgen Danyel and Philipp Ther, eds., “Flucht Und Vertreibung in 
Europäischer Perspektive,” Zeitschrift Für Geschichtswissenschaft 51, no. 1 (2003): 1–104. 
67 Deutsche Wochenschau of March 16, 1945, quoted in Gerhard Paul, ed., “Der Flüchtlingstrek,” in Das 
Jahrhundert der Bilder, vol. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 668. 
68 “Die Abrechnung: Schrecklicher Exodus,” Spiegel-Special 2/2005, 222-225. 
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Haus der Geschichte or watching Die Grosse Flucht, the trek wagon symbolizes a supposed 
universal experience, and as exemplified by the film Jokehnen, it is cast with familiar characters: 
Dependable mayors, disillusioned noblewomen, “good” Jews, affable and loyal slave laborers, 
craven and corrupt Nazis haranguing the population, and incomprehensibly ruthless Soviets.69 
Nazi suggestions that Soviet barbarism drove the flight, and that this westward retreat 
represented safety, were also a propagandistic simplification that the Schieder Commission 
largely reified, and German media and authors adopted again and again under the rubric of 
“bloody vengeance,” as the popular historian Guido Knopp framed it.70 The Nemmersdorf 
massacre in particular remained the symbol of Soviet predaciousness which explained the source 
of the chaos.71 What Germans consume today remains on occasion largely indistinguishable 
from the literature of seven decades ago. In assessing the final months of the war, Knopp 
resurrects Ilja Ehrenburg as the firebrand goading savage Red Army soldiers:   
“The vengeance was terrible. Incited by the murderous slogans of Ilja 
Ehrenburg, the Soviets now carried out bloody retribution on the German 
civilian population. […] They were no perpetrators upon whom the 
victors unleashed their rage—they were the defenseless. Above all 
women, children, the elderly. The civilian population would have been 
spared much if it would have been evacuated in a timely manner.”72 
 
                                                 
69 Moeller, War Stories, 182. 
70 Knopp, Die große Flucht, 10. 
71 Knopp, 37–49. See also “Die Katastrophe,” Der Stahlhelm 5, May 1955, in BArch B150-5641; “Wie viele 
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Seemingly unaware that several decades earlier their journalists had powerfully indicted 
the image of Ehrenburg, Der Spiegel ironically also invoked Ehrenburg in its 2002 tableau of 
savage Soviet soldiers, innocent Germans, and fleeing treks:  
“Those who now attempted to flee before [the Red Army] were indeed 
the wrong victims....But the army now was rarely merciful, many Red 
Army soldiers rather thought like…Ilja Ehrenburg, who exhorted: ‘Kill 
the Germans.’ When finally in early May the Soviet troops halted at the 
Elbe, they left nightmarish scenes in their wake—squashed treks, 
scorched earth, mistreated corpses.”73  
 
Despite identifying Nazi crimes as the source of the catastrophe and criticizing postwar 
revisionist tendencies of narrowly focusing on German suffering and ignoring the National 
Socialist past, the authors nevertheless made use of familiar and clichéd tropes with a long 
history. Unsurprisingly, politicians succumbed to the media images and passed them along to 
audiences, as Bavarian Christa Stewens did during a commemoration ceremony on May 8, 2002: 
“In the territories invaded by the Red Army the inhabitants fleeing in 
endless treks suffered horrific torture. Countless numbers were ground 
beneath Russian tank treads, sank in the hail of bombs in the frozen 
Vistula Lagoon or were indiscriminately cut down. The conquerors 
followed the exhortation of Ilja Ehrenburg to murder and rape as if 
intoxicated. Never ending mass rap count as the unspeakable horrors in 
this last act of destiny.”74 
 
Perilous evacuations over the sea, and especially the Wilhelm Gustloff disaster, also 
remained a near constant fixture in West German discourse for decades.75 After sinking the ship 
on a West German sound stage in the 1960 hit Nacht fiel über Gotenhafen, director Frank Wisbar 
returned to the tragedy in his 1967 Flucht über die Ostsee. Wisbar’s works left profound 
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74 Quoted in Hans Henning Hahn and Eva Hahn, Die Vertreibung im deutschen Erinnern: Legenden, Mythos, 
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influences on the 2008 Die Gustloff, which also included the “Gustloff foundling” as a central 
plot point. Günter Grass’s Im Krebsgang likewise incorporated the orphan as a central plot point 
of his story of the maritime tragedy. Between 1960 and 2010, over eighty films, documentaries, 
news reports, or other broadcasts referenced the maritime disaster a total of more than two 
hundred times.76 With so many continuous references, it should hardly come as a surprise that 
expellees often vow that they nearly ended up on the doomed ship. The brush with fate, similar 
to tropes of the “last plane out of Stalingrad” among Stalingrad veterans—as seen in the 1993 
Stalingrad epic—is an iconic image produced by West German discourse, even as it conveys the 
psychological truths of wartime suffering. 
Yet another perpetual theme carried from the 1950s today is the notion of the Wehrmacht 
as savior, already analyzed in previous chapters. Contrary to the sources that painted a far more 
complicated picture, authoritative public figures endorsed the self-serving portrayals of the 
military and postwar media narratives. The historian Andreas Hillgruber, for instance, argued 
that the Wehrmacht “offered a protective shield for a centuries-old German area of settlement.”77 
Moreover, one “must identify with the…desperate and sacrificial efforts of the German army in 
the East, which attempted to preserve the population of the German East from the orgy of 
revenge of the Red Army…and sought to keep open the avenue of flight.”78 Celebrated pop 
historian Guido Knopp’s suggestions of honorable acts of benevolence on the part of the 
apolitical and selfless German soldier are virtually indistinguishable from Jürgen Thorwald’s 
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78 Hillgruber, 24. 
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renditions half a century earlier.79 Politicians also shared these assessments: Speaking at the 
inauguration of an expellee memorial in 1984, Franz Josef Strauss reminded audiences of the 
“heroism, the bravery of the helping and saving branches of the navy, merchant navy, and 
army.”80 The May 8, 2002 speech by Stewens echoed this praise: “The defenders in the East are 
owed a permanent commemoration…for them it was not about extending the war. Their service 
was for the tortured civilian population. Time and again we encounter the testimonies of the 
surviving fighters, who by their own avowals would have felt miserable had they left defenseless 
women, children, and elderly, for whom they were the last hope, in the lurch.”81 
Regarding the expulsions, some of the same rhetoric and tendencies constructed in the 
immediate postwar period emerge in writings today. Just as their predecessors, authors have 
trouble distinguishing between the “wild” and “organized” expulsions. Decades ago this 
tendency revealed a strategy of framing a complex process with the most violent and shortest 
phase in order to provide political arguments against the population transfers. The propensity 
toward invoking the Aussig massacre as a metaphor of the entire expulsion process bequeathed 
to successive generations a distorted interpretation of the forced migrations.82 Even in 2002, the 
most dramatic and radical, yet brief and hardly universal, experiences came to represent the fate 
of millions. To the bestselling pop historian Guido Knopp, “the hatred that the former occupiers 
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endured" manifested itself in Aussig, when “this hysteria escalated.”83 Not even Micha Brumlik, 
the former director of the Fritz Bauer Institute for the Study and Documentation of the History of 
the Holocaust, proved immune from relying on the stereotypical narrative founded by expellee 
activisits: 2,700 people fell victim to the “Czech population” animated by a “paranoid, hysterical 
fantasy of vengeance.”84 
Thorwald’s unsubstantiated grotesque image of a family nailed to a raft floating down the 
Elbe, already analyzed in previous chapters, did not remain a typical expulsion experience for 
just the author.85  Its impact lingered for decades, as expellees activists turned to Thorwald 
precisely because of the emotional power of his scenes: Despite disappearing from publications 
after 1995, the account remained for Erika Steinbach an example to illustrate “particularly for 
young people” the need for a “Centre Against Expulsions.”86  
The point here is not to, as some historians have opted to do, uncover “myths” and 
relativize expellee suffering by unveiling the manifold silences and problematic framings of this 
German victimhood narrative.87 Undoubtedly, various simplifications or exaggerations, if not 
outright falsehoods, continue to resonate today. Of greater significance, however, is the 
remarkable stability of “typical” memories associated with the forced migrations, which speak to 
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the power of earlier media images and reports that anchored themselves in West German cultural 
and historical memory.  
Their continued hold can be explained by the fact that they are a construction, the 
foundation of which was laid by Nazi propaganda reports in 1944 and 1945, and which expellee 
testimonies added to in the immediate postwar period. Expellee activists, historians, and the 
postwar press added to this layer in the 1950s by streamlining the narrative, including purging it 
of the context of the Third Reich and focusing the interpretation on the brief and most violent 
episodes. With slight regional variances that emphasized certain aspects, “typical” fates and 
images emerged from the cacophony of voices. This produced a seemingly inscrutable labyrinth 
of experience and memory that successively built upon one another, until a homogenized central 
concept of “flight and expulsion” crystalized. 
 Their lasting resonance can also be explained by their widespread instrumentalization. 
Nazi propaganda leveraged a “narrative of fear” that, combined with witnessed wartime 
devastation, left lasting impressions. Postwar activists in turn developed a “sympathy narrative” 
that provided the foundations for integration, yet also familiarized Germans with their new 
neighbors. The anticommunism of the early Federal Republic and Cold War provided an 
incubator for the mobilization of expellee suffering aimed at winning back the homeland. 
Though this ultimately failed, for the first decade and a half after 1945 the expellees leveraged 
their misery and used it to as an argument that underpinned their political and social power.  
 During this ascendency, the expellee associations took careful care to institutionalize 
their narrative in museums, schools, memorials, and virtually all aspects of West German public 
life, another key factor in explaining the longevity of “flight and expulsion.” Political and 
cultural trends saw the associations rapidly decline and appear anachronistic. Nonetheless, their 
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successful monopoly and colonization of the public discourse on the German East guaranteed 
that the potency of their interpretations would last into the 21st century, despite a profound 
ambivalence toward expellee politics and German victimhood. Yet since 1970, their gradual 
displacement from the center of German public memory means that “flight and expulsion” no 
longer carry the political baggage that they once did. They have become “history,” a chapter of 
the nation’s past that sometimes presents a challenge to contend with. But they are no longer a 
trauma that interest groups can manipulate for political purposes, as their number rapidly 
dwindles and because the German East no longer holds a political meaning.  
 The reality that those with a living memory of the German East will soon disappear offers 
both an opportunity and a misfortune. On the one hand, the increased temporal and emotional 
distance may offer a new prospective for engagement between Germans and their neighbors. Just 
a few years ago, the German past of Breslau was largely absent from plaques and city history; 
today, the excellent city museum highlights the plurality of the Silesian capital’s past. Without 
the emotional baggage of wartime traumas, Europeans can more easily contemplate their 
interconnected past and rediscover a multi-ethnic heritage unburdened by the dichotomies of the 
Second World War and Cold War. 
 Yet on the other hand, without a concerted effort to cultivate such discoveries, the danger 
emerges that something will irrevocably will be lost when the eyewitness generation pass way. 
The homeland museums, already nostalgic shrines to a bygone world documented in folk 
costumes, curios filled with crystal and porcelain, or woodcuts and scale models of churches and 
landmarks long destroyed, are eerily empty, save for occasional elderly couples coming into 
conversation with one another over a particular item that triggers a common memory of 
childhood. The obligatory handcart or suitcase may spark associations with familiar images that 
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have circulated in popular media since 1945 and have anchored themselves in the cultural 
memory. For the most part, however, the collection documents an unfamiliar world of people 
and places whose names on does not know. Melancholy has replaced nostalgia. In Königswinter, 
where the Haus Schlesien (“Silesian House”) conserves the history of the region in a renovated 
manor house, the inner courtyard with its coats of arms of Silesian cities and trees stands empty, 
and the kitchen staff serving traditional Silesian food stand idly by. Who comes here anymore, 
one can’t help but wonder, and who will care? 
In 2005, the historian Michael Schwartz asked if “expellees can be victims.”88 By 
extension, one could query whether Germans generally may contemplate their suffering. The 
answer is, of course, yes. The terror of war, the pain of leaving one’s homeland forever and 
disintegration of entire communities are ruptures that many struggled to cope with their entire 
lives. It is only natural that personal traumas need to be contended with, and that these would 
rank higher than the victimhood of unknown others. More nuance and care must be given when 
societies remember: When commemorating victims or providing an interpretation of these 
events, distinctions need to be made between expulsion and the Holocaust. This study examined, 
and often indicted, the memory politics, not individual suffering or the right to mourn. 
If contextualized in the Second World War, and not—as expellees often attempted to 
do—deployed in an effort to secure the highest rung on a hierarchy of victimhood for political 
gains, Germans have every right to grieve and mourn. It has taken a long time—and it continues 
to remain a challenge—for Germans to come to a place where they are capable of honoring their 
losses without ignoring the victims of Nazism, or commemorating the victims of National 
                                                 
88 Michael Schwartz, “Dürfen Vertriebene Opfer sein? Zeitgeschichtliche Überlegungen zu einem Problem 
deutscher und europäischer Identität,” Deutschland Archiv 38, no. 3 (2005): 494–505. 
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Socialism without castigating attempts to process their own traumas. Though not equal horrors, 
German misery and the suffering that they inflicted upon others are intimately linked with one 
another and a part of Germany’s history, and need to be historicized. Given the profound 
ambivalence of German cultural memory and lingering media memories that indicate the 
pervasiveness of exaggerated tropes, it is unlikely that this will fully succeed. 
In over seven decades, expellees often complicated and delayed a coming to terms with 
the past by remaining a near perpetual fixture of public memory narrowly focused on German 
suffering. The inability, indeed unwillingness, to contend with the consequences of the Nazi 
dictatorship should rightly be criticized. But German cultural memory has come a long way, and 
even shaped how expellees view their experience. In the summer of 2007, before my 
grandparents would become too old, the family embarked on a journey to their homes in Silesia 
and East Prussia. Among the many excursions to farms of uncles and aunts and sharing of 
memories sparked by the explorations, one moment stands out: My grandmother staring at the 
Vistula Lagoon, glittering in the summer sun, at the exact spot that she stepped onto the ice more 
than sixty years before as a young girl. “We deserved to lose it,” she surprisingly uttered after 
contemplative silence. “This is what we got for Hitler and starting the war,” my grandfather 
echoed. Never before, or since, had I heard my grandparents so explicitly link their personal 
suffering with the Third Reich. Even in their old age, the more self-critical examination of the 
German past filtered through. Once again, my grandmother unwittingly revealed how collective 
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